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Turkey’s involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 indirectly helped to pave the
way for the country’s invitation almost a decade later to negotiate its
accession into the European Union. This book traces that process and in
the first part looks at Turkey’s foreign policy in the 1990s, considering the
ability of the country to withstand the repercussions of the fall of
communism. 
It focuses on Turkey’s achievement in halting and minimising the effects
of the temporary devaluation in its strategic importance that resulted
from the waning of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. It emphasizes the skilful way in which Turkey avoided becoming
embroiled in the ethnic and international upheavals in Central Asia, the
Balkans, the east-Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the
development of a continued policy of closer integration into the European
and western worlds.
Internal politics are the focus of the second part of the book, addressing
the curbing of the Kurdish revolt, the economic gains made, and the
strengthening of civil society. Nachmani goes on to analyse the prospects
for Turkey in the twenty-first century, in the light of the possible
integration into Europe, which may leave the country’s leadership free to
deal effectively with domestic issues.
This book will make crucial reading for anyone studying Turkish politics,
or indeed European or European Union politics.
Amikam Nachmani is Senior Lecturer in the Department
of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan Univerity, Israel
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It has been said that Turkey’s participation in the Korean War in the 1950s
bought it the entrance ticket into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Forty years later, in 1991, Turkey participated in the Gulf War. Not a
single Turkish soldier crossed the Iraqi–Turkish border, yet the six or so Turkish
divisions that were deployed along the border drew off Iraqi forces from the
Kuwaiti battlefield. This was meant by Turkey’s late President, Torgut Ozal, to
pave the way towards his country’s accession into the European Union (EU).
Was there any connection between the 1991 war in the Gulf and the December
1999 EU Helsinki decision to invite Turkey to negotiate its entrance into the
Union? Perhaps not a direct one, but one cannot fail to see that the 1990s were
marked by crossroads, developments, events, etc., which linked the two dates,
perhaps even led to the December 1999 decision. This study will attempt to
analyze these years.
The 1990s were successful years as regards Ankara’s foreign relations. Turkey
manifested its ability to withstand the repercussions of the fall of communism, to
stop the temporary devaluation in its strategic importance that resulted from the
waning of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to avoid
becoming embroiled in the ethnic upheavals in Central Asia, the Balkans and
the Middle East, to prevent an eruption of yet another cycle in Cyprus and in the
Aegean Sea, etc. Turkey managed also to develop close relations with its ethni-
cally related Asian Turkic peoples, seemingly without becoming sidetracked from
its declared hopes of becoming integrated into the European and Western
worlds. Similarly, Turkey’s first politically Muslim Prime Minister, Necmettin
Erbakan, did not Islamize its foreign policy, nor did he bring excessive Muslim
policies to bear on its domestic affairs.
The 1990s were also successful for Turkey internally, although here the
results are clearly more mixed. The Kurdish revolt has been curbed, the Turkish
economy has achieved some important gains, secular–religious disagreements
have not worsened, and wider circles – hitherto not a party to the decision-
making procedures in Turkey – have taken part in municipal, national and polit-
ical processes. Democracy in Turkey has successfully coped with various political
and constitutional crises, the observing of human and civil rights by the author-
ities has improved and features of civil society have become stronger. True,
changes and improvements are still needed, the economy gravely faltered towards
the end of the decade and further respect of human rights must continue, yet
many achievements are clearly discernible, some are indeed outstanding.
Introduction
Our study centers on several key internal and external aspects of Turkey in
the 1990s. Turkey’s role in the Gulf War and its wake is discussed in detail
in Chapter 1. Comprehending this role and its wake helps in understanding some
major developments in Turkey’s relations with the United States, Europe, Russia,
the Hellenic world, Central Asia, the Arab Middle East, Iran, Israel, etc. Turkey’s
relations with Greece at the end of the 1990s (Chapter 6) are a direct outcome of
the political and strategic changes – global and regional – occurring around
Turkey from the late 1980s, and which have intensified since the Gulf War. The
weakening of Turkey’s adversaries – the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the
collapse of communism, the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, the weakening
of Syria, the collapse of the Kurdish PKK revolt, etc. – have all left Greece to
face alone an otherwise conflict-free Turkey. Because, according to Athens, a
conflict-ridden Turkey is more dangerous to Greece, the result was a dramatic
change in the Greco-Turkish conflict. Apparently there is no more Greek
alienation of Turkey but an attempt to extricate concessions from her through
dialogue and cooperation.
Chapter 7 of our work deals with the newly emerged Turkish–Israeli coop-
eration. A bridge has been built over the Middle East, comprising the two
strongest parties in the region. Suffice it to say that the largest civil trade of any
pair of Middle Eastern countries – be it oil-producing countries and their trade
with each other or any two Middle Eastern countries and their bilateral trade 
– is between Israel and Turkey. This surprising development adds a more 
solid element to the much publicized Turkish–Israeli military cooperation,
implying long-term relations, even if Middle Eastern military and political 
circumstances change.
Chapter 2 centers on the Kurdish problem and the victory Turkey gained
over the PKK. When Turkey’s external circumstances became more favorable,
when the country’s conflicts with its neighbors waned, when Turkey’s oppo-
nents and adversaries weakened or practically collapsed or even disappeared
(communism and the Soviet Union), the area was open for Turkey to deal with
internal issues, chief among them being the PKK revolt. Turkey crushed the
PKK armed uprising; the Turkish–Kurdish issue still awaits a resolution. Chap-
ter 3 discusses the ambivalent relations between the EU and Turkey and the
economic aspects of this. Both sides feel inhibitions: in many respects Turkey
differs from the EU which is at pains to see the common grounds between the
two and not harp on the dissimilarities. Turkey, too, has its reservations as to
the amount of change and alterations she should apply before being acceded to
the EU. “Will it remain the same Turkey?” ask the Turks. Chapter 4 focuses on
issues related to identity and nationalism. The subjects discussed are Turkish
nationalism and Islam, the encounter between Turkey and the Turkic peoples
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the conflict with Syria over the latter’s
support of the PKK. These issues were reflected in the general elections of April
1999. Chapter 5 deals with the major international encounters the country
experiences during the 1990s: relations with Russia, energy issues, Central
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Asian gas and oil, relations with the United States and their impact on issues of
human rights.
In conclusion we will attempt to analyze the prospects for Turkey in the twenty-
first century. We might say that Turkey’s political and strategic status seems to be
solid – a regional actor with a say in Middle Eastern, Balkan, European and Cen-
tral Asian affairs. The country’s leadership should be complimented for avoiding
becoming embroiled in the conflicts around it. Temptations were high to become
“a regional policeman” (see Chapter 1); very prudently Ankara brushed aside all
such offers. Furthermore, when Western Europe is the much sought-after vision,
Asian bickering, conflicts and even possible warring therein with Russia or Iran
have been left to others. Turkey’s integration in Europe and in the West seems to
grow stronger as Turkey’s external adversaries and internal conflicts become
weaker and appear to be less threatening. In case Europe develops closer relations
with Turkey, it (Europe) should not be concerned that it imports into its own
ranks the conflicts mentioned here. Comparison is almost inevitable: Turkey’s
European ambitions and achievements get more credit as her Balkan, Arab and
Asian neighbors drift more and more towards intolerance, radicalism, less
democracy, and Third World manifestations. Likewise, Turkey’s integration in
Europe becomes stronger as long as its internal features seem to be less problem-
atic. For instance, the ending of the struggle with the Kurds gives hopes for a
decrease in military influence over civil matters. Thus, a Turkey that strategically
and politically looks confident and deters attempts to harm it, which will not
export its external problems or its ethnic strife, which will be more ready and
willing to deal with its internal issues – such a Turkey will be more welcomed in
Europe. Indeed, as seen from the fin de siècle, it seems that Turkey’s leadership,
after buttressing the country’s integration and borders, is ready to cope with its
domestic issues. With a rare frankness and with unique sincerity – unique for a
leader, extremely rare for a politician – Turkey’s President, Suleiman Demirel,
admitted the following:
Twenty-nine percent of the women in my country are still unable to read and write
by the time they are 15 years of age. Do you have a project to solve this problem?
The great majority of women in Turkey are unaware of the concept of gynecologi-
cal health. Do you have a project to solve this? In my country, 43 children out of
every 10,000 die during birth. Do you have a project to prevent that?
I just talked to the authorities. There are 21 cases of polio in my country. This
number is zero in many countries, but I have 21 cases to deal with. I am so ashamed
that I don’t know what to do. Let’s get together and try to find a solution for these
problems. In my country only one out of every four people brush their teeth. This
has nothing to do with money or wealth. Let’s concentrate on every household in
all of Turkey. Do you have a project to solve these problems? No, there isn’t one.
We constructed highways from one end of Turkey to the other and provided elec-
tric power to every corner in the country. We have erected schools, universities and
hospitals. But I am still concerned about what kind of life a particular city, country
Introduction 3
or village leads. We were in a much worse situation 50 years ago. I fully understand
that, but we have much to accomplish to arrive at a much better condition.1
As the Contents shows, the book focuses on aspects relevant to Turkey’s exter-
nal and internal affairs. During the 1990s Turkey coped successfully with foreign
matters, simultaneously dealing with domestic issues. At the beginning of a new
century the country appears more capable to concentrate on finding remedies
for its internal problems.
Note
1 Interview, Turkish Daily News, 16 March 1999.
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In a 1992 issue of Time magazine, in an article on Turkey, the writer inserted the
following “ad” in the middle:
Help Wanted
Nation to serve as go-between for the Western world and the Middle East and assist
in turning suspicion into cooperation. Must be firm U.S.–European ally desirous of
still closer ties yet, Islamic in religion and culture, capable of serving as a role model
of secularized Western democracy for other Muslim states. Ethnic links with some
of those states, booming free-market economy, permitting some assistance to
poorer brethren highly desirable. Benefits: regional superpower within a few years;
eventual major influence on wider world affairs possible.
To which the article’s author observed, “There is no need to look for such a
country: Turkey fits every specification. Moreover, it wants the job.”1
This chapter will look at Turkey before and after the Gulf War, starting in
the mid-1980s and concluding at the end of the 1990s. It will examine, among
other things, the Time writer’s glib assertion of Turkey’s unequivocal readiness
to serve as the West’s policeman in the Middle East.
The fifteen-year period under consideration confronted Turkey with an
assortment of problems, whose ramifications are vital for an understanding of
Ankara’s moves during the Gulf crisis, in the war itself, and in the course of the
1990s. Among these problems were the apparent decline in Turkey’s strategic
value due to the decline in inter-bloc rivalries; Turkey’s wearisome – and, some
will add, fruitless – courtship of the EU; the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus;
disputes with Iraq and Syria over water resources; the persistent territorial quar-
rel with Syria over the Hatay province (Alexandretta to the Syrians); and Iraq’s
debt to Turkey (2–3 billion dollars). Other issues relevant to our discussion are
Turkey’s domestic policies; the country’s conflict with its Kurdish minority;
President Turgat Ozal’s status in Turkish politics; the Islam-state relationship
1
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in Turkey; Turkish nationalism; Turkey’s commitment to the West and its demo-
cratic values; and Turkey’s relations with the Arab and Central Asian worlds.
Background: Turkey and the West
For as long as the cold war was simmering, Turkey was crucial to American
strategic interests. The 1947 Truman Doctrine, while ostensibly relating to
Greece and its preservation from communist insurgency, was aimed primarily
at foiling a communist takeover of Turkey, which the United States saw as a far
graver threat to its Middle Eastern interests. Were Greece to fall, so feared the
United States, Turkey would be the next “domino” in line. Since the communist
threat to Greece was internal, massive economic aid was poured into the coun-
try, alongside military assistance. But for Turkey, where the communist threat
was external, massive military aid was provided. When, in the course of time,
the Turkish–Greek conflict became exacerbated, Athens could point to the
immediate post-Second World War period as the source of its weakness vis-à-
vis Turkey. The external communist threat to Turkey resulted in Turkey acquir-
ing an offensive military capacity, whereas Greece, facing an internal threat,
acquired a defensive capacity, at most.
Ever since the Second World War, Turkey has advocated the physical
presence of British or American forces in the Middle East. Turkey opposed the
partition of Palestine largely because it entailed Britain’s withdrawal from that
country. It opposed Britain’s evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone and, naturally,
Greek demands for “Enosis” with Cyprus, which would have removed British
units from the island. Turkey is the only country in the region to sanction the
physical presence of US troops on its soil. For the same reason – the main-
tenance of a Western presence in the Middle East – Turkey also supported the
continuation of French rule in Algeria.
In 1958, when the American marines landed in Beirut, one of the objectives
of the operation was to remove a pro-Soviet Syrian-Nasserist threat to Turkey’s
south. At the time, Turkey looked on in dread at the Soviet takeover of the
Middle East. There were no lack of examples: the July 1958 coup in Iraq led by
Abdul Karim Kassim; the Soviet penetration of Syria and Egypt by means of the
Czech–Egyptian arms deal and Soviet financing of the Aswan Dam; the insta-
bility of pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Lebanon; the loss of British and
French influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Only the dispatch of
American and British forces to Jordan and Lebanon managed to reassure
Turkey. The country collaborated fully by providing bases on its territory
(Adana) from which these forces could take off.2
It is significant to note the declaration of then US Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles in the autumn of 1957. It was just few months before Syria and
Egypt united (February 1958), and before the marines landed in Beirut, but
Egyptian troops were already deployed along the Turkish–Syrian border: “[It is]
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Turkey [which] now faces a growing military danger from the major build-up
of arms in Syria.” Depicting that state of affairs as a threat to Turkey was, by all
accounts, an exaggeration: most of the Syrian army, then numbering 50,000
men, was deployed along the Israeli border or in and around Damascus as a
shield against coup d’état attempts; its equipment, albeit modern, had yet to be
properly integrated. On the other hand, Turkey boasted an army of half a mil-
lion men. It was NATO’s largest land force, trained and armed over the past
decade by the Americans and backed by NATO guarantees, and was massed in
force on the Syrian border.3 The primary objective of the subsequent dispatch of
marines to Beirut – the United States’ second major intervention in the Middle
East (the Truman Doctrine was the first) – was to bolster the tottering Lebanese
and Jordanian regimes. Yet, in American eyes, Turkey was also being threatened
by Egypt’s Nasser and the pro-Soviet regime in Damascus. Once again, remov-
ing a threat from Turkey formed a major, if not the principal impetus behind the
American action.
Washington was always convinced that as long as communism existed,
Turkey was one of its most important assets. Its geo-political location as a buffer
between the Soviet Union and the Middle East ensured that Soviet influence in
the region remained limited, without territorial expansion. As Bernard Lewis
and Dankwart Rustow claim, the fact that Israel, in all its conflicts with Syria,
encountered Soviet weaponry but never Soviet troops, can be attributed to this
Turkish buffer. The same Turkish territorial buffer may be credited with the rel-
ative ease with which Arab states could switch from apparent Soviet influence to
a major overture towards Washington. By comparison, it is manifest that where-
soever such a barrier was non-existent, any bid to erode Soviet positions was
promptly nipped in the bud by Soviet troops: Hungary in 1956; Czechoslovakia
in 1968; Afghanistan in 1989. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, Turkey had
been an island of relative sanity in a hostile and unpredictable world in which
neutral Afghanistan became a Soviet satellite, where Andreas Papandreou’s
Greece was growing erratic, and where Iran, once the bulwark of Western defence
in the Middle East, toppled the Shah and unleashed a torrent of hostility towards
the West. These developments, when added to Turkey’s oft-expressed commit-
ment to Western values, something not linked to one political personality or
another, meant small wonder that Washington was eager, when necessary, to
rush to its ally’s aid.4
The end of the cold war changed all this. Like other countries that had been
in the forefront of the battle against communism, Turkey found that its political
and strategic value to Washington had, sadly, diminished. Beginning with Gor-
bachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, Ankara was made
aware that the worth of its geo-political assets were declining in Western eyes.
Consequently, and with a frequency worrisome from a Turkish point of view,
issues and matters over which the West had refrained from exerting pressure
began surfacing on the agenda of Ankara’s dealings with Washington and the
West European capitals: the Turkish–Greek standoff over Cyprus; the Turkish
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army’s frequent intervention in domestic politics; Turkey’s questionable human
rights and freedom of expression records; its maltreatment of the Kurdish minor-
ity; and longstanding allegations about Turkey’s role – including government
officials – in drug smuggling into Europe and the United States (“The multi-
billion Turkish ‘drug economy’”).5 How reliable our friends in Washington really
are, was something that the Turks often wondered. The rise of America’s anti-aid
body, which sees the end of the cold war as a reason for cutting aid to Turkey, was
another warning. It signaled to Ankara that a new era has emerged. The results
of this period of Turkish discomfort were evident.
In the past, whenever disagreements seemed to mar Turkey’s relations
with the United States, Ankara could resort to improving – or threatening to do
so – its relations with Moscow. This was the ploy adopted during the various
Cyprus crises, and in the 1960s and 1970s, when the United States campaigned
extensively against what it perceived as Turkey’s share in drug-smuggling.
Turkey considered a similar move when she realized the poor performance of
the Americans in Vietnam; relying solely on Washington looked problematic
following the American inability to win the war. But the end of the cold war
robbed Turkish foreign policy of this useful dodge. The end of the cold war also
inspired the US decision to dismantle its major military bases in Turkey – leav-
ing only one US/NATO base in Incirlik – often to the great disappointment of
local communities for whom the bases were an important source of income.
This, also, deprived Ankara of yet another important instrument of political
leverage over Washington.6
Similarly, Turkey’s relations with Europe and the EU were seldom harmo-
nious. Turkish workers who had sought employment in large numbers in the
wealthier countries of Western Europe, principally Germany, were encounter-
ing increasing hostility. Host countries preferred East Germans or East Euro-
peans to Turkish workers. The number of work visas allotted to Turks – as to
North Africans or Asians – was frozen or even reduced. This had a detrimental
effect on Turkey, as economic immigration, serving as a vital social and
economic safety valve, had allowed the country to cope, to a degree, with its
unemployment and soaring inflation. Turkey’s high inflation rate (officially set
at 65–100 percent annually in recent years), along with European preference
for investment in Eastern Europe, have not facilitated the creation of additional
jobs in Turkey.
The 1980s were not easy years in connection with Turkey’s relations with
Western Europe. Turkey’s pursuit of its European aspirations, i.e., membership
of the EU, kept running into difficulties about the stability of Turkish democ-
racy, the army’s role in domestic politics, civic freedom and individual rights.
Even when Turkey met the EU membership terms – reduction of subsidies and
customs duties, restrictions on agriculture and emigration to EU countries,
etc. – Europe continued to fall back on a Greek veto to keep Turkey out. As will
be seen, Turkey seized upon the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to improve its
standing in Europe and to break out of its isolation.
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Background: Turkey and Iraq – oil, water, the Kurds
Turkish–Iraqi relations were notable for cooperation and correctness. There
were the Sadabad pact of 1937 and the Baghdad Treaty of 1955.7 There
were ramified bilateral trade relations developed during the Iran–Iraq war
(1980–88). Yet, by the late 1980s it seemed as though the two neighbors were set
on a collision course.
From an Iraqi point of view, Turkey represented a dangerous dependency in
relation to oil and water. About 96 percent of Iraq’s income was from oil exports
and when the Gulf route was closed to oil tankers during the Iran–Iraq War,
almost 100 percent of Iraq’s oil – 80 million tons annually – was exported via the
986 km long pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik. Trans-
portation time was thus reduced from forty-five days to two. For years the
Yumurtalik route has been the only one functioning and, during non-tension
times, was one of only two outlets for Iraqi oil exports, the other being the Gulf
terminal of Mina al-Bakr. Normally, 56 percent of Iraqi oil export was ferried to
Yumurtalik. However, a case in point that justifies the assertion that Baghdad’s
Middle East hegemonic aspirations could not tolerate being dependent on
Turkey in, was the reluctance of the Iraqis to reopen the Kerkuk–Yumurtalik
pipeline. In the summer of 1993 Baghdad insisted that she would prefer the
Mina al-Bakr route in any future arrangement that would allow her to re-export
oil. It seems that Baghdad refused to put Turkey again in the influential position
of controlling its oil export. It could produce the same result as Turkey did in
August 1990, following the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait, when Ankara shut down
the Yumurtalik outlet in accordance with United Nations (UN) resolutions.8
(On oil and the mentality of Saddam Hussein and those around him we can
learn from the remarks of Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister. During the
course of the Iran–Iraq war, he was asked why Iraq attacked oil tankers from
countries friendly to Iraq that were buying oil from Iran. He replied that Iraq
wanted more international pressure to end the war, and “the way to get people
to do what you want is to hurt them”.)9
This dependency explains Iraqi silence in the face of Turkey’s damming of
the Euphrates which, although begun in the early 1980s, only drew Baghdad’s
protests in 1988, when its war with Iran was over. In 2020, when Turkey com-
pletes it Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) – harnessing the rivers Tigris and
Euphrates for the development of Turkey’s southeastern provinces – the flow of
water into Iraq will be cut by 80 percent. Iraq’s silence stemmed also from
Turkey serving as its principal import gateway, almost the only one in emergen-
cies, through which Iraq shipped-in some 75 percent of its foodstuffs.10
The Iraqi–Turkish water dispute alone contains the potential for a violent
confrontation. Welling up in Turkey, the Tigris and Euphrates flow south to
Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s development plans for its southeastern provinces rest
upon the two rivers as an important component, particularly the Euphrates
(whose flow is 32 billion cubic meters annually; 31 billion for the Tigris). Turkey
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uses half of the Euphrates water, leaving the remainder, 500 cubic meters a
second, to its two southern neighbors. Moreover, Ankara stresses that she actu-
ally lets 700 cubic meters a second flow to Syria, an amount, so argue the Turks,
the Syrians could not absorb owing to their poor infrastructure. Euphrates water
not consumed by Turkey is divided between Iraq, who receives 58 percent, and
Syria, who draws 42 percent. Conversely, most of the Tigris water is consumed
by Iraq. However, the Tigris and Euphrates lose more than 40 percent of their
flow by the time they reach Syria and 90 percent by the time they reach Iraq, i.e.
after Syria has taken its share. Also, to Turkey, a country otherwise lacking its
own energy resources, the two rivers are a source of cheap and clean hydroelec-
tric power, another reason why Turkey maintains its monopoly over the rivers.11
The Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP), including the
Ataturk Dam, the world’s fourth largest, will generate electricity and irrigate 2.5
million acres of land. Completion of the project will further halve – i.e. will leave
one-quarter – the amount of water carried south by the Euphrates into Syria and
Iraq. Cultivation of additional Turkish lands will increase pollution of the
Euphrates’ remaining water, further restricting its use by Syrian and Iraqi farm-
ers. The danger is that pollution of the Euphrates by minerals, herbicides, chem-
icals and waste from Turkish soil will render 2.5 million acres of Iraqi
agricultural land unusable within a generation. Moreover, completion of the
Ataturk Dam and the inundation of its basin to the north are expected to bring
on an ecological calamity analogous to that inflicted by the Aswan Dam. The
reservoir will retain the biological wealth and natural materials stored in the
water, while the quality of flow south into Syria and Iraq will deteriorate. Fertil-
ization of farmland in those countries, hitherto accomplished naturally by its
irrigation with Euphrates water, will henceforth have to be carried out by artifi-
cial means, making cultivation more expensive and, ultimately, polluting the
soil with chemicals and salts.
Tripartite Turkish–Iraqi–Syrian conventions during 1990 proved fruitless.
Iraq and Syria demanded a political treaty, as well as sharing arrangements for
the water of the Euphrates, which they claimed to be an international waterway.
But Turkey argued that since the river was Turkish, its assets could not be shared.
The amount of water it allots its neighbors was its own business and a purely
technical issue. Furthermore, Turkey insisted on an end to irrigation by open
channels and flooding in Iraq and Syria, a wasteful technique that increases loss
of water through evaporation. As the Turkish press maintained:
We should be clear: the water of the Euphrates is ours and we can give away only
what we do not need. Water is not something that we can permit to flow away. We
are the lucky ones in the Middle East. So we have to make the maximum use of this
potential. Water is as important as oil. The day may not be far off when Turkey starts
filling bottles with water and marketing them in the Middle East.12
In private conversation, even harsher tones could be heard: “They have oil, we
have water; let them drink their oil,” was a common refrain in Turkish political
10 Turkey: facing a new millennium
circles. “What does Syria need more water for anyway?” wondered Deniz Baikal,
Turkish former Foreign Minister, remarking snidely that it was probably “in
order to wash its hands of terrorism.” And President Demirel was reported
having a very useful solution to the dispute, namely, that “the water is ours on
this side of the border and theirs on the other side.”13
As for their common Kurdish problem, for decades Turkey and Iraq worked
hand in hand imposing restrictions on the Kurds living within their borders
(approximately up to one-fifth of the population in each country, altogether
around 25 million in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and in the republics of the ex-
Soviet Union – mainly Armenia – making it, globally, “the largest stateless, self-
described nation”).14 During the 1980s, Iraqi Kurds rebelled against Baghdad
while its army was tied down in the war with Iran. The end of the war was
approaching (a UN-supervised truce came into effect in August 1988), and
Baghdad felt free to deal with the Kurdish rebellion. Its treatment was harsh,
even by Iraqi standards, and included the Halabjah village incident (March
1988) in which chemical weapons were employed in a barbaric way. Soon, much
to Ankara’s dismay, some 100,000 Kurdish refugees, fearing for their lives, fled
across the border into Turkey.
Though not plainly expressed, since the early 1980s Iraq permitted the
Turkish army to operate against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Baghdad had to
“swallow,” with hardly a gulp, these Turkish occasional anti-Kurdish incursions
into its territory. Prevented from imposing its authority on northern Iraq – first,
because of its long war with Iran and, later, because of the “Safe Haven” policy
(or “Safe Zone” – see pp. 38–40), imposed by the United States and its Gulf war
allies – Iraq practically owes its territorial integrity to the whims of Ankara.
Turkey resents a too strong Kurdish “Safe Haven;” without those incursions, the
Kurds would have wrested larger areas of northern Iraq. Turkish troops have
been sent occasionally in their thousands to the “Safe Haven” to hold back Iraqi
Kurds fleeing from Saddam; these potential refugees are not welcome in Turkey.
Nor can these incursions be dismissed as irrelevant: in March 1995 and in May
1997, some 35,000 soldiers were involved – the largest contingent of Turkish
troops ever to fight on foreign territory (including its participation in the
Korean War in 1950 and its intervention in Cyprus in 1974).15
The Turkoman minority of Northern Iraq is yet another divisive issue,
which elicits much Iraqi–Turkish acrimony. According to Turkey, there are some
3 million Turkomans living in Iraq, though Western experts put their number at
the much more modest 200,000–300,000. They are the third ethnic group
among Iraq’s 18 million, together with the Arabs and Kurds, and with strong
ethnic ties to Turkey. Baghdad regards them as a Fifth Column – it remains con-
vinced that they are no less and, perhaps, thanks to their powerful Turkish
patron, even more of a danger to its integrity than the Kurds. Iraq is particularly
concerned over their location near the oil territory of Mosul, Erbil, and Kerkuk,
to which Turkey has historical claims. (Kerkuk and Mosul were allotted to Iraq
in 1925 by the League of Nations, as its share of the war booty from the
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vanquished Ottoman Empire. On occasion, there are calls in Turkey for restora-
tion of these areas.)16 The Iraqi method of dealing with groups of a different
ethnic background – relinquishing identity, culture and rights, destruction of
villages, and removal of the population to the interior, i.e. forced relocation,
forced assimilation and forced Arabization – was also applied here, to the detri-
ment of Turkish–Iraqi relations. The situation has become even more complex
with the practical autonomy that the Kurds enjoy in northern Iraq. Occasion-
ally, this results in attempts at Kurdification of Turkomans living there.
Iraq’s debt to Turkey was yet another cause of conflict, albeit insufficient in
itself to draw the two states into confrontation. But when compounded with
other elements it helped further exacerbate bilateral relations. After its war with
Iran, Iraq was left with debts of 80 billion dollars – 40 billion to Arab oil pro-
ducers plus 40 billion to non-Arab creditors, who all insisted on quick repay-
ment. Iraq owed Turkey some 2.5 billion dollars, of which it had paid off some
600 million by August 1990, when it ceased payments. It made payment
resumption contingent upon the resolution of the conflict between Turkey, Iraq
and Syria over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates.17
Turkey responded to the events enumerated here, and the profusion of
Iraqi–Turkish conflicts, actual and potential, by increasing its defense budget. In
1989, the allotment stood at 1.7 billion dollars. In 1990, even before the Gulf
crisis erupted, it was doubled to 3.4 billion, rising in 1991 to 4.8 billion, or 12.5
percent of the overall national budget. Turkey was continually strengthening its
army – the possibility of a showdown with Baghdad has never been excluded. A
comparison with the defense budget for 1995, three years after Iraq’s defeat in
the Gulf War, shows a reduction to 3.9 billion. In 2000 and 2001, with Iraq prac-
tically free since 1998 of UN inspection on weapons of mass destruction and
once again threatening the region’s stability, the amount spent in Turkey on
defense grew to 7.6 and 7.2 billion dollars, respectively.
At the end of the 1990s most of Turkey’s major defense procurement
projects survived, despite the cuts that resulted from the devastating earth-
quakes of 1999. The quake left at least 17,000 dead, 30,000 injured, 500,000
homeless and was estimated to have caused 12–15 billion dollars worth of
destruction and the gross domestic product (GDP) to contract by 5–10 percent.
International and ethnic threats to Turkey from the unstable Balkans, Caucasus
and Middle East, with specific references to Iraq, Iran and Syria, plus the need
to protect the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Black Seas all justified Turkey’s
increased military spending.18
In the next twenty-five years Turkey will spend the fantastic amount of 150
billion dollars on military equipment, as follows.
● Land Forces Command – 60 billion dollars for 750 helicopters, 180 rocket
and missile systems, 150 anti-tank rockets, 12 remote control air vehicles,
3,627 main communication tanks, 1951 guns and howitzers, and 48,564
wheeled vehicles.
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● Naval Forces Command – 25 billion for 14 frigates, 16 patrol ships, 15
guided assault boats, 9 submarines, 4 anti-mine ships, 4 minesweepers, 35
landing vehicles, 1 communications-backed ship, 25 auxiliary-class ships
and vehicles, 9 sea patrol aircraft, and 38 helicopters.
● Air Forces Command – 65 billion dollar for 640 fighter jets, 79 operations
airplanes, 160 training aircraft, 68 transportation airplanes, 25 helicopters,
442 air defense weapon systems.19
Among its neighbors, Turkey ranks third after Israel and Russia, in allocation of
funds for defense and is the sixth largest importer of arms in the world. Twenty-
one percent of the country’s military needs are met by domestic sources; foreign
firms supply the rest. As of 1994 Turkey has the fourth largest security budget
among NATO members in relation to its GDP, following Greece, the UK and the
United States.20
Turkey and Israel
Another component in Turkey’s response to the regional threats has been the
development of economic and military ties with Israel. Bilateral Turkish–Israeli
relations have got their own raison d’être. Still, common adversaries such as Iran,
Iraq, and Syria have drawn the two together, as have Islamic extremism and terror.
At the same time, Israel provides a kind of alternative to the unfriendly EU. It also
promotes Turkey’s interests among the EU members, but more so in the United
States. Interestingly, EU coldness is also behind Turkey’s new closeness to Russia,
to the tune of 14 billion dollar in investments and another 10 billion in trade
(see Chapter 5).21
Enhanced by a multiplicity of motives, the association developed into a many
tiered relationship. On the economic front, trade between Israel and Turkey
flourishes. At 1 billion dollars a year, this trade is the largest volume of civil goods
trade between any two Middle Eastern countries, a figure which is destined to
double by the early 2000s.22 In military terms, the upgrading of the Turkish F-4
Phantoms in Israel, the joint mid-air refueling exercises of the Turkish and Israeli
air forces, and naval exercises in the Mediterranean are only the tip of the iceberg
in the aforementioned alliance. The two parties share military intelligence and
Turkey provides landing and training facilities for the Israeli air force. The two
also conduct regular bilateral visits and discussions on military and political
issues, under the supervision of high-ranking steering committees. In this exten-
sive interactivity, the United States has a place of honor: tripartite understandings
between Washington, Ankara and Jerusalem point to close cooperation between
the three in the Muslim republics of Central Asia (see Chapter 7).23
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Turkey and the Arab states
The First World War, the end of the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of Kemalism,
with its singular brand of Turkish nationalism, had a decisive effect on Turkey’s
relations with the Arab world. Turkey turned its back on the Arab world and set
its sights on the West. Kemalism promoted secularity, in emulation of European
values, and the ideas of democracy, freedom and human rights – with varying
degrees of success. Among the thirty-member strong Islamic Conference,
Turkey is the only professed secular and democratic country. However, in time,
Turkey has learnt that its secularity, its democracy, its identification with the
West and its ideological distance from the Islamic states are of no avail in
moments of need. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is a good example. It
appeared to Ankara that the United States was ignoring Turkey’s security: in an
apparent quid pro quo deal with Moscow, Washington agreed to remove its
Jupiter missiles from its bases on Turkish territory. In return, Moscow had to
remove its offensive weapons from Cuba. But it was now Turkey, devoid of
American missile protection, which would be exposed to the full brunt of
Moscow’s fury.
When the Cyprus crisis erupted in 1964 and Turkey found itself stripped of
United States support – gross ingratitude in the eyes of Turkey, whose identifi-
cation with the West at times of crisis was total – Ankara hoped that rapproche-
ment with the Arabs would pay off. The Arabs, instead, rushed en masse to
support Greece, going so far as to supply the Greek Cypriots with arms for their
campaign against the Turkish Cypriot minority. Turkey depicted this as a the
second Arab betrayal – the first was Arab aid to Britain against the Ottoman
Empire during the First World War – where Muslims, once again, stabbed it in
the back, working closely with Christian infidels to slaughter fellow Muslims.24
The 1970s saw another discreet attempt on Turkey’s part to draw closer to
the Arab world, notably after the 1973 energy crisis. The country, practically,
lacks its own oil resources. It produces only about 65,000 barrels of oil per day
but needs 500,000. In 1996, for instance, Turkey’s total oil reserves were esti-
mated at around 260 million barrels, which would last seventeen months. In the
years 1997 and 1998 Turkey imported 23,357,000 and 24,629,000 tons of crude
oil, respectively. (Although it imported more oil in 1998, Turkey paid less
because price per barrel was 11.40 dollars whereas in 1997 it was 18.50.) Still, in
spite of the heavy imports of crude, domestic production of energy in Turkey
does not meet with the level of consumption. In 2000 Turkey’s total energy pro-
duction needs were 91 million tons of oil, and the demand for energy is expected
to increase almost fourfold by the year 2020 to 314 million tons of oil per
annum. Turkey’s natural gas consumption has been growing at 10 percent a
year, and is expected to rise from 19 billion cubic meters in 2000 to 54 billion in
2010, and to 82 billion in 2020. Russia, Algeria, Turkmenistan, and Iran are, or
will be, Turkey’s main gas suppliers. The country’s interest in the Caspian Sea
energy sources is therefore obvious and is discussed in details below.25
14 Turkey: facing a new millennium
But the turnabout towards the Arab world was a limited one: the Arabs may
possess oil, but the West possesses modern industrial technology and consumer
goods. Turkey’s commercial links with the Arab states – though contributing to
Turkish prosperity in the 1980s – went into a progressive decline, while trade
with the United States and the European countries increased again. Prior to the
1970s oil crisis, Turkey’s trade with the Arab states came to a mere 5 percent of
its overall trade. From the 1973 October war up to 1981, that figure increased to
34 percent, mostly Turkish imports of Arab oil, more specifically Saudi, Libyan
and Iraqi oil. (In 1981 United Arab Emirates [UAE] oil took Iraq’s place.) Nine-
teen seventy-four was a particular crisis year, though not the worst of it: oil
prices increased fivefold but Turkey also experienced political isolation owing
to its intervention in Cyprus. In 1980, for example, Turkey’s outlay on crude
oil imports exceeded the country’s total export earnings by 30 percent! This
imbalance exacerbated Turkey’s indebtedness and raised its inflation rate to
extraordinary levels.
The situation changed again as from the mid-1980s. The eruption of the
Iran–Iraq War and the ensuing fall of oil prices, resulted in a diminishing of 
Arab purchasing power. The waning of the cold war brought about the opening
of market opportunities for Turkish goods in Eastern Europe and Asia. The
eruption of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) uprising in 1984 was attrib-
uted by Turkey to the support of Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organizaton
(PLO). Also, Ankara did not like the connection that Yasser Arafat found
between the Iraqi eviction from Kuwait in 1991 and the need for similar moves
in relation to Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Turkey and the
northern part of Cyprus. All this combined to reduce Turkey’s trade with Middle
Eastern Arab countries. It declined to mere 16 percent of the country’s total for-
eign trade and later stabilized at less than 18 percent. Conversely, the trade has
changed in character, with a growing component of Turkish exports and a
reduction of Turkey’s Middle Eastern imports. At the same time, the EU share of
overall Turkish exports increased, reaching 45 percent in the late 1980s.26
Turkey’s efforts at a rapprochement with the Arab states never really suc-
ceeded. Both distant and recent history combined to render these relations
resentful and hostile. Memories of the struggle of incipient Arab nationalism
against the decaying Ottoman Empire linger. The Turkish Republic’s support
for the Western powers in the inter-bloc standoff was often prejudicial to Arab
nationalism and its campaign for independence. Suffice it to mention that
Turkey supported Britain against Egypt, France against the Algerians, and has
maintained close relations with Israel.
Modern Turkish nationalism is relatively youthful, dating to the turn of the
nineteenth century. Only with the loss of the non-Turkish portions of the
Ottoman Empire did the Turks fully formulate their national awareness. It, too,
is under challenge, as evidenced by the Kurdish rebellion. Turkish nationalism
dissociated itself from the Arab Islamic world, and even from the ethnic Turks
of Central Asia. Whenever Turkey became the butt of pan-Arab or pan-Islamic
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hostility and pressure from Egypt’s Nasser or Iraq’s Saddam (Hussein) or from
Iran’s Khumeini and their successors, it chose not the Muslim-regional option,
but the preservation of its unique pro-Western, secular, democratic and non-
Arab character. The complications resulting from Turkey’s proximity not only
to the crises ridden Middle East and Central Asia, but also to the Balkans only
serve to reinforce Turkey’s belief in strong relations with the West and its vari-
ous organizations, NATO and the EU in particular.
The Gulf crisis erupts
Iraq’s aspirations to regional hegemony became obvious when it demobilized
only a small part of its enormous army, following its apparent victory over Iran.27
The war with Iran had granted Iraq worldwide renown as the barrier to the Iran-
ian revolution, that was depicted in vividly barbaric colors. When the war ended,
Iraq was perceived as victor, having forced Tehran to accept a cease-fire. As pres-
ident of a regional power with undisguised aspirations to hegemony, Saddam’s
words and deeds had to be taken seriously. He called for the reinforcement of
Arab nationalism and an Arab takeover of the Gulf by removal of the US forces,
stationed there in the course of the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. He made a verbal
onslaught upon the United States – a paper tiger that had withdrawn from Viet-
nam, and pulled out of Lebanon when a few marines were killed there. In April
1990 Saddam threatened to burn half of Israel; all army commanders of the Iraqi
military were taken on a tour to inspect the Jordanian–Israeli border; and Iraqi
jet fighters camouflaged in Jordanian colors photographed the Israeli nuclear
reactor in Dimona. The execution, despite international appeals for clemency, of
the British journalist Farzad Bazoft, found guilty on what were clearly trumped
up charges of spying, was widely seen as evidence that Saddam was ready to take
on the West. He went on to offer protection to the entire Arab world, a role he
claimed to have discharged already when his country took on Iran, calling for a
holy war – a jihad – against all Crusader heretics and their lackeys.28
Iraq’s economy had suffered grievously in the war with Iran: damages
inflicted on the country were estimated at 30 billion dollars. With a national
income of 14 billion dollars at the immediate post-war period, Iraq had to repay
foreign creditors 80 billion dollars, at an annual rate of 5 billion dollars. The
Iraqi army, with its modern weapons, long-range missiles and non-conventional
weaponry – chemical and, possibly, biological and nuclear – seemed an obvious
threat to stability in the Gulf region and, in time, to the entire Middle East. Like
Turkey, Iraq could no longer resort to the traditional tactic of playing on
East–West rivalries for its own benefit. Having lost Soviet support, Baghdad
began to entertain growing fears of the United States. As sole superpower, along
with its Middle Eastern allies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Turkey), the
United States could step in and prevent Iraq from achieving its aspirations to
regional hegemony. The economic resources required for that hegemony and for
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its own reconstruction were to be found in Kuwait and in Kuwaiti banks.29 (Iraqi
troops who invaded Kuwait City on August 1990 found the local banks to be a
disappointment: traditionally, in the summer the wealthy Kuwaitis take them-
selves and much of their money on shopping tours to Western countries.) Yet,
Iraq blamed the Kuwaitis and the Saudis for conniving to ruin the Iraqi economy
by reducing oil prices and by insisting on quick repayment of Iraqi debts.
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 struck at a basic tenet
of Turkey’s Middle East policy: support for the present division of the states in
the region. Ankara regards any unification as a threat of overbearing Arab
nationalism, foreshadowing an expansionist policy by the unified state. The
same Turkish objection was felt towards the merging of Syria and Egypt,
1958–61, that formed the United Arab Republic and was to be the first step
towards the union of all Arab states. A super-Iraq, enjoying the economic and
geo-political assets acquired through the conquest of Kuwait would be intolera-
ble to Turkey. By pooling together Iraq’s and Kuwait’s oil resources, Saddam
would gain control of one-fifth of the world’s oil. Add to that Saudi Arabia’s and
Iraq would monopolize over 47.5 percent of the world’s energy resources.
But Iraq’s military muscle was the immediate threat. At the end of the 1980s
Iraq had a mighty million-man army in 66 combat-seasoned divisions. They
were experienced in gas warfare, equipped with surface-to-surface missiles,
10,000 anti-aircraft guns, 750 combat bombers, 160 shift-wing airplanes, 6,000
tanks and 64,000 shells with chemical warheads.30 Baghdad’s effective potential
control of the Arabian peninsula, perhaps later including parts of Greater Syria,
i.e. Jordan, with its human and strategic assets, would certainly menace Turkey’s
integrity. It would surely weaken it in its water and territorial disputes with Iraq
and Syria. Horrified, Ankara watched the equilibrium of the entire Middle East
being upset by a super-Iraq: Israel was perceived as capable of nothing beyond
surgical strikes; Syria was tied down in Lebanon and its border with Israel; Iran
was licking its wounds after eight years of war with Iraq.31
Circumstances both justified Turkish anxiety and explained the unequivo-
cal resolve President Ozal displayed throughout the Gulf crisis, calling for
Saddam’s overthrow, even for his personal elimination, and insisting on an
exclusively military resolution of the crisis. It could well be, as Mahmut Bali
Aykan quotes, that Ozal regarded the failure of the Americans to act to remove
Saddam from power, as “the biggest trick the Western world played on Turkey.”
Even after the 1991 Gulf War, Ozal called for Saddam’s removal, saying it would
be hard to imagine a leader surviving after dragging his people through nine
years of war in the course of twelve years in power. Ozal hoped that the cease-
fire terms imposed on Iraq at the end of the Gulf war – comparing it to the
“drinking of the cup of humiliation” – would lead to Saddam’s overthrow.32
With the invasion of Kuwait (August 1990), Saddam’s rhetoric became
increasingly histrionic. He depicted the conquest of Kuwait as an Islamic jihad
on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, and against the corrupt and the
monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for inviting the Crusaders to defile the
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sacred Arab soil. Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, warned public opinion in
the coalition member countries that their governments had sent troops to the
Gulf to fight for the cause of the Saudi and Kuwaiti degenerate monarchs who
were incapable of distinguishing their daughters from their wives. But Saddam
went a step further: he urged that Kuwaiti oil reserves and their proceeds be
placed at the disposal of all the Muslim and Arab peoples. It is easy to see why.
On the eve of the Gulf War Kuwaiti production amounted to 59 million ton of
crude, Iraq’s to 100 million, and both countries hold 20 percent of the world’s
oil reserves. By comparison, Saudi Arabia’s production at that time was 322
million tons, 25.2 percent of the world’s reserves.33
At the immediate period before the crisis Saddam asked Kuwait for money.
The Kuwaitis refused and, as above, demanded first to be the reimbursed for
monies they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Declaring Kuwait “an
impertinent state, a state of pygmies” for her reply, Baghdad offered a new divi-
sion of Muslim wealth that should be done under the rule of Iraq and its Presi-
dent, a modern reincarnation of the Sword of Islam, Salah al-Din (1139–93).
Having defeated the Crusaders at the battle of Hittin (1187), Salah al-Din went
on to conquer and liberate Jerusalem from Crusader rule. The parallel between
the West – the Americans, the Christians, and their “lackeys” like the Israelis or
even Muslims like the Saudis or the Turks – and the Crusaders is self-evident.
Both are foreign infidels or their servants, who invaded Arab lands and are
therefore bound to suffer the same fate as the Crusaders.
Iraq’s Islamic propaganda (“We invaded Kuwait for the benefit of the entire
Muslim world”) belittled the significance of borders between different Muslim
peoples. There are no borders between Muslims; political borders that do exist
were created by imperialists for their own ends. There is nothing sacred about
the borders of Kuwait, and Kuwait’s oil belongs to all Muslims. Besides, annex-
ing Kuwait is re-installing justice, an internal Iraqi business, strictly not to be
interfered by outsiders: Kuwait is a renegade province that should be reunited
with its mother country. Indeed, not long ago, following the announcement of
Kuwaiti independence in June 1961, Baghdad claimed Kuwait as an integral part
of Iraq. Threatened with Iraqi invasion, it were British troops, and later an Arab
League force, that deterred Iraqi action.34
What was Turkey to make of Saddam’s nationalistic and Muslim fervor, his
dismissal of borders and repudiation of the significance of ownership of natural
resources like oil? It was just one step before a Muslim Arab demand, spear-
headed by Iraq and Syria, for ownership of Turkey’s water. Saddam’s similar ref-
erence to Turkey and Kuwait is indeed a case in point. In a speech in July 1997,
he distinguished between the government of Turkey and its people, the same as
he used to describe the Kuwaitis and their monarchs. He mentioned the differ-
ence between being injured by Muslims and by non-Muslims (“Infidels and
their lackeys”). Iraq, Saddam claimed, was greatly injured during the Gulf War
– “The Thirty State Aggression” – by Muslim countries like Turkey. But Ankara
should learn the lesson:
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Turkish officials must understand that the official reaction of a government is not
an exact replica of the reaction of its Muslim or Arab people. Indeed, a Muslim state
that pursues unpredicted and unjust policies against another Muslim country
should expect a harsh and violent reaction by its own Arab or Muslim population.
I hope that Turkey’s officials will rise above their stubborn conceit and refrain from
doing evil. Instead, they must look to their own people and grasp the need to merge
Turkish with Arab and Islamic interests.35
Saddam’s brand of Arab nationalism was far from easing differences. In January
1990, just a few months before the invasion of Kuwait, when Turkey temporar-
ily blocked the flow of the Euphrates for thirty days to fill up the reservoir north
of the Ataturk Dam, Iraq “suddenly” unveiled its arsenal of ballistic and non-
conventional weaponry. Stories of Iraq’s “super cannon,” capable of firing its
shells hundreds of kilometers, along with recollections of Iraqi gas attacks on the
Kurds, added to the tension then building between Turkey and Iraq.
A further issue that should have caused concern in Ankara was Iraq’s nuclear
potential. But the Turks, like the rest of the world, including all intelligence
agencies, were only aware in the most general terms of the fact that Iraq possessed
sufficient enriched uranium for the production of a nuclear bomb. In summer
1990, on the eve of the Gulf War, Iraq was two-thirds of the way there, if not closer.
Rolfe Ekeus, the United Nations representative in UNSCOM – the Security
Council Observation Mission in Iraq, the body supervising the country’s disar-
mament in non-conventional weaponry – noted that on the eve of the Gulf War
that Iraq was only three months short of conducting its first nuclear test.36
Turkey’s unease was further inflamed when its General Staff conducted its
war games in early 1990. It appeared that the Iraqi army’s modern weaponry and
combat experience were likely to take a heavy toll of the Turkish army before the
latter could stabilize its line of defense in the east of the country.37 However, this
worrying prospect was not solely due to Iraq’s military superiority. The Turkish
army had not fared well since the end of the cold war. Owing to American and
European restrictions, acquisition of new weaponry had ground to a complete
halt and, lacking funds for spare parts, military equipment was rendered idle.
The cannibalization of weapon systems and vehicles was adopted as a common
solution. Sophisticated weapons like the “Patriot” anti-missile-missiles delivered
to other NATO members did not reach the Turkish army. The modern weapons
that poured into Turkey during and after the Gulf War showed the Turks just how
antiquated their weapons systems actually were. Some dated to Korean War-era
American military surplus, including aging M47 and M48 Patton tanks and
F4 Phantom jets. Earlier, with the eruption of the Iraq–Kuwait crisis and facing
an uncertain military balance with Iraq, Turkey’s senior officers had queried
President Ozal’s aggressive policy towards Iraq. They doubted that he had the
necessary military muscle to back it.
A summation of all the above thus shows that the international intervention
in the Gulf crisis and in the subsequent war was designed, first, to free Kuwait
and foil an Iraqi takeover of Saudi oil fields. It also was aimed, most probably by
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Washington, at preventing Iraq from attacking Turkey. As noted above, Bagh-
dad and Turkey seemed to be on a collision course: a super-Iraq could not have
tolerated its total dependence upon Turkey for its water, for the export of its oil,
and for the integrity of its northern territories.
It would be tempting to generalize that, as shown by the Gulf War and past
experience (the 1947 Truman Doctrine and the 1958 dispatch of the Marines to
Lebanon), massive and forceful US intervention in the Middle East had first to
be preceded by a threat to Turkey. Alas, such a conclusion would be over-hasty
as long as the relevant documents are unavailable. But the Gulf crisis focused US
attention on Turkey, seemingly to an exceptional degree judging by Secretary of
States James Baker’s numerous telephone conversations with Turgut Ozal and
his frequent visits to Ankara. These unique relations probably did not terminate
at the Secretary of State’s level, but continued at the “President to President”
level through the summer of 1991. Some go so far as to claim that the Ankara’s
permission to allow the deployment in Turkey of a Western multinational force
to monitor Iraq and the “Safe Haven,” was nothing but “a kind of ‘present or
souvenir’,” granted by President Ozal to President Bush.38
Turkey’s response
Turgut Ozal, an electrical engineer by profession, became Prime Minister of
Turkey in 1983, and President in 1989 until his death in 1993. He is given credit
for his country’s prosperity during the 1980s. He is said to have held the “Jidda-
Dallas” theory: Turks should conduct their religious life like the Muslims of
Jidda, and enjoy the lifestyle displayed in the Dallas television series. Ozal
appears to have been the first Turkish politician to grasp the importance of tele-
vision, making great use of it to enhance his influence. It was particularly
noticeable during the Gulf crisis when Ozal resorted to frequent television
appearances in an effort to show that Turkey had a unique opportunity to
improve its relations with the West, and remove the Iraqi threat against it. His
policy throughout the crisis rested upon the following elements:
1 Turkish troop concentrations near the Iraqi border;
2 permission to the coalition forces to use Turkish territory for its operations;
3 strict observance of the international sanctions imposed on Iraq;
4 extracting economic and political concessions from the West and Japan, in
return for Turkey’ s aid during the crisis;
5 weakening Iraq without a single Turkish soldier actually taking part in the
fighting or crossing into Iraq.
The annals of this century show few examples of a country that has succeeded,
in the course of over seventy years, in achieving its regional objectives without
its armed forces becoming embroiled in combat. Having contrived to do so ever
since the 1920s – the 1974 Cyprus crisis, when partition was forced on the island
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by the Turkish army, was the exception that proves the rule – Turkey did not
relinquish that policy in the Gulf War. 
Turgut Ozal, after years in office as Prime Minister and President was
dubbed with numerous nicknames, not all flattering: “omnipotent ruler,”
“Ottoman Sultan,” and “l’etat c’est moi.” He was, perhaps, no different from
what Metin Heper describes as the line of Ottoman and Turkish political leaders
who enjoyed excessive and inordinate power.39 Ozal was a Turkish statesman,
without a president to overshadow him or confine his megalomania. Yet, Ozal
was the greatest innovator and reformer in Turkey since the time of Ataturk,
particularly with regard to economic and internal matters. He destroyed the
accepted notion that the Turkish President was only a figurehead and that real
power was lodged with the Prime Minister. He also changed the tradition which,
since 1960, had insisted that the President be a retired General. It seems that after
Ozal, the President of the Turkish Republic – be it Suleiman Demirel or Ahmet
Sezer – is no longer a weak political figure, but always a force to reckon with.
Furthermore, Ozal did more for Turkey outside its borders than any previ-
ous leader, having gone abroad more than seventy times during his tenure. He
was the initiator of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR or
BSEC), the foundations of which were laid in June 1992 in Istanbul, during
Ozal’s presidency, but were formally established only in June 1998, long after his
death. Turkey, at that time feeling snubbed in Europe despite her contribution
to the victory over Iraq, was keen to build a regional body with high potential
for economic and trade cooperation. The littoral Black Sea countries and adja-
cent states joined the BSECR and established a body of states comprising more
than 325 million people. Eleven countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bul-
garia, Georgia, Greece, Moldavia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine),
consider the BSECR as aiming at promoting cooperation among the member
countries in matters pertaining to transportation, communications, energy,
mining, tourism industry, and the environment. The BSECR, however, has not
yet created the economic community its founder wished for. A secretariat has
been established in Istanbul and a bank was set up in Thessaloniki – the Black
Sea Trade and Development Bank – yet, local, regional and global economic and
political hardships still hamper the development of the BSECR. Conflicts
among its members – Greece versus Turkey; Azerbaijan and Turkey versus
Armenia – proved to be detrimental for cooperation. Also, antecedence is given
to mutual rather than to regional contacts, and other priorities that overshadow
the BSECR (like that of Turkey and of most of the organization’s western coun-
tries whose main focus is the EU), causing the organization to be of secondary
importance to its members.40
Those who disagreed with Ozal’s policies in the Gulf crisis were offered a
single option: they could resign. That, indeed, was the fate of Turkey’s Com-
mander-in-Chief, Minister of Defense, and Foreign Minister, Necip Torumtay,
Safa Giray, and Ali Bozer, respectively. Ozal’s policies during the crisis were pru-
dent, but his rhetoric was belligerent – some called it “zoological” – and directed
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at “the serpent of Baghdad” whose head the Turkish President proposed to
crush. (He also said “that the only way to survive with a hawk like Saddam is to
be yourself a hawk.”) Without preempting UN Security Council decisions relat-
ing to Iraq, Ozal complied with them to the letter throughout the Gulf crisis.
Dismissing diplomacy or economic sanctions as means of inducing Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait, Ozal fervently advocated the military option. He gave
the coalition forces all possible military aid, short of engaging Turkish troops in
the fighting.41
The fiercest opposition to Ozal’s policies came from within his own camp.
The Generals in his entourage feared that his violently anti-Saddam rhetoric
would ultimately set off a war with Iraq. They were concerned lest the Turkish
army’s antiquated armaments would not stand up to the Iraqis’ combat experi-
ence and modern weaponry. Ozal’s Foreign Ministry complained that when the
crisis came to an end, coalition forces would vacate the region, leaving Turkey
alone to confront Iraq. Opposition also came from conservative circles within
his Motherland Party who sought to restrict his power. In quarters more remote
from the President, religious circles claimed that, as an Islamic state, Turkey
should support Saddam against the Crusade of the Christian West. In their
opinion, Ozal failed to show consideration for Iraq’s Muslim character, or
convey admiration for the words “Allah is Great!” which appear on the Iraqi flag.
Indeed, Saddam Hussein did gain some sympathies among sections of the Turk-
ish people, in contrast to the hostility of the country’s decision-makers. In
Turkey, as in other Arab and Muslim countries that had joined the anti-Iraq
coalition, the populace, in marked contrast to the ruling elite, was to a degree
sympathetic towards Saddam.
Ozal could rely on his army, despite the conflicting stands that the Generals
and he had taken vis-à-vis Iraq. To be precise, the President could be sure that
the Turkish military would refrain from intervening by either removing him
from office or seizing power. The year of 1990 marked the end of the pattern of
the “ten-year cycle” of 1960, 1971 and 1980, when the Turkish army intervened
in domestic politics, changing the composition of the government, taking over
the reins of power and dispersing parliament. It was plain to everyone, includ-
ing the Turkish army, that further intervention on its part would prompt fierce
criticism from Europe. Turkey’s wish to demonstrate the existence of a stable,
Western-style democracy in Turkey would suffer an intolerable setback from
any further military intervention in domestic politics. Such a step would have
offered deadly ammunition to those who did not want Turkey in the EU. But
Turkey’s unrelenting support of the anti-Iraq coalition was in great part given
with an eye to improving Turkey’s relations with the EU.
There is yet one other matter to which Ozal gave his attention. In January
1991, only days before the outbreak of the Gulf War, Turkey proclaimed a seem-
ingly dramatic switch in policy towards its Kurdish citizens. For the first time,
Kurds were permitted to use their language, names, and literature, and pursue
their heritage and history. The Kurdish issue was opened up for a discussion
22 Turkey: facing a new millennium
never held before, with first-ever proposals for a response not exclusively force-
ful and military. Views differed as to the motives behind Ozal’s step. On the eve
of the Gulf War, with Turkey manifestly adhering to the anti-Iraq coalition, Ozal
may have thought his country’s pro-Western image would be enhanced by a
saner and more moderate domestic policy. Alas, Ankara’s moderation appears
to have been directed at the Iraqi Kurds rather than their Turkish brethren.
Turkey’s post-Gulf War Kurdish policies apparently prove this: it shows toler-
ance towards the Kurds of Iraq, while persisting in its campaign against its own
Kurds. Ozal was hoping that the Iraqi Kurds would subsequently help him to
foster his links with other elements in Iraq, in the event of Iraq’s disintegration
in the wake of hostilities. (Iran, it should be recalled, then acted similarly in rela-
tion to the Shi’ites of southern Iraq.) History seemed to repeat itself because in
December 2001 Turkey launched a similar policy: anticipating America’s “War
Against Terror” to be waged also against Iraq, and a consequent breakdown
of the regime in Baghdad, Ankara amassed its forces in northern Iraq. The
Turkish infantry and the 160 or so tanks should help Turkish interests in case a
new map has to be drawn for Iraq.42
Regional reaction
Turkish declarations and deeds left no room for doubt as to Ankara’s total com-
mitment to the West’s anti-Baghdad coalition. It was a clear signal: Turkey, it
seemed, had reverted to the 1950s, when Ankara, under the premiership of
Adnan Menderes, was the most pro-Western capital in the Middle East. There
were times in-between when this was not the case. In 1980, for example, during
one of the coolest periods in Turkish–American relations, Turkey turned down
an American request to join in sanctions against Iran, following the American
hostage crisis in Tehran.43 Menderes and Turkey’s total identification with the
West drew condemnation, often vicious, from the Arab Middle East, whose
venom was reflected in caricatures of Turkey as a small dog sniffing at the rear
quarters of a larger hound (the United States, the UK), or a lapdog being
dragged by its Western master.44
In 1990, however, it was Yasser Arafat who, after supporting Saddam Hussein
fervently throughout the Gulf crisis and war, complained bitterly of the interna-
tional community’s hypocrisy in relation to Iraq. The world was up in arms
about Iraq’s actions in Kuwait in 1990, but that selfsame world had come to terms
with Turkey’s aggression in Cyprus ever since 1974. Greece reveled in the com-
parison but in Turkey it further inflamed declarations against Iraq. The concept
of “linkage” between the solution of the Kuwait crisis and the resolution of con-
flicts elsewhere, as in Cyprus or in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, were vehemently rejected in Turkey; but not only there. On 15 March
1991, at a press conference in Martinique, President George Bush backed Turkey
unequivocally. The Cyprus conflict was not among Middle East problems for
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whose solution Washington would extend aid. Cyprus was not part of the Middle
East, its affairs should be entrusted to the United Nations, argued Bush, thereby
effectively putting paid to any solution of the conflict in the foreseeable future.
And Greece, it should be recalled, had to settle for moral support from the Euro-
pean Parliament in the form of an 18 April 1991 resolution, urging that the
resolve applied in the Gulf War apply equally in Cyprus.45
Even Kuwait was not “thrilled” by Turkish support. In March 1991, in a
lavish one-page publication in the Washington Post, the Kuwaiti government
thanked all the governments and states that had aided in liberating its country.
The list, however, omitted Turkey. Turkey’s response was not long delayed: a few
days later, Turkish state television screened the movie Lawrence of Arabia, as a
reminder of Arab perfidy and ingratitude during the First World War.
Aftermath of the war: economic losses
Turkey’s war losses were heavy, somewhere between the conservative estimate of
9 billion dollars and a long-range estimate of over 35 billion dollars. The losses
stemmed from the decline in tourist revenues, the absence of Iraqi oil royalties
from the line which pipes oil from Kerkuk to Yumurtalik (an annual loss of 400
million dollars), the loss of markets and the cessation of services and construc-
tion in Iraq and Kuwait. A fleet of more than 40,000 trucks fell idle. Before the
imposition of the UN Security Council’s sanctions these vehicles had operated
between Turkey and Iraq, serving as the “oxygen in the blood” of the trade
between the two countries. Most of the vehicles belonged to people in southeast
Turkey, which is populated largely by Kurds. Their idleness further exacerbated
the economic crisis in that area. Turkey was not even permitted to empty the
contents of the oil lines running through its territory. (When the Gulf War
erupted, 7.2 million barrels of oil remained in the Kerkuk–Yumurtalik pipeline.)
When the war started, the UN Security Council affirmed that use of the oil
lodged in the pipeline would prejudice the export embargo imposed on Iraq. At
the same time Turkey found itself saddled with somewhere between 500,000 and
700,000 Kurdish refugees from Iraq, concentrated at sixteen points on either
side of the Iraq–Turkish border.46 Furthermore, unlike Egypt, for example,
whose external debts were mainly to Western governments, and could therefore
be written-off in return for its adherence to the anti-Iraq coalition, most of
Turkey’s external debts (some 43 billion dollars), were due to private banking
creditors, making it harder for Ankara to get these rescheduled.
Inflation in Turkey rose to 71.1 percent in 1991, compared with 60.3 percent
in the year preceding the Gulf War. Interest went sky-high that year, reaching 105
percent on an annual basis. The gross national product (GNP) decreased, as did
the growth of agricultural and industrial production, the latter from 9.1 percent
in 1990 to a mere 3.2 percent in 1991. The service sector expanded by a mere 1.1
percent in 1991, compared with 9.4 percent in 1990. Increase in overall GDP,
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which had rocketed by 9.2 percent in 1990, declined to 1.5 percent the following
year. An indication of the economic slowdown can be found in the following
figures: accounts in Turkish banks in 1991 were in credit to a total 272 million
dollars. In 1990, the selfsame accounts were in more active use, showing over-
drafts to a total of 2.6 billion dollars.47
Turkey, understandably, has a direct interest in the cancellation of the eco-
nomic sanctions against Iraq or, at least, in their reduction. Not waiting for a
move from the Security Council, Ankara signed contracts with Iraq for the
importation of crude oil in lieu of Iraqi debts. This stimulated the transportation
sector in the country’s southeast and created new jobs.48 Simultaneously, Turkey
expended much diplomatic activity in promoting UN Resolution 986 which calls
for “Oil for Food” and allows Iraq, since December 1996, to export 2.1 million
barrels a day (equal to 2 billion dollars every six months), in return for the import
of food and medicines. The UN decided to ensure that the proceeds would not
be spent on weaponry and earmarked 53 percent of it for Baghdad to buy food
and medicines. Thirteen percent were to serve the UN agencies active in the Iraqi
Kurdish areas. Thirty percent were to be paid to Kuwait and, proportionally, to
other countries that suffered from the Iraqi aggression. The rest was to cover the
expenses of the UN observers that run the Oil for Food project.
In 1998 the amount the UN allowed Baghdad to earn by exporting its oil,
was raised to 5.25 billion dollars per 6 months. But falling oil prices (8–9 dollars
per barrel in early 1999), plus production limits – Iraq’s oil fields cannot pump
nearly that much and do not exceed 2.1 million barrels a day – caused proceeds
to fall much below the 5.25 billion amount. (The pre-1991 Gulf War level stood
on 3.5 million barrels a day.) Consequently, the UN has allowed Baghdad to
spend 300 million dollar for the purchasing of spare parts and to upgrade capac-
ity. However, the process is slow and behind schedule, and would take years to
complete. Nevertheless, some progress has been made and Iraqi oil production,
plus the quantity sold to Jordan under special arrangements, has risen to 2.6
million barrels a day, allowing Iraq to earn 18 billion dollars in 2000.49
Resolution 986 has reduced the economic pressures on Turkey since both
the oil and the foods pass in and out of Turkey. The “Oil for Food” agreement is
estimated to bring Turkey about 500 million dollar a year. (For comparison,
between 1985 and 1990, Turkish exports to Iraq were 780 million dollar a year.
The entire annual volume of trade between the two countries during those years
– including Turkey’s oil imports – reached 4 billion dollars.)50 Furthermore,
Ankara agreed to extend the mandate of “Operation Northern Watch” if the
United States consented to the partial revival of Iraqi–Turkish trade. Washing-
ton agreed and allowed the resumption of trade between the two countries,
within the strict confines of the “Oil for Food” agreement.
“Operation Northern Watch,” it should be recalled, forbids Iraqi flights over
northern Iraq past the thirty-sixth latitude. This, in accordance with UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions accepted after the Gulf War, was to provide on one-
tenth of the Iraqi territory (about 19,000 square miles or 49,000 square
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kilometers) a “Safe Haven,” or “Safe Zone,” for the Kurds. More than forty-five
American and British airplanes and some 1400 soldiers take part in these activ-
ities (known up to 1997 as “Operation Provide Comfort” and “Poised
Hammer”), whose headquarters are located at the air base in Incirlik in south-
ern Turkey, with ground and support elements in Silopi and Batman. There are
two no-flight zones in Iraq: above the thirty-sixth parallel which covers most of
the Kurdish “Safe Haven” imposed in April 1991, and the southern no-flight
zone imposed in August 1992 to protect Shi’ite Muslims in Iraq. The southern
zone now covers the southern third of Iraq, reaching the thirty-third parallel,
and extends to the outskirts of Baghdad. Turkey cooperates with this monitor-
ing – among other things it further confirms its deterrence vis-à-vis Iraq – but
insists that it will be coordinated with Iraq. Ankara is concerned lest the inter-
national force might extend help, even unintentionally, to PKK people also
active in northern Iraq. For instance, there have been reports that a transport
aircraft belonging to the force and operating from Incirlik dropped aid supplies
in various places in the “Safe Haven” where Kurdish rebels were known to be.51
The war’s aftermath: Turkey’s gains
There are various ways of measuring Turkey’s Gulf War gains. One, no doubt, is
the fact that the fighting was left to others. Turkey’s greatest success is that for
more than seventy years there has not been a war on Turkish territory. There are
not many countries in the world that can match this record, especially not the
countries of the Middle East. During the 500 years of the Ottoman Empire,
Turkey never stopped fighting. Quincy Wright found that between 1450 and 1900
the Ottoman Empire spent an average of sixty-one years per century fighting.52 In
the Second World War Turkey was already pursuing a policy of “abstinence”: it
refused to fight on any side, thereby avoiding both Nazi occupation and Soviet
“liberation.” Leaving war to others and concentrating on bringing Turkey into the
twentieth century has been Ankara’s international policy since the establishment
of the republic in 1923. Accordingly, the neutrality exhibited by Turkey towards
conflicts and wars in the Middle East – among other things, for the purpose of
precluding any accusations of “neo-Ottomanism” – remained in force during the
Gulf War. Not a single Turkish soldier crossed his country’s borders.
But no less important is that Turkey gained security. The Iraqi army was
weakened, significant parts of it were annihilated and Iraq has been subjected to
extensive intelligence surveillance. While the Iraqi army lay in ruins, the Turk-
ish army, thanks to Western gratitude, remedied many of its deficiencies. It
replenished its second-rate, inadequate arms arsenal, acquiring vast amounts of
modern weapons, including 600 M60 tanks, 400 Leopard tanks, 700 armored
troop carriers, and an assortment of helicopters, missiles and airplanes. The
“Patriot” missiles stationed in Turkey in the course of the fighting were ulti-
mately left in place. Turkey’s air force gained over forty US combat airplanes,
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while its aircraft industry (TAI) has been licensed to construct forty-six F-16s
and, moreover, to sell them, in this instance, to Egypt. Turkey is now in second
place among all the countries receiving surplus American weaponry. As of the
early 1990s it had received 1.53 billion dollars. (Greece is in first place with 1.8
billion dollars and Israel is third with 718 million dollars.) Turkey has since
received billions of dollars in export contracts, oil deliveries, customs conces-
sions, grants, canceled debts and access to markets, which have more than made
up for its initial losses. Textile exports to the United States, for example, are up
50 percent, comprising 1 percent of US textile imports. In 1998 the trade volume
between Turkey and the United States reached 6.289 billion dollar – 3.25 billion
in 1990 – almost twice what it was just before the Gulf War.53
Turkey’s political gains vis-à-vis Washington are also impressive, especially
on issues pertaining to Turkish–Greek relations and Cyprus. From 1980 up to
the Gulf War, the United States granted the two countries military and economic
aid in a seven:ten ratio, Turkey, being larger, receiving the larger share. United
States military aid to the two countries served to deter them from attacking one
another over Cyprus and over matters relating to sovereignty and territorial
waters in the Aegean Sea. However, with the growth of tensions in the Middle
East and around Turkey, the bolstering of Turkish power was considered more
pressing than the preservation of the Greco-Turkish balance of forces.54 An
opportunity for breaking out of the seven:ten straitjacket was offered by the Gulf
crisis, the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the eruption of
violence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Washington’s policy
position – in apparent discharge of a pledge to President Ozal given in return for
Turkey’s aid to the coalition forces during the Gulf campaign – put an end to the
seven:ten ratio in US relations with Turkey and Greece. In 1996 the United
States reverted for a while to the seven:ten ratio, but towards the end of the 1990s
it was totally quashed (see Chapter 6).
The Economist’s “Survey Turkey” concluded its June 1996 chapter on Turkey
in the following words: “If you had to pick ten countries in the world you would
least like to live next to, they would be bound to include some of Turkey’s neigh-
bors.” “You don’t know what is it like to have Saddam Hussein, Hafez Assad and
the Iranians next door,” complain the Turks. And just how stable, they ask, are
the new countries to their east: Azerbaijan and Armenia? And what would
happen if Russia became aggressively nationalist and tried to restore its hege-
mony in the region?55 Similarly, a Turkish official has expressed himself recently:
“I only wish God had built Turkey somewhere else.” One can sympathize with
this anxiety. The only thing missing in Turkey’s list of woes is a border conflict
with Chechnya – the two do not have a common border. Then it would have
been easy to observe just how Turkey is inextricably drawn into every possible
conflict in the area.
Seemingly, there is no external conflict or focus of internal instability in
which Turkey has not been involved in one way or another: Iraq, Iran, Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbejan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkey and the Gulf War 27
Syria, Muslim extremism and a civil war with the PKK. In the same breath,
however, one can praise Turkish policies which, despite all those undesirable
neighbors, has wisely managed to keep out of trouble and minimize possible
damages. Similarly, the 1990s have defused many of the conflicts and sores men-
tioned here, thus removing pressures on Turkey’s strategic calculations and
easing some of its strains – to mention but few: the end of the cold war, the weak-
ening of Iraq, and the defeat of the PKK. Conversely, the shortening of the list of
strife that Turkey has been embroiled with has worsened the situation of those
who still remained in conflict with Turkey. The result, for Greece for instance,
was a recalculation of its stand vis-à-vis Turkey, ending in opting for a dialogue
with her (see Chapter 6).
Turkey’s non-participation in the Gulf War – i.e. avoiding the dispatch of
soldiers – was classical testimony to Ankara’s spectacular caution. There is a firm
basis for the assumption, therefore, that Turkey will not be tempted to respond
to the call of the Time magazine writer (mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter) to become the policeman or the regional superpower in the service of
the West. There is nothing like the Gulf War to remind us that the gendarmes
will not be Turks. Turkey, perhaps, will serve as a courier, an intermediary. Pres-
ident Suleiman Demirel, still in the capacity of Prime Minister when writing
these words, made this clear: “We may be a bridge to Asia but we do not pretend
to be the voice of Asia. On the contrary, for our closest neighbors we represent
the voice of Europe.”56
The Gulf War and the period following it produced some results that will
make things easier for Turkey in the future. As mentioned above, the Iraqi army
received an enormous blow and Iraq remains under close intelligence surveil-
lance – the war was traumatic because it demonstrated how little relevant intel-
ligence on Iraq was available. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, its traditional
protégé being Baghdad, was dismembered. These elements improve Turkey’s
situation and leave it with the largest and strongest army in the Middle East –
800,000 soldiers.
Turkey’s army demonstrated considerable restraint during the Gulf War
and it was the army Generals who demanded restraint from President Ozal,
a rather exceptional occurrence in army–state relations. When forced by
resistance from the military and the Foreign Ministry, Ozal was unable to
involve Turkey more actively in the war against Iraq by dispatching ships and
troops.57 However, the resignation of the Chief-of-Staff, General Necip Torum-
tay (Feroz Ahmad’s description of him: “an unusual officer, who loved classical
music and serious reading and was fluent in English”), because of differences
with President Ozal, constituted a very positive development in army–state rela-
tions. Previously, it had been the government that gave in when differences with
the army arose, unless, as happened twice, the army physically intervened and
took over from the government. As Gareth Winrow put it, powerful civilian
rulers can still overrule military commanders. Indeed, already as Prime Minis-
ter, Ozal demonstrated unusual determination against the army when, in 1987,
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he insisted on the appointment of Torumtay and not the army’s candidate,
Necdet Oztorun. Significantly, this was dubbed in Turkey a “civilian coup.”58
Still, the continuation of the war against the PKK and the danger of inter-
nal instability raised some anxieties lest the army would try to force its opinions
on the government. There were even those who believed that the brass were not
really interested in ending the Kurdish uprising because it provided them with
an excuse for threatening to take, or taking, power.59 It is impossible to exagger-
ate the extreme harm to Turkish democracy that such a takeover would have
caused, not to mention the damage to Turkey’s international position. Those
who take pleasure in Turkey’s trials and tribulations most certainly would have
enjoyed occurrences like the army’s intervention in politics. As is well known,
such straightforward interventions on behalf of the military did not take place.
There were instead conspicuous moves that eventually led to resignation of
politicians, Prime Minister Erbakan, for instance (see Chapter 4).
Among the other harmful effects caused by the army–PKK war, was the
slowdown in decreasing the size of the Turkish army. Because of the blow sus-
tained by the Iraqi army and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Turkish army was
supposed to have been reduced in numbers between 1991 and 1996 by more
than half – from 1.1 million soldiers to between 350,000 and 500,000 – with less
conscripts and more career soldiers. However, the Turkish military still numbers
720,000–800,000 and length of service is still eighteen months rather than the
projected twelve months, though with shorter service for the reserve forces. In
addition to the war with the PKK that lasted until 1999, the unsettled situation
of Turkey’s neighbors has also contributed to this slowdown.60
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32 Turkey: facing a new millennium
The Economist’s “Survey of Turkey” might serve as a motto for our discussion:
Turkey is more like a tree, with roots in many different cultures and ethnicities. In
its early years it was pruned and trained to grow strictly in one direction: Turkish.
Now, in its maturity, its branches tend to go their own way, seeking their own kind
of light.1
Up until the winter of 1991, there were no Kurds in Turkey, merely “Mountain
Turks” – even in this definition an aspect of Turkishness was granted to the
Kurds. These people, like other non-Turkish elements, were encouraged to forget
their own language and culture, and undergo “Turkification.” Their Kurdish her-
itage was to be rooted out. The Turkish media mentions that some 8,000 villages
and towns have been renamed in Turkish under Article 5542 of Turkish law.2
Names of mountains and lakes have been changed into Turkish. Kurdish families
were asked to give Turkish names to their children. These bans and the prohibi-
tion on Kurdish publications – actually in action since the mid-1920s – were
slightly lifted in 1991. Still, above all else, Turkey opposes any form of ethnic
expression reflecting Kurdish nationalism or inclinations towards autonomy,
within Turkey or beyond its borders. Any expression of Kurdish separatism out-
side Turkey was bound to stir up the millions of Kurds living within its borders –
12 million or more, out of a population of close to 65 million.
As a result of guerrilla and terror campaigns launched since 1984 by the
Kurdish Workers Party (the PKK) against the Turkish authorities and Turkish
civilians, the government of then Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, proclaimed (in
1987) a state of emergency. This was imposed in seven provinces, out of
Turkey’s seventy-six, which are in the southeast of the country and are largely
Kurdish populated. Even though power had been restored in Turkey to civil
bodies and institutions in 1983 – after it had been rescinded in the 1980 coup
d’état of General Kenan Evren – policy towards the Kurds continued to be
2
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determined by the army. Also, in the mixed decision-making bodies the mili-
tary has the upper hand when it comes to the Kurdish issue. The discussions
pertaining to the Kurds made by Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) – a
body that makes recommendations to the cabinet – often reflect the military
stand and are rarely overruled. According to the 1982 constitution the govern-
ment has to give priority to policy decisions made by the NSC.3 Philip Robins
notes that personal experience induced Turkish politicians, Suleiman Demirel
when serving as Prime Minister in particular, to refrain from reducing the
army’s role in relation to the Kurds. On two occasions, in 1971 and 1980, while
officiating as Prime Minister, Demirel had been subjected to military interven-
tions, and he preferred to avoid granting the army a pretext for intervening a
third time.4
But much of the harm that was sustained by Turkey as a result of the Gulf
War had to do with the Kurdish issue. As noted above, following the war, some
700,000 Kurds fled the Iraqi army in the direction of Turkey. Turkey alleged that
Saddam chased the Kurds into its territory in revenge for Turkish aid to the
coalition forces in the Gulf fighting. Bearing in mind his record, Saddam could
have easily annihilated the Kurds; the fact that he chose to drive them into
Turkey shows it was vindictiveness, claimed Turkey. Instead of blaming Iraq for
the travails of the Kurdish refugees, Western media showed Turkish soldiers
beating Kurdish refugees as they tried to cross into Turkish territory. Ankara was
incensed: hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees had received assistance in
Turkish army installations along the border with Iraq. Thousands more had
found refuge inside Turkey itself, and Turkey had expended some 1.6 million
dollar a day for an extended period on the welfare of these refugees.5
Baghdad’s loss of authority in northern Iraq, when the “Safe Zone” was
allotted to the Kurds, did not leave a vacuum for long. The PKK took root in
northern Iraq, around the towns of Kerkuk, Sulaymaniya, Dukan, Arbil and
Zakho. From there it conducted a campaign of terror against Turkey. Increas-
ingly, in a conflict that verged on civil war, the damage was enormous, with up
to sixty casualties daily on both sides. In such an atmosphere, the average Turk
regarded any concession to the Kurds – even if merely social or cultural – as
capitulation to terrorism and a recipe for Turkey’s territorial disintegration.
And, since the army dictated policy towards the Kurdish rebellion, non-military
options have been removed from the range of means available to Turkey in deal-
ing with the uprising. Turkey’s own Kurds have given up moderation and a will-
ingness to come to an understanding with, and integration into, the Turkish
mainstream. Their support was gradually moving towards the PKK, the solu-
tion ultimately to pursue separation from Turkey, and the creation of Kurdish
statehood. The upheaval in the southeast that in the 1970s resulted primarily
from economic reasons, became politicized and, in the 1980s, violent, and even
more so in the 1990s. In sum, during the 1990s, the Kurdish problem confronted
Turkey with a complex challenge that threatened its territorial integrity and
overshadowed its external relations.
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The PKK was indeed making efforts to gain control over areas of southeast-
ern Turkey, functioning in various domains as a fully-fledged government,
thereby undermining the authority of Ankara. The government controlled
enclaves of military bases, defended by armor and artillery and yet was power-
less to protect people still collaborating with them. Bakers discovered delivering
bread to an army base were put to death by the PKK. Fuel stations serving the
authorities were set alight and the owners killed. State institutions such as Turk-
ish Airlines, for example, have been closely guarded, operating, in effect, out of
fortresses. At nightfall, virtually all semblance of Turkish rule vanished: the PKK
ruled the roost. Inhabitants were required to pay taxes to the PKK, on pain of
death. Many dared not serve in government-sponsored paramilitary organiza-
tions (like the Village Guards – see p. 51), or other state posts for fear of being
marked “as revolutionary targets.” Local inhabitants were forbidden to join any
Turkish political party. Legal matters were entrusted exclusively to “people’s
courts.” The distribution or sale of newspapers published in Istanbul or Ankara
was banned in Kurdish areas as was watching television. Inhabitants were
required to remove television antennas “so that justice is not merely done; it is
seen to be done.” Schools experienced destruction: they were regarded by the
PKK as emblems of “Turkish imperialism,” belong to the “colonial assimilation
system,” from which the Kurdish culture and language were omitted. Teachers
who refused to resign risked their lives: forty-seven teachers were murdered in
the course of 1993 alone; more than 100 teachers were murdered for teaching
Turkish to Kurdish children. Altogether some 500 schools were burnt and 3,060
closed down. All types of family planning were resisted by the PKK: the organi-
zation regarded these as racist acts done by Ankara to reduce the Kurdish popu-
lation in the southeastern provinces of Turkey. Gambling in any form was
forbidden, as was excessive consumption of alcohol. Drunkenness was a crimi-
nal offence. In some places, the PKK enforced a total ban on the sale of alcohol.
Alcohol vendors courted a fine of 50 million Turkish pounds – about 1,000 US
dollars. Candidates for local elections had to have prior clearance from the PKK.6
The activities of the PKK were financed by millions of dollars in donations –
some extracted under duress from Kurds working in Europe. (There are 500,000
Kurds living in Western Europe, 400,000 of them in Germany.) Kurdish-owned
businesses, in Turkey or elsewhere, paid a “revolutionary tax.” Millions of dollars
flowed into PKK coffers from the drug trade: the organization has controlled
30–40 percent of the heroin traffic from Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon, which
passes through Turkey on its way to Europe.7 Some 5,000 trained PKK fighters
were active inside Turkey, supported by 150,000 militiamen and 2 million Turk-
ish Kurd sympathizers. Until the early 1990s, the PKK avoided pitched battles
with the Turkish army. Instead, they undertook daring raids on police vehicles
and bases, officers’ clubs and other military installations. As shown below, both
contenders changed radically their strategies: the PKK, using its bases in north-
ern Iraq, began to operate as a conventional army. On its part, Turkey greatly
improved its anti-guerilla warfare, but also conducted an effective conventional
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war against the PKK. The moment the PKK bore more signs of a regular army
and less of an underground organization, the Turkish army could exert more suc-
cessfully its supremacy, resulting from it being a highly modernized conventional
army now fighting another one, which only recently was an agrarian guerilla
group (see pp. 43–44).8
Awareness of the aims and character of the conflict and the changes it has
undergone are vital for an understanding of the Turkish–Kurdish problem, and
of the role of the “Safe Zone” in the conflict. Abdullah Ocalan, also known as
“Apo,” or “uncle” – his followers known as “Apocu’s” – founded the PKK in
November 1978, when he was still a political science student at Ankara Univer-
sity. Indeed, Henry Barkey attributes the discovery of Kurdishness and the process
of politization by students and workers of Kurdish origin, to large migration
movements inside Turkey. These people, who previously had become thoroughly
Turkish, migrated from the rural areas to Turkey’s metropolitan industrial and
educational centers, Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara.9 After the September 1980 coup
in Turkey, Ocalan – the name means “revenge” – fled to Lebanon. From there,
and from Syria or Syrian-controlled territory, he directed the Kurdish uprising
from 15 August 1984 until his capture by the Turks in February 1999. The
accepted version is that the PKK rebellion had begun with the 15 August attack,
in which thirty Turkish soldiers and citizens were killed.
Ocalan’s statements were pointed: “The Kemalists were wrong. They
claimed to have buried the Kurds, but we tore off our burial-shrouds”; or “The
whole of Kurdistan has been cleared [of its Kurdish population] by the Turks;
is it so bad if the PKK clears [i.e. massacres] a few fascist villages?” These and
similar utterances by Ocalan, give an inkling of the degree of hostility and bru-
tality involved in their campaigns. (The Kurdish organization had a special
trademark: it hacked off the noses of its opponents.) The PKK appeared to be
the world’s most vicious terrorist underground. Some – not exclusively Turks
– compared its brutality with that of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, or Peru’s
“Shining Path” underground. The PKK was held responsible for the murder of
thousands of innocent Turkish Kurds, aimed at dissuading collaboration with
the Turkish authorities, or drumming up support. To Ocalan at least, the
objective was to reduce Turkey to a prolonged state of chaos and disorder. Such
a state of affairs would ultimately provoke another military coup, putting an
end to democracy and isolating Turkey in the international community. This
would make foreign intervention on behalf of the Kurds more likely, resulting
in the imposition of a sort of a Kurdish “Safe Haven” inside Turkey, similar to
the one the United Nations has enforced in northern Iraq for the Iraqi Kurds.
One could question the prudence of these aims and their relevance to Turkey’s
realities or to the readiness of the international community to do something
for the benefit of the Kurds inside Turkey. One way or another, according to
Turkish interpretation, such a conflict as Ocalan had envisaged, was supposed
to smooth the path toward the fulfillment of PKK aspirations: Kurdish self-
determination.10
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The Kurds have rebelled sixteen times against the Turks over the past
seventy years. From the 1930s to the 1960s, their rebellions, confined to the
southeastern provinces, were generally handled effectively by the Turkish
authorities. The PKK rebellion launched in 1984 is the seventeenth (or the
twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth according to other counts).11 It developed into
all-out war, embracing seventeen provinces in southeastern Turkey. Of all the
campaigns the Kurds have waged, that of 1984 was the longest, the bloodiest,
and at times the most successful from their point of view. The total death toll so
far was 34,000. The campaign has been extended to Turkey’s main cities and
tourist centers, and to West European capitals.
During its early stages the PKK prudently avoided evolving into a regular
army, thereby excluding the possibility that the Turkish army would be able to
exploit its military superiority. The underground’s guerilla forays and vicious
terrorism destabilized Turkish rule in the southeastern provinces, preventing
the region’s economic development. In particular, the PKK targeted the GAP
water development project in Turkey’s southeast because, among its objectives,
the GAP is designed to restrict the Kurds’ nationalist zeal by moderating the
social and economic discrimination of which they complain.
If the exploits of the seventeenth Kurdish uprising were exceptional, Turk-
ish repression was equally extreme and unprecedented. Alas, it goaded entire
Kurdish populations, hitherto passive, into active support for the underground.
The Generals’ coup of 1980 took the anarchy and violence of the late 1970s as a
pretext for military intervention in domestic politics. The Turkish response thus
made the 1980 coup a turning point in the Kurdish campaign, with counter-ter-
rorism at its strongest in the entire history of the Turkish republic. The Kurdish
uprising, likewise a turning point, could thus be largely attributed to the exces-
sive nature of Turkish counter-measures which followed the 1980 coup. A
vicious circle had thus been created.
Escalation of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict sidelined moderates on both
sides. The PKK appeared to be the sole option open to the Kurds. Kurdish lead-
ers displayed growing disdain for the Turkish state and their declarations were
increasingly separatist. Mass demonstrations, strikes in city centers, and protest
actions attracted ever-growing numbers from the Kurdish community in
Turkey and elsewhere. The red, yellow and green colors of the Kurdish flag –
banned in Turkey – have been increasingly evident in the Kurds’ dress and pub-
lications. The Kurdish challenge is not sustained exclusively by local motivation;
the conflict with Turkey is not the only ground from which it emerges. It draws
upon worldwide demands for greater democracy, and the erosion of all-embrac-
ing ideologies such as communism or Kemalism, with their intolerance of non-
conformists and minorities. In this respect, the Kurdish uprising did not differ
from a broad global tide that reflected a desire for greater ethnic and national
self-expression.12
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The “Safe Zone” in northern Iraq
The “Safe Zone” in northern Iraq, along with the various interpretations placed
on it by the parties involved, also represents a turning point in the Kurdish–
Turkish conflict. In the PKK view, Kurdish soil has been, for the first time,
under Kurdish rule; for the first time, Kurds are enjoying the trappings of state-
hood and sovereignty over territory. From this to statehood, the distance could
be short. Ostensibly, the PKK use of this territory as a base of anti-Turkish
forays improved the Kurd positions in their campaign for an independent 
Kurdistan. But unlike the PKK, the Kurds of northern Iraq – grasping the “Safe
Zone’s” dependency upon Turkey – interpreted their control thereof as some-
thing less than a state. Moreover, the Kurds of northern Iraq, Massoud
Barazani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in particular, have gone so far 
as to collaborate with the Turkish government against the PKK. Their depen-
dency upon Turkey is total with regard to supplies as well as to defense against
Iraqi attacks.
Matters were even more complex: since October 1991, Turkish territory has
hosted a multination air force, composed largely of American planes and troops,
but also including crews and air crafts from France, Britain and Turkey, under
Turkish and American command. Their mission is the defense of the “Safe
Zone.” Turkey has a veto with regard to operations over Iraqi territory. Further-
more, there is a decades-old understanding between Baghdad and Ankara
regarding the need to restrict – or crush – any expression of Kurdish national
aspirations. The integrity of Turkey and Iraq would be prejudiced should an
independent Kurdistan emerge on their territories. A classical expression of this
understanding is the protest from Baghdad – invariably belated and lukewarm
– against the Turkish army’s forays into Iraqi territory in its operations against
the Kurdish rebels.
For its part, Turkey could not help perceiving the qualitative benefits the “Safe
Zone” offered the PKK in its anti-Turkish operations. Moreover, these benefits
also affected the Kurds in Turkey. Their resounding dissatisfaction, now expressed
more overtly and extensively than ever before, could be attributed in part to the
effect transmitted by the “Safe Zone.” A de facto Kurdish entity has emerged in
northern Iraq, and it would be foolish to assume that it has no effect upon the
feelings of discrimination of Turkey’s Kurds or their national aspirations.
The “Safe Zone” far exceeds its post-Gulf War role as a dumping ground for
Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. It now boasts some of the trappings of state-
hood, including an elected parliament that represents the 3.6 million Iraqi
Kurds who live there (a sixth of Iraq’s population). But it faces grave problems,
whose solutions entail cooperation with Turkey against the PKK, for it is Ankara
that has enabled the zone to survive its difficulties with Baghdad. During the
1990s Iraq itself was under siege, and not only denied the zone foodstuffs and
medicines, but left it open to incursion and agricultural theft. The zone receives
Western aid supplies (150 million dollars annually) through the Turkish border.
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In effect, this dependency requires the Kurds to make do with autonomy, rather
than statehood: local Kurds fear that proclamation of a state would result in
their abandonment by Turkey and the West. The consequence is paradoxical.
The Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq will survive as long as it is
under threat from Saddam Hussein, and has not been taken over by the PKK.
When the Iraqi threat is removed, the Western multination air force will with-
draw. Should the PKK gain control, Turkey will take action against the “Safe
Zone.” This bizarre rationale leads the Kurds of the “Safe Zone” to collaborate
with the Turkish government against the PKK. As The Economist put it: in return
for a measure of independence in the “Safe Zone,” Iraqi Kurds were willing to
sacrifice millions of Turkish Kurds.13
The gravest outcome is the conclusion drawn by the Ankara authorities.
From Ankara’s point of view, experience with the “Safe Zone” and the qualita-
tive changes it has introduced into the conflict, merely demonstrate that if this
is how matters evolve from Kurdish autonomy outside Turkey’s borders, they
can only get worse should any kind of Kurdish entity be established actually on
Turkish soil. Moreover, the aggravation of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict that
followed the Gulf War caused many Turkish army circles to believe that perhaps
it would be in Ankara’s interest to have the Iraqi army back in northern Iraq.14
Worthy of further consideration is the rift between the Kurds of northern
Iraq and the Turkish Kurds, including the PKK. The PKK regards the “Safe
Zone” as a liberated Kurdish territory, meaning, in effect, that it advocates the
dismemberment of Iraq, whereas the Iraqi Kurds want a united Iraq and, as
noted, are prepared to settle for autonomy. But the PKK also attempted to pre-
vent the transportation of supply trucks from Turkey into the “Safe Zone.” As a
result, the inhabitants of the zone charge that Saddam Hussein, who is equally
interested in undermining the “Safe Zone,” supports the PKK.15
But there are other reasons for the rift between the Turkish Kurds and their
Iraqi brethren. Having long been denied Kurdish cultural expression, most
Turkish Kurds are no longer able to read or write their own language. They even
encounter difficulties in talking with their Iraqi brethren. For instance, Abdul-
lah Ocalan, who was born in 1949 in the province of Sanliurfa in southeast
Turkey, speaks Turkish but has only a poor grasp of some Kurdish dialects.
(“Apo . . . did not know Kurdish when I met him in 1991. In our interview at the
[Syrian controlled Lebanese] Bekaa he told me that he speaks Turkish, gives
orders in Turkish and think in Turkish.”)16 Turkification and urbanization have
made Turkish the language of the Kurds of Turkey’s cities, although Kurdish is
still spoken in the villages. As a result, thousands of modern concepts are con-
spicuous by their absence from the Kurdish spoken in Turkey. Nor are there in
Turkey any Kurdish translations of literary works. The Kurds of Iraq, on the
other hand, were too strong, and too concentrated, to be successfully subjected
to cultural “Iraqification.” They preserved their language and culture, employ-
ing the Arabic alphabet which, it will be recalled, is not in use in Turkey. It is they
who set the tone for “Kurdishness,” and they look down on their Turkish
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counterparts as illiterates. Over the centuries, countless accounts have pointed
to disunity, tribalism, and factionalism as the prime reasons for the Kurds’ fail-
ure to achieve self-determination. Their dispersion among five states (Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and parts of the former Soviet Union) ensures that the concern
of each country for its integrity induces the five to make common cause in
repressing the Kurds.
Even the Kurdish language, which should have served to unify the different
branches of the Kurdish people, uses dissimilar dialects and, as referred to pre-
viously, different alphabets: Arabic in Iraq, Latin in Turkey, Cyrillic in the
former Soviet Union. There are further divisive factors at work. The only factor
unifying the Kurds is their history, and their heroic leader Salah al-Din
(1139–93), Kurdish founder of the Ayyubid Dynasty that once ruled the region
and captured Jerusalem from the Crusaders. The remote past, however, is inad-
equate to alleviate the torments of the divisive present. For example, a vicious
struggle is intermittently going on between the Barazani’s KDP and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani, for the political and economic
control of the “Safe Haven.”17
Various attempts at mediation over the past few years have produced only
temporary truces among the Kurdish factions. The 1990s’ last attempt was under-
taken in Washington (August–September 1998) by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright. Washington, needless to say, prefers a united Kurdish front in northern
Iraq, able to withstand Saddam Hussein. Talabani and Barazani – both from
different regions of Kurdistan and speaking different dialects of the language –
agreed on a division of the power and the income from duties imposed on goods
coming into the “Safe Zone.” They also agreed to hold elections: the results would
determine the proportional shares of the income. A breakthrough was the KDP’s
stated willingness to share its greater revenues with the PUK as the first step in the
process of reconciliation. The sides also endorsed a federative basis for a post-
Saddam Iraq, implying a Kurdish state, within a federative Iraq.
Agreement or not, it is clear to everyone that internal Kurdish rivalries con-
tinue to tempt Saddam. Barazani and Talabani receive their oil from Iraq – part
of it they sell abroad – hence, their ability to turn against Baghdad is limited.
These rivalries also increase the dependence of the “Safe Zone” on the West and
on Turkey, and certainly weakens Kurdish interests vis-à-vis Turkey. Each and all
of the Kurdish factions are interested in joining forces with some country or some
neighboring elements – including Baghdad – in order to gain some advantage
over the other factions, even if it is only temporary. That is what happened in
August of 1996 when Barzani joined up with the Iraqi army to defeat the Talaban.
As Alan Makovsky explains, Turkey and its neighbors prefer the Kurds being
divided, and certainly worry deeply about the possible emergence of an inde-
pendent or even autonomous Kurdish entity in Iraq that would further fuel sep-
aratist sentiments among their own Kurdish communities, Turkey in particular.
Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey will eventually object to the Barazani–Talabani
agreement and try to undermine it.18
40 Turkey: facing a new millennium
Turkey and the Kurds: Ankara’s response
Overall, official Turkish reaction to the Kurdish problem could be divided into
its social, economic and, more prominently, military responses. Ankara con-
cluded that in order to assure a successful economic revival of the southeastern
provinces – home of half of its Kurdish population – it was vital to eliminate the
PKK. The PKK, for its part, realized that its own success depended, inter alia, on
foiling Turkish policy to reduce the disparities between the Kurds and the rest of
the population. Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, the GAP project became a
“Fascist Target” for PKK attacks.
In fact, GAP’s success has yet to be seen. The construction of dams and reser-
voirs on the Euphrates entailed the inundation of hundreds of Kurdish villages,
forcing thousands of Kurds off their land and filling Turkey’s cities with disgrun-
tled proletarian and petit bourgeois elements. Designed to reduce disparities
between Turks and Kurds, so far GAP has succeeded in lining the pockets of
landowners and tribal chiefs, without raising the living standards of the Kurdish
peasant masses. It is questionable whether Ankara will succeed, in the foreseeable
future, in ameliorating the lot of its millions of Kurdish subjects.
All the data concerning figures for the Kurds are slanted, either for or
against Kurdish aspirations. Official Turkish statistics set the number of Kurds
at 7.1 percent of the overall population, i.e. less than 5 million out of 65 million.
The Kurds claim to constitute 24 percent. Other estimations give any number
between 10 and 20 million Kurds who live in Turkey. A figure appearing to be
true would be around 13 percent, or about 9 million. (A 1999 nationwide survey
has found that only 1.4 percent of Turkish citizens identified themselves as
Kurds.)19 A large majority living in the big cities of western and central Turkey
and are part of mainstream Turkish life. Six million to 8 million Kurds live in the
southeast and eastern provinces. Natural increase among the Kurds is high – 3.8
percent annually in rural areas, 2.9 percent in the cities. The Turkish average in
the early 1990s was of 2.7 and 2.4 percent, respectively. The dramatic decline in
the Turkish average at the end of the 1990s – which stood at 1.5 percent – is not
matched by a similar Kurdish reduction.
The Kurdish populated southeast Turkey – where some 15 percent of the
population live – has always been a poor area. It produces only 4 percent of
Turkey’s GDP and 2 percent of its industrial output. Unemployment in the Kur-
dish sector is 25 percent – double the rate for the rest of the country. Per capita
income of the Turks is double the Kurdish average. Actually, per capita income in
the Kurdish provinces is as low as one-tenth that of Istanbul. According to the
United Nations’ latest Human Development Index, Turkey as a whole is ranked
seventy-fourth among the countries of the world, with a point value of 0.778 (on
a scale of zero to one). The index for southeastern Anatolia is as low as 0.585
points. And while the average number of Ankara students per class is seventy, and
per teacher twenty-nine, it is eighty-six in the southeastern town of Sirnak. The
value of per capita bank deposits in Turkey as a whole was 167 million Turkish
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lira (TL), i.e. 417.5 dollars (at the beginning of 1999). The figure for the south-
east is as low as TL10 million (25 dollars). Some figures further illustrate the gap
between Turkey’s west and east. While per capita income is 7,882 dollars in
Kocaeli, an industrial and commercial center an hour away from Istanbul, it is
merely 774 dollars in the eastern province of Agri. A southeastern Anatolia
family’s average monthly income was TL30 million (75 dollars) at the beginning
of 1999, which is much lower than the national monthly minimum wage of TL78
million (195 dollars). One can safely sum up that Turkey’s rising prosperity since
the 1980s (see Chapter 3), has bypassed the largely Kurdish southeastern
provinces. Aegean and Mediterranean cities flourish while rural Anatolia
remains backward. Indeed, a Turkish officer who had been fighting the PKK, and
thus became acquainted with the population in the southeastern provinces of
Turkey, described the situation there as “being alive is the only luxury that the
people of these areas have.”20
As already noted and further illustrated by these grim statistics, Turkey’s
non-military response to the conflict with the Kurds has been marginal, largely
confined to sporadic efforts to bridging social and economic gaps, while ignor-
ing the problem’s national aspects. Dogu Ergil from Ankara University,
explained that there is no “Kurdish Question” in Turkey but a “Turkish Ques-
tion;” “Kurdishness cannot be properly placed within the Turkishness that con-
stitutes the basic attributes of citizenship in the Republic of Turkey.”21 Soon after
the First World War, with the loss of Arab provinces, the Armenian community,
the population exchange with Greece, etc., the Turkish official inclination
towards pluralism of cultures was abandoned. Unity, uniformity, and the ideol-
ogy of Turkish nationalism were created as a method of nation-building. When
citizenship was based on Turkishness, members of other ethnic groups living
in Turkey had to accept it, keeping, if they wished, the religious and cultural
parts of their ethnic group and peacefully or forcefully losing the non-cultural-
religious parts (i.e. political and national identities). Accordingly, during the
twentieth century millions of Kurds have integrated into the Turkish society,
economy, culture, and politics. Two million marriages were held between Turks
and Kurds.22
Still, 90 percent of the Kurds living in Turkey in the 1920s were living along
tribal lines under the strong control of powerful Kurdish landlords (agas). The
tribal cleavages persisted and were further aggravated by keen competition for
meager resources. Unity – neither Turkish, not even Kurdish – did not prevail.
Successive uprisings that started in 1925 led southeastern Turkey to live in con-
stant strife and under a state of siege. The area was out of touch with the rest of
the society. The government invested little in an area that it did not trust much,
explained Dogu Ergil. Poverty and detachment, together with the traditional
character of the southeast rendered the area the least integrated part of Turkey.23
It was not until the early 1970s that a strong Kurdish movement appeared
on the political scene. Kurds cooperated then with the Kurdish leftist move-
ment. The harsh bans (e.g. on the use of the Kurdish language, television and
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radio, as previously mentioned) imposed by the military were lifted in 1991, but
rejection of Kurdish education continued. When Turkey’s left – the only avail-
able place for Kurds to express opposition – had been crushed by the military,
the more militant Kurds opted for an armed struggle. In this atmosphere the
PKK was conceived (in 1978), based on a contradictory Marxist-Leninist–
Kurdish-Muslim national ideology, and the acts of terror began (in 1984).
Following harsh counter-measures that the Turkish government took, the
PKK was seen as the sole road for many Kurds. The hit-and-run and guerrilla
tactics that the PKK employed in the mountains of southeast Turkey seriously
damaged the ill-prepared Turkish troops. The tide turned against the Kurdish
organization only in the early 1990s, when the PKK moved into larger units and
applied conventional warfare, thereby facilitating the supremacy of Turkey’s
conventional army. Also, useful intelligence was collected from the “Safe Zone”
by Turkish units as well as by forces belonging to the Operation Provide Com-
fort. It enormously helped in neutralizing the PKK bases there. Specially trained
Turkish commando, police and helicopter units were made available for
combat, equipped with the appropriate gear. Then Turkey managed to confine
PKK activity to specific rural areas and, eventually, got the upper hand in those
places as well.
The turning point in the confrontation with the PKK was the summer and
winter of 1991, i.e. at the time of the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War and the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union, with both events closely linked to the waning of
the cold war. The weakening of Syria that resulted from Moscow disassociating
itself from its former allies also helped the Turkish strategists in their stage B of
their anti-PKK campaign. Pulverizing the Kurdish resistance internally (stage
A) was followed by the crushing of international support given to the PKK, be
it by raids deep into northern Iraq or by intimidating Syria (see pp. 44, 48–49).
Much of the Turkish force previously deployed along the Turkish–Iraqi and the
Turkish–Soviet borders – about 200,000 troops – was assigned to the war
against the Kurdish underground. Conventional warfare tactics and weapons
that for years were directed at the threats that Turkey faced from its neighbors
and from its cold war commitments had to be redirected to the mountains and
the guerillas. Politically, the home front became favorable and the determina-
tion to beat the PKK by military means increased with the death of Turgut Ozal
(1993). The latter was the last Turkish politician to advocate other than purely
military means to end the Kurdish violence. The Turkish military then took 
the lead, viewing the PKK as a strategic threat – formerly there were various
opinions as to the type of problem Turkey was facing (riots, a local uprising, a
limited insurrection, etc.) – and that strategic threat had to be crushed by any
means. Thus, a combination of domestic and external factors assisted Turkey to
victory over the PKK.
A number of major initiatives helped the Turkish military. The first, which
started in 1995, was the importance of consolidating an area, how remote it
was, how hectic it was, and how demanding it was to keep a permanent military
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presence there. A visitor to Turkish troops holding a remote position in the
southeast of the country described the miseries the soldiers had to endure: “You
are lying in a place where 450 military personnel have only one telephone, and
can take a shower only once every three weeks [and] without seeing your family
for months.”24 The tactics of consolidating an area was not always appreciated:
on several occasions troops moved from a base in the lowlands to a hilly area,
dispersed the PKK, and returned to base. The guerrillas returned to the area and
the soldiers had to repeat the operation. “Nothing can be worse for morale,”
commented a Turkish officer.25
The second successful tactic was the employment of mixed ground and air
force anti-guerrilla warfare. The combination of lightly armed, tough special
forces supported by flying artillery and the flexibility and maneuverability of the
helicopter were dreaded by the PKK. These teams were dispatched along the
frontier with Iraq and into northern Iraq itself, denying the PKK their tradi-
tional strongholds and forcing them to fight, even in winter. In a tactic called
“The Tiger Hunt,” commandos worked in tightening concentric circles to trap
their prey. “If you see five PKKs send in 100 troops,” was the motto.26 Fighting
during winter in the freezing and snowy mountain crests of southeast Anatolia
was clearly a revolution. Never before tried, it enabled the PKK to winter there
and to prepare itself for its spring and summer offensives. The novelty caused a
Turkish General to compare it to the stubborn decision of Vice Admiral Louis
Mountbatten during the Second World War to thrust into the jungles of Burma
during the monsoon season, another non-combat time. The third influential
move was to separate the PKK, its headquarters and bases outside Turkey, both
in Syria and Iraq, and by so doing curtailing the logistics the organization
enjoyed (hospitals, for instance) in countries like Russia and the Ukraine. The
supply lines of the PKK were thus cut off. In evicting Abdullah Ocalan from
Damascus (October 1998), Turkey was implicitly assisted by its recent security
contacts with Israel, and more so by the image they created on Syria. Being
threatened by a potential north–south Turkish–Israeli squeeze, President Assad
gave in and expelled Ocalan.27 Simultaneously, the links between the PKK and
external forces and foreign countries made it easy to accuse the organization of
having no authentic roots in Turkey, of being manipulated by others, and of
pursuing the policies of anti-Turkish international elements and ideologies.
Another Turkish move that left a continuous detrimental impact on the PKK
was the successful hit on the organization’s leadership. Abdullah Ocalan is the
most well-known case. Another case of impressive impact was the capture in
April 1998 of Semdin Sakik, second-in-command of the PKK. True, there was
no short of successors, yet it greatly assisted Turkey that the PKK leadership had
to run for their lives or for fear of being captured by the Turkish military instead
of terrorizing Turkey.
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Turkey and the Kurds: cultural aspects
Kurds resident in Turkey are “Turkish citizens,” “Turkish citizens of Kurdish
origin,” “people of separatist inclinations” and, as already mentioned, “Moun-
tain Turks.” Kurds, or people of Kurdish origin, are Turks or “citizens identified
as Kurds.” Kurds living in Iraq are “northern Iraqis,” or “the groups in northern
Iraq,” or “citizens of northern Iraq,” or “kinsmen of our citizens on the far side
of the border.” Their leaders are the “tribal chiefs of northern Iraq.” Members of
the PKK are “terrorists” or “separatists.” The conflict in the southeastern
provinces of the country is referred to as “the situation,” seldom “the problem.”
But not “a Kurdish problem: there is only a terrorism problem,” or a “problem
[which is] a product of the growing disparity in socioeconomic income level.” A
broader interpretation of the issue by a Turkish newspaper introduces the reader
to new and surprising inputs: 
There is no problem such as the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey. However, a PKK
problem, supported by the Christian West, Zionism, Russia, Greece, Syria and
many others – this does exist. The Kurdish state is not what the Kurds want but what
the U.S. and the E.U. want in order to establish a mandate in the Middle East. The
Kurdish state is also essential for the realization of the Greater Israel and Greater
Armenia projects.28
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit made it clear that the issue Turkey is faced with in
its southeast is not a Kurdish problem but a lack of economic and social reforms.
Ecevit explained that it was the cessation of trade with Iraq, more specifically the
closure of the Habur Gate trade point in accordance with the UN economic
embargo, plus Iraqi debts, that caused hardships to the region. This is the
essence of the problem, not the “stories” and “legends” voiced by the PKK or by
its supporters in the West. Also, “[It is not an] ‘ethnic’ or ‘Kurdish’ issue, as
many Europeans like to call it. The problems and ailments of these regions are
largely due to their semi-feudal heritage. In those districts of southeastern
Turkey where economic and social development have reached a certain level,
terrorism has visibly abated.”29 In short, as Mesut Yegen put it, there is banditry,
smuggling, and tribalism, but no “Kurdishness [in] the Kurdish question:”
[T]he discourse of the Turkish state necessarily reads the Kurdish question in terms
of the tensions between the past and the present; tradition and modernity; the
periphery and the center; Islam and reason. Being a necessary outcome of a partic-
ular discursive formation, this reading led to the Kurdish question being reconsti-
tuted as an issue of reactionary politics; of tribal resistance and of regional
backwardness.30
Recognition of the Kurds as a community distinct from the Turks, even negoti-
ating with them thus acknowledging them as a distinct community, is perceived
by most Turkish parties as the emergence of Turkey’s “private nightmare,” the
“unravelling of a single thread, that will entail disintegration of the entire fabric.”
Turkey contains fifty-one ethnic elements or religious communities distinct from
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the Turkish majority. Some are tiny, like the Jewish community. Others number
millions, such as the Kurds, or the Alevis. Hence, you granted the Kurds special
treatment and the monolithic Kemalist conception is gravely harmed.31
The August 1920 Treaty of Sevres is often mentioned in Turkey, by Turkish
media and by Turkish politicians, and Turks are repeatedly warned against a
new Sevres. True, Sevres was never ratified but was superseded by the Treaty of
Lausanne in July 1923, which reflected the victory of the Turks, led by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, in their war of independence against Allied forces. But Sevres
was imposed upon the Ottoman Empire by the victors in the First World War,
the West, a lesson not to be forgotten in Turkey. The treaty stripped Turkey of
its Arab colonies, virtually of all Eastern Thrace, of the Aegean islands, and of
the Dodecanese. International control was to be set up on various Turkish ports
and rivers (Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandretta, the Maritsa River, etc.). The
Straits of Istanbul and the adjacent territory on the Asiatic mainland were to be
demilitarized and handed over to an international commission. Western Thrace
was ceded to Greece. The Ottoman army could be no more than 50,000 strong,
all aircraft were to be surrendered together with all the navy, except a few ships.
In addition, the treaty granted statehood to the Armenians and local autonomy
to the Kurds, at the expense of Turkey’s integrity.
To many Turks, Sevres is not a name of a small French town of northern
France, famous for its porcelain industry, but it is synonymous with “Munich.”
To this day, they are convinced that the West is merely waiting for an opportune
moment to put the Sevres plan into effect. Accordingly, any utterance drawing a
distinction between Kurds and Turks is unacceptable in Turkey – it is a repetition
of Sevres. The anti-Sevres formula thus produces an overwhelming Kemalist
unity, and excludes any deviations:
[I]nstead of smoothing relations between the various elements in our society,
our political cadres have long intentionally or unintentionally encouraged the deep-
ening of the fragmentation among those elements through left-right, secular-
fundamentalist, Alawite-Sunni differentials, favoritism towards certain religious
sects, political flirting with local notables, regional variations in industrialization
and regional discrepancies in income distributions. The long delay in smoothing all
of these disparities in society unfortunately created a suitable climate for certain
external circles to play with the Kurdish card once again . . . [W]e ourselves have
been partially creating a suitable climate for those dreamers, who are now getting
excited that they may have an opportunity in reviving the Sevres treaty.32
Even granting the Kurds self-rule – along the lines of the autonomy granted to
Spain’s minorities (e.g. the Basques) – is rejected in Turkey: “We are not the
Iberian Peninsula, and our southern neighbor is not Andorra.” The implication
is that Turkey’s neighbors are just waiting for an opportunity for territorial ret-
ribution: Syria, for example, who wants the restoration of Alexandretta. Hence,
any erosion of Turkey’s ethnic integrity would merely serve those ends. After all,
claim the Turks – in line with Turkey’s Kemalist philosophy that rules out a
homeland containing more than a single nationality – the Kurds are everywhere
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among us; Kurdish statehood would accordingly entail an unthinkable popula-
tion exchange involving millions of Kurds and Turks. For its part, the argument
continues, Turkey has never demanded autonomy, or separation, or territorial
dismemberment, as a solution for the millions of Turkmens in Iraq, or the
million or more Turks in Bulgaria, or the 100,000 Turks in Greece, in Western
Thracia. (See Chapter 6.) Why then, the question is, should the Kurds of Turkey
deserve preferential treatment? They should settle for the same equal rights, and
religious and cultural freedoms that Ankara asks for Turkish ethnic communi-
ties in foreign countries.33 As is well known, the Kurds do not follow the Turkish
example but insist on recognition of their rights.
The Turkish response is firm and unequivocal: the use of military force and,
as described by Turkish media, the resort to a scorched earth policy. This verges,
in some views, on civil war tactics. The few Turkish attempts to consider the
conflict in non-military terms have failed. Even the apparent moderation exhib-
ited by Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, owed more to Turkey’s
wish to elicit favorable reactions in the West than to a genuine change of policy
towards the Kurds. As already mentioned, In January 1991, just before the Gulf
War, President Ozal proposed abrogation of some restrictions on Kurdish cul-
tural and linguistic expression. In July 1995, Tansu Ciller proposed to enhance
freedom of expression, implying that Kurds, too, would enjoy greater liberty.
One may expect that greater freedom of expression will enable Turkish cit-
izens to voice criticism of their government. As for the Kurds, for the time being
they do not enjoy the freedom of any kind of cultural organization – as Kurds.
One can expect them to continue and labor under various restrictions. But
changes do occur. For example, as of 1991 the Kurds can speak their own lan-
guage. A public conversation in Kurdish or playing Kurdish music is no longer
considered illegal. Other changes – some of a macabre nature – were reported in
the Turkish paper, Hurriyet: in order to improve its image the Turkish army has
decided that the bodies of Kurdish rebels will no longer be publicly displayed in
the villages. Furthermore, only women or policewomen will conduct body
searches on Kurdish women. Turkish soldiers have been ordered to stop bar-
gaining in Kurdish shops. The Turkish Foreign Office also provides information
about Turkish soldiers, accused of crimes against Kurdish citizens: in 1994 out
of 1,194 cases, fifteen ended in conviction. In 1995, 962 cases were investigated
and twenty ended in conviction.34
In 1987, it will be recalled, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Turkey’s
southeastern provinces (Diyarbakir, Elazig, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman, Sirnak).
Of Turkey’s four army corps, two were stationed in these provinces; over
250,000 soldiers were employed in suppressing terror and the Kurdish uprising.
In pursuit of a policy designed to deny PKK rebels geographical and human
shelter, the army has burned down some 30 million acres of woodland in the
past decade – 25 million acres in East Anatolia alone. Over 1,500 villages were
razed to the ground to deny the PKK its human hinterland. Some set the figure
at 3,478 residential areas, of which 905 are villages and 2,523 are hamlets, from
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which 401,328 people were evacuated. Conversely, government sources attrib-
uted this migration to economic reasons (35 percent), and to PKK oppression
(60 percent). The remaining 5 percent is due to “the compulsory applications of
the provincial administration.” Altogether, for reasons to be attributed to the
war with the PKK or to harsh economic reasons, an estimated four million
people left their villages, reducing the number of farmers in the region by 75
percent.35 It has been a classical civil war, a guerilla movement fighting the cen-
tral government, a secessionary war, with the objective of acquiring a slice of ter-
ritory. All was fair in this civil strife: since its outbreak in the 1980s, it has taken
a toll of more than 34,000 lives, subjecting Turkey to enormous economic
damage and decimating its Kurdish community. 
Compromise is out of the question, as it is in any civil war inspired by over-
riding ideologies. It is Kemalism on the one hand, Kurdish-Marxist nationalism
(although the combination may seem contradictory) on the other, and the
bloodshed has soared. The two sides have been moving towards a zero-sum solu-
tion, i.e. the triumph of one side, the inevitable annihilation of the other. As
noted, the Turkish side is led by the army, which lays down an uncompromisingly
belligerent strategy. The more Turkey’s political leaders lost face because of their
failure to resolve the conflict, the greater became their tendency to leave its reso-
lution to the army. This may spring from a wish to detract attention from their
travails by indulging in military operations against a detested domestic foe or,
simply, from an awareness of the probable outcome of a showdown between the
politicians and the Generals. We have already quoted Philip Robins (see p. 34)
about President Demirel, who had endured military interventions in his political
career. It is unlikely that any Turkish politician will pick the Kurds as an issue
worthy of a showdown with the Turkish General Staff. The true state of affairs –
a civil war, with enormous suffering on both sides, which would end only after a
protracted and hectic struggle – was well illustrated by the Turkish Daily News:
“We hear stories every day how the PKK is beaten and crushed. We wish to know
what the real story is . . . we hear plenty of empty promises.”36
From the mid-1990s, the Turkish army has succeeded in keeping the Kur-
dish rebellion below “boiling point,” in both civilian and army-controlled areas,
including in the “Safe Haven” in northern Iraq. As a result, Turkish army sources
could declare: “There are no more gains to be made at the point of a gun . . . Ter-
rorism is at an acceptable level – and now it is up to the politicians to finish the
job.” Indeed, Ocalan’s suggestions, every now and then, for a cease-fire, or talks,
or a federative solution that would not entail severance from Turkey (the last
made in August 1998), testify to a weakening of the PKK underground. And
when the internal front had been dealt with, it was easy for the Turkish victor to
persuade its neighbors to stop assisting the PKK. Russia, for example, has closed
down PKK logistic bases and medical centers in Yaroslav Forest (300 km from
Moscow). But the main Turkish gain was on 20 October 1998 when Syria and
Turkey signed an anti-terror cooperation document. Following a tough Turkish
demand, within which was an explicit threat of Turkish military intervention,
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Damascus agreed to stop supporting the PKK, to stop granting shelter to
Ocalan, and to cause Lebanon to do the same. Part of the quid pro quo was that
Turkey would stop its preventive shelling deep into the Syrian area in the Hatay
region, and would remove its ambushes from there, that penetrated deep into
the Syrian territory in an effort to hit at PKK bases. The Turkish–Syrian accord
forbids any sort of PKK activity in Syria, even commercial activity. Surprisingly
– what points to the effects of the Turkish threat – Syria agreed to stop inciting
against Turkey’s close contacts with Israel. The rest is well known: Ocalan was
expelled from Syria and few months later was caught by the Turks. Turkey’s
readiness to enforce a showdown, whatever the price, had an effect.37
Turkey has estimated the cost of its war against the PKK, as of April 1998, at
80 billion dollar. The 1998 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fact book quotes
a yearly expense of approximately 7 billion dollars, an amount that contributed
to the 99 percent inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the
government’s revenue. Other sources quote a 15 billion dollar annual spending,
that is an incredible 225 billion dollar spend during the fifteen-year struggle
with the PKK.38
Official Turkish statistics points clearly to an escalation of the war against
the PKK, particularly since 1995. There is a definite parallel between Turkish
offensives and PKK casualties. According to Turkish army spokesmen, of the
10,663 PKK casualties between 1987 and 1996, 7,116 were killed between 1995
and 1996. During that same two years Turkey lost 1,811 soldiers, whereas during
the period 1987–96, total Turkish casualties were 3,400. The number of inci-
dents linked with the PKK has been dropping significantly: 3,993 in 1993; 3,908
in 1994; 2,118 in 1995; 1,941 in 1996; 1,300 in 1997; and 977 in 1998. Altogether,
of the 2.5 million troops that served in the force and took part in quelling the
PKK uprising during its fifteen years (1984–99), a total of 5,606 soldiers, police
and Village Guards were killed, 11,269 were injured, 5,316 civilians died, and an
additional 5,903 were injured. During the same period 23,638 PKK members
lost their lives.
In preparing their case against Abdullah Ocalan, the Turkish prosecution
had furnished the court that eventually sentenced Ocalan to death, with the
following statistics, relating to the period of August 1984–February 1999. The
PKK staged 6,036 attacks and 8,257 armed clashes with the Turkish security
forces. There were also 3,071 bomb attacks, 388 people were robbed at gunpoint
and 1,046 people were kidnapped. As a result of these attacks, 4,472 civilians,
3,874 soldiers, 247 policemen and 1,255 Village Guards were killed. A total of
16,362 people were injured.39
Turkey’s response to the PKK’s suggestions of a cease-fire has been
unequivocal: they will not negotiate with terrorists. Ocalan’s federative pro-
posals only increased Turkish wrath: any compromise, even the smallest, with
Kurdish demands, would lead to the unraveling of the entire fabric of Turkish
society. However, now that Turkey has satisfied itself that it has crushed the
PKK military uprisings, both within Turkey and in the areas it controls in
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northern Iraq, the international aspects of the conflict are snowballing. With
each progressive decline in the extent of Kurdish terrorism, Turkey absorbs
more and more international criticism for its treatment of the Kurds and their
political aspirations.
Turkey did well in one and a half of the “two and a half wars” it is supposed
to be fighting.40 As noted, it reduced Kurdish terrorism (“the half war”) to a
tolerable level. It reduced the threats emanating from Syria. As for Greece,
Turkey was ready, it was claimed, to do battle whenever necessary. Six countries
have been accused of aiding and abetting the PKK: first, Syria and Greece, then
Armenia, Cyprus, Serbia and Iran. Apart from Iran, the rest practically stopped
supporting the military uprising of the Kurds. However, when the war was prac-
tically over, it became easier to attack Turkey on the non-military aspects of the
Kurdish question. When the PKK ceased its terrorist activity its status in certain
places in Europe slowly changed from that of a “terrorist organization” to a
“criminal one.”41 The subject of human rights in Turkey (see Chapter 5) is given
broad media coverage due to the number of Kurds seeking political asylum in
Western Europe. Tens of thousands of Kurds are fleeing, allegedly from the
threats of the Turkish authorities. Between 1988 and 1997, 30,000 refugees
sought political asylum in Greece, most were from Turkey, and 70 percent of
these Turks claimed to be of Kurdish nationality. Ankara rejected the notion that
these people were in need of a shelter, claiming instead that they merely consider
Italy and Greece as the closest entrance on their way to the richer members of
the EU. It also blamed Greece for accepting “terrorists and fugitives” from
Turkey, while deporting immigrants and genuine asylum seekers from countries
like Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.42
Turkey has repeatedly protested at what it calls “the exaggeration” of
the problem of Kurdish refugees by a number of European countries. It also
challenged the double standards it is treated with. The PKK has been militarily
weakened, but it has succeeded in stressing the political aspects of the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict and gaining Western support for the recognition of its rights –
to the detriment of Turkey. Mesut Yilmaz, when serving as Turkey’s Prime
Minister, was upset at the way in which Europe had “romanticized” the Turk-
ish–Kurdish conflict, turning terrorists into “freedom fighters struggling for their
self-determination.” And now, that Congress in Washington is intermittently
placing a condition of the sale of arms to Turkey on the improvement of human
rights there, particularly with regard to the Kurds, Turkey has responded bitterly:
“And is everything in Saudi Arabia perfect already?”43 Understandably, expecta-
tions from Turkey are different from what is expected of Saudi Arabia.
The Turkish military put it even more forthrightly:
Regarding human rights . . . the Turkish Armed Forces are far ahead of many Euro-
pean nations. Unfortunately, we are facing double standards in human rights. If any
member of the general staff of a European country says “we will prepare a human
rights plan for the Southeast” [of Turkey, where most Turkish Kurds reside], we as
the Turkish General Staff, are ready to undersign such a plan with our eyes closed.
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Because we are 100 percent sure that their plan will turn out to be exactly like the
one we have in place right now.44
When PKK danger to the country’s territorial integrity had practically been
removed, attention was drawn to the terror acts of the Muslim and ultra-
nationalist radicals, the Turkish Hizbullah. The secular integrity of the country
was now at risk. The victims of this ugly war – disappearances, the extra-
judicial killings, the remains of more than forty mutilated people slaughtered
by the Muslim extremists – had been Kurds from the southeastern provinces of
the country, as well as Turkish intellectuals and businessmen. The fact that
hundreds of Kurds – many identifying themselves with the PKK – were among
the victims, raised the suspicion that Turkish Hizbullah had actually acted as
an arm of the Turkish military. The PKK–Hizbullah animosity was actually a
civil war within a civil war; although the PKK had a declared Marxist ideology,
it also used Muslim ideas to attract the conservative Kurdish Muslims of south-
eastern Turkey. The Kurds, most of them Sunni Muslims, tend to be more pious
than the rest of society. Both organizations thus competed over the same people.
However, another interpretation attributed this Kurdish–Muslim conflict to a
struggle over the control of contraband smuggling.45
The capture of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 marked a turning point,
as the Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, was winning its seventeenth war
(or twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth – see p. 37) against the Kurds. A year later, in
February 2000, the PKK declared a unilateral, no preconditions, cease-fire. New
challenges now face Turkey, in particular in the southeast of the country. The area
suffers from a lack of 80,000 jobs, in particular for the pro-government para-
military troops, the Village Guards. The end of the war with the PKK resulted 
in the dissolution of the force, i.e. a sharp increase of unemployment in the area.
The guards were trying to resume civilian life despite the killing of animal hus-
bandry and other means of employment, but with meager or no support at all
from Ankara. This was seen as gross ingratitude because, during the war the Turk-
ish military was helped by 95,000 guards who became the army’s first line of
defence. (Established in the late 1980s, the Village Guards comprised local vil-
lagers who volunteered to serve, mainly for economic reasons, or were forced to
do so. Their monthly wages amounted to 115 dollars, a considerable amount in
the poverty-stricken southeast.)46
The end of the war has caused Turkey intricacies and difficulties perhaps no less
intractable than during the war. Metehan Demir of the Turkish Daily News, who
toured southeastern Turkey in late November 1997, conveyed the gist of this
new situation. Leaving the area to the Turkish military alone is a sure recipe for
new problems. If the Turkish state will not deal with it, the mosquitoes will
return to the swamp:
The Turkish Armed Forces had managed to kill the mosquitoes (terrorists) but the
swamp (terrorism) was still there. The military Generals say that the most important
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thing is to drain this swamp by earning the support of the public in the region. The
Generals based in the region, and the messages sent by the military from Ankara, are
urging the government to take immediate economic and social measures as a follow-
up to the victory won by the military against the separatist PKK . . . before it is too
late. Nowadays, unfortunately, the military is everything in the southeast. It is the
post office, doctor, teacher and highway constructor, as well as encouraging people
to engage in new business sectors. As a General said: “Now the military is asking the
state, ‘Where are you?’ and is urging it to come to the southeast. But holding Cabi-
net meetings in the southeast for show is not enough. I’m asking how many govern-
ment programs have been put into effect.”
Putting aside the military and national interests of the PKK, southeast Turkey
contains enough social and economic reasons for the re-emergence of radicalism.
An average family has 15 children – an “alarming proportion” of the young popu-
lation need schooling and other facilities which are not available. Also women are
regarded as second class citizens, despite attempts by officers’ wives to win the con-
fidence and cooperation of these women.47
Interestingly, the southeast suffers from the highest rate of suicide attempts
among women in Turkey – twice as high as other regions. (More women than
men in Turkey attempt suicide – twice as many.) Half of the region’s women are
illiterate – most families refuse to let the girls attend schools.48 Perhaps there
could not have been a better summation for our Turkish-Kurdish chapter: so
much has to be done internally in Turkey, for the underprivileged in particular.
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Turkey’s relations with Europe and the EU have covered a multitude of issues,
in particular being heavily involved with economic, political, cultural, ethnic,
social, religious, secular and excessive national issues, the democratic process
and military interventions in that process, human rights, minority rights,
immigration and other aspects. Turkish association with Europe was meant to
be the epitome of the country’s integration in the Western civilization; mem-
bership in the relevant economic and military bodies (NATO, the EU), the chief
agents to achieve it. Alas, the road to Europe has been hectic, something that
often resembled a roller-coaster ride. Savage and bitter criticisms were
exchanged, pleasantries and compliments were reciprocally given, rosy and
optimistic hopes for better times were shared. Absolute democracy has been the
EU prerequisite; insistence that each nation has a right to its own form of
democracy and that Turkish democracy should be seen as the equal of any other
has been the Turkish view. In this chapter we analyze the major elements of this
complex relationship.1
Realities, ambivalence, and hopes: Turkey and the EU
The 1990s started with an explicit wish of the Turkish President to link its coun-
try’s moves in the Gulf War to a rapprochement with the EU. The Luxembourg
decision of December 1997 to reject Turkish accession into the EU rebuffed
Turkey’s wishes. The Helsinki’s decision two years later to offer Turkey a place
corroborated it. The 1990s have thus produced a debit and a credit side to
Turkey’s relations with Europe and the EU.
The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU, which took effect in Jan-
uary 1996, has been a qualitative great leap forward. At the end of the 1990s, 50
percent of Turkey’s yearly trade was with the EU, more than 37.5 billion dollar.
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In 1998, for instance, Turkey’s imports from the EU reached 24.08 billion dol-
lars, its exports 13.5 billion.2
But not all remained plain sailing. The December 1997 EU Luxembourg
decision to bypass Ankara and to invite eleven applicant countries to negotiate
membership was bitterly perceived in Turkey, as if the Europeans were pushing
a strategically significant and loyal colleague away from the West. Ankara
regarded the resolution as an unjust, unfair, discriminatory step. Implicitly it put
on Turkey the entire onus for the Greco–Cypriot–Kurdish and other minorities’
conflicts with Turkey. It was for Turkey to accept her contenders’ solutions and
not the other way round, hence the pushing of Ankara to the end of the queue.
Others were preferred to Turkey, including some who are less advanced, includ-
ing the Cypriot Greeks. Inviting the Republic of Cyprus while not solving first
the Island’s ethnic-political problems, and simultaneously excluding the Turkish
Cypriots from the negotiations was particularly galling for Turkey, a clear
expression of just how little regard or respect Europe had for her.
The resolution came at a bad time for the Turkish government. By 1997, a
growing number of Turks no longer identified with the West or defined them-
selves as Europeans, while Muslim organizations and parties were successfully
challenging the country’s ruling, Westernized, secular elite – itself beset by sev-
eral leadership crises – in the street and in the polls.3 Prime Minister Mesut
Yilmaz defined the Luxembourg decision as an attempt by the EU, Germany in
particular, to set up a “New Berlin Wall” in Europe, an effective means to iso-
late Turkey. It was, Yilmaz thundered, German racism, a desire of creating a
“New Lebensraum” on the part of Germany, a pure religious discrimination on
behalf of the EU, that was to divide Europe along a line stretching from Christ-
ian Bulgaria to Muslim Turkey. German remarks that the Turkish Prime Minis-
ter was “running amok,” spewing chauvinist rhetoric, were hardly designed to
improve Ankara’s temper. Much use has been made for instance, with the
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s declaration that Turkey’s chances of acces-
sion into the EU were slim, because the European boundaries coincided with
those of Christendom.
But the tide turned again, and in Turkey’s favor, when Greece removed its
veto or, as Ankara would have it, “sabotage.” (See Chapter 6.) Also, a new Social
Democrat–Greens coalition government favorable to Turkish candidacy
emerged in Germany in 1998. The coalition projected a more open stand toward
EU enlargement, rejecting narrow geographical interpretations and religious-
cultural criteria.4 Above all, the path seemed easier for a different attitude
towards Ankara when the Turkish–PKK war was practically over. By offering
Turkey a place the organization does not simultaneously import a violent con-
flict. The Europeans were also convinced by US lobbying to change policies
toward Turkey. A favorable look at Turkey’s candidacy would give a boost to the
professed EU goal of democratization in that country, argued Washington who
added that it would advance “the important role the organization has in
promoting values of tolerance and diversity toward the Muslim world.”5 This all
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culminated in Helsinki’s invitation to negotiate Turkey’s membership. Still,
when one realizes what the EU wants Turkey to change before it is admitted, one
also understands that Turkish accession is not close. There still remains the issue
of granting social and cultural – perhaps even political – rights to the Kurdish
minority. Also, more than 20,000 Turkish laws and regulations must first be
amended and improved to conform 90,000 pages of EU requirements and
guidelines for legal, political, economic and cultural standards. Small wonder
that the reaction of Turkey’s Foreign Secretary to these demands was an allega-
tion that “The EU behaves towards us like ‘colonial governors’.”6
The sympathy throughout Europe toward earthquake stricken Turkey in
1999 was wide, even astonishing. The August tremor, measured 7.4 on the
Richter scale, was one of the strongest – and longest, at 45 seconds – to hit
Europe in recent memory. It shocked Turkey’s industrial heartland, southeast of
Istanbul, and left 17,000 dead and 30,000 injured. Almost every European coun-
try rushed to send Turkey relief aid and the EU Commission allocated monies
for humanitarian needs and for building housing for survivors. A two-hour tele-
vision appeal in Germany raised 7 million dollars, a similar campaign in the
Netherlands produced 13 million dollars.7 The change in the attitude of human
rights groups – which in 1997 opposed Turkish accession but in 1999 favored it
– apparently showed that EU candidacy was thought to offer the best hope for a
reform in Turkey. Indeed in 1999, shortly after winning the April elections, the
government of Turkey’s Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, launched an anti-torture
reform campaign.8 Many Europeans, particularly those on the left who are influ-
ential in EU governments, feel goodwill toward Ecevit, who is considered to be
“clean” when it comes to corruption issues, and who believes in social democ-
rat ideas. Before he entered parliament as an Ankara deputy and becoming a
politician (1959), Ecevit has been a pioneer of labor rights in his country. He
has also been an English translator who studied art, history, Bengali and San-
skrit at London University. A man of letters, a writer, an editor in Turkey’s
dailies, and a poet who arouses sympathy, his works had been translated into
German, Russian, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Danish and Swedish.
Turkey in the 1990s enjoyed the talents and the reputations of two success-
ful leaders – Ozal and Ecevit. (Erbakan’s year in office is considered an “acci-
dent”; Yimaz’s and Ciller’s got mixed evaluations). Internally and outside
Turkey, the two leaders pursued their country’s interests, and in most cases
brought fame and success to Turkey. More important, they managed to per-
suade their constituencies and public opinion, as well as foreign governments
and world media, of the justification of Turkey’s policies. It is not very often one
comes across a decade in which two successful politicians like Ozal and Ecevit
lead Turkey.
Even Kurdish organizations softened when the idea of removing the ban
on Kurdish-language television and broadcasts was given a boost following the
announcement of the December 1999 Helsinki decision. (In August 2002,
the Turkish Parliament finally approved these concessions.) The thesis that
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advocates cooperation with Turkey – not alienation – as a means of extricating
concessions from it, apparently proved itself. Ismail Cem, Turkey’s Foreign Sec-
retary, defined the ban as an obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership. A bit earlier,
in one of Turkey’s leading newspaper, in an article entitled “Turkey vs. the West,”
the writer openly advocated the opening of a Kurdish television channel in
Turkey. Who cares if the Kurdish Turks will have their own station? Could this
possibly harm anyone, he asked. He even went a step further and offered Kur-
dish, Arabic, Uzbek, Turkish and Ottoman Turkish as electives in high schools.
If an ethnic language television channel abuses its position and preaches armed
uprising or insults, the station should be taken to court and fined severely. “If
they lost enough money enough times, they would be careful henceforth or they
would go broke . . . This is a Western concept, and not necessarily always a good
thing, but it works: make them pay money!”9 Enabling the Kurds in Turkey to
live their own culture in line with their traditions and customs has caused the
Turkish State Minister Responsible for Human Rights to approve the teaching of
the Kurdish language. “But I do not think that there is a need to learn Kurdish
math [or] Kurdish biology,” he commented.10
Kurds are not allowed to use their language in education, but the ban on
Kurdish broadcasts is largely ignored. No official legal action has been taken
against dozens of newly opened local radio stations broadcasting in Kurdish.
But not everyone in Turkey was entirely happy with even these moderate
advances in Turkey’s Kurdish policies. President Demirel observed that there
were several Kurdish dialects. Suppose Turkey allows broadcasts in the Kurdish
language, what accent should be used? Could Turkey afford to allow all of them
on air? And if the Kurds are allowed to have their radio, should Turkey give the
same to the Georgians, to the Arabs? According to the Turkish constitution,
schools may teach only the official languages of recognized states. As there is no
Kurdish state, Kurdish cannot be taught, concluded the President.11
Major hurdles still make Turkey’s accession into the EU a long and pro-
tracted one. Though the reasons seem to be more cultural and emotional with
strong relevance to human rights (see Chapter 5), and not strictly economic,
deep gaps still exist in the latter area as well. For instance, EU inflation for the
years 1998–2000 has been 1.3–1.7 percent annually. Alas, the Turkish average
figure was close to 70 percent, and the crisis of winter 2001 elevated inflation
even further. The average increase of EU exports and imports for the same
period comes to 7.1–6.7, and 7.0–6.2 percent, respectively. The Turkish average
figures amount to minus 5.4–minus 12.5, and plus 2.7–minus 3.6.12 Another dis-
turbing economic gap is Turkey’s budget deficit, which has soared to 14 percent,
whereas the EU permits its members a shortfall of no more than 3 percent.
Hence, the cost of economic adjustment and support programs to bring Turkey
closer to EU levels would be prohibitively high. Eighteen years after admitting
Greece, the EU still pays assistance to this country. Do we need a second Greece,
officials ask in Brussels. Kenneth Moss mentions that some Europeans also fear
the strengthening of the “Mediterranean Voice” in EU bodies, and worry lest
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Turkey’s cheaper cost of labor, when combined with its strong work ethic, would
draw jobs out of northern Europe. But, above all, it seems as if the inclusion of
a Muslim state, partly Asian – “whether Turkey is really Byzantium in a fancy
dress” – is hardest for the Europeans to swallow.13
The inclusion of millions of Turkish farmers threatens to break the EU
budget. In a typical expression, an EU official commented desperately of the
“butter mountains” that will be doubled if Turkey is in the EU, as are the farm-
ing subsidies the EU presently grants – 43 billion dollar a year. If the Turks join
the 7.13 million EU farmers – 4.3 percent of the EU workforce as against 43 per-
cent in Turkey – and agriculture is expected to double, then subsidies will
double as well, or come to astronomical sums if given per person. The fact that,
at present, Turkey’s agricultural exports to the EU rarely exceed 17 percent (and
is mere 5 percent in imports), fails to allay EU anxieties. On the contrary, it con-
vinces the Europeans that trade with Turkey would show a negative balance, for
the Turks’ purchasing power is one-third the EU average14
Similarly threatening is the migration of millions of industrious Turks who
would move in to take the jobs of Europeans. There remains the issue of human
and minority rights, and the abolition of Article 312 of the Turkish penal code
– that practically accuses anyone who dares to criticize the state with violating
the law against preaching hatred. Disputed aspects of Turkish democracy
also mar relations, for instance, the issue of political freedoms, the role of the
military in politics, etc. “It’s a bit tricky counting on Turkey’s top brass: they feel
committed to defend their country’s democracy – as they perceive it – secular-
ism and westernization. That is why they rush to intervene in domestic politics
whenever they smell that the three or each of them are under assault” – is a
typical NATO attempt to understand the Turkish internal realities.15
We have already mentioned that more than 20,000 Turkish laws and regu-
lations must be amended and improved to conform to EU requirements. True,
Ankara tries hard and does strive to change its laws. Among the 502 new articles
of the new penal code, one finds the abolition of the death penalty, the elevation
of the minimal age eligible for prison punishment to twelve years old, preaching
hatred and separation was redefined, its scope greatly limited, etc. Still, the
Turkish parliament is known for its dilatory methods when controversial new
laws are debated. The proposed new penal code might therefore experience
changes that will practically emasculate the above amendments.
The EU also takes a negative position vis-à-vis Turkey’s periodic forays into
northern Iraq in its war against PKK, and as a result the EU is holding up the
dispatch of military supplies. In Germany, for instance, the dispatch of bridge-
building equipment was frozen, so was a grant of 150 million DM for the con-
struction in Germany of two destroyers for the Turkish navy. Norway recalled
military supplies already on their way to Turkey. 
These hurdles notwithstanding, Prime Minister Ecevit saw no hindrance to
Turkey being ready in less than four years for full membership, i.e. by 2004.
Cem, the Foreign Secretary, more cautious and realistic, expected it to happen
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in fifteen years’ time.16 However, skepticism prevails in Turkey. Turks were not
overjoyed when hearing about Helsinki but have remained fundamentally
unconvinced of the Europeans’ willingness to accept them as one of their own.
The embrace, they said, could be capricious and short-lived. It was mentioned
that Helsinki is hardly the first time the Europeans have recognized Turkey’s
Europeanness. In 1856, the Ottoman Empire was invited to join the Concert of
Europe. More than a century later, following the signing of the Association
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Turkey (1964),
Turkey was solemnly declared as being part of Europe. Such flattering remarks
have been uttered many times during the past 200 years, mentions Dov
Waxman, yet Turkey’s European identity has never been settled. On the con-
trary: Ankara is often reminded that its human rights record, its military’s inter-
ventions in politics, its rampant, unruly, and unchecked corruption, its poor
market economy, and its conflicts with the Hellenic world do not leave much
room for hope regarding Turkey’s possible accession into the EU.17
Turkish immigrants in Germany
Next to Greece, Germany has been the strongest opponent of Turkish member-
ship in the EU, allegedly because it fears the inundation of the country with more
Turkish immigrants, in addition to the 2.8 million already there – the largest
migrant group in Germany. More than 1 million Turkish workers are employed
in EU countries, of which 700,000 reside in Germany. Germany has some 8
million foreigners – just under 10 percent of the population. “Ethnic Germans”
from the former Soviet Union – who, incidentally, speak no German – raise the
ratio to 13 percent. Although Germany stopped accepting foreign workers after
the 1973 energy crisis and the ensuing increases in oil prices, it still absorbs,
annually, 100,000 “Ethnic Germans,” 60,000 relatives of foreigners already resid-
ing in the country, and 100,000 refugees. Refugees and asylum seekers in
Germany – the country has long been a prime destination for asylum seekers –
amount to 1.7 million. Between 1990 and 2001, almost 2.05 million people
applied for asylum in the country – about 41 percent of the overall number of
applicants in Western Europe. Ten percent were eventually granted shelter.18 Half
a million of the 2.8 million Turks living in Germany are of Kurdish origin. A
Turkish–Kurdish conflict is, thus, very viable in Germany. Turks are the largest
group among the 3.2 million Muslims residing in Germany. For comparison,
there are more than 5 million Muslims in France, 2 million in Great Britain, and
one million in Italy – altogether there are 12 million Muslims in the EU. Islam,
as a result, has become the second largest religion in Europe. It has a strong Turk-
ish character in Germany, a more Indian–Pakistani character in England, and a
more Magrebian character in France, where close to 2 million Moroccans and
Algerians live.19 Following the civil war in Yugoslavia, some 1.4 million immi-
grants have migrated to EU countries, the majority to Germany, where 280,000
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Muslim immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina look for help and shelter. Berlin
is, or is close to being, the third largest Turkish city in the world, after Istanbul
and Ankara. In addition, the 51,000 Turkish entrepreneurs comprise the largest
group (18.3 percent) among foreign entrepreneurs in Germany, whose number
at the end of the 1990s reached 279,000. There are also 23,000 Turkish university
students and 48,000 vocational training (apprentices) students.20
German citizenship has been granted only to a fraction of the Turkish
immigrants – 160,000. The main argument against a dual Turkish–German
citizenship is that holding two passports produces “half a citizen” of a doubtful
loyalty. However, a change – some say a revolution because hitherto citizenship
was granted according to that of the parents, not place of birth – took place in
1999 in the German naturalization law. From now on it enables the granting of
a German passport to children of immigrants born in Germany, living and inte-
grating continuously there for fifteen years, i.e. citizenship according to the
Land Law, or Jus Soli, not blood affinity of the parents. These children would
be able to keep their parents’ nationality, but would have to choose one at the
age of twenty-three. Only in rare hardship cases will adults be allowed to hold
two passports.
In general, Germans associate the word “Islam” with Turks who, owing to
their numbers, are more visible than other Muslims. Islam and immigrants from
Muslim countries –Turkey inclusive – are almost automatically associated by
many Europeans with memories of wars with the Ottoman Empire, but also with
religious fundamentalism and extreme political ideologies. The fact that many
immigrants come from ex-European imperial colonies adds to the uneasiness
that exists in the meeting of former masters and formers natives. A perceptive
summation was given lately by Roger Cohen of the New York Times: the ghost
that hovers now above Europe is not anymore communism but the foreigner and
his or her otherness. Similarly, Professor Faruk Sen, director of the Turkish
Research Institute in Essen, Germany, asserts that Muslim immigration to
Europe, or Islam in Germany, are perceived today by the majority of Germans as
a hindrance to integration, as a menace, as a symbol of alienation, and as some-
thing which threatens to dilute their “Europeaness.” The consequent demand
that the immigrant should adopt German (or European) culture and drop
the ethnic or national microcosom he or she has established in the receiving
countries, is a sure recipe for a conflict. Immigrants to Europe nowadays mean a
problem, not a potential, not a possible positive contribution, not a solution to
the growing European demand for more people.21
Introversion and extremism are therefore the results. The exclusion and
discriminatory steps taken by the European majority, are reinforced by inward
moves and isolation – even ghettoization – taken by the migrant minority. The
gap is accentuated and widened in particular for the young ones. In Germany
half the Turks are below the age of thirty. They have lost any affiliation with their
parents’ countries of origin but find no welcoming attitude in their places of
residence, although 61 percent of the Turks living in Germany were born there
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or have resided there for more than twenty years. When Turkey and Germany
are excluded, Islam remains the option of identity of these young Turks:22
Most third generation Turks in Germany do not have a sufficient knowledge of
German even though most of them have been born and raised there. Outside work
or school they have little reason to speak German. They tend to live in urban
enclaves with extensive Turkish networks of shops, restaurants, mosques and pro-
fessional services. They can even watch Turkish TV . . . available via cable or satel-
lite . . . For many young Turks, inability to communicate effectively in the language
of their adopted country is a real handicap. It often means poor scholastic achieve-
ment and inferior education. In 1998, only 14 percent of Turkish secondary school
students qualified for university admission, compared to more than 30 percent of
their German counterparts . . . With unskilled jobs becoming ever scarcer, unem-
ployment among those untrained Turkish youths is more than twice the national
[Germany’s] average of 9.6 percent. This leads to growing frustration among the
youngsters and makes them more susceptible to political and religious extremism
. . . [In such circumstances] fundamentalist Islamic organizations and nationalist
Turkish associations [thrive].23
No wonder, concluded The Economist, that the chances of these migrant young
Muslims and Turks being unemployed, suffering from poor education, and
being molested and abused by the local police, are much higher than those of the
same indigenous, non-migrant group age.24
The difficulties linked to the reunification of the two German states, and the
increase in unemployment – 17 percent without jobs in what was before East
Germany, 3.7 million unemployed people in the entire country – produce strong
xenophobic emotions, racism, vicious and brutal attacks against foreigners
residing in Germany. There were 16,000 cases of racist incidents in Germany
in the year 2000 – 1,000 of them violent – a dramatic increase of 59 percent by
comparison with 1999. Turks, not surprisingly, were made particular scapegoats
for the social turbulence in Germany.25
Some scholars speak of two Turkish communities in Germany: the integrated
minority, and the community enclosed within its own world. Only the minority
among the Turks in Germany communicates in German, in fact even the
third generation faces difficulties in freely speaking the language. The rest – the
majority – speaks only Turkish, eats Turkish food, listens to Turkish music, and
watches Turkish television. They actually “live at the borderline with Germans
and not in an integrated way.” In short, they have created their own isolated
worlds within German towns, trying not to integrate with the German society.
More than a little uneasy, Germans have compared their Turkish community
unfavorably to the Haitians, who emigrated to the United States and made every
effort to raise their children as Americans in order to ensure their future.26
These migrant workers, Turks included, demand of their hosts services that
are equal but segregated, their culture forbidding believers to mingle with infi-
dels. They have no desire to assimilate, nor do they wish to adopt the social and
political models of Europe’s secular society. “They are subjects of Allah, not the
62 Turkey: facing a new millennium
state.” Extremist voices among them even argue that “You are more Muslim
when you are against the West.” No wonder the European majority blames them
for rejecting freedom of speech and full democracy. Furthermore, what Euro-
peans perceive as repression of women in the migrants’ Muslim society, and
issues of forced arranged marriages, abortion and sexuality, often leads to con-
flict with the institutions of the host country. Preservation of family honor
through the murder of women is not a matter the host country can delegate to
internal family jurisdiction. The civil wars in the Balkans are also perceived as
interfaith conflicts, injecting the specter of religious war into the already sullied
atmosphere. Even if Europeans do not wish to show indifference to the massacre
of Chechens or Bosnians or the people of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia, the
relatives of the victims, along with the Muslim states, complain that because 
the victims were Muslim Europe did nothing to save them.27
Cultural disdain for Turks is part of European fear of a Muslim influx that
would alter the character of Europe’s population. The migrants reaching Europe
from North Africa and Indonesia, the Indian subcontinent and Turkey, are all
Muslims. As already noted, more than 3 million Turks reside in EU countries. In
Britain and France, Muslims constitute over 10 percent of the population. At the
end of the twentieth century, some 20 million Europeans identified themselves
as Muslims. Continued immigration, negative population growth in some West
European countries, and a high rate of natural increase among the migrants, fan
European fears that within a generation the ratio of Muslims in the population
of Western Europe will reach 25 percent. The migrants’ inclination to stay aloof,
and the local population’s reluctance to enter into anything but the most essen-
tial contacts with them, combine to create a separate Muslim culture in Western
Europe. Convinced that their culture is superior to that of their infidel host
countries, the migrants do everything possible to preserve their customs and
heritage. Alternatively, they have grave reservations about European calls for
them to assimilate themselves in the cultures of the host countries. Experienc-
ing violent racist reactions, Muslim migrants to Germany quote the fate of
German Jews whose integration did not spare them extermination. “Next time
there are gas chambers in Europe they will be for Muslims.”28
Islam in Germany – as associated with Turks, above – has become even more
“visible,” through the increase in the proportion of women among migrants
because the religious affiliation of women is clearly and publicly manifested in
their attire, particularly in their veils. A survey in Le Monde, for example, revealed
that an ever growing number of Muslim women in Britain had adopted the hijab,
the traditional Islamic head covering. Germany is no different. During the years
many Turkish families followed their men and migrated to Germany. This family
reunification confronted the German society – or other European receiving state
– with the cultural and social consequences of migration that had thus far been
neglected: schools, kindergartens, proper housing, health services and clinics,
intra-family abuse, etc. No wonder legal restrictions and economic incentives –
like direct payments for those who return to their countries of origin, as well as
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assistance in establishing new businesses there – were imposed and offered by
the German authorities. The aim in Germany was decreasing the number of
Turks residing there and limiting the number of those who would be potential
candidates for naturalization and for German citizenship.29
The EU attracts immigrants, many of whom are Turks, many of whom
come to Germany. More than 1.2 million immigrants came to Germany in 1992
– Turkish job seekers, ethnic Germans, refugees of the Yugoslav upheavals and
of the collapse of communism in east Europe. In 1997 the number was down to
615,000. The explanation for this attraction is that side by side with its economic
prosperity, the EU population, Germany’s included, is becoming older. By 2025
the percentage of those above the age of sixty-five will be 22.4 percent – com-
pared with 15.4 percent in the year 2000 – and the number of children born to
EU women is declining. On average, when a woman gives birth to an average 2.1
children the number of people in a given place remains stable. However, in EU
countries women give birth to an average 1.45 children, with German women
even fewer – 1.3. Natural population growth in the entire EU (in 1999) was
270,000, which is less than one-thousandth of the 380 millions who live in EU
countries. Legal immigration for the same period –there must have been many
more illegal immigrants – amounted to 711,000, almost three times the EU nat-
ural growth.30 Young foreigners in growing numbers are the work force who fills
the gaps, replacing the aging Europeans and those who look for “clean” jobs
only, and allocate from their wages the monies needed to sustain the growing
numbers of retired people.
Half of Germany’s population, which will decrease and number 66 million
in 2050 (82 million in 2000), will be over sixty years old. Already one in six
Germans – 17 percent – is above the age of sixty-five, and children comprise less
than a quarter of the population. What is happening in Germany applies to the
rest of the EU. There are many European countries among the twenty countries
worldwide with the lowest birth rate. “In 17 European countries there are more
burials than birthday parties, more coffins are being built than cradles.”31 The
rapid urbanization that the continent has experienced since the Second World
War is one of the explanations for the shrinking numbers in EU countries. The
size of urban accommodation is less than in rural areas, hence less space is left
for children. Women need to look for jobs outside the home to help sustain their
families. The family and the church are a diminishing influence. Abortions and
family planning are available. There is increasing use of contraceptives, an
increase in the number of one-parent families and a growing demand for higher
educated women – women who develop their own careers and thus delay
parenting. It is said of Italy that by the year 2010 it will be the “first culture in
history” in which the number of people of sixty years old or more will be higher
than the age group for birth to eighteen and, more apocalyptically, if perhaps
fancifully, “900 years from now and there will be no more Italians.”32
The situation in Germany is not much better. The country is aging, average
life expectancy is seventy-six years, but the number of the working, active
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people, whose tax payments sustain the country’s welfare system is rapidly
diminishing. Already the major share of the national budget – 36 percent – goes
to the Ministry for Welfare and National Insurance. Within a generation the
German pension system will hardly be able to cope with the growing class of
retirees whose share in the population will increase from 22 to 40 percent. Cur-
rently, for every four workers who are active in Germany, one is retired and
enjoys the pension system. Before long, with the growing number of pension-
ers, that ratio will be down to just two:one. The country, thus, is in a great need
of immigrant workers. Eventually it will have to absorb them as citizens, and will
benefit from their work and tax payments.
Immigrants to Germany are young – which is understandable – but they
might constitute a demographic and cultural threat. Twenty percent of the for-
eigners residing in Germany are between the ages of birth and twenty-four; for
Germans the equivalent figure is 13 percent. Fifty-one percent of foreigners are
in the age group of twenty-five to fifty-four, which is the main workforce; for
Germans it is 41 percent. The picture reverses in the age group of fifty-five to
sixty-five, and older: here there are many more Germans – 16.5 percent – but
only 4.5 percent foreigners. German politicians try hard by offering German
women more money – 484 dollar a month – to increase births and to raise the
fertility rate to 2.2 children per woman.
Between the years 2000 and 2050 Germany will have to import 487,000–
600,000 foreign workers annually to keep its workforce stable, France 109,000,
and the entire EU – 1.6 million. Without immigration, Germany’s working-age
population will drop from 41 million now to a mere 27.3 million in 2050. To
sustain the mid-twenty-first century pension levels in EU countries, the work-
ing and taxpayer groups among the number of Europeans will have to increase
by another 75 million. Many of them will be immigrants. Yet, as migration
expert Han Entzinger concludes, although “markets need migrants, the people
don’t want them”33
It will not be a wild guess to assume that there will be many Turks among the
foreign workers who seek jobs in the EU. Similarly, one can assume that racism
will increase, among other reasons, because of allegations that Turks hold jobs of
unemployed Europeans (10–11 percent EU average), that foreigners abuse the
European welfare system, etc. All this brings to the fore the fears among Germans
from growing Turkish immigration. It also sharpens, particularly German,
sensitive issues related to citizenship, kinship, blood-affinity, ethnicity, etc.
Turkey–EU: hectic negotiations
Turkey’s Gulf War profit–loss balance will not be complete without taking into
account the post-war relations between Ankara and the EU. President Ozal’s sup-
port for the anti-Iraqi coalition stemmed, inter alia, from an eagerness to gain the
sympathy of the EU, perhaps boosting Turkey’s chances of admission to it. In
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March 1995 Turkey reached agreement with the EU on a customs union, coming
into effect on 1 January 1996 – the highest affiliation stage short of membership.
Tansu Ciller, Prime Minister at the time, regarded the agreement as virtual mem-
bership in the organization, perceiving its outcome as irrevocably rooting Turkey
in the West.34 In December 1999 Turkey was invited by the EU Helsinki meeting
to negotiate its accession into the organization. It is almost forty years since
Turkey concluded its first agreement with the European Community, when it
signed (1963) an association agreement. In 1987 Ankara submitted a request to
become a member of the EU. But accession is not a foregone conclusion: the hur-
dles are many, and the changes that are demanded of Turkey are tough. The
agreement reached in March 1995 is in practice Turkey’s highest achievement,
and will probably remain so for many years to come.
The customs union was a significant step forward in Turkey’s relations with
the EU. The initial results were a 5 billion dollar increase in Turkey’s trade deficit
with the EU, bringing the total deficit to 10 billion dollars. (Usually, Ankara
attributes these deficits to Greek blockage, or “sabotage,” of EU funds due to
Turkey to improve its competitiveness). Yet the wave of bankruptcies predicted
by many never came to pass. The EU did foresee Turkish difficulties and estab-
lished the “Customs Union Package,” a financial aid to Turkey of 375 million
ecus for the years 1996–99, plus access to other EU funds, all totaling 2.5 billion
dollars. The money was supposed to help the Turkish economy by tackling the
implications of the customs union. Accordingly, some 7,000 Turkish businesses,
which owing to removal of customs faced cheaper EU products, were assisted by
the package. Monies were also granted for the adoption of effective and cheaper
production techniques, or for a total shift aiming at the production of entirely
new goods.35
Turkey’s policy during the Gulf War may have helped the Europeans to over-
come various inhibitions and objections, and to sign the customs agreement. A
Greek veto, it should be recalled, was removed by the EU promise to start admis-
sion negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is also perceived as an
island of relative stability in the heart of regional ferment, extending from the
Balkans to Central Asia. But opposition to Turkey continues. Accepting new
members, in addition to the fifteen countries that currently compose the EU,
raises questions as to the character of this organization. Some favor a larger body,
even of twenty-seven members, a move that will prevent the further deepening
of the current federal frame and will help preserve the unique features of each
member. Others favor a smaller body but with greater unity. No doubt Turkey
has better chances with the first school of thought. Still, the grounds for rejecting
Turkey relate more to features found in it and less to the wider discussion about
the future of the EU.
Inflation, denial of human rights, repression of the Kurds, the lack of social
security mechanisms, and the large size of the country’s agricultural sector –
these are the common arguments to exclude Turkey. In the 1980s the EU main-
tained that the gap between its poorest member – at that time Portugal – and
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Turkey is still significant: Turkey’s GNP was then only one-third that of Portugal.
Greece, not Portugal, is nowadays at the bottom of the EU ladder. Still the gap is
clear when the 1999 figures are surveyed: 11,739 dollars GDP per capita in
Greece, 3,159 dollars in Turkey.36 Thus, Turks are constantly reminded that their
per capita annual income is well below the EU average, and much less than the
organization’s poorest. When 43 percent of Turkey’s population are peasants, an
agriculture nightmare to the EU as well as a cultural gap, because “peasants make
for tough cops,” then rejecting Turkey is a double-edged sword. It is cashing in
on human rights issues and raising objections on economic grounds.
The size of Turkey’s population and its deviation from the conventions
prevalent in the EU, alarm the organization. Should Turkey join, it would soon
be the EU’s most populous member, with all that that means as regards repre-
sentation in the European Parliament and in the Council of Ministers. Popula-
tion predictions pertaining to Turkey are of 70 million by the year 2020, and
between 95 million and 98 million by the mid-twenty-first century. By then Ger-
many’s population, now 82 million and the EU’s largest member, will number
66 million. Thirty-one percent of Turks are under fifteen, as against 19 percent
for Europe. Just 6 percent are older than sixty-four, as against 14 percent and
climbing in Europe. Similarly, Turkey’s area of 300,870 square miles is larger
than that of any EU country. Turkish numbers, thus, look threatening, and the
EU faces a worrisome situation – a view expressed by a German official but
prevalent among other members as well. Should Turkey join, it will be the
largest recipient of EU subsidies for members with lower per capita income, the
largest number of votes will go to the EU poorest member, to the country which
geographically is on the margin of Europe, and to the one that was not among
the founders of the EU and has no history of integration in Europe.37 The rejec-
tion of Turkey, whether on economic, social or cultural grounds, is thus near to
total. Some of the EU countries mention that they spent centuries trying to force
the Turks and their ilk out of Europe. Are they to be allowed back in?38
In general, a population growth of 2 percent means the doubling of popu-
lation every thirty-six years, hence another piece of worrying evidence for the
Europeans. Peace and modern medicine have caused the Turkish population to
increase fivefold in the past seventy-five years, from 12 million to more than 65
million today (56 million in 1990). Half of Turkey’s population is under the age
of thirty. Life expectancy that was not much above forty years in the 1930s has
increased to seventy-three on average today. The 1940 annual population
growth surpassed 5 percent, which then placed Turkey near the top of world
demographic lists. It was only after 1980 that the population growth was show-
ing smaller numbers. Family planning and birth control were introduced and
abortions were made legal. The process of urbanization has turned out to be a
major cause – urban women give birth to fewer children. The population of
urban areas reached 56.3 percent by the end of 1990 and 66 percent in the year
2000 – even 71 percent according to another account – compared with only 16.4
percent in 1927. Turkish women looking for jobs outside the home inevitably
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pushed for smaller families. All these factors helped curb Turkey’s population
growth. The country should be complemented for its current population
growth – 1.67 percent; thirty years ago it peaked at 2.8 percent. Hopes were
expressed (by President Demirel, for instance) that it should be further scaled
down to 1.0–1.5 percent. Also, the average number of children born per woman
has shrunk from about 7.0 in the early 1930s to 2.7 in 1993. Thus, readiness to
curb excessive national growth, even to de-legitimize it, does exist in Turkey. “A
population that increases by more than a million each year can’t handle the new
crowd. Even if the country’s [economic] growth rate is more than 5 percent,
[then] finding jobs, providing education, and many other services can’t be
sufficient,” is but one example.39
Turkish workers currently resident in Europe, mostly rural, traditionally
characterized Anatolian Muslim peasants, are commonly depicted as resisting
integration into their host countries, thus preserving and bringing Anatolia into
the heart of Europe. As already mentioned, hostility to otherness focuses on the
Turks, who are among Europe’s largest groups of migrant workers – more than
3 million in EU countries, comprising 24 percent of all migrants workers.
Europeans also fear that religious and cultural divisions “will entail dilution
of our European character.” European disdain, disagreements and criticism vis-
à-vis the Muslim immigrants, revolve now around issues like the need to sepa-
rate between state and church, family and women rights, etc. Turkish immigrant
girls attending European schools while wearing headscarf, or their participation
in coeducational sports and class outings, have become bones of contention. In
France, for instance, schoolgirls have been expelled for wearing the hijab. Sur-
prisingly, in Austria the Turkish schoolgirls prefer the Austrian education
system: they are allowed to cover their heads, whereas in Turkey this is forbid-
den by law. (For the headscarf controversy in Turkey, see Chapter 4.) Other dis-
agreements and conflicts relate to the state demand that religious classes at
school should be given in German, to the religious services extended to Turkish
migrants resident in Western Europe, and so on. The five time a day practice of
praying which is seen as a disturbance at the workplace, and the religious
slaughtering of animals for the supply of meat that contradicts the laws against
cruelty to animals, all serve to further exacerbate existing conflicts. So does
Ankara’s dispatch of Muslim clergymen to the Turkish diaspora in Europe, the
height of mosques’ minarets in comparison to church towers – in Germany
alone there are 1,500 mosques, only a few have a minaret – and the call for
prayers which allegedly disturbs the neighbors. Muslim burial practices in
Germany continue to bother the authorities. The Germans would like to restore
to themselves for development purposes urban areas that were allocated in the
past to cemeteries for Muslim immigrants. However, Muslim law which forbids
disturbing burials, is thus contrary to German law which limits “standard
burial” to a period of fifteen years.
It seems that unlike that of their Christian neighbors, the religious faith of
Europe’s Muslims is getting stronger, that of the Turks in Germany included.
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People from Muslim backgrounds are praying more, attending mosques more
often, and observing the Ramadan fast more assiduously than they did before
when they arrived in Europe or even in their home countries. Living in a foreign
world could be the explanation that creates proximity around Islam but accen-
tuates the difference with the secular majority or with the Christian neighbor-
hood. But Time’s Nicholas Le Quesne also found that living in Europe gives the
Muslim migrants the confidence to practice their religion more openly, relying
on the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the freedoms of expression
and association. Unlike their parents or grandparents who thought their
sojourn in Europe was temporary and so were content to express their faith
in private, their children see Europe as their home and see no reason not to
worship more publicly.40
As mentioned above, Europeans are disturbed by the Turkish–Kurdish con-
flict. There can be no doubt that hair-raising testimonies regarding repression
of the Kurds – authentic or fabricated – weaken Turkey’s advocates. Yasar Kemal,
a left-wing writer, the most widely read author in Turkey (Memed My Hawk,
Legend Ararat, Song of a Thousand Bulls, and Annotation Trilogy), and a fierce
critic of Ankara’s policies towards the Kurds, accused the authorities of forcing
Kurdish prisoners to eat human faeces. His charges shocked the European
Council, which used the harshest of terms to express its acute disgust, and
ordered Turkey to pay 500,000 French francs in compensation to its Kurdish vic-
tims. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights condemned and fined
Turkey (November 1997) and ordered her to pay compensation, for arbitrarily
detaining six former Kurdish members of parliament (MP) in 1994. The MPs
were held in police custody accused of separatism and undermining Turkish ter-
ritorial integrity. The Strasbourg-based court defined the detention a breach of
Ankara’s commitments to respecting the judicial control of detention under the
European Rights Convention, saying authorities could not have a free hand to
hold suspects even in terrorism investigations. It added that Turkey could not
justify the arrests with the state of emergency prevailing in the country’s south-
east, because the MPs were arrested for what they said in Ankara.41 Birsan
Isenderoglu, in the Turkish Daily News, advised Ankara to pursue a different
line:
The government spends a lot of its energy reacting to happenings that it envisions
as threatening to its image. For example, the Turkish image was not damaged by
Yasar Kemal’s anti-Turkish article, which was probably read by only a few leftists
and communists, until the Turkish government decided to prosecute him. It was
then that the story made the headlines in the international press. Turkey neatly fell
into the trap. This kind of government reaction strengthens the position of the West
and gives it the initiative. It is also a waste of national energy to be overly anxious
about what the West thinks.42
It is clear that the EU is not anxious to open up its ranks to a violent ethnic
struggle of unforeseeable consequences. The Turkish–Kurdish struggle, which
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has been exported to European capitals by the Kurds as a way of drawing world
attention to their plight, further reinforces European reluctance to forge new
links with the Turks. Conversely, the Helsinki decision to negotiate Turkey’s
accession came only after the Turkish–PKK war was practically over. It should
be noted that many of the Turkish migrant workers in Western Europe are Kurds
who make strenuous efforts to ensure that their cause is not struck off the Euro-
pean agenda. Loud Kurdish protests brought about the resignation of Gerhardt
Stoltenberg, Germany’s Defense Minister (March 1993) when it emerged that,
in defiance of a ban by the German parliament, fifteen Leopard tanks had been
shipped to the Turkish army, and may have served in repressing Kurds.
Turkey is making efforts to refurbish its cultural and political image in Euro-
pean eyes. The country’s image in Europe is not flattering: the films Midnight
Express and Lawrence of Arabia, and Turkey’s role – real, fictitious, or carried
to excess – in the massacres of Armenians, Kurds and Greeks, and Cypriots in
twentieth century, further exacerbate hostility. On occasion, Turkey formulated
its foreign policy with one eye on Europe. During the Nagorno–Karabakh con-
flict, between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia (see Chapter 4), Turkey
remained on the sidelines, offering the beleaguered Azeris little more than token
support. Suleiman Demirel, Turkey’s President, defended the decision, by
explaining that to intervene in the dispute would reawaken the age-old
Muslim–Christian conflict, with Muslim Turkey cast as the villain of the piece.
“All our contacts with Europe would be disrupted,” he claimed.43
Efforts have been made to improve Turkey’s freedom of expression and
association. The media has been reformed – some of the alterations in accor-
dance with the standards of Western democracies – by abrogating the monop-
oly of state radio and television. In place of one public television channel there
are now sixteen, with 300 local stations. The ban on the private use of the Kur-
dish language was abrogated early in 1991. In theory, Marxists no longer suffer
persecution and workers have been given the right to organize. True, the last
two reforms were ignored in remote places or in the southeast of the country.
Still, in the major urban centers changes do take place. In the spring of 1992,
Turkey invited a delegation from the Council of Europe Judicial Committee to
tour the Kurdish areas of Anatolia. In April that year, Turkey proclaimed a
number of reforms relating to the rights of people detained by the police. Their
rights are read to them at the time of arrest. Bureaucratic procedures in crimi-
nal trials have been speeded up. There is now a maximum period of two years’
detention before trial and a strict ban on torture during interrogations. Accused
persons are entitled to legal defense from the beginning of the interrogation
phase and evidence elicited by violence or threats is inadmissible in court.
Recently Turkey has re-examined its anti-terrorism law, particularly clause 8,
which forbids expressing support for separatist or subversive activity. If clause
8 is one day cancelled, it will enable the Kurds to openly proclaim their views –
a possibility that has drawn vigorous protests from the Turkish General Staff
and right-wing parties.
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It is generally felt that Europe’s vilification of Turkey strengthens the
Muslim and nationalist elements in the country and reinforces the position that
it is unwise for Turkey to look to the West for its future. The sharp rise of the
Muslim Welfare party in the December 1995 elections – the party was dissolved
by the courts in 1997 but substituted by the Party of Virtue, also to be outlawed
by the judicial system in June 2001 (see Chapter 4) – was commonly ascribed to
the hostility revealed by the West, Europe in particular, towards the government
of Tansu Ciller. Similarly, the surprising rise of Devlet Bahceli’s Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) in the elections of April 1999 was also attributed to the
patriotic feelings many Turks had felt following the crackdown on the PKK and
the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan.44
As earlier pointed out, much of Europe’s criticism of Turkey centers on the
question of human rights and military interventions in political and democra-
tic processes. Henry Barkey mentions that the very existence of the powerful
National Security Council, through which the military exerts its influence over
the Turkish politics, is perceived by the EU as a violation of its norms.45 Another
issue that has intermittently risen in the 1990s – epitomized in the resolution of
the French National Assembly of May 1998 – is the criticism on Ankara for its
refusal to take responsibility for the massacre of the Armenians during the First
World War. The subject deeply mars Turkey’s relations with other countries. It
brings about bitter allegations about European, American and Western hidden
aims at the territorial integrity of the country. The Sevres syndrome is repeat-
edly confirmed whenever the Armenian or Kurdish issues arise.
The Turkish reaction against the French National Assembly’s move was
harsh. Ankara alleged that the French deputies acted to placate their con-
stituencies – France has one of the largest Armenian communities in Europe,
about 300,000 strong, most are descendents of First World War survivors. It
blamed the French government for showing indifference and passivity towards
the anti-Turkish moves in the Assembly, and the deputies for relying on dis-
torted information. Ankara warned that the decision put Turkish diplomats in
peril – the Turkish diplomatic community has suffered thirty-one deaths at the
hands of Armenian terrorists since the 1970s. “When we look back on our his-
tory there can be certain events that we will not endorse utterly, but today’s issue
is based on wrong information and is being exaggerated,” protested Foreign
Minister Ismail Cem. Many in Turkey unequivocally argue that the wrongdo-
ings of the Ottoman Empire have nothing to do with today’s Republican Turkey.
Further more: “France would also have to explain past conduct in its colonies as
well as the atrocities committed more recently by the French Army in Algeria,
before saddling modern Turkey with the shame imposed by this bill . . . Turks
did not commit this horrible crime they are accused of.”46
As it sees itself receding from hopes for membership in the EU, Turkey has
turned to alternatives: relations with Russia, the Ukraine, Israel and the increase
of trade with the United States. With the latter Turkey has reached a 6.5 billion
dollar trade volume (2001). It has acquired forty-nine American-made Boeing
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737–800 commercial passenger planes (at a cost of 2.5 billion dollars), thus
turning its back on the European alternative – the Airbus. It has also called off a
145 million dollar purchase of Eryx anti-tank missiles with France. Turkey con-
cluded a gas deal with Russia (13.5 billion dollars), and plans the further devel-
opment of its economy based on Russian-supplied energy. However, the
ambivalence prevails: among the Mediterranean countries Turkey is the largest
commercial partner of the EU. In 1995, for instance, Turkey imported 13.4 bil-
lion ecus worth of goods from the EU – an increase of 44.7 percent compared
with 1994 – and exported to the EU 9.24 billion ecus worth – an increase of 17
percent compared with 1994.47
Some argue that Turgut Ozal overreached himself. He loved to repeat to his
audience that just as Turkey’s participation in the Korean War gained it admis-
sion into NATO, its policy in the Gulf crisis would earn its accession into the EU.
He was wrong. Furthermore, the customs union signed with Ankara is not a
membership; it is questionable whether one will eventually lead to the other. But
to the frustration of Turkey – even bitter allegations pertaining to double and dis-
criminatory standards – there were candidate states that were spared the customs
union stage and elevated directly towards full membership. A few others did
move rather quickly from one stage to the next.48 Atila Eralp’s summation is an
accurate description of the conflicting views: “While the EU viewed the customs
union as a mechanism to improve its relationship with Turkey without linking it
to the issue of full membership, the Turkish side viewed customs union as part of
a tacit comprehensive package that would eventually lead to full membership.”49
Helsinki has not changed the feelings in Turkey that Europe does not want
to see the Turks in the EU. This emphasizes emotions that the “world is against
us,” and repeatedly feeds bitter accusations of the application of double stan-
dards where Turkey is concerned. The most recent occurrence is the inclusion,
in 2002, of the PKK on the EU list of terror groups. The Spanish ETA and the
Irish IRA were long ago on the list; so why did the EU waited eighteen years,
since 1984, when the PKK had started terror, complained the Hurriyet? It fur-
ther alleged that though the PKK is on the list, yet if a PKK member asked for a
political asylum, say in Germany, this would be granted. This, because Europe
differentiates between the organization, which is a terrorist group, and its mem-
bers, who are entitled to protection. Would the same happen with an ETA or an
IRA member, asks the Hurriyet?50
All this pushes Turkey further away from Europe, towards introversion and
inwardness, if not national and religious radicalism. Other options that harbor
danger to Turkey’s Westernization and declared secularism, are the resumption
of too close contacts with the Central Asian republics, or with the sixty or so
countries-strong Muslim world. These alternatives are injurious to Turkey, as
well as to the Europeans. Both sides should do their utmost not to see Turkey
become a party to the Western–Muslim confrontation that erupted in 2001.
There should be other options available an answer to these detrimental devel-
opments. If Turkey’s admission into the EU does not materialize, it could still be
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given access to certain economic, political and military bodies of the EU, whose
activity and decisions are of direct relevance to Turkey. This is because, in the
final analysis, Europe is Turkey’s hope for the twenty-first century, Turkey’s
markets are important to the Europeans, and its stability and its affinity with the
Western democratic world is even more important.
The Turkish economy: a mass of contradictions
Turkey has responded to the EU’s and international financial bodies’ charges
and demands in a variety of ways. Particular attention was given to the economy,
but changes were observed also as regards human rights and foreign policy.
There has been a considerable progress in Turkey’s economy – in several areas
European standards were attained. In several others there were hopes that
Turkey would be on a par with the newly industrialized countries (NICs)
together with Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. There were years
in which Turkey appeared on a list of ten countries denoted by the United States
as “newly emerging markets” (NEMs). Nonetheless, neither the NICs nor the
NEMs can any longer be considered economic “tigers.” Economically, the 1990s
have badly affected the economies of these countries – Turkey included – and
slowed them down by 15–20 percent on average.
The 1998 world economic slump – the collapse of the stock markets in
southeast Asia, the spiral of inflation and deep devaluation of the national cur-
rencies in places like Russia, Malaysia and Indonesia, the practical bankruptcy
of the economies there and debt repayments which stopped, the stagnation in
South Korea and the recession in Taiwan – all seem to herald bad news. For
Turkish traders and construction firms it meant losing between 7 and 10 billion
dollars worth of investment in Russia. (By the end of 1997, the value of con-
tracted work undertaken by Turkish firms in Russia totaled over 12.3 billion
dollars.)51 As a result, Turkey’s public deficit – 7.7 percent in 1998 – jumped in
1999 to 12 percent. Similarly, the ongoing slowdown in European manufactur-
ing which started at the end of the 1990s (the German economy might not show
any growth in the year 2001) some of it related to the decrease in US imports of
European products, have resulted in considerable European cuts pertaining to
Turkish goods.
Detailed figures for Turkey are no different from the above. Of every TL10 of
taxes collected in 1999 by the state, TL6.8 had to go into payment of interest
accrued on domestic debts. Similarly, the GNP growth was only 1.8 percent, as
against the government’s modest 2.3 percent estimate.52 The decline of the Russ-
ian “suitcase economy” brought about a sharp recession in Turkey. As of the late
1980s when communism collapsed in eastern Europe, and with the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, east Europeans and traders from the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) started to fill their luggage with Turkish goods and
sold these later in their own countries. This Turkish export was estimated at 5.8
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billion dollars in 1997. It decreased, however, to 3.7 billion dollars in 1998. By way
of comparison, in 1990 the bilateral Turkish–Soviet trade was 1.8 billion dollars;
in 1998 it was 9.7 billion dollars, or 12.7 percent of Ankara’s foreign trade.
William Hale noted that following the luggage trade exports to the CIS, Russia
began to rival Germany as Turkey’s biggest export market, buying about 4.1 bil-
lion dollars of Turkish goods in 1998, compared with 5.4 billion for Germany.53 A
30 percent plunge was noted, mainly in the Turkish textile industry, but also in
electronics, leather, footwear, and house hold goods, all heavily dependent on the
trade with Russia. Istanbul’s Laleli market declined from a 0.8 billion dollar
volume in 1996, to 340 million in 1997. All in all some 17,000 Turkish companies
experienced severe difficulties or, even, went out of business.54
The “suitcase economy” has been Turkey’s unofficial export to Russia and
the driving force behind Turkey’s annual 8 percent growth rates between 1995
and 1997. With the eruption of the crisis in Russia (August 1998), and when the
numbers of Russian tourist traders visiting the country dropped off, Turkey’s
growth dramatically plunged. Accordingly, Russia’s share of Turkey’s official
exports fell in 1999 to a mere 2.3 percent. This was 6.9 percent in 1998, or 1.35
billion dollars. One result of the Russian crisis was that foreign fund managers
lumped Turkey together with other emerging markets. They withdrew their
investments from emerging markets and invested in safe, but low-interest 
earning US governments bonds. As the crisis in Russia unfolded, panicky insti-
tutional investors withdrew around 7 billion dollars of investment shares from
the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB), and from government bonds and treasury
bills. Share prices on the IMKB dropped as much as 60 percent. Since then the
index has recovered, but in term of US dollars, it is still down by 15 percent on
the 1998 index, mainly because of the lack of foreign funds in the markets.
Another fallout from the Russian crisis was that Turkish bank borrowing costs
in international markets have risen by 30 percent.55
Russia, however, is not the entire story. In all, the years 1996–99 gave mixed
results and implications as regards Turkey’s economy. On major items and indi-
cators there were considerable decreases that meant recession. In 1997, for
instance, Turkish exports to the EU amounted to 5.72 billion dollars. Earlier, in
1996, it was 12.08 billion. Turkish imports from the EU, for the year 1997,
amounted to 11.17 billion dollars; in 1996 it was 21.9 billion. And while decrease
of imports signals a healthy situation, in Turkey’s case it meant a slowdown in
Turkish industry, which imports unfinished goods and commodities, turns
them into finished goods, and re-exports them. One should also bear in mind
the heavy share of Turkish–EU trade: Turkey’s exports to the EU (1999) consist
of 53.7 percent of the country’s total export. In the same year, 52.7 percent of
Turkey’s imports originated in the EU.56
Some facts and figures concerning Turkey’s imports and exports will help
explain the changes and fluctuations in the country’s economy and foreign
trade. At the end of the 1990s Turkey’s imports by country groups amounted to:
52.7 percent from the EU, 4.6 percent from the Middle East, and 9 percent from
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the CIS. Exports by country groups were 53.7 percent to the EU, 8.3 percent to
the Middle East, and 5.6 percent to the CIS. Germany topped the list of coun-
tries from where Turkey imports its goods. Yet, the decline of imported German
goods between 1998 and 1999 – from 6.2 billion dollars to 4.8 billion, a reduc-
tion of 24.1 percent – clearly point to the economic recession Turkey has expe-
rienced. The same picture shows a decline of imports from Italy (from 3.6
billion dollars in 1998 to 2.6 billion in 1999, a 28.8 percent decline), from the
United States (a 27.9 percent decline, from 3.6 billion dollars to 2.6 billion),
from the UK (from 2.3 billion dollars to 1.8 billion, a 23.5 percent decline), and
from Japan (from 1.8 billion dollars to 1.2 billion, a 34.7 percent decline). Alto-
gether, Turkey’s imports in 1998 amounted to close on 39 billion dollars; in 1999
it declined to 32.5 billion, a 16.5 percent decline.
The export balance shows slightly better results. It is indicative of the
strength of the major trend in the Turkish economy in the 1990s, namely, the
increase of the export sector. The huge gap that existed between Turkish exports
and imports was dramatically cut. In 1996, for instance, Turkey’s exports
amounted to 23 billion dollars, imports were 43 billion. Figures for 1999 show
21 billion dollars of exports and 32 billion dollars of imports. This points to the
viability of the export trade in the Turkish economy. Alas, it is also a sign of an
economic recession, exemplified by the reduction of imports.57
The grand total of Turkey’s exports in 1998 was 22.48 billion dollars. In
1999 it was 21.4 billion dollars, a 5.7 percent decline. Distribution by countries
shows a sharp decline in Turkish exports to the Russian Federation – from 1.32
billion dollars in 1998 to less than 0.5 billion in 1999, a decrease of 62.5 percent.
In 1998 Turkey exported goods worth 4.56 billion dollars to Germany ; in 1999
this declined to 4.45 billion, a 4.9 percent reduction. Also of importance is the
increase in Turkish exports to the United States: 1.93 billion dollar in 1998, and
2.2 billion dollars in 1999, a 4.1 percent increase. Similar results were experi-
enced with Turkish exports to the UK: 1.43 billion dollars in 1998, 1.5 billion
in 1999, a 2.3 percent increase. To Israel – ninth among the ten top buyers of
Turkish goods – Turkey exported (in 1998) 405 million dollars worth of goods.
In 1999 this amount passed 0.5 billion dollars, an increase of 16.8 percent.
Overall, Turkey’s economy is a strange combination of enormous suc-
cesses and huge failures. The country keeps swinging back and forth between
prosperity and recession. Success, prosperity, inflation, stagnation and reces-
sion – a most peculiar mixture hardly explainable by experts and academics –
characterize the economy in the past decade. “Economists scratch their heads
over how Turkey sustained what the textbooks declared unsustainable – long-
term chronic inflation,” writes Andrew Finkel in Time.58 Asaf Savas Akat men-
tions that Turkey is the only middle-income and sizeable open economy with
relatively developed market structures that has managed to sustain average
annual inflation rates around 60 percent for a long period of time without
falling into hyperinflation or successfully reducing inflation to reasonable
levels.59 Together with Japan and Brazil, the World Bank rated Turkey, with
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its 4.3 percent growth rate during the 1965–98 period, as the seventh fastest
growing economy among thirty countries. In this period Turkey’s gross
national product rose from 50 billion dollars to more than 200 billion dollars.
The economy thus quadrupled. A striking trend in these years was that
Turkey’s industrial growth was not limited to the Istanbul and Marmara
regions but new centers emerged in inner Anatolia. Nicknamed the “Anatolian
Tigers,” the industry thrived in Denizli, Urfa, Gaziantep, Konya, and in may
other places. Indeed, the country’s business seemed to be business, as Andrew
Mango writes.60 Still, though production quadrupled, income per person
only doubled – from 1,590 dollars to 3,160 dollars – owing to a rapid popula-
tion increase.
In 1995–97 Turkey enjoyed a 7–8 percent economic growth rate. The trade
volume for 1998 was 72.8 billion dollars; it had been 1.5 billion dollars in 1970.
In 1994 Turkey exported goods worth 18 billion dollars; in 1999 this was 22 bil-
lion.61 At the end of the 1990s the country seemed to have weathered the global
crisis well: although in 1998 the growth rate decreased in comparison with pre-
vious years, its economy grew 3.8 percent in real terms. In the same year Turkey’s
GNP increased by 6.33 percent, rising from 192.4 billion dollars in 1997 to
204.59 billion. The country’s GDP rose by 5.55 percent, from 188.75 billion dol-
lars in 1997, to 192.23 billion in 1998, and per capita income rose from 3,080
dollar to 3,224 dollars. Yet, again, although the GNP increased in 1998 by 6.33
percent, the per capita income increased by only 4.68 percent because of a 1.58
percent population increase.62
Comparatively Turkey’s economy did well in the past twenty years. As
above, the country more than tripled its per capita income – from 1,000 dollars
to 3,220 dollars – surpassing neighbors it previously tailed, such as Syria, Iraq,
Iran, and Russia. This was accomplished despite inflation that rarely dipped
below 70 percent, an achievement that defied conventional economic wisdom.
In spite of inflation – to overcome this its businesses frequently calculate future
prices and costs in US dollars, then convert back into TL at the current exchange
rate at the time of payment – Turkey’s growth in 1998 was much higher than,
say, that of South-Korea, or Japan, which have borne the brunt of the Asian eco-
nomic crisis. Its unemployment rate is low, 5.8 percent – the expectation for
2001 being 6.9 percent – half that of France, Germany and Italy, and close to that
of Japan and the United States that stand on 3 and 4.5 percent, respectively. Its
203.8 billion dollar GNP (in 2000) makes Turkey the eighteenth largest econ-
omy in the world. In that year the country dropped down one level owing to a
6.4 percent decline in GNP, attributed to the devastating earthquakes and to the
aforementioned crisis in Russia.
Turkey topped the list of Europe’s fastest growing market for credit cards. In
1999, Istanbul’s stock exchange grew faster, in dollar terms, than any other
market in the world. Turkey is one of the largest dispensers of foreign aid rela-
tive to its GNP, where it was once a recipient. On average, Turkey has a 22 bil-
lion dollar foreign currency balance and its industrial output rose more than 10
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percent between 1996 and 1997. The country ranks among the world’s top ten
producers of iron and steel – producing 13 million ton annually. According to
Purchasing Power Parities Turkey holds seventeenth place but, based on US
values, Turkey’s 200.5 billion dollar income is in fact worth 419 billion, and the
3,000 dollar income per capita is equal to 5,500–6,000 dollars.63
Privatization reduced the role of the government in the economy from 50
to 25 percent. Unfortunately, the process was indefinitely postponed in late
1998, waiting to be continued by strong coalition governments. Turkey’s huge
public sector deficits emphasize the urgency in expediting the privatization
process. Usually, successive Turkish governments covered the deficits by print-
ing money or borrowing at sky-high interest rates. Indeed, 50 percent of the
country’s budget is allocated to cover the public debt. In 2000, privatization
restarted and was expected to produce 7.6 billion dollars. A 20 percent stake in
Turk Telecom – the twelfth largest communication company in the world –
worth a few billion dollars, was at risk. However, foreign buyers failed to show
up for such a small package so it was removed from the list for privatization.
Strong objections, from military echelons in particular, blocked the sale to 
foreigners of more than 39 percent of any governmental company, Turk Tele-
com and the national carrier, Turkish-Airlines, in particular, apparently in
accordance with the articles of the Turkish law.64
“Foreigners will again be our masters,” is the Turkish battle cry that resists
the privatization demand of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this
mood, whoever complies with the IMF’s conditions, like Kemal Dervis, Turkey’s
Secretary for the Treasury since February 2001 (he resigned in August 2002), is
at risk of being labeled a “foreign agent.” Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank
made expediting privatization a condition of granting a large and very much
needed loan to Turkey. From 1999 through to 2001, the IMF allocated Turkey 19
billion dollars; during the period 2002 to 2004 Turkey would borrow another
16.3 billion, thus becoming the IMF’s largest borrower. Eventually, the two
financial bodies would give Turkey a financial support of 24.7 billion dollar.
Accordingly, they further insisted on cutting public spending as a proportion of
GNP by 2.5 percent, and the liquidation of state-owned banks and government
involvement in the private banking system.65 Turkey’s state-owned banks serve
the political machine, writing off debts as political favors, with staggering accu-
mulated losses – 20 billion dollars for the two largest banks. Since the end of
2000 the government has directly controled twelve insolvent banks where the
Bank of Turkey overseeing system “failed” to discover their imminent bank-
ruptcy and collapse, mainly due to widespread corruption.
The IMF also insisted on the liberalization of the tobacco business, another
market that is heavily controlled by the government, and on cutting subsidies to
the farms that grow it and supply 600,000 jobs. General reduction of subsidies,
decentralization and privatization of the country’s energy market and power
stations as well as privatization of Turk Telecom and the sale of 51 percent of
Turkish Airlines, were but a few of the other demands of the IMF.
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One can easily trace, in the Turkish objection to the IMF’s stipulations on
privatization and sale of government assets to foreigners, the fear of a recurrence
of the ill-famed Ottoman capitulation system. The word in Turkey was not a call
for painful changes and catharses but for the rejection of the IMF’s “dictate.”66
The Sevres syndrome exists also in Turkey’s economy: foreigners just look for
the occasion to gather for the kill and to slice off parts of Turkey – its territory
or its economy.
Ilhan Kesici, an MP, described the “comeback,” the leap forward of the
Turkish economy:
By the 1980s, the state seemed to be breaking down. There were queues, even for
olive oil, something in which we normally ought to be able to bathe babies. Foreign
exchange transactions were a nightmare for the economic bureaucracy. Now these
days are gone . . . In 1922, if you wanted a table with non-wobbly legs, you had to
ask a Greek carpenter. Now there is a Turkish tile factory in Wales, our banks are
well represented in Germany, and we are having [sic] to farm out production of tele-
vision sets and even fighter aircraft to Poland, Slovakia, and Egypt. I do not believe
that Turks have made an appearance of this sort on the European stage since the
early 17th Century. We are, in other words, coming back.67
In spite of the above rosy information, some deep and basic drawbacks badly
affect the chances of Turkey being able to enjoy a stable economy. Financing a
huge chronic gap between Turkey’s exports and imports – 30 billion dollars as
against 50 billion in the year 2000 – plus a habitual public sector budget deficit
of few additional billions (10 billion dollars in 2000), lead the country’s econ-
omy into a vicious circle of external and internal debts, amazing amounts of
interest payments, and greatly contribute to the country’s three-digit inflation.
The latest UN Human Development Index ranks Turkey as a whole as seventy-
fourth among the countries of the world, with a point value of 0.778 on a scale
of zero to one.68
The country’s rate of inflation in the mid-1990s was 97 percent, and the
average rate in the past decade was 73.7 percent – by far the highest among the
forty largest economies in the world. The Turkish economy grew in real terms 3.6
percent on average for the past twenty-five years and, accordingly, the per capita
income should have been 6,000 dollars – twice the current figure – had there been
less than 10 percent inflation in that period. On average, inflation robbed Turks
of 30 percent of their purchasing power despite nominal increases in income.
One thousand TL in 1990 was worth TL60 in buying power in 1995, TL18 in
1997, less than TL1 in 2000. Persisting inflation at the current rate means that
TL100 of 1990 was only worth TL3 at the end of the year 2000.69 Turkey’s infla-
tion dates back to the 1970s, to the extreme increases in oil prices. Political pri-
orities, loss-making public banks, a heavily subsidized agricultural sector, a
bankrupt social security system, poor and corrupt tax collecting system – all
forced the government to borrow money to meet obligations. This heavily fueled
inflation, kept interest rate high, and led to ever more expensive borrowing.
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The good signs of 1999 vanished in 2000. The general elections of April
1999 produced a solid coalition government, inflation dropped to 64.7 percent
thus approaching the 50 percent mark for the first time since the 1980s, and
interest rates tumbled by nearly two-thirds to just over 30 percent. All, however,
remained signs and vanished in 2000 and in early 2001. The 1999 sharp drop in
tourism – for fear of PKK avenging the capture of Abdullah Ocalan – and the
devastating earthquakes, among other things, resulted in a growth rate of minus
6.4 percent, and eventually this turned into the worst year since the early
1940s.70 But the crisis continued and dramatically worsened in 2000 and 2001.
In 2001 alone Turkey’s GDP dropped by 8 percent. The “reassuring” words of
Alan Makovsky, who is highly conversant with Turkey’s realities, is indicative of
the country’s economic chaos: “The situation has now calmed somewhat: the
stock market has crept back a bit and interest rates are just barely above 100 per-
cent.”71 Just few months earlier the interbank interest for December 2000 soared
from 400 percent to 1,700 percent. For a time this passed 7,000 percent, later
“calmed down,” and settled at 3,000 percent. The Istanbul share market
dropped by 50 percent compare with January 2000. Foreign currency reserves
that on average stood at 22 billion dollars, dropped to 18 billion. Twelve banks
collapsed and were taken over by the government and the central bank was
forced to remove the Turkish lira’s peg to the US dollar. In May 2001 a single US
dollar was equal to TL1.35 million. The exchange rate was TL675,000 to the
dollar in February 2001, and TL450,000 to the dollar in June 1999. Spiraling
inflation resumed and at the end of 2001 Turkey again faced three-digit infla-
tion. Unemployment in various places soared to 15 percent, though the 2001
national figure was expected to be 6.9 percent. Turkey’s GDP growth in the
years 2000 to 2002 declined by 7.1 percent and GNP per capita dropped sharply
to 2,160 dollar (from 2,967 in 2001) – the lowest since 1994. Social, political and
international implications of the crisis have been enormous: the gap between
Turkey’s situation and the standards required for it to join the EU widened.
Prices of basic goods and commodities sky-rocketed, employers stopped salary
payments owing to lack of money, the purchasing power of salaries and pen-
sions that were paid were cut by half owing to soaring prices. People were fear-
ful lest the military would take power, incidentally giving the coup de grace to
Turkey’s EU dream.72
Hopes, it should be recalled, were high. Just months before the crisis
described above, the government promised to bring down the rate of consumer
price rises to 25 percent by the end of the 2000, and to get down to single-digit
increases by the end of 2002. Similarly, Turkey’s central bank decided not to
allow a higher than 0.9 percent per month devaluation of the Turkish lira, thus
raised expectations that by the end of 2000 Turkey would achieve a 20 percent
inflation rate. Six zeroes would then be removed from the Turkish lira exchange
rate, so it will equal it to 1 US dollar or to 2 euros. Unfortunately, by the end of
2002 the lira is likely to be close to 2 million per dollar. Spiraling devaluation led
to a loss of confidence in the Turkish currency, giving it bad names – “funny
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money” and “phoney money” – and resulted in the Turkish lira’s replacement
by the US dollar and the Deutsche Mark.73 All the above was a heaven-sent gift
for those Europeanists who adamantly preached that Turkey would never be
able to keep up with EU standards.
In 1996 Turkey had a trade imbalance of 22 billion dollars, 11 percent of
its GDP. In mid-1999 the country had a domestic debt of 37 billion dollars and
foreign debt of 101 billion dollars – equivalent to half its GNP. This debt is owed
by Turkey to European, American and Japanese banks. The government, who
desperately needs cash flow to repay its debts, continues to issue high-interest,
short-run, inflation-indexed government bonds. It encourages the local popu-
lation to purchase these bonds, promising close to 90 percent interest payments.
Turkey’s debts to its citizens grow accordingly: IMF estimations were that the
country’s domestic debt would double by early 2001. In addition, the govern-
ment must create 5 million new jobs, which is another high money-consuming
role – the unemployment rate in 1998 was 6.3 percent and reached 7.3 percent
in 1999 – to ease unemployment and to boost the economy, in particular in
formerly war stricken areas.
The 3 million Turks who look for jobs contribute to the figure of 13.5 mil-
lion people living in poverty in Turkey. United Nations reports indicate that one
in seven Turks – 14 percent of 63 million – live in poverty. In Turkey it means
below the daily limit of the equivalent of 1.48 dollars. Others quote a daily limit
of 2 dollars, which then puts some 40 percent of the Turks under the poverty
line. Not surprisingly, this signals that the country is getting poorer: the 1999
per capita annual income was expected to be 3,200 dollars; in reality it dropped
below the 3,000 dollar mark and in 2001–2 plunged to just above 2000 dollars.
In addition, Turkey is one of the worst countries with respect to distribution of
income. Approximately half the population has to make do with a very small
proportion of the GNP – one-fifth of it. “Today, the cost of a meal at an expen-
sive restaurant in Turkey equals the annual income of someone from the lower
classes,” is the Hurriyet’s version of this dangerous Turkish inequality.74
In the period from March 1998 to March 1999, poor performance was
noted in two main sectors: services and industry. Industrial production declined
by 7.6 percent, and the fall in importation of capital goods in early 1999 is a fur-
ther clear indication of declining industrial production. Agricultural produc-
tion, which saw a slowdown in 1997 – by all means a good omen in a modern
economy – grew by 7.6 percent in 1998. When distribution of GDP by sectors is
examined, it becomes evident that the share of agricultural production, which
was 15.8 percent in 1997, increased to 17.6 percent in 1998, while the share of
industrial production decreased to 19.6 percent in 1998 (having been 21.9 per-
cent in 1997). Forty three percent of the Turkish workforce is employed in agri-
culture, but this sector contributes only 15 percent of the national income.
President Demirel, an enthusiastic supporter of curbing the share of agriculture
in Turkey’s economy, insisted on not more than a 10 percent rural sector and
“on a society with less people, but one that is also stronger.” The only way of
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“getting richer” and maintaining domestic peace, according to Demirel, is
industrialization with fewer people tilling the land:
Here lies Turkey’s most basic problem. This is the root of our income distribution
problem. Almost half of the population accounts for one seventh of the gross
national product. Other countries have solved this problem not by increasing the
share of the agricultural sector but by decreasing rural population. There is no other
way. Twenty acres of land, a tractor and a family of eight . . . This is Turkey’s most
serious problem.75
Summing-up Turkey’s economy in the 1990s and in the new millenium, one
clearly notices several major trends. Exports demonstrated rapid growth, an
increase of 13.1 percent in 1997, but soon slowed considerably due to the nega-
tive developments in external demand, and recorded an increase of only 2.7 per-
cent in 1998. There were similar developments in the country’s imports: they fell
from 49 billion dollars in 1997, to 46 billion in 1998 – a 5.4 percent decline – due
mainly to a shrink in domestic demand but also to a fall in crude oil prices. In
ordinary times, exports rise, imports decline, and cheaper energy could indicate
a good future. However, the increase in exports was temporary, cheap energy
has been a short-lived phenomenon, and the decline in production and the eco-
nomic recession were better explanations for the decrease in Turkey’s imports.
The country’s interest rates are among the highest in the world – in 1998
they reached 145 percent. In 2001 interest rates decreased slightly but they are
still around the three-digit area, something that bears acute economic and social
implications. In addition, none of the six governments that have ruled Turkey
since 1994 have succeeded in curbing public spending, reducing agricultural
subsidies that drain government funds, and bringing up the retirement age of
employees to internationally accepted levels to prevent the financially ailing
social security system from breaking down. Nor has there been any effective
effort to tax the black market economy, which has a turnover of 80 billion dol-
lars, or even 140 billion according to another estimation, which, as William Hale
explains, is enabling Turks to ride out crises which could otherwise be expected
to be fatal.76
Tourism suffered a sharp decline in 1998 and 1999. The fear of the PKK
avenging the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1998, and the series of earthquakes
that rocked Turkey the following summer, caused many tourists to stay away
from Turkey. Hotel occupancy during the 1999 season in Antalya was only 20
percent. Close to 9 million tourists visited Turkey in 1998, with tourism rev-
enues reaching 11.2 billion dollars. Less than 6 million tourists came in 1999,
reducing revenues to under 7 billion dollars. The sharp decrease in the country’s
GNP for 1999 – minus 10 percent, from plus 4 percent in 1998 and minus 6 per-
cent in 1999 – is to be partly attributed to the crisis in tourism. Improvement
was achieved in 2000 and the target of more than 10.4 million tourists was
reached (11.5 million in 2001), producing an 8 billion dollar industry – almost
twice the figures for 1999. More than 2 million Germans who visited Turkey led
Turkey and Europe 81
the way, followed by tourists from the UK and Russia. The decline of tourism to
Israel as a result of the war with the Palestinians, diverted tourists to Turkey but
also to Cyprus and Greece. A tourism revival in 2000 expected to yield an
increase – though modest – of 1.5 to 2.5 percent in the Turkish economy, plus
an inflation rate of “only” 40 to 50 percents (lower than the 67 percent of 1999).
As already noted, the Turkish economic turmoil of winter 2000/2001 – some
described it as a catastrophe – and the implications of the global economic slow-
down, have pushed the Turkish economy backwards.77
The beginning of the new millennium has not brought good news for
Turkey’s economy. The implications of the country’s economic crisis could have
a detrimental effect, both internally and on Turkey’s international status. Alan
Makovsky noticed that the emergence of Turkey as a regional power in recent
years has been possible thanks also to a perky economy that has seen sustained
growth, with occasional interruptions, over the past two decades. Makovsky also
warned that, were the country to face long-term economic collapse, a less con-
fident Turkey might no longer be a regional power, with heavily detrimental
implications, for instance to the US perception of Turkey as a forward-moving
supporter in a mainly hostile region.78 Turkish decision-makers should therefore
take care that the transition period towards better economic standards would be
short, with minimal painful social implications that usually accompany the
remedies to economic crises. Turkey’s friends should also contribute their share.
An economically and socially weaker Turkey is a much worse option.
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Turkish nationalism and Islam
Turkey professes to be a secular state, the only such country in the Middle East
and the only secular Muslim country in the world. Turkey is a living example,
though not without difficulties, of a country whose population is predomi-
nantly Muslim but which is not a Muslim state. Ayse Kadioglu supplies a brief
but painful enough reminder of the reforms, better called trauma, that the
country and its population had experienced, which helps when evaluating
the interaction between state and religion in Turkey, what has been achieved in
this field, and the almost religious zeal – “secular fundamentalism” – in which
secularism has been applied in the country:
The proclamation of the Republic in 1923 was followed by the abolition of the office
of the caliphate in 1924. Other steps were taken in the course of the 1920s and early
1930s towards secularizing the Republic. These included the abolition of the Min-
istry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, abolition of religious courts, pro-
scription of male religious headgear, namely the fez, dissolution of the dervish
orders, reform of the calendar, and adoption of the Swiss Civil Code. By the end of
the 1920s, radical reforms were passed such as dis-establishment of the state religion
(10 April 1928), adoption of the Latin alphabet (1 November 1928), and the use of
the Turkish language in the Islamic call to prayer (3 February 1932). These reforms
constituted an onslaught on the existing cultural practices. They opted for a general
state of amnesia, which would lead a process of estrangement of the people from
some of their cultural practices.1
As Dogu Ergil writes, the disconnection of the Turkish society from its past
allowed the ruling elite to see the people as an entity ready to be molded accord-
ing to their vision of what society and the nation should be.2 Accordingly,
separation from culture of the past was not confined to religious practices. In
the pursuit for the unique Turkish nationalism (Milliyetcilik), different from the
4
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cultures and civilization in its proximity, Turkey severed ties with basic features
of the Arab, Persian and Islamic worlds, emphasizing instead the modern and
Western alternatives, as well as the pre-Islamic past. Hakan Yavuz mentions that
during the 1930s and the 1940s villagers with traditional attire were not allowed
to enter the major streets in Ankara, and were relegated to the less conspicuous
back streets.3 A national narrative was supplied, in accordance with the rules
mentioned above, that was to prove the uniqueness of the Turks, and their
belonging to pre-Islamic and pre-Arab times. They are the descendants of the
powerful Hittite Empire, whose capital was in Hatushash, near Ankara, and
who, over the ages, made their way back to Anatolia from the prairies of Central
Asia, the way shown to them by the Grey Wolf, the Bozkurt.4 (This last symbol,
though indicating that ancient Turkic peoples emanated in much older times
than Turkey’s Islamic or Arab neighborhood, was later adopted by Turkey’s Pan-
Turkists. The Bozkurt thus acts contrary to the idea of Turkish nationalism
which centers on the Turkish State alone; see pp. 109–110.) The Antatolian peas-
antry, of whom the Ottoman elite did not think very highly, was now, in the
Turkish Republic, praised as the pure core of the Turkish nation. Dogu Ergil
supplies a fascinating description of the efforts to supply an alternative Turkish
ideology to the so-called defunct past:
In the absence of a medieval high culture that could be labeled “Turkish”, the
nationalist elite found their glory in a history that never was. The search for, and
consolidation of, a new national identity were carried to such extremes in the 1930s
that theories like the Sun Theory of Language were concocted. According to this
“theory”, all languages emerged out of Turkish. As a reminder of those days, the
presidential banner consists of a sun representing the Turkish Republic encircled by
16 stars, symbolizing the Turkish states that were presumably created by Turks
throughout history. This fabricated glorious past was a panacea for Turkish pride
wounded by the loss of empire and reincarnated as a poor, backward society that
was occupied during the First World War.5
True, in the fervent desire to break with the past, sometimes resulting in painful
situations, secularism and modernization should be credited with great accom-
plishments, mainly in the urban centers. Turkey could honestly claim to be the
only country in the Middle East, indeed the world, with a predominantly
Muslim population that is not an Islamic state. But Turkish realities are not
monolithic. Many Turks have never really separated themselves – openly or
covertly – from their Islamic cultural heritage, nor from Islam’s religious prac-
tices. Many Turks consider Islam as the powerful counter-identity to the totality
that Kemalists have applied in Turkey.
The state, its Western and secular establishments and elite, view Muslim
manifestations as detrimental to the very existence of modern Turkey. Indeed,
the growth of Muslim influence in Turkey cannot be downplayed. The 1970s
and the first half of the 1980s were years of economic crisis in Turkey, stemming
mostly from the global energy crisis but also from internal Turkish phenomena
like the huge wave of immigrants from rural areas into Turkey’s urban centers.
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Those years subjected Turkey to acute inflation, shortages, unemployment,
enormous expenditure on energy imports, and a slowdown in the absorption of
Turkish workers in European countries similarly suffering from a recession.
These difficulties, together with widespread existing feelings of being powerless,
marginalized and excluded, in short belonging to the “have nots,” contributed
to the rising power of radical ideologies – rightist, leftist, national and religious
– and of Islam in Turkey.
Outwardly, more Turks appear to fast during Ramadan, more to attend Friday
prayers in the mosques, and more women to wear veils. A 1997 survey on sects,
communities, shari’a and foundations carried out in Turkey’s major cities, reveals
that 50 percent of the urban sector have religious morals and practice the necessi-
ties of Islam periodically. Thirty percent practice them every day. Though identi-
fying themselves as religious, 16 percent do not practice the necessities of Islam.6
No doubt findings pertaining to the rural sector would give much higher figures.
The struggle between Turkish nationalism, secularism, and Islam; between
western modernity and traditional structure, appears to be gaining momentum.
Turkey is probably more Western than modern, i.e. the country adopted West-
ern styles without simultaneously changing or promoting its laws, freedoms,
rights, etc. Turkish nationalism was the last to be extricated, molded and refined
from the ethnic hodgepodge that characterized the Ottoman Empire. (“Since
they saw themselves the owners of the Empire, no one expected them [the
Turks] to claim the right of self-determination. The Serbs left first, then the
Greeks, the Bulgarians and Armenians, and only the Jews had no option”.)7
Practically a novice, Turkish nationalism had to face Islam, a well-established
force, which is seen as a means for uniting all its followers and eliminating dif-
ferences between them, i.e. between Turkey and its Muslim and Arab brethren,
between Turkey and Islamic universalism or pan-Arabism.
Most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam shares many common fea-
tures with other Middle East and Muslim movements, it has grown and devel-
oped in a very different political and social environment, shaping its unique
nature. Turkey’s Muslim ideology is tied up with Turkish nationalism in a
unique fashion, because nationalism affected all spheres of life in contemporary
Turkey. Religion and socialism – to name but two although far apart from each
other – were among schools of thought and ideologies that were affected by
Turkish nationalism. Still, there are Muslim Turks – they prefer to be called
Turkish Muslims – who, although colored by patriotism, do challenge the secu-
larist component and European identification of their society and of their coun-
try’s Kemalist nationalism. These people question the intentions of the Turkish
state when it comes to religious freedoms. Mete Tuncay, a leading Turkish intel-
lectual, asserts that Turkish secularism does not mean a separation of politics
from religion, but that religion is controlled by the state. The goal is to establish
a kind of control mechanism to prevent religion from influencing politics.8
One milestone in the rise of Islam in Turkey was the officers’ coup of 1980,
in whose wake religious lessons were made compulsory in schools. The army
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justified its intervention in domestic politics by pointing to the growth of the
radical and Marxist left, particularly its militant and terrorist elements. The
encouragement of “bearable” religious believers and of religious education in
schools was considered by the army to be the antidote for the impact of ethnic
extremism and the Iranian revolution, as well as leftist radicalism. “Islam’s green
will defeat communist red,” was the mantra. Considered a factor of unity, Islam
was thought to be the remedy for many divisions in Turkey, among them the
Turkish–Kurdish conflict. The result: “Islam had finally been brought from the
periphery to the centre of Turkish politics.”9 Simultaneously though, all through
the 1990s, the Turkish military dismissed hundreds of officers and non-com-
missioned officers (NCO) for being “excessively affiliated” with Islamic bodies.
On 16 June 1998, for instance, 167 officers and NCOs were fired in the largest
purge carried out in a single day.10
When Turkey reverted to a multiparty system in 1983, the Muslim opposi-
tion groups came to occupy a legitimate slot in the political system. People from
the lower classes and many Kurds joined Islamic opposition parties because the
existing parties did not address their needs. Furthermore, some of the opposition
to the establishment, having failed to find its place in the political mainstream,
was also drawn to the Muslim parties. In the 1995 general elections, for instance,
in the western urban centers, the mostly Kurdish shantytowns voted overwhelm-
ingly for the Welfare Party.11 The poor attitude towards Turkish immigrants in
Europe also contributed to their anti-Western and European feelings, which soon
enough were expressed in Muslim extremism or a return to their old ethnic roots
(i.e. Kurdishness). Political parties courted Muslim circles and granted them reli-
gious concessions in return for their votes. This may well explain the appearance
of certain previously banned practices, such as calls to prayer in Arabic, Muslim
publications, Muslim schools, and Muslim associations.
The Muslim parties gained ground in both general and local elections. In
the December 1995 general elections, Muslim parties received about 21 percent
of the vote, 2 percent more than in the March 1994 local elections. In the last
three general elections, the Muslim parties have tripled their strength. Twenty-
eight of Turkey’s seventy-six city councils, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir,
are ruled by representatives of Muslim parties. The result of the general elections
in December 1995 showed the Refah Partis, the Welfare Party, to be the largest
party in Turkey – 21.2 percent. In short, a formerly marginal political element,
which lacked legitimacy, found itself accepted into the political establishment.12
The resurgence of Islam in Turkey could also be linked to the growing
prominence of Muslim oil-producing countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and
Iran. Turkey’s dependence on energy imported from them in the 1970s, and
their accumulated purchasing and investment power, induced the Turkish gov-
ernment to moderate its attitude towards Muslim circles (and to scale-down its
relations with Israel – see Chapter 7). Similarly, the previously banned Arabic
script, became increasingly evident in Turkish commercial areas, something
that could be attributed to the affluent of the Arab world which, having been
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deprived of Beirut as a place of entertainment, shopping and investment, took
to Istanbul as one possible substitute.13
But above and beyond the political events noted here, ideological, economic
and social motives came into play in the rise of Islam in Turkey. The crisis of com-
munism throughout the world and the repression of the Turkish left channeled
many marginal or extreme groups to another radical alternative –Islam. When
growing portions of the population fail to ameliorate their lot through modern-
ization, the answer to inflation, unemployment, uncontrolled urbanization and
exorbitant real estate costs, slums and alienation, is Islam. Islam seemed to offer
a third way: neither capitalism nor socialism. It is a response akin to the response
of the world’s poorer peoples to secularization, the collapse of communism,
Western materialism, capitalism, globalization, and the intrusion – even imposi-
tion – of alien, principally Western, cultures. It is a search for identity on the part
of people whose rulers have adhered to the West and its values to an excessive
degree, while they themselves find Western luxuries unattainable.
The Muslim revival is doubly powerful when Muslim organizations and
political bodies move in to take the place of enfeebled and impotent government.
It should be noted that some 1,500 new mosques are constructed annually. Alto-
gether there are more than 80,000 mosques in Turkey – a mosque for every 800
people – some of which clearly indicating the strength of religious defiance vis-
à-vis secular Kemalism. See, for instance, the monumental Kocatepe Mosque in
Ankara that overlooks Anitkabir, Ataturk’s mausoleum and burial ground. But
apart from soul saving, Muslim bodies also provide education, health services,
housing, and employment. Islamic banks offer interest-free loans, as Muslim law
dictates. Muslim groups allocate food and money to the poor. Millions of poor
migrants, many of them of Kurdish origin, who were forced to leave the war torn
areas of southeast Turkey, looked for sustenance from these Muslim bodies. This
support was not granted to them by Turkey’s secular parties. Above all, a
common religious solidarity and a sense of belonging – so important for
uprooted people – was provided for them by the Islamic Refah Partisi.14
Does all this constitute a threat to Turkey’s unique status in the surround-
ing Arab and Muslim worlds, to its links with the West, to its aspirations for
Europeanization, to Turkish democracy? There is no single answer to these
questions. Those concerned for Turkey’s image in view of the Muslim revival are
worried mainly over the failure of the state in the social and economic domains,
and its replacement by Islamic organizations. The price of public welfare, when
carried out by religious or even fundamentalist circles instead of the govern-
ment, is exploitation of the misery of the masses – particularly migrant villagers
and Kurds uprooted from their home provinces. Since the outbreak of the PKK
rebellion in 1984, some 3 million Kurds have relocated from the southeast of the
country to its western provinces. As a consequence, 3 million Kurdish residents
have transformed Istanbul into the world’s largest Kurdish city. Adana, too, is
now a Kurdish city, so is half of Izmir. The unfortunate people receiving hand-
outs are told that Western progress is to blame for their troubles, and that Islam
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will better their lot. When the beneficiaries expressed their gratitude in the
polling booths by awarding their votes to the Islamic parties, they altered
the political balance in Turkey’s municipalities, and doubly so at the national
governmental level.
Some grave consequences have followed upon this trend. Wherever the
Muslims were triumphant, hostels for battered women were closed. In a number
of places restaurants serving alcohol were shut down. Efforts were made to seg-
regate men and women on public transport, and Muslim mayors have made
such changes as painting all the bus stations green, the color of Islam. Banning
was imposed on immodest advertising in posters and films, and in public there
was insistence on modest attire. Municipal offices were closed early during
Ramadan, and there were reports of intimidation of people who did not observe
the fast. In the past, Turkish courts opposed closing early during Ramadan. Sim-
ilarly, time off for workers for Friday noon prayers was not granted because the
official day off is Sunday. Classical music and ballet are under attack as symbols
of decadent Western culture. Neither are the city walls of Istanbul spared: it is
said that Muslim extremists want them demolished, as they are a symbol of the
Byzantine Christian regime that preceded the Muslim Ottomans.15
Conversely, there are those who see no threat in the Muslim revival and its
expression in Turkey’s cities – the countryside is traditionally devout – even going
so far as to predict a reduction in recruitment to Islam. Admittedly, Islam is more
evident on city streets – women wear veils, men are bearded, long rows of wor-
shipers prostrate themselves at prayer, Muslim charities and businesses and
grassroots organizations of the Muslim parties are active everywhere. And every-
thing is so discernible. As Nulifer Gole put it: “instead of asking for assimilation
and equality the Islamists claim differences, much as U.S. Afro-Americans have
done . . . ‘Islam is beautiful like black is beautiful’.”16 But this might also be mis-
leading, or could be differently interpreted. Most of these believers are migrants
from the traditionally religious villages. The construction of transportation and
communication networks has eased this migration, which was part of the mighty
wave of industrialization and urbanization that has swept Turkey since the 1950s.
During the past two decades, cities with over 100,000 inhabitants have increased
their populations to 9.3 million, while places with a population of 2,000 or less
have decreased by 1.6 million. To give but one example from the research of Resat
Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan: in 1927, 12.5 percent of the Turks lived in cities with
over 20,000 inhabitants, whereas in the year 2000, 71 percent of Turkey’s popu-
lation is classified as urban.17 The argument therefore goes that the numbers of
the faithful have not increased, they have merely relocated from countryside to
city, thus become more visible. Furthermore, urbanization holds out prospects
of moderating the rise of Turkish Islam. The number of villagers who pray at least
once a day stands at about 70 percent; the number drops dramatically to 24 per-
cent in the cities. Dwindling numbers of city-dwellers fast at Ramadan, and
attendance in the mosques is smaller than in any other Muslim country. In other
words, the villager’s exposure to urban culture is liable to temper his or her
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Muslim fervor, for past experience shows that today’s city-dweller – yesterday’s
villager – is less drawn to Islam and its attractions.18
A review of the history and nature of political Islam in Turkey – for exam-
ple, the rise to power of the Welfare Party under Necmettin Erbakan and its brief
tenure there – reveals that the threat the Islamic parties posed to Turkey’s iden-
tity was significantly less than the authorities feared. There was a huge difference
between Turkey’s Islamic parties and the radical militant Muslim parties of Iran
and Algeria, and it is not by chance that Turkey is rarely mentioned in surveys
discussing Middle East religious fundamentalism. Only a minority among
Turkish Muslim believers consider Islam and its universal aspects to be superior
to their country’s nationalism and patriotism. A brand of political Turkish-
Muslim synthesis exists which emphasizes the national needs of the country
(for instance: the right-wing Nationalist Action Party, led by Alparslan Turkes;
see p. 110).
Erbakan’s short-lived regime – from June 1996 to June 1997 – failed to allow
one to draw clear-cut conclusions about the nature of Muslim politics in Turkey.
They made no changes in foreign policy – neither withdrawing from NATO, nor
severing ties with “the microbes of the Zionist banking system” – neither did
they try to put engulfing internal Muslim reforms into effect. For example, noth-
ing materialized from Erbakan’s promise to build a mosque at the center of
Istanbul, in Taksim Square, across from the Ataturk Cultural Center, an icon of
secular Turkey, or in Cankaya, the section of Ankara where the presidential
palace is located.20 A similar fate awaited the proposal to allow women govern-
ment employees who wanted to attend work wearing head coverings, or – unlike
in municipal offices – for shorter working hours during Ramadan for govern-
ment employees who obey the fast. As Philip Robins observed, the government
was considered by most to be a continuation of the previous one. Being in oppo-
sition Erbakan spoke loudly against Turkey supporting US bombings in north
Iraq, and Turkey called it “a second Sevres,” and was extremely critical of
Ankara’s contacts with Israel. But, once in power, he concurred –often reluc-
tantly or retrospectively, when it was found that he had been ignored – with these
very Turkish moves.21
In June 1997, Erbakan was forced to step down under pressure from the
military. The reasons given were that the policies and actions of his government
were not commensurate with the principles of the constitution with regard to
democracy and secularity. It was not the first time Erbakan had fallen foul of the
army, which had already dissolved two of his political creations, and both times
after launching a coup. In 1970 the Generals had disbanded the Islamic National
Order Party and, in 1980, the National Salvation Party. Rather than risk a third
coup and see the Welfare Party go the way of its predecessors, Erbakan chose to
play by the rules of, the albeit very Turkish, democracy, and resign. He was to be
sorely disillusioned. In January 1998 Turkey’s Constitutional Court declared the
Welfare Party illegal on the grounds that its platform and polices contradicted
Turkey’s secular constitution – from the time the court was established in 1963
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until 1998, it had dissolved twenty parties for these reasons. It was the third
party led by Erbakan to be dispersed and Erbakan himself was excluded from all
political activity.
Eleven months of Muslim rule, 1996–97, had made it clear that “Turkish-
ness” and Turkish democracy were still more vital than any Muslim principle. It
is interesting to note that 41 percent of the voters for the Muslim Welfare Party
defined themselves as secular and considered Ataturk, not Mohammed, their
most important historical figure. Nor is Jihad – Holy War – considered a prac-
tical method for achieving any of the aims of the party program.22 Disagree-
ments do exist, and they are painful as the following words show, but they are
not carried to excess. For instance, Erbakan protested that “If I make a speech
and say this is what our dear Prophet Muhammad said, they will start banging
on the desks and protesting. This is not secularism, it is enmity toward reli-
gion.”23 Similarly bitter was Abdullah Gul, member of the Refah and a former
Minister of State: “They want to create another religion, which is atheism. It’s
the secular people who are not tolerant, and they want to impose their lifestyle
here.”24 The struggle, even conflict, between Turkey’s secularity and Islam goes
on, but it does not appear as extreme as the Iranian or Algerian models. A
devout Muslim headed the government in Ankara; a no less devout Muslim
Prime Minister relinquished this post, his party later to be declared illegal. There
was no trace of Erbakan’s vow to pursue his policy “with or without blood.”25 All
was done democratically, admittedly Turkish democracy.
The little that Erbakan did on foreign policy was no more impressive. Per-
haps he did not have enough time. Nothing of “Islamic fraternity” came out of
his much publicized visits to Iran, Malaysia, Algeria and Libya. Interestingly,
Erbakan likened his return from Tripoli to no less than the homecoming of a
victorious Roman tribune. In Tehran he clearly failed to contain the Kurdish
issue on the basis of Muslim brotherhood; Iran has not stopped granting facili-
ties to the PKK.26 Similarly, nothing substantive emerged out of the November
1996 twenty Muslim countries conference that Erbakan had organized. Neither
was the D-8 bloc, launched in Istanbul in 1997, any more of a success. The idea
was to promote trade and economic cooperation among the 800 million com-
bined populations of the eight Muslim developing countries. Turkey, Egypt,
Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia account for 4 per-
cent of world trade, but with whom Turkey’s trade is less than 4 percent of its
total foreign trade. Why, then, not changing the picture by calling on the
Muslim countries to abandon the American dollar as the basis of trade and
increase mutual trade from the 10 percent of today to 90 percent in the future?
The Refah party, it should be recalled, vigorously opposed Turkey’s accession to
the EU – the custom agreement signed with Turkey was “Frankenstein’s poison.”
Accordingly, the colonial, unjust, oppressive, Christian West was not an option,
let alone that it is inferior. On a trip to Kuala Lumpur, in August 1996, Erbakan
declared that Western development has been dependent on Islamic intellectual
contributions – Arab arithmetic, for example – and that Western scientific
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progress is hindered by belief in the Trinity. “Many think he is often unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality,” commented Morton Abramowitz,
Washington’s former ambassador to Ankara.27
As Atila Eralp summed up, the West, the EU in particular, being a Christian
community organized to undermine the Muslim world, the pro-EU lobby in
Turkey being a part of a Zionist plot to sow dissent among Muslim countries –
this was the world of Erbakan.28 Obviously, nothing of Erbakan’s “Islamic open-
ings,” “Islamic automobile,” or “Islamic aircraft” materialized or brought gains
to Turkey. On the contrary: “Eleven months after his [Erbakan’s] accession to
power, Turkey’s relations with most other Muslim states were worse than
before,” concluded Andrew Mango.29
Even Erbakan’s signature on a twenty-five year, 23 billion dollar agreement,
for the annual supply of close to 10 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas to Turkey,
was actually the final step in a long-term process, that started before the Refah
came to power. The Iranian project was on the agenda of the two foreign min-
istries since 1995, when Turkey had decided to diversify its energy sources, and
to use imported natural gas instead of the local low-grade coal. The Ankara
example encouraged Turkey to continue the use of natural gas. The conversion
in Ankara to natural gas has finally made the air in the capital fit to breathe. The
projected pipeline for Iranian gas is therefore meant to serve Erzurum, Sivas,
Kayseri and Konya – all grim towns enveloped in smog in the harsh winter
weather.30 The entire deal consists of 228 billion cubic meters of gas. If both sides
completed their obligations and each constructed on his side the necessary facil-
ities, the first transport of Iranian gas was to reach Ankara by 1 August 2001.
Next to Russia (more than 30 percent), Iran (12 percent) will thus become
Turkey’s biggest gas supplier – until the gas deal with Turkmenistan materializes
(see p. 127). However, this dependency raised much concern, particularly in
Washington, as to the leverage Tehran could use against Turkey.
Turkey’s energy needs are increasing quickly; the country is the fastest
growing gas market in Europe. Its gas demands during the 1990s have been
growing at 10 percent a year, and by the year 2005 it is expected to have quadru-
pled to 45 billion cubic meters, and more than 80 billion meters by 2020. Oil
needs are similarly urgent: the country produces about 3 million tons of crude,
which is a mere 13 percent of its consumption, the rest being imported. Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt are Turkey’s oil market and the country
constantly diversifies its supply sources. The forecast is for close to 50 million
tons of oil imports by the year 2010, 40 percent of it from the Caspian region and
Russia. Hence, if power cuts and gaps are to be avoided a decade or two from
now, proper planning and large investment are needed in the energy market. It
is estimated that Turkey will need to triple its total generating capacity by 2015
to meet rising demand – from today’s 27,000 megawatts to more than 85,000
megawatts. The country’s consumption of oil, gas, coal, hydro-energy, etc. for
the production of energy, currently equals to 71 million ton of crude oil –
41 percent oil, 16 percent gas, 30 percent coal – might increase to 300 million
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tons by the year 2020. It will then consist of 27 percent oil, 29 percent gas and
32 percent coal.31
As mentioned above, Erbakan was forced to step down under pressure from
the military. The Generals accused the civil echelons of ignoring excessive reli-
gious activities and of failing to impose the secular articles of the Constitution.
The army demanded on 28 February 1997 that Erbakan order a number of
reforms to restrict what was perceived as religious fanaticism and Muslim
extremist politics. After he balked at implementing these demands, Erbakan
tendered his resignation in early June 1997. With Turkey facing a conflict
between its first Muslim Prime Minister and the military, the scenario of the
Gulf War did not repeat itself: in the summer of 1997 resignations were handed
by the politicians, not by the Generals.
Among other things, the Prime Minister was asked to reinstate Section 163
of the political penal code – the section had been annulled in 1991 – which pro-
hibits religious political activity that is a threat to the secular state. Accordingly,
new laws were to be enacted that would restrict such detrimental activity. The
army insisted on a uniform secular education for all and a limit to the number
of Muslim-sponsored schools’ graduates who would be admitted into the cadres
of the civil service. A great deal of attention and demands for cuts were focused
on the government-controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs, with a 350 mil-
lion dollar budget – exceeding that of five combined ministries32 – which has
expanded from 50,000 staff in the 1970s to 100,000 in the 1990s. The Directorate
is responsible for the country’s 80,000 mosques, 600 religious high schools,
4,000 religious courses and 24 college-level programs that turn out Turkey’s
future Islamic scholars and imams.33 Other demands related to a reduction in
the number of theological seminaries and prohibition of anti-secular broadcasts
in the Turkish media. An insistence worth noting was for a ban on sales of skins
from animal sacrifices in the Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha, or the Feast of
the Sacrifice, called Kurban Bayram in Turkey, marking the end of the Haj, the
Pilgrimage to Mecca. The intention was “to kill these Islamic groups in their
embryonic stage, and it starts with [the proceeds from] sheepskins.”34 This pro-
hibition – on the books for a long time – has until recently been widely ignored.
The Turkish Justice Ministry announced that it would prosecute and insist on
six-month prison punishment for those who illegally trade in sheepskins, one
of the products of the Bayram slaughter. Proceeds from the skins used to go to
religious groups and to Muslim parties, though the government encouraged it
to be donated to secular or military bodies.35
During his year in office Erbakan’s government was cited for “incompe-
tence and lack of preparation for running Turkey.”36 Furthermore, a number of
bribery scandals were uncovered which cast a long shadow over the Refah’s
integrity. However, the Refah, was outlawed in January 1998, and succeeded by
the Fazilet, the Virtue Party. The new body acted under the remote control of
Erbakan, probably the reason why it did not do so well – it achieved 15 percent
of the votes – in the April 1999 general elections. Expectations, it is worth
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noting, were much higher. In the mean time it seemed as if the successive
increases of political Islam in Turkey were blocked; a political party of 15 per-
cent does not seem too menacing.
International media, as well as Turkish public opinion, objected strenu-
ously to the fact that it was the army that forced Erbakan out, violated Muslim
religious freedoms, and brought about the dissolution of the Welfare Party. “A
second Algeria” – a rather exaggerated terminology – was the example Turkey
has been compared to. The Chicago Tribune pointed to a tragedy that looms over
Turkey, referring to country’s “arrogant” yet extremely strong military elite, who
was launching war against, no less, student girls wearing the headscarf, the hijab,
known in Turkey as “Turban,” even when worn by women. A government
decree from February 1998 barred university students from class for wearing
Islamic dress; university rectors and presidents followed suit and ordered the
ban enforced. On 10 June 1998, Turkish police and Muslim students scuffled in
Istanbul University following the university’s refusal to allow eleven female stu-
dents wearing head coverings to take final examinations.37
The official explanation for the imposition of the headscarf ban in Turkish
universities is that students’ dress codes require Western-style clothes. Defying it
by wearing the hijab was a symbol of political Islam, a matter threatening the
Constitution’s articles that decree Turkey is a secular state. Yielding to the hijab
seemed to spokesmen from the Turkish middle class as the beginning of an irre-
versible process in which Turkey would become a Muslim republic. The secular
republic was not going to survive this “political cancer,” so they would warn.
Turkish political Islam presses continuously for the Islamization of Turkey,
including issues such as sex relations, family concepts, dress codes, private and
public divisions, science, government and the rule of law. Hence, wearing the
hijab is not a cry for democracy or for the preservation of human or feminist
rights, but is the battlecry of Turkish political Islam. Granting a concession today,
allowing females to wear head-coverings or students to be bearded – the ban on
both has been on the books for a long time but is widely ignored – and tomor-
row “they will not hesitate to force us all to cover ourselves, if they get a chance.”38
All the above are senseless and do not exist at all, maintain the Muslim parties.
There is no enforcement of Muslim values on women’s attire, on education, or
on law, and there is total revulsion towards all sorts of religious violence. They
distance themselves from acts of terrorism such the horrific events of 1993, when
militant Sunni activists set fire to the Madimak Hotel, in which an Alawite conven-
tion was being held, killing thirty-seven people. They proudly point to Demokrasi,
Insan Haklari, Ozgurlu (Democracy, Human Rights, Freedom) as the principles
that top the parties’ agendas. Accordingly, Turkish political Islam is seeking to
produce a balance between Western values and Muslim tradition, aiming at a state
where the “Islamic headscarf and the miniskirt walk together hand in hand.”39
It was education, however, that proved the most hotly contested battle-
ground between Turkey’s secular authorities and religious circles. The educa-
tion system plays a crucial role in shaping Turkey’s identity. Determining
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children’s minds, education could ultimately be the deciding factor as to
whether secularism or religion win the day. Elementary education in Turkey has
been compulsory since the 1950s. Still, quarter of the children do not attend pri-
mary school, and the average number of years spent in the classrooms was 3.6
years or, in the case of girls, 2.4 years.40 According to research by the World Bank,
by allocating 240 million dollars to education – 1.5 percent of its GNP – Turkey
was, in 1995, on a par with Ethiopia. In practice it meant that Turkey’s class-
rooms were vastly overcrowded, with fifty-five pupils per class, double the
number in the West, and understaffed. Many teachers must moonlight.
The eight-year, replacing the old five-year, compulsory education law, was
enacted in Turkey in 1998 by the government of Mesut Yilmaz. It aroused much
protest from religious circles. The latter claimed that the law was aimed at pre-
venting children from being influenced at an early age by religious education at
the Imam Hatip schools, originally founded in 1951 for the purpose of training
imams for the mosques. By the 1990s, the Imam Hatip schools were producing,
annually, 53,000 diploma-qualified religious preachers. It was far more than
Turkey’s mosques annual requirement of 2,300 imams.
According to the new education law, the junior sections of the religious
schools were to close down. Only the high school sections of the Imam Hatip
schools were to remain open. The state primary school system was to be extended
from five to eight years; however, even before this legal extension, most of Turkey’s
15 million students attending state schools used to stay on for eight years in vari-
ous modes of private, public and religious education. Another cause for much
controversy were the Koran schools active in local mosques, which many primary
school children attend in their spare time and holidays. Between the 1980s and the
1990s the number of these schools doubled to 4,700 and attendance reached
155,000. According to the new law, children now are only allowed to attend the
Koran courses after graduating from the eight-year compulsory education.41
Before the enactment of the law, on terminating the five-year study, 500,000
pupils continued their studies at some 600 religious schools for an additional
three- to seven-year period. And though the main wrath against the religious
school system was during the Prime Ministry of Erbakan, it is interesting to note
that his term of office was the only period with no increase in the number of reli-
gious schools. In 1951 Turkey had a mere seven religious schools attended by a
miniscule number of pupils. In 1975 there were 150,000 pupils; in 1995 there
were 479,000 pupils who attended 448 schools; and by 1996 there were 561 such
schools boasting 493,000 students.42
In the 1997–98 education year, the Turkish Ministry of Education, in line
with the Talim Terbiye Kurulu’s (Training and Education Council’s) recom-
mendation, banned twenty-six textbooks, which, it claimed, espoused “reac-
tionary propaganda”, a typical euphemism denoting religious fundamentalism
or politicized Islam.43 Various changes were made in the remaining textbooks to
be used during the eight-year compulsory education and in high schools. Phi-
losophy became a compulsory class on the grounds that it teaches students to
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develop skills of “thinking and discussing.” Social and political issues were
added, among them topics related to the EU, human rights, traffic education,
and environmental and health issues like AIDS, and organ transplants. National
security classes were incorporated in high school curricula. The Turkish armed
forces and their vital importance to the country’s well-being and in defending
principles of democracy, prosperity and secularism, is a subject that has recently
been introduced. Conversely, there is also a course on “Fundamentalist Reac-
tionarism,” which explains “why some do not want Turkey to develop and
become modern.”44
It is much too early to judge whether the government’s education reforms
were successful, allowing the secular state to regain its hold over Turkey’s youth.
It will take a great deal of time and money, particularly in view of the dismal
state of Turkey’s education system, before these reforms, extensive and expen-
sive, can take effect. Unfortunately, owing to the economic crisis of 1999–2000,
and the violent earthquakes which hit Turkey in August 1999, not much money
was available to devote to the education system. It is also extremely unlikely that
the religious establishment will abandon its grip on Turkey’s children without a
fight. At present, the state has the upper hand, but only time will tell who finally
wins the battle for the minds of Turkey’s youth.
One observer, Richard Tapper, regarded the Muslim revival in Turkey,
which began in the 1970s and 1980s, as a rebuke to those who predicted that
modernization, education, progress and urbanization would lead to modera-
tion of the Muslim character of Turkey. It seems, however, that at present Islam
in Turkey is a culture of protest, a unique product of Turkey, not a recipe for rev-
olution that harbors non-Turkish goals. Its political features, the Repha Partisi,
for instance, have integrated into the Turkish pluralist system, and do not plot
against Turkey’s very democracy, toward an ultimate goal of installing a reli-
gious-based pan-Islamic regime in the country. Even if looking forward to van-
quishing the West through a blend of Turkism and Islam, the Muslim revival has
yet to advocate the notion of a Turkish nation state for fear of angering oppo-
nents, particularly in the army. A not inconsiderable degree of political plural-
ism and separation of religion from state has taken firm root in Turkish society.
Accordingly, the gains of the Turkish Muslim movements are clearly visible – in
the year 1994, 700 of the 1,600 key ministry executives, provincial governors and
other functionaries were believed to be Refah supporters. The party’s main
activity focused on the urban poor, where it furnished them with services and
commodities that the government failed to supply. Still, the Refah opted for cau-
tion, for struggle within the parliamentary system, desisting from a direct clash
with Kemalism, defended by the Turkish military. It is worth noting that Turk-
ish Muslim terrorists avoid attacking military or security personnel, but instead
aim at secular intellectuals, media people, Jewish, American and Israeli targets.
This clearly contrasts with Egypt or Algeria where police and army were pre-
ferred targets for religious radicalism. This says something about the deterrence
of the Turkish military. It also shows that Turkish Islam does not consider itself
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as separate from the state and its organs, but sees itself equally Turkish as the
military. The peaceful way in which the Refah and the Fazilet accepted their
forced dissolution and the jailing if its leaders (during 1998–2001), shows that
Turkish Muslim parties’ threatening character should not be overrated. It is,
perhaps, indicative that two detailed surveys of Middle Eastern Islamic radical-
ism hardly mention Turkey.45
Thus, at the onset of a new millenium, it appears that it is secular Turkey
that is the lion and Islam the lamb in our story. True, the two may on rare occa-
sions, as in a zoo, live peacefully side by side, with the proviso that “every now
and then we have to replace the lamb.”46
Turkey and Iran: opposite ends of the pole
Nationalism and Islam inevitably cause Turkey and Iran to cross each other’s
path and to hold perverse, if not painful, images each about the other. Iran, in
particular, does not do much to assuage Turkey’s suspicions. Tehran is thus per-
ceived in Turkey as violently anti-Western, fanatically religious and intent on
spreading its revolutionary message throughout the Muslim world, in short
Kemalism’s and Turkey’s worst nightmare. Ceaselessly challenging, verbally and
actively, Turkey’s political, religious and social identity, constantly denouncing
Ankara’s traditional Western orientation, and vying for power and influence in
Muslim Central Asia at Turkey’s expense, it seemed that there was nowhere
Turkey could turn without encountering Iran’s grim, hostile face. Even in areas
of presumable agreement, such as Iraq and Kurdish nationalism, Tehran pur-
sued policies that flagrantly contradicted Turkey’s interests. Though rivals,
subjecting one another to a barrage of verbal abuse and intent on undermining
each other’s policies, and possibly sovereignty, Turkey and Iran have yet to come
to blows, a puzzling state of affairs.
A secular, pro-Western democracy, representing everything Iran despises,
Ankara was positive that Tehran sought to export the revolution to Turkey.
Ankara knew that it would be an extraordinary coup for the revolution should
Iran manage successfully to subvert Turkey, a key Muslim state, a symbol of pro-
fane worldly rule, as well as a strategic and ideological adversary. Regularly and
violently, Iran raged against the Turkish secular state, against Turkish democ-
racy, and against Turkey’s blind adoption of Western values. Periodically, the
two countries discover spy nets, expose terror cells, declare diplomats as persona
non grata, etc. While Turkey blames Iran for supporting the PKK and acting
against its secularism, democracy and Western values, Tehran suspects that
Ankara, together with Azerbaijan, foments anti-Iranian feelings among the
Iranian Azeris. Iranian dignitaries, while visiting Turkey, do not respect the
Turkish flag or anthem, neither do they pay a visit to Ataturk mausoleum, a
must on any visitor’s itinerary. Ataturk, it should be recalled, was declared an
“enemy of Islam” by Tehran. The refusal to bend down before the statute of
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Ataturk while laying a wreath at the tomb, as demanded by protocol, was
explained as violating the Muslim prohibition against bowing down to an idol.
This was adding insult to injury, by implying that Turkey was not only a secular
state but an idolatrous one to boot. The daughter of President Rafsanjani of
Iran, observed during a visit to Ankara (December 1996), that the situation
there reminds her of the last days of the deposed Iranian shah. Turkish press
reacted furiously, adding “Thank you Ataturk,” and praised the modernization
existing among Turkish women in the secular Republic of Turkey as against the
backwardness of the Iranian Muslim revolution.47
But, for all its sniping, criticisms, and insults, Iran was not foolhardy
enough to confront Turkey head on, preferring instead to rely on covert and
indirect methods of action. Not that this stopped Ankara, which deeply
resented Iran’s poisonous tirades and was unnerved by what it suspected were
Tehran’s ultimate objectives, of accusing Iran of meddling in Turkey’s internal
affairs, of subverting its population, of supporting anti-government terrorists,
and launching clandestine operations, all in order to undermine the Turkish
regime. In 1993, the celebrated intellectual and journalist – famous for his
investigations into the drug trade as well as his exposé on the attempt on Pope
John Paul’s life, Ugur Mumcu, who was also one of the more outspoken sup-
porters of Turkish secularism, was murdered. Ankara claimed that it was Ira-
nians, or Turks trained by the Iranian intelligence service, who were
responsible for this damnable deed. In May 2000, the Turkish police arrested
some 300 Iranians for involvement in various terrorist actions, among them
members of the Al Kouds (Jerusalem) terrorist organization, which had mur-
dered Israelis, Americans, as well as Turks opposed to Turkey’s apparent drift
towards Islam. Ankara bitterly complained about Iranian declarations in favor
of applying the Muslim shari’a law in Turkey, or against Ankara cooperating
with the United States and Israel, or being a member in NATO. In February
1997, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Mohhamad Reza Bageri, threatened
Turkey with God’s punishment following its cooperation with Washington
and Israel. These Turkish contacts, alleged Tehran, place Israel and the United
States – both branded in Iran as the little and big Satans, respectively – as her
immediate neighbors.
Turkey also accused Iran of actively supporting Turkish terrorist groups,
including the Turkish Hizbullah, known as the Islamic Movement or Islami
Hareket. According to the MIT, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization,
Iranian diplomats hunted out and recruited pro-Islamic sympathizers, while the
Iranian cultural centers were used to indoctrinate and subvert impressionable
young Turks. The more malleable and radical youths were sent to Iran, where
they were brainwashed and trained in military and terrorist tactics. Furnished
with real and forged documents, and armed with weapons and explosives, they
were returned to Turkey with orders to carry out terrorist attacks against Turk-
ish citizens and leaders of the Iranian opposition. One million Iranians had fled
the terrors of Khomeini’s Iran into Turkey and, according to Turkey, the Iranian
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secret service was directly implicated in the assassination of several of the more
prominent of these Iranian refugees.48
Turkish–Iranian relations revolve around a series of issues. The two share
common views as to the preservation of Iraqi integrity – though Iran protests
over the Turkish army incursions into northern Iraq, regarding them as
attempts to seek changes in the borders. Both countries share objection to Russ-
ian growing influence in Central Asia. Moscow, however, sees Iran as a balanc-
ing factor that moderates the influence of Turkey in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Both Iran and Turkey reveal objections to a Kurdish state, and Tehran does
not fail to see the detrimental effect that realization of Kurdish national aspira-
tions elsewhere might have on its own Kurdish or Azeri communities.
Ankara, however, resents the Iranian influence in the Caucasian Muslim
republics and the improvement in Tehran’s relations with the Gulf States – like
the political dialogue with Saudi Arabia and the resumption of flights between
Riyadh and Tehran. Turkey is also concerned because of the development of bal-
listic and probably nuclear capability by Iran. Iran, though, accused Turkey,
together with the United States and Israel, of organizing the mass demonstra-
tions that swept Iranian cities in 1999, protesting against the clerical regime in
Tehran. Prime Minister Ecevit labeled the demonstrations a “natural” reaction
against an “outdated regime of oppression.”49
Strangely, economics not religion, proved the main battleground between
Turkey and Iran in Central Asia. Ethnically, Iran had little in common with the
primarily Turkic nations of Central Asia. Moreover, the latter, mostly Sunni
Muslims by faith, tended to firmly reject Shi’ite interpretations of Islam and
were hardly susceptible to the preaching of Shi’ite Iran. The Republics’ ruling
elites were determined to preserve their countries’ secular identity and
embraced steadfast anti-Islamic policies. As a result, other than in Tajikistan,
which is ethnically akin to Iran and whose Tajik language bares a close resem-
blance to Pharsi, Iran’s attempts to disseminate its revolutionary Islamic mes-
sage throughout Central Asia failed. Even in Tajikistan, which publicly displayed
photographs of Khomeini, it was essentially the ruling elite’s fear of being sub-
merged by the Turkic majority of Central Asia that drew it closer to Iran. Seek-
ing Tehran’s protection, the Tajik authorities adopted the principals of the
Iranian revolution. Not everyone in Tajikistan was happy with the regime’s
Islamization and the result was a vicious civil war. Nevertheless, there was always
the possibility that Iran would exploit the Islamic issue, to stir up the people of
Central Asia, who, straining under the burden of backward economies, corrupt
regimes, and few social amenities, were highly susceptible to radical religious
messages. The last thing Turkey wanted was a series of radical Islamic republics
on its doorstep. Accordingly, constantly on guard, it offering the Republics’ sec-
ular regimes all the help it could to combat any sign of an Islamic revival. Turkey
expected that the secular ideologies and the secular political systems left in Cen-
tral Asia by the Soviets would continue well into the post-Moscow era. There-
fore, Ankara was even willing to acquiesce in the presence of its great rival for
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regional primacy, Russia, in the area, aware that Moscow was much better
placed than it to combat the perils of Islam.50
However, it was the Republics’ economic potential that formed the focus of
Iran’s and Turkey’s rivalry in the region. Ankara hoped to exploit its links with
the Republics to become “a crossroads” between East and West, with goods
shuttling back and forth between the Far East, the Republics, Europe and the
United States across Turkish territory, to the benefit of the Turkish economy. It
was a position that Iran threatened to usurp. Iran, like Turkey, had century-old
contacts in the region, which it could and did turn to its economic advantage,
often at Turkey’s expense. The newly built railway lines between the Republics
and Iranian ports, completed in 1996, which not only carried 1 million passen-
gers and 8 million tons of cargo annually, but also reduced the transport time
between Europe and southeast Asia to less than ten days, presents a very attrac-
tive and cheaper alternative to the Turkish land route. Iran, not Turkey, might
turn into the “crossroads” where East meets West.
The choosing of national languages spoken by the majority in the Central
Asian republics is of importance to our discussion. During the Soviet era,
national languages, as well as the Turkic common heritage and kinship, were
wittingly neglected because heterogeneity of languages was considered detri-
mental to Soviet unity. Instead, the Russian language has played a role in the
Russian dominance and in binding the republics together. During the Soviet era
almost every education or science institution was using the Russian language.
Even today, Russian is still needed in practically every sphere of life. Cleansing
the language of Slavic and Russian words, replacement of Cyrillic letters by
Latinization of the language, not by Arabic scripts – these are symbols of nation
building and of disconnection from the Russians and separation from the Ira-
nians. The shift to Latin characters, not to the Arabic alphabet, brought about
protests from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In spite of these pressures, the process is
implemented à la Turkey in five Central Asian republics – Azerbaijan, Uzbek-
istan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan – though not in Tajikistan.
There the majority speaks Pharsi, it is culturally and linguistically akin to Iran,
and is changing to Arabic lettering.
Naturally, the move is slow: choosing a national language is not easy in mul-
tilanguage areas. Russian objection is not a barrier: Moscow is unwilling to
intensify the process of de-Russification, hence tends not to support the 10 mil-
lion Russians in the diasporas in Central Asia who seek prevalence of the Russ-
ian language. Also, when Latinization started in Central Asia, there was not in
Turkey even one Russian language institute that could help the Republics “de-
Russify” their languages: the disintegration of the Soviet Union had caught it,
like so many others, unprepared. In time a few successes did take place: Turk-
menistan tends to be a trilingual country with Turkmeni, Russian and English
as official languages. For other republics the current switch to Latin alphabets is
the third change in the twentieth century: at the beginning of the Soviet era
Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet, and in 1939 Stalin forced a
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second change, to Cyrillic letters. In both cases the aim was to promote unity
and to isolate the Soviet Turkic republics from Iran, or from Turkey.51
Iran and the Kurds
One of the few things Iran and Turkey did agree upon was the need to preserve
Iraq’s integrity. With both countries supporting large ethnic minorities, Kurdish
in Turkey’s case, Kurdish and Azeri, in Iran’s, neither had any doubt that parti-
tioning Iraq on national-ethnic lines would undermine their own sovereign
integrity. It was also why, loath to inflame their own minorities, they strongly
objected to the formation of a Kurdish state. Yet despite this broad area of con-
sensus, Iran and Turkey came close to blows over, on the one hand, Turkey’s
actions in the Kurdish “Safe Haven” in northern Iraq and, on the other, Iran’s
alleged support of the PKK.
Iran, as noted, took strong exception to Turkey’s constant incursions into
northern Iraq, which, it suspected, were designed to push Turkey eastwards at its
expense. Ankara, on its part, accused Iran of cynically supporting the PKK, in
return for a quiet life at home. Iran, while allowing its 4.5 million, mostly Sunni
Muslim, Kurds a measure of cultural freedom – they were permitted to speak
their own language and run their own television channels – nevertheless dis-
criminated against them, so that the latter often strained against the Iranian bit.
Consequently, there is no love lost and a great deal of friction between the Kurds
and Tehran, who Iran utterly mistrusts, suspecting them of nursing nationalist
sentiments. The last thing Iran wanted was for the PKK to extend its mandate
into Iran, whipping up separatist feelings among its large and potentially dissi-
dent Kurdish community. Accordingly, Tehran reached an agreement with the
PKK whereby the latter conceded that Iran’s Kurdish community was off limits,
while, in return, Iran allowed the PKK to rest and recoup on Iranian territory, on
condition that the PKK did not launch attacks on Turkey from the 50 kilometer
strip along the Iranian–Turkish Border. If this was not bad enough, Iran, Turkey
accused, went well beyond the letter of the agreement, supplying the PKK with
heavy arms and Katyusha rockets, some of which were used during an attack on
a Turkish guard post in the Silopi district of Siyahkaya in January 1997. In 1998,
following Syrian–Turkish anti-terrorist accord, which forced Syria to abandon
the PKK, Iran, Ankara alleged, replaced Syria as the PKK’s principal source of
support. It allowed the PKK to establish camps in the Iranian villages along the
Iranian–Turkish border and the Orumiyeh region. It provided the PKK with
basic services and facilities as well as support. Wounded PKK guerrillas were
treated in Iranian hospitals, while Iranian officials met with high-ranking PKK
leaders, including Osman Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan’s brother.52
In the summer of 1999, Turkish jets, allegedly in pursuit of PKK guerrillas,
attacked a base belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and an uniden-
tified village near the town of Piranshahr in West Azerbaijan, along Turkey’s
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southeast border. The attack was followed by a brief exchange of fire between the
Turkish aircraft and Iranian ground forces. But this was a rare occurrence.
Unlike northern Iraq, where Turkey felt free to take action against the PKK,
Ankara was unwilling to attack the PKK’s bases in Iran, as such action would
almost certainly provoke an Iranian military response. Therefore, the Turkish
army restricted its actions to bombing PKK positions along the Turkish–Iranian
border. Similarly, other than to lodge some very strong protests, Turkey took no
action to end against Tehran’s links with the PKK. This was in marked contrast
to Syria, who, smaller and weaker than Iran, was intimidated, threatened, and
ultimately forced to sever all ties with the Kurdish terrorist organization. The
risks of pursuing a similar policy with Iran were simply too great.53
Turkey and Iran found themselves supporting opposite sides in the early
1990s Azeri–Armenian war over the Nagorno–Karabakh enclave: Shi’ite Muslim
Iran was siding with Christian Armenia, Turkey supported Azerbaijan. The area
became a battlefield for possession between Armenians and Azeris as Soviet
power crumbled in the late 1980s, after independence from Moscow rule. In 1991
Nagorno–Karabakh, an Armenian enclave inside neighboring Azerbaijan, uni-
laterally declared independence from Azerbaijan. The war that erupted caused
at least 30,000 deaths and created a million refugees, mostly Azeri. Armenia
won the war and still holds a quarter of Azerbaijan’s territory.
Armenia was the only country among the former Soviet Republics with
whom Turkey failed to establish diplomatic relations. This was hardly unex-
pected given that the Armenians and Turks have a long history of mutual
antipathy and enmity. The Ottoman Empire had often discriminated against,
and occasionally persecuted, its Christian Armenian subjects. The empire’s
alleged responsibility – a responsibility Turkey utterly denies – for the death of
1.5 million Armenians during the First World War became a running sore in
Turkish–Armenian relations, which continued to fester, blighting their relations
right up to the twenty-first century. In the 1990s, Turkey, with some reason, sus-
pected Armenia of secretly supporting militant Armenian separatists, as part of
its policy of Armenian irredentism. It further believed that extremist Armenian
nationalist groups were closely cooperating with the PKK in order to destabilize
Turkey. Armenia, also to Turkey annoyance, hoped to establish close military
ties with two of Ankara’s arch-rivals, Syria and Greece, with the aim of coordi-
nating their actions should any one of the three find itself at war with Turkey.
(Tozun Bahcheli writes that at most the Greco–Syrian accord was no more than
an informal understanding allowing, perhaps, Greek warplanes to land in Syria
in case of emergency, such as Turkish attacks on the Greek Cypriots).54
Turkey cautiously sided with the Azeris – it limiting itself mainly to training
Azeri troops and handing them medical supplies. Of all the Central Asian
Republics, Azerbaijan was the closest to Turkey. With strong ethnic and linguistic
ties – Azeri is the Central Asian Turkic language most similar to Turkish – and a
shared history – the Ottoman Empire had ruled parts of Azerbaijan – Ankara had
a special interest in that country. Turkey was the first to recognize Azerbaijan,
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in 1991. Between 1991 and 1999, the two countries signed over 100 bilateral
agreements, including trade and finance agreements, agricultural agreements,
transport and telecommunication agreements, scientific agreements, health and
social welfare agreements, and sporting and cultural agreements. Turkish
construction companies signed contracts in Azerbaijan worth 2.5 billion dollars,
equal, at least on paper, to what they earned in all the other Republics together.
The Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline project to transport Caspian oil and gas 
to Turkey and Europe would, if realized, profit the partners to the deal to the tune
of several billions of dollars a year. And this was only one of its many attractions,
which included, among other things, the happy prospect of putting an end to
Russia’s monopoly over Central Asia’s energy resources. Azerbaijan is looked
upon as Turkey’s closest partner in the Caucasus – most Azerbaijanis believe 
that Ankara is the only regional power with the will and ability to contain 
Russia’s assertiveness.55
Admittedly, things did not always run smoothly. Ankara was unhappy at the
Azeris’ attempts to strike a balance between Russia, Iran and Turkey, while Baku
worried that Turkey sought to carve itself too dominant a position in the coun-
try. But, on the whole, with Turkey looking upon Azerbaijan as its closest
regional ally and the Azeris relishing Turkey’s economic and other help and
aware that Turkey was the only power capable of balancing even blocking
Russia’s invidious influence, it proved a warm and profitable relationship. The
fact that both had a common enemy in Armenia served only to cement their
relationship further.
Notwithstanding calls in Turkey for military activity, Turkey failed to come
openly to the beleaguered Azeris’ aid. Other than furnishing Baku with medical
supplies, training Azeri troops, and offering some limited diplomatic support,
it did nothing. This was partly because Turkey did not want, by siding with the
Muslim Azeris against the Christian Armenians, to raise the specter of the his-
torical Christian–Muslim rivalry. More importantly, it was also because Turkey
hoped that by staying out of the conflict it would avoid a confrontation with
Russia. Russia, who disliked Turkey’s growing influence in the region, enjoyed a
close relationship with Armenia, and had consistently backed it in the Nagorno
Karabakh dispute. Any active Turkish intervention on the side of the Azeris
would, Ankara feared, trigger an immediate Russian response, which might take
one of several forms. Russia might decide to intervene in the war and, with sev-
eral military bases in Armenia, it was much better placed to come to Armenia’s
aid than Turkey was to assist Azerbaijan. There was also the possibility that
Turkish intervention would lead to open Turkish–Russian hostilities, something
Turkey was particularly keen to avoid, especially with Russian troops patrolling
the Turkish–Armenian and Turkish–Georgian borders.56
In its confrontation with Azerbaijan, Yerevan was supported by Russia and
Iran, both objecting to the growing power of Turkey and pan-Turkism. This
strange policy of Shi’ite Iran siding with the Christian Armenian enemies of
Azeri Shi’ite Muslims – Azerbaijan is 70 percent Shi’ite – is understandable
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when people bear in mind the existence of a restless, nationally minded Azeri
minority in Iran. Between 33 and 40 percent of the Iranians are of Azeri origin;
other estimations are any number between 8 and 25 million. The existence in
Baku of a strong pan-Azeri tendency for unity with the Azeris in Iran, explains
the policy of Tehran. Actually, there are more ethnic Azeris living in Iran than in
Azerbaijan. Iran is also the greatest exporter to Armenia, mainly food, manu-
factured goods and machinery, in addition to some 10 percent of Armenia’s
electricity demands. Iran, next to the CIS, is Armenia’s biggest export market,
mainly metals and building materials.57
Still, despite occupying opposite ends of the pole, politically, religiously
and ideologically, and despite the fact that each threatens the other’s identity,
Ankara and Tehran have yet to engage in battle. Instead, the two have been
content to limit themselves to exchanging, albeit very vicious, verbal and diplo-
matic blows, with occasional covert action. Turkey and Iran can point to the
absence of any territorial controversies. Their common border has not been dis-
puted for 400 years –one of the oldest borders in the world, demarcated in 1639
by an agreement between the Ottoman and Iranian empires. High-ranking offi-
cers from both armies who command the military units in the border area meet
regularly, even in periods of tension and non-dialogue between the two states.
Bilateral trade in 2001 reached 1.2 billion dollars, of which Iranian oil export
to Turkey amounted to 700 million dollars.58 Officially, Iran is cautious not to
support the PKK, lest this arouses its own 4.5 million Kurds – 9 percent of the
population – and Turkey accepts that Iranian Revolutionary Guards support
the Kurdish underground or instigate Muslim radical terrorism in Turkey, not
official government bodies in Tehran. It seems that fear of a crisis that would be
disruptive to bilateral relations, causes Turkey to moderate its criticism against
Tehran. And, as above, the different aggressive treatment Turkey assigns to
Syria, smaller and weaker than Iran, demonstrates the caution she pursued with
Iran – an ideological adversary and another supporter of the PKK. Risks are
simply too high.
Turkey–Syria: crises and rapprochement
Iran probably fits The Economist’s view of a country Turkey would love seeing
moved elsewhere.59 Notwithstanding Syria becoming closer to being defined in
similar words by Turkey, there has recently been a surprising development in
Turkish–Syrian relations – surprising because, not long ago, Turkish newspapers
were rejoicing at Damascus’s calamity, announcing that “terror is in deep
mourning.” This was said following the death in June 2000 of the Syrian Presi-
dent, Hafez al-Assad. The presence of Ahmet Sezer, Turkey’s President, at the
funeral did not change the mood of the Turkish media but, explained a Turkish
source, “miracles do happen and Assad’s death and Turkish-Syrian relations is
the same as happened to Stalin:” the Soviet dictator’s death in 1953, signaled a
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new beginning in the superpowers’ cold-war relations. Similar improvement
took place between Damascus and Ankara. But before “the miracles,” a different
atmosphere predominated over the two countries’ relations. Ankara was con-
cerned lest Syria’s peace negotiations with Israel, started in Madrid in October
1991, let alone a peace agreement, would remove Damascus from the list of
nations supporting terrorism without Syria first withdrawing its assistance from
the PKK.60 Moreover, Turkey feared that a Syrian–Israeli peace accord would
make Damascus more powerful in its conflicts with Turkey: Damascus was prob-
ably interested in the peace talks with Israel to achieve the neutralization of the
Israeli front. Syria could then cope successfully with its real if not existential
problems – its water and territorial conflicts with Turkey. Sixty percent of the
water supplied in Syria comes from the Euphrates River that originates in Turkey,
and Syria strongly claims sovereignty to Alexandretta – since July 1939 the Turk-
ish province of Hatay –persistently depicting the area as Syrian on its maps.
A major obstacle to the two countries’ relations was removed in October
1998 when Abdullah Ocalan was expelled from Damascus. The bilateral trade
for the year 1999 amounted to 539 million dollars – a decline from 615 million
in 1998 – owing to global decrease in oil prices, in agriculture and because of a
number of droughts. Syria still accounts for 1.3 percent of Turkey’s total exports
and 0.7 percent of total imports, i.e. third in the Middle East, after Israel and
Egypt. Turkey exports synthetic materials, iron, steel, margarine, agricultural
and automotive products, and imports mainly Syrian crude oil. Turkey plans to
import 2 billion cubic meters of Syrian gas, but the two countries lack the
finances needed to lay a gas pipeline. Ankara aims at a 1 billion dollar volume
bilateral trade, and Damascus is looking for work permits for more Syrians in
Turkey and for better cooperation over the water issue. Triple talks – Iraqi water
experts joined Turkish and Syrian engineers – resumed recently over the
Euphrates water. Ankara stresses that it gives Syria more water than Syria can
handle or needs, yet is reluctant to commit itself concerning the future. “We
can’t guarantee that we’ll be that benevolent for long,” say Turkish officials. Such
words do not raise optimism in Damascus, which is without water most nights.
Still, a good omen for possible improved relations is Syria’s readiness to alter the
curriculum of Syrian schools so that the 500 years of Ottoman rule should not
be regarded anymore as imperialism.
Syria suffers from a deep crisis: decline of oil prices – oil is 70 percent of
Syria’s exports – and of agriculture products, mainly cotton, created 12–15
percent unemployment that badly affected the Syrian stagnated economy. The
1997 Syrian GNP was less than 900 dollars per person (1,050 in 1995), and
the Syrian annual population growth stood at 3.8 percent – among the highest
in the Middle East – facts which do not ease economic and social strains. Inter-
estingly, most Syrians do not have bank accounts and there is no private bank-
ing system in the country. With Syrian GDP down by 4.4 percent in 1997, GNP
per person being less than 900 dollars, a sharp decline in foreign investments,
in tourism, in remittances from Syrians working abroad, and in the output
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of the drought-ridden agriculture, improvement of contacts with Turkey
was essential.
Turkish enthusiasm indeed increased: the Under Secretary for Foreign
Trade, Kursat Tuzman, announced during a visit of Turkish businessmen to
Damascus that, “When Turkey becomes a full EU member, the border of the
Union will start from Syria.” The Syrians, no less enthusiastic, reciprocated by
promising Turkish businessmen the opportunity to reach Gulf markets through
Syria. Syria looks for thriving contacts with Turkey, but the most astonishing
move has been the cooperation between the two armies and the conclusion of
military cooperation agreements, culminating in the overt visit of the Syrian
Chief of Staff to Ankara in June 2002. There was no Syrian demand for Turkey
to scale down its contacts with Israel. On the other hand, there was probably a
Turkish request that the Arab press would tone down its objection to the Turk-
ish–Israeli rapprochement. A number of editors of the Arab press are of Syrian
origin and it looks as if they comply with a similar request from Damascus. Fur-
thermore, the Turkish–Syrian military contacts – for example, mutual instruc-
tion of officers in both countries military academies, exchange of intelligence
pertaining to the PKK, joint military exercises, the unearthing of mines along
their common border, etc. – lessen the Syrian criticism aimed against similar
interaction between Ankara and Israel.61
Syria is dependent on the Euphrates’ uninterrupted flow. In addition, the
“pincer-like” grip which Israel and Turkey exert on it, practically makes ineffec-
tive its ability to pose a real threat to Turkey. The expulsion of Ocalan and Dam-
ascus’s disassociation from the PKK – Syria thus relinquishing the only leverage
it has vis-à-vis Turkey – reveal an economically and militarily weak Syrian state.
Unless water stops flowing – which might then produce desperate Syrian moves
– one can expect a quiet Turkish–Syrian border. It is worth noting that this
actual impotence on behalf of Syria has had its implications even on Athens. A
Syrian state turning powerless vis-à-vis Turkey, affected the Greek decision to
stop alienating Turkey and to start a dialogue with her (see Chapter 6.)
The Turkic tribe: Turkey’s relations with the Caucasian and 
Central Asian countries
A most loaded issue – emotionally, culturally, politically, economically, and mil-
itarily – has been posed before Turkey in the 1990s: the resumption of contacts
with its Caucasus and Central Asian kin. No other matter put a clearer question
before the Turkish quest for identity. Ideas like pan-Turkism (Turkculkuk) and
Turanism (Turanalik), which had laid dormant for years owing to the commu-
nist separation between Turkey and the “Outside Turks,” or the “Captive Turks,”
or the “Brothers and Cousins,” resurfaced. And while sincere intentions – even
temptations – to deepen these contacts were high, the potential abandonment
of the national Turkish way and the Western European wishes in favor of a
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non-defined, large Asian-Turkic frame, is problematic. Notwithstanding emo-
tions and hopes, it seems that there will be no Turkic union or commonwealth
led by Ankara – indeed, a suggestion to establish a “Turkic Commonwealth” was
officially rejected in Ankara.62
Turkey’s interests in good relations with the Caucasian and Central Asia
countries seem to be obvious. Good relations with the Muslim republics, the spe-
cial relations with Israel, a rapprochement with Russia – all serve as alternatives
to the alienation Turkey faces in Europe. Suffice it to mention the importance of
markets for Turkish goods and sources for energy needs among the producing
countries around the Caspian Sea. Similarly, lessening the dependence on Arab
energy by procuring oil and gas from the Central Asian markets is another incen-
tive for good Turkish–Turkic interaction. Central Asia is of vital political and
strategic importance for Ankara: it borders with Iran and Russia – two powers
that want to exert their influence there, that want to resume their past hegemony,
most likely on Turkey’s expense. Turkey feels close, linguistically, culturally, and
ethnically, to these countries. Turk Hava Yulari, the Turkish airline, has been for
years the only foreign airline that served the Central Asian republics. British
Airways, KLM, El-Al and Lufthansa, to mention but few, followed suit only later.
Similarly, Turkish television broadcasts to almost all major cities there.
The affinity with the Turkic world – the six ex-Soviet Muslim republics plus
the Turanian peoples, approximately 155 million people – plays a major role in
the Turkish search for identity. The ideas of pan-Turkism and Turanism encom-
pass the area from Azerbaijan to Xinjiang. It talks of the recreation of brother-
hood and cooperation of the Turkic world, the one that predated the Ottoman
Empire. Pan-Turkists frequently spoke and wrote of a Great Turkey, stretching
from the Mediterranean nearly to the Pacific, or from the Adriatic to the Chi-
nese Wall – “a powerful and affluent state, with its ancient glories restored and
old customs revived.”63 Others, aware of the political hurdles – for instance, the
expression of pan-Turkic sympathies by Ankara might antagonize the host
countries of Turkic minorities – merely canvass cultural and economic features
or confine themselves to a smaller region that stretches up to the Caspian Sea.
One way or another, this is something that strongly attracts many in Turkey.
The political influence and power of the pan-Turkist lobby in Turkey should
not be exaggerated. Gareth Winrow attributed it to the small number of Turk-
ish citizens who are recent immigrants from Central Asia.64 The threat of Turk-
ish nationalism being swapped for something much larger is a hurdle the
pan-Turkist lobbyists could hardly get over. This deprives the pan-Turkist
groups of more extensive grassroots support. Also, since its inception, Kemalism
tolerated cultural and economic cooperation among peoples of Turkic origin.
Political unity among them – “Turanism” – something that directly contradicts
the idea of Turkish nationalism of focusing only on Turks in Anatolia and on
those left in Rumelia plus the Western and European notions of it, was not
accepted. Turkish ideologists and politicians, among them the historian Zeki
Velidi Togan (1890–1970), known for his work on the origins of Turkic clans in
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Russia and Central Asia, and Alparslan Turkes (1917–97), Deputy Prime Minis-
ter in the 1970s and Member of Parliament in the 1990s, were tried, sentenced
and exiled for promoting Turanism.65
It should be recalled that Turan is an undefined area in the steppes of Cen-
tral Asia. Its limits were given as China in the east, Tibet, India, and Iran in the
south, and the Caspian Sea in the west and north. Turanism, as clearly explained
by Jacob Landau, had as its chief objective rapprochement, and ultimately
union, among all peoples whose origins are purported to extend back to Turan.
Pan-Turkism strives for some sort of union – cultural, or physical, or both –
among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living both
within and without the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, subsequently the
Republic of Turkey. Turanism, thus, is a far broader concept than pan-Turkism,
embracing such peoples as the Hungarians, the Finns and Estonians.66
Many Turks have viewed the Kemalist and communist imposed separation
from the Turkic world as artificial, the resumption of contact as “homecoming.”
As such, these attitudes challenge the uniqueness of Turkish nationalism or the
European-oriented Kemalist ideology. Turkey thus faces two “pans” that chal-
lenge Kemalism and its territorial Turkish nationalism: the ethnic pan-Turkism
and pan-Islam. Externally and internally, the importance for Turkey of Central
Asia and its links with the Muslim Caucasian and Asian republics (Azerbaijan in
the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbek-
istan in Central Asia, all independent since August–December 1991) is on par
with the country’s utmost and top issues. Some say that the country’s soul is at
stake. Similarly, the leaderships of these republics, eager to achieve international
recognition and entry into economic and financial bodies, regarded Turkey as a
model state “who has made it.” A Muslim people living in a secular, Western-
oriented state, has been an example that most Central Asian elites want to apply
in their countries. Also, Turkey, a friend and ally of the Western countries, was
perceived as an intermediary who could introduce these Asian republics to
Western know-how, investment, assistance, and democracy.
Remarks made by Hikmet Cetin, Speaker of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, might add an interesting insight to our discussion. It links together EU
alienation towards Turkey, anti-democracy, anti-modernism, and an implicit
explanation of the increase of extreme ideas and ideologies in Turkey. Excessive
Turkish nationalism, Muslim radicalism, and the search for alternatives, whether
in the Caucasus, in the third world, among the Muslim peoples, etc. will affect the
Turkic world as well. “Turkey’s exclusion from the EU will send a negative message
to the Muslim-majority states of Central Asia, discouraging them from continu-
ing along the path of democratization and modernization,” warned Cetin.67
Ankara reveals an interest in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan –
the first for its geopolitical and military strength and importance, all the
three for their oil, gas and raw materials that could be exported to Europe
via Azerbaijan and the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Turkish entrepreneurs
will thus gain rich contracts, a limit will be put to the number of supertankers
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crossing the Bosporus and Canakkale (Dardanelles) Straits, and apparently
Turkish – not Russian – political, economic and cultural influences will prevail
in these countries. As for the rest then, as noted, the Persian-speaking Tajikistan
inclines toward Iran, in Kyrgyzstan priority is given to China, and in Kazakhstan
Russian influence is clear.
Turkey has been instrumental in promoting regional multilateral schemes
for economic, financial, scientific, technology and cultural cooperation. The
idea was to promote contacts among states and peoples; some even envisioned
the creation of a Turkic world commonwealth, bank and a common market.
Summit conferences were convened; as it turned out Russian, not Turkish, was
the lingua franca at these assemblies. Numerous meetings were held, and a
plethora of correspondence and documentation were exchanged. The Turkish
International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was established in 1992 to facilitate
the activities of Turkish businessmen in Central Asia and to coordinate between
Turkey and the Turkic states in such spheres as banking, training officials and
establishing computer networks, etc. The agency helped organize the “Turkish
Speaking” conferences of youth leaders, university sectors, and news agencies.
The Turkish Ministry of Culture formed the Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint
Administration. The Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey organized the
Muslim leaderships of twenty-eight Turkic countries and communities, and
launched the Eurasian Islamic Council Organization. None of the above has yet
materialized to the extent its initiators wished. The Turkish International Coop-
eration Agency’s success was not great, and cooperation remained mainly at the
bilateral level, on occasions solely restricted to cultural and educational matters.
It was found that each of the Turkic Muslim republics was moving down a sep-
arate path. When the Turkish Ministry of Education regarded the Turkic world
as homogeneous and wanted to standardize school history textbooks through-
out the Turkic states, it faced opposition from the Central Asian republics: they
preferred history textbooks reflecting their own particular experience.68
Existing ethnic, border and religious conflicts, regional rivalries (for instance,
Uzbekistan v. Kazakhstan), uneven economic development, different expecta-
tions, conflicting interests and influences, language and bureaucratic hurdles – all
detrimentally affected the establishment of a Turkic world extending from the
Mediterranean to China. The aforementioned Turkish model that has not yet
fully proven itself in Turkey itself – a secular, liberal democracy with a free market
economy has little applicability to the Caucasus or Central Asian republics. As
was shown by Gareth Winrow, high budget deficits, rising foreign debts, poor
taxation systems, strongman rule, lack of free, open, and competitive elections,
censorship, bureaucratic inertia, corruption, nepotism, local disputes, etc., all
impair democratization, hinder the development of economic and political
reforms, in short reducing to the minimum the chances of success of the so-called
Turkish model. Neither language affinity eased the process or produced the
expected proximity: beyond the Caspian there is little in common between
local populations and Turks. The Turkish language helps in Azerbaijan and
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Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan Turks will be linguistically challenged. In Kyrgyzs-
tan and Uzbekistan Turkish will be completely useless. Most of these places were
never part of the Ottoman world, so there is little in the way of shared culture
beyond the Caspian Sea.69
Only small amounts of monies, from the Turkish business community and
Western sources, were invested in Central Asia or the Caucasus; money was
assigned instead to Russia. The lack in Central Asia of proper physical and finan-
cial infrastructure and distribution channels, vital for the conduct of business,
was detrimental to increasing economic relations. No wonder Ankara’s trade
with the Turkic peoples accounted in 1998 for not more than 3.5 percent of its
exports and a mere 1 percent of its imports.
Above all, Central Asians express strong reluctance to antagonize either the
large Russian communities that live within the Central Asia republics, or
Moscow, who sees itself as the successor of the Soviet Union in Central Asia.
Also, Iran harbors some hegemonic ambitions and it objects to manifestations
of excessive Turkish influence or Turkish secularism. Caution has led the Cen-
tral Asians to refrain from crowning Turkey as the new patron. The ex-Soviet
Muslim republics refused to accept a new yoke, to bind themselves exclusively to
Turkish leadership or to Turkic formations, only a few years after they got rid of
Soviet supervision and Moscow-controlled bureaucracies. The republics seek
instead to diversify their relations, rather than becoming identified with this or
that model. Gareth Winrow mentions that in the euphoric days of the early
1990s, when the Turkic republics secured independence from Moscow, Presi-
dent Ozal had hoped to announce the creation of a Turkic Common Market and
establishment of a Turkic Trade and Development Bank. As noted, nothing
materialized, among other reasons because of the Turkic leaders’ reluctance to
secure only Turkic political and economic support, solely from within the
Turkic world.70
In spite of apparent familiarity with local culture that was supposed to grant
Turkish businessmen an advantage compared with their Western counterparts,
Charalambos Tsardanidis points to the Turks’ lack of adequate knowledge, if not
ignorance, as to the real situations, differences and wishes of the peoples and
republics of Central Asia. This, he says, is a result of decades of separation
between Kemalist Turkey and the republics becoming communist. Thus, many
Turks went to Central Asia in the 1990s with the expectation of discovering
people like themselves, and were surprised to meet total strangers. All this
proved stronger than the unrealistic visions of a Turkey-led Turkic world, or, as
Gregory Gleason puts it, the Central Asians began to think of Turkey only as a
partner, not a model, nor a leader.71
There are also good reasons that prevent Turkey from becoming too
involved in these republics, especially with those with whom it has ethnic ties.
Ankara was unable to provide aid to the Central Asian countries in the quanti-
ties hoped for. The 1.5 billion dollar commercial credit offered to these coun-
tries by Turkey’s Eximbank for the purchase of Turkish goods and foodstuffs
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and for the building of infrastructure, covered only a fraction of these countries’
needs. Surprisingly, parts of the credit were not used; unsurprisingly, the bor-
rowers often failed to make repayments. It turned out that some Turkish goods,
for instance basic medical equipment, were too sophisticated to be installed in
Central Asia or the Caucasus. Also, as noted, to avoid confrontation with Russia,
Turkey wisely decided to refrain from interfering in the Armenian–Abzerbaijani
conflict over Nagorno–Karabakh. On her part, Moscow did not conceal
her objection to the sale of American F-16 fighter aircraft assembled in Turkey,
to the modernization of Turkey’s Black Sea navy, and to the Turkish army get-
ting equipped with best of US armaments. It seems that the Moscow–Turkey
interaction is more important to Turkey than any far-fetched and dubious pan-
Turkism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Turks are also aware that the
Central Asia leaders wish to remain part of a loose Russian security umbrella in
order to check the spread of religious Muslim radicalism. Derogatory references
were made to “Wahhabism” in Uzbekistan, i.e. to the puritanical brand of Islam
common in Saudi Arabia. Neither are the Turkish armed forces in a position to
help contain Muslim extremism emanating from Tajikistan’s civil war or
Afghanistan’s Taliban. Russia seems more capable and ruthless.72
Turkey’s decision to keep out of the cruel ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus
and Central Asia – “an ethnic time-bomb,” according to Jacob Landau – has
something to do with the position of the republics themselves as well. As men-
tioned before, having only recently been liberated from the domination by the
Soviets, they could hardly be interested in exchanging it for domination by
the Turks, who are equal in population to the six Muslim republics combined.
By successfully removing the Soviet economic monopolies, the Muslim
republics, for economic interests, are reluctant to install Turkish monopolies.
They encourage, instead, the involvement of Russians and Turks together in
economic and trade projects and ventures. Some of the republics find difficul-
ties with pan-Turkism. Kazakhstan, for instance, a republic of minorities, is
inclined to promote a policy of pan-Kazakhism, rather than pan-Turkism: it
encourages expatriate Kazakhs to return home, in order to alter the demo-
graphic balance.73
The republics’ needs are estimated in the range of 250 billion dollars. Since
Russia is in no position to support them economically, the republics turn for
assistance elsewhere, to places like Europe, the United States, Japan and China.
However, the West, although regarded as an ideal model, is remote – culturally
and geographically – and it will not invest its monies in the risky economies
of Central Asia. Turkey and Iran are therefore approached to serve as a model
in the solution of pressing problems. Ankara lacks the sources to provide
the republics with their major economic, social or material needs, but it
helps educate Central Asian diplomats, offers modest credits and financial
aid, assists with plans for setting up local air companies, and has invited 10,000
Central Asian students and 4,000 military cadets to study and train in Turkey’s
universities and war colleges.
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Ankara circulates its newspapers and publications in the Muslim republics,
harboring hopes to make Turkish the lingua franca of the area, and as men-
tioned previously, helps in the Latinization of the republics’ languages. Turkey
also assisted in rebuilding the republics’ telephone, computer, television and
satellite communication systems, cut by Moscow in 1992 after the republics pro-
claimed their independence. Turkey is also perceived as helping the American
cause in Central Asia – presenting a model of Western democracy and of “sane”
Islam in contrast to Russia or Iran – and as capable of bringing US economic
and financial support there. Indeed, Turkish influence in Central Asia will be
more credible if in its wake Western businessmen show up.74
Turkey’s dilemma, though not simple, has apparently been resolved. The
continuation of Kemalism, the territorial Turkish nationalism – which rejected
the ethnic unity of the Turkic peoples, i.e. pan-Turkism or the more embracing
Turanism – may well result in the abandonment of the peoples of Central Asia
to Russian hegemony or Iranian Shi’ism. On the other hand, a major involve-
ment would mean giving up of the dream of the Western alternative – some-
thing Turkey’s enemies in Europe and the West’s enemies in Turkey would
welcome. By concentrating on the nebulous and potentially dangerous Asian
option, Ankara would have to relinquish that special Turkish nationalism which
has been built up with so much effort over the last seventy-five years. “We are
not going to build an Eastern alternative” declared President Demirel, empha-
sizing the direction Turkey had no intention of taking.75 Still, frictions, alien-
ation, exclusion, criticism, patronizing, suspension, rebukes, sanctions, etc.,
that too often mar Turkey’s relations with the “Big West” – Europe, EU, USA,
etc. – arouse the following reaction:
Turkish culture is very different from the West. Concepts such as strong family ties,
respect for elders and unconditional love of and commitment to children sound like
cliches in the West but form the basis of Turkish society. Loneliness is a rare phe-
nomenon. Relationships are not based on manipulation, and the foremost motiva-
tion of individuals is not greed. The people of Turkey are enamored of foreigners,
and racism seems to be distant from everyone’s mind, even though the West tries to
portray Turks as ogres . . . On the political side, Turkey could slowly but politely let
Europe stand on the sidelines while the republic looks to itself, to its other friends
and to the Turkic nations of Asia. We are culturally more akin to them than to the
West, with its excessive and exploitative nature, or to the Arabs, with their strange
views of women and their theocratic political systems. Turkish culture, since its
origins on the steppes, has always put women on the same horse as men.76
Each of the conclusions of this quotation, presented so unequivocally, could be
subject to fierce attacks, if not total refutation. Neither is the call for the “Tur-
kicness” of Turkey as a substitute for Westernization the prevailing theme in the
country. Even ardent supporters of pan-Turkism would agree that Central Asia’s
Tajikistan, Kirgistan, and Uzbekistan could not be Turkey’s source for modern-
ization, democracy, prosperity, etc. Neither would the country’s pan-Islamists
consider Yemen, Mauritania, or Bangladesh to be the wish of Turkey. They all
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know very well that twenty-first century Turkey should look to the West. In
addition, becoming Turkic, means becoming embroiled in the Caucasus and
Central Asian interstate and ethnic conflicts, as well as arousing Russia’s wrath.
Hitherto, Turkey has managed to avoid this kind of excessive involvement and
Kemalism, with its European, Western, and secular orientation, seems to pre-
vail. But pan-Turkism and pan-Islam do show the alternatives, as does the too
frequent European and Western alienation that creates the mindset to produce
suggestions like those in the above quotation.
General elections, 18 April 1999
Nationalism, Islam, the Turkic peoples, relations with the West, the PKK, forc-
ing Syria to its knees – these and other issues of nation and identity aspects even-
tually reflected in the Turkish general elections of April 1999. Weak coalition
governments shuffled in and out of office in Turkey during the 1990s. The aver-
age rate was one per year. Eleven governments, including nine coalitions, held
office in Ankara during the decade. Major policy changes in Turkey were thus
most unlikely, because only a strong government could undertake bold policy
departures.77 Erbakan’s government was no exception: it ruled for less than a
year. A rather unexpected coalition with Tansu Ciller, who enjoyed support
from the Turkish media and business community as well as Western leaders, did
not remove military pressure from the government. Morton Abramowitz’s
description of the Erbakan–Ciller cooperation reflected the surprise:
Turkey’s political system breeds political promiscuity. Over the years . . . party
leaders have jumped into bed with some strange partners. The current government
is provocative even for Turkey: a 70 year old devout Muslim leading a religious party
. . . [who] shares power with the female, U.S. trained leader of a center-right
secular party whom many Turks believe is corrupt.78
Erbakan had to resign following Turkey’s Chiefs of Staff ’s charges that he acted
against the secular character of Turkey. His Welfare Party was later dissolved for
similar accusations, and he was banned from taking part in future political
activities. Ciller’s shield did not help Erbakan: it turned out to be that Ciller her-
self cooperated with Erbakan just to stop the Welfare Party’s investigations
against her being allegedly involved in huge financial vice.79
Mesut Yilmaz’s minority government replaced that of Erbakan. Yilmaz cap-
tured the leadership of his Motherland Party in 1991 and 1997 was in his third
stint as Prime Minister (two months in 1991, three in 1996). His government
consisted of the Motherland Party, of Bulent Ecevit’s center-left Democratic Left
Party, and defectors from the True Path Party. For its majority in parliamentary
votes, the government relied on Deniz Baykal’s Republican People’s Party.80
However, Yilmaz’s government lost its parliament majority in November 1998,
only seventeen months after it came to power. The reason? Although considered
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“clean” among often corrupt competitors, Yilmaz found himself entangled in a
similar manner to Ciller, namely, grave suspicion of silencing investigations or
covering state-Mafia organized crime triangle, and personally being involved in
corruption. His November 1998 fall, after seventeen months in power, brought
about the transition government led by Ecevit and the elections of April 1999.
The April elections showed that the electorate found the Welfare Party and
later the Virtue Muslim Party to be successful in providing running water, col-
lecting the garbage and providing services, and consequently kept them in con-
trol of municipal administrations. The same electorate, however, did not
hesitate to reflect in the ballot boxes that they were not satisfied with Muslim
parties’ politics in state affairs. Radical and protest voting in 1999 did not
increase Islamic power but, rather, and dramatically so, the nationalist view. The
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP), the Nationalist Action Party, became the
second largest political party represented in parliament, with 18.1 percent of the
vote. Ecevit’s Demokratik Sol Partisi (DSP), the Democratic Left Party, came
first with 21.6 percent of the vote, the Muslim Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi or the
FP) headed by Recai Kutan won 15.5 percent, Mesut Yilmaz’s Anavatan Partisi
(ANAP), the Motherland Party, achieved 13.4 percent, and Tansu Ciller’s True
Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) got 12.3 percent of the vote.
The MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli, Ankara’s Gazi University economics pro-
fessor, enjoyed the frustration and patriotic pride of the Turkish electorate. The
latter felt alienated, hence highly nationalist, as a result of the EU December
1997 Luxembourg decision to defer the negotiations on Turkey’s accession into
the EU; and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, February 1999, only added to the
excessive nationalist feelings. On such occasions the national or Turkic world
options thrive and reflect in the ballots. Turks, sensing their growing economy
and military prowess, as well as close links with the United States and Israel, and
living in a country that emerges as the regional power which forces its will on its
neighbors (Greece, Syria), expressed their pride in the ballots. Hurriyet’s Enis
Berberoglu gave the following explanation of MHP’s victory: “The coffins of the
soldiers martyred in the Southeast, being sent to their hometowns for burial,
have obviously helped boost the MHP vote. While the DSP and the FP received
votes by inspiring hope, the MHP has received votes by demanding ‘Let us hang
APO [Abdullah Ocalan]’.”81 It should be mentioned that the same MHP had
failed to enter parliament in the general elections of 1995 because it could not
pass the 10 percent threshold. The MHP election triumph was doubly impor-
tant because the party had undergone serious internal upheaval following the
death of its legendary leader, Alparslan Turkes.
Ecevit’s DSP was also seen as a nationalist force because of the party’s and
its leader’s positions on specific issues – support for Turkish Cyprus, strong
opposition to the PKK, to Kurdish nationalism, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan,
and so on. The party’s support of the “Turkey First” approach (“Turkey First”
has been a vague expression for the 1990s tendency to pursue a more active place
for Turkey in regional and world affairs, a status that should match the country’s
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importance and achievements) had also granted it a nationalist tone. The
MHP’s nationalism is more all-embracing – romantic, ideological, and ethni-
cally based, with an emphasis on the wider “Turkish Nation,” the pan-Turkish
world comprising Turkey and the Turkic peoples, and Turkic parts of the former
Soviet Union, of Cyprus, of the Balkans, and the Turkomans in the Middle East.
All this is an “indispensable part of Turkey’s national interests,” according to the
MHP’s election program. In order to achieve these ambitious objectives, the
MHP found it necessary to establish a “Ministry of the Turkish World,” and to
set up a “Common Market of the Turkish World.”82
Following the general elections of April 1999, Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minis-
ter for the fifth time, found, together with Bahceli’s MHP and Yilmaz’s Mother-
land Party, a common national ground and formed a coalition government.
Ecevit had to choose between Ciller and Yilmaz. The two – both leading center-
right parties but lacking any real ideology difference, hence vying for the same
electorate, hence the extreme personal hatred that they feel towards each other
– had to separate. Ciller went to the opposition, together with the Muslim Virtue
Party. This was not an exception: Turkish politics is often explained more by
personal likes and hatreds than by differences of substance or ideology.
Forming the fifty-seventh government of the Republic of Turkey – there were
six governments in Turkey during the previous five years – the three-party coali-
tion seemed to have introduced a measure of political and economic stability.
The election to the presidency of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the Constitutional Court
Chief Justice (May 2000), raised hopes for further democratization, respect
for human rights, and corruption-free government. The capture of Ocalan and,
in practice, the ending of the fifteen-year war with the PKK, were expected to
help in the fight against inflation, to ease the privatizing of various sectors of the
Turkish economy, and in attracting foreign investment. To improve the chances
of economic stability, Turkey won the confidence of the International Monetary
Fund and other financial bodies and received multibillion dollar loans to sustain
its monetary system.
Ecevit’s government has also intended to toughen Turkey’s foreign policy
and strengthen its military. The fact that Turkey was left with only one conflict
and with only Greece as an adversary – precisely because of this solitude Athens
opted for negotiations with Turkey (see Chapter 7) – could be attributed to
Ankara’s unyielding military deterrence and its prudent foreign policy. No
doubt the end of the Turkish–PKK war and Ankara desisting from the imple-
mentation of the death penalty on Abdullah Ocalan, eased the EU decision to
invite Turkey to join its ranks.
Notes
1 Ayse Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official
Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1996, Special Issue on Turkey:
Identity, Democracy, Politics, p. 186.
The quest for identity 117
2 Dogu Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey,” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 43–62, 50.
3 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 21–42, 24.
4 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, Woodstock
and New York, Overlook Press, 1997, p. 17.
5 Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey,” p. 50.
6 TDN, 1 December 1997. 
7 Mete Tuncay, TDN, 4 March 1999.
8 For Islam in Turkey see: Morton I. Abramowitz, “Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal,”
Foreign Policy, No. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 176–177; The Economist, 14 December 1991;
27 February 1993; Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally, New York,
Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, p. 33; Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” in Richard
Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey, London and New York, Tauris, 1991, pp. 9–12, 14,
17–20; Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London, Routledge, 1993, pp.
220–223; Jeremy Salt, “Nationalism and the Rise of Moslem Sentiment in Turkey,”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 13–27; G. Bechor, Ha’aretz, 3
February 1993; G. Zohar, Ha’aretz, 20 June 1993; Ha’aretz, reprinted from New York
Times, 9 March 1995; Ely Karmon, “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey,” MERIA
Journal, Vol. 4, article 2, 9 February 1998.
9 Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Iden-
tity,” p. 190.
10 Abramowitz, “Dateline Ankara,” pp. 176–177; Time, 19 October 1992; Yoav Karni,
Ha’aretz Supplement, 9 August 1991; G. Bechor, Ha’aretz, 3 February 1993; Daily Tele-
graph, 2 August 1996; Ha’aretz, 17 June 1998; George E. Gruen, “Defining Limits on
Religious Expression in Public Institutions: The Turkish Dilemma,” paper submitted to
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Summer Workshop, 1998, on “Religion in the
Public Sphere,” p. 11. 
11 Henry J. Barkey, “ The Struggles of a ‘Strong’ State,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 87–105, 103.
12 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs and Pinter Publishers, 1991, pp. 39–41; Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey, pp. 9, 12.
13 Rustow, Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally, p. 33. 
14 Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey, pp. 14–23; G. Bechor, Ha’aretz, 3 February 1993;
G. Zohar, Ha’aretz, 20 June 1993; Gruen, “Defining Limits on Religious Expression in
Public Institutions,” p. 12.
15 Abramowitz, “Dateline Ankara,” p. 175; Ha’aretz, 31 August 1993; Ha’aretz, reprinted
from New York Times, 9 March 1995; Gruen, “Defining Limits on Religious Expression
in Public Institutions,” p. 12.
16 Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan, “Turkey at the Crossroad,” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 1–20; Nulifer Gole, quoted in Jolyon Naegele,
“Turkey: Military Upholds Secularist Tradition,” MERIA Seminar: REF/RL Magazine:
Turkey Military Upholds Secularist Tradition, 5 August 1998.
17 Kasaba and Bozdogan, “Turkey at the Crossroad”, 7.
18 The Economist, 14 December 1991; 27 February 1993; Rustow, Turkey: America’s Forgot-
ten Ally, pp. 34–36. 
19 Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey,” p. 50.
20 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 21–42, 39; Kasaba and Bozdogan, “Turkey at
the Crossroad,” p. 17; Stephen Kinzer, New York Times, 17 January 1998.
21 Philip Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer
1997, pp. 84, 85. On the brutal attacks of Erbakan on Israel during his 1970s and 1980s
118 Turkey: facing a new millennium
opposition days, see Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics, Boul-
der, CO, Lynne Reinner, 2001, pp. 206–208; The Economist, 30 May 1998.
22 Ha’aretz, 24, 25 September 1996. 
23 Time, 21 October 1996.
24 Abdullah Gul, quoted in Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, 20 January 1998.
25 Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” p. 39.
26 Andrew Mango, “Reflections on the Ataturkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and
Domestic Linkages,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), Turkey’s New World:
Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Washington, DC, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 2000, p. 14; The Economist, 12 October 1996.
27 Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” pp. 21–42; Meyron Rapoport, Yediot
Ahronot (Hebrew), 23 February 1996; Morton I. Abramowitz, “This, Too, Will Pass,”
Newsweek, 11 November 1996. Abramowitz served in Ankara from 1989 to 1991.
28 Atila Eralp, “Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era,” in
Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in
Turkish Foreign Policy, Washington, DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000,
p. 179. 
29 Mango, “Reflections on the Ataturkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic
Linkages,” p. 16.
30 Andrew J. A. Mango, “Testing Time in Turkey,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20,
No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 3–20; Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy Policy under Erbakan,”
pp. 90–91; Bulent Aras, “Further Comments on Turkey–Iran”, MERIA Turkeylist, 7
September 1999. 
31 Brent Sasley, “Turkey Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 2,
No. 4/Sasley: Turkey Energy Policy, 8 December 1998; Necdet Pamir, “The Future
Prospects of the Euroasian Corridor: Is There a Future?” Paper presented at the confer-
ence on “Building a Secure Euroasia in the 21st Century,” Istanbul, 8–9 June 2000; Lau-
rent Ruseckas, “Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline
Derby,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 217–236, 229.
32 Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” pp. 21–42.
33 James Kitfield, “The Turkish Model,” National Journal, Vol. 34, No. 9, March 2002,
pp. 598–608.
34 Laura Kay Rozen, Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1998.
35 Ibid.
36 Muharrem Kayhan, Chairman of TUSIAA, The Washington Institute’s Policy Forum,
Washington, DC, 19 November 1997.
37 Chicago Tribune, 10 April 1998; Sami Kohen, “Torn Over Garments, Turkey Hurtles
Toward a Showdown,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 March 1998. 
38 Gole, quoted in Naegele, “Turkey: Military Upholds Secularist Tradition;” Ustun
Reinart, “Freedom under Wraps: Islamic Garb on Turkish Campuses,” MERIA Journal,
Vol. 2, No. 3, Palestinian and Turkish Women, 16 September 1998. Ustun Reinart sees a
feminism struggle in the use of head covers for women. The scarf or the veil guards
against intruding eyes of men and serves as a sign that the women’s first allegiance is to
God, not to their husbands or fathers. Stephen Kinzer, “Mayor Guilty of Godliness:
What Next for Turkey?” reprinted from the New York Times, MERIA Seminar: Kinzer on
Turkey, 7 October 1998; Gruen, “Defining Limits on Religious Expression in Public
Institutions,” p. 12.
39 Abdullah Gul, member of the Refah and a former minister of state, quoted in Scott Peter-
son, Christian Science Monitor, 20 January 1998. The Fazilet banner shows a crescent, five
light rays and a beating heart. The five principles of the party read: Demokrasi, Insan
Haklari, Ozgurluk, Hukuk Devleti, Kalkinma (Democracy, Human Rights, Freedom, State
The quest for identity 119
of Law, Development). See also “Virtue Party Launches Webpage,” MERIA Seminar, 26
July 1998.
40 Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey,” pp. 43–62.
41 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 221.
42 The Economist, reprinted in Ha’aretz, 19 December 1996; 29 April 1997; 17 August 1997;
20 August 1997; Time, 12 January 1998; Turkish Probe, 30 November 1997.
43 TDN, 19 April 1999.
44 Ibid.
45 Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey, pp. 3, 10–11, 21, 22; Bernard Lewis’s introduction to
Rustow’s, Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally, pp. vii–xi; Sami Zubaida, “Turkish Islam and
National Identity,” Middle East Report, No. 199, April–June 1996, pp. 10–15, 12;
Karmon, “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey;” Emmanuel Sivan, “Why Radical
Muslims Aren’t Taking over Governments,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, Item 2 of 8,
Sivan on Revolutionary Islam, 24 May 1998; Barry Rubin, “Islamic Radicalism in the
Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, Article 3 of 8,
Rubin on Islamic Political Movements, 27 May 1998.
46 TDN, 4 March 1998.
47 Karmon, “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey”, Sabah, 21 December 1996;
Ha’aretz, 22 December 1996; Gruen, “Defining Limits on Religious Expression in Public
Institutions,” p. 29. 
48 Karmon, “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey.”
49 Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey and the Muslim Middle East,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari
(eds), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Washington,
DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p. 51.
50 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation, Bloomington, IN, and
Indianapolis, IN, Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 200.
51 Toby Lester, “New Alphabet Disease?,” Turkistan Newsletter, BITIG: Vol. 8:13/03,
January–March 1998; Nadir Devlet, Director, The Turkic Studies Institute, Marmara
University, Istanbul, interview, TDN, 12–13 April 1999.
52 Milliyet, 28 July 1999; Hurriyet, 29 July 1999; TDN, 25 July 1999. Sometimes in 2000, the
Turkish government paid an undisclosed sum as compensation to the families of seven
Iranians killed in the Turkish airforce attack on the village near the Iranian town, Piran-
shahr. See Arabies Trends, January 2001, p. 20.
53 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Describing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran,” Draft, 31 March
1998; Hurriyet, 18 October 1999.
54 Tozun Bahcheli, “Turkish Foreign Policy toward Greece,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri
Sayari (eds), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Wash-
ington, DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p. 139. 
55 Suha Bolukbasi, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?,” Middle
East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 1997, p. 92. 
56 Time, 19 October 1992; 20 November 1995; Ha’aretz, 16 June 1992; 10 July 1995; Der
Spiegel, reprinted in Ha’aretz, 30 June 1992.
57 Turkistan Newsletter, Vol. 98-2:030, 17 February 1998; Landau, Pan-Turkism, p. 197;
Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns,
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000, pp. 8–11.
58 Turkish Radio Hour, 22 June 2002.
59 The Economist, “Survey Turkey”, 8 June 1996.
60 Ha’aretz, 12 January 2001. On 8 October 1997 the US Administration designated thirty
foreign groups as being “Terrorist Organizations.” Among them the Algerian Armed
Islamic Group (GIA), the Lebanese Hizbullah, the Egyptian Gamaat Al-Islamiya, the
Egyptian Al-Jihad, the Jewish organization Kach, the Jewish organization Kahane Chai,
the Iranian Mujahideen E-Khalk, the Turkish Kurd PKK, the Turkish Revolutionary
120 Turkey: facing a new millennium
People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and
seven Palestinian organizations. MERIA Seminar, 24 October 1997.
61 Hurriyet, 9 May 2000; Hurriyet, 10 May 2000; Milliyet, 10 March 2000; TDN, 23 March
1999; Ha’aretz, 19 March 2002; Oguz Celikkol, Turkish Under Secretary of State for
Middle Eastern Affairs, lecture, Ankara, the Middle East Technical University, 12 May
1999. For details about Syrian economy see Ha’aretz, 2 April 1999 and CIA World Fact
Book, quoted in Ha’aretz, 14 December 2000.
62 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p. 292.
63 Landau, Pan-Turkism, pp. 187, 194.
64 Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 5, 15 June 1997.
65 For the idea of Turanism see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent. Turkish
Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, London, Hurst, 1997, pp. 82–84.
66 Landau, Pan-Turkism, p. 1. Another example – in addition to Turanism, pan-Turkism,
etc. – that strove to direct Turkey from its traditional Western aspirations, was “Third
Worldism.” It was canvassed by Mumtaz Soysal, Turkey’s Foreign Secretary (1994), a
constitutional law expert who turned popular columnist. It did not result in the expul-
sion of Soysal (as had happened to Turkes and Togan), but neither did he remain in
office long enough to bring any lasting change. See Winrow, “Turkey and the Newly
Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.” 
67 Hikmet Cetin, Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Washington, DC, the
Washington Institute’s Policy Forum, 5 May 1998.
68 Winrow, “Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Trans-
caucasus.”
69 The Economist, “Survey Turkey,” 8 June 1996; Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey and the Cau-
casus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns, p. 7.
70 Winrow, “Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia nd the Trans-
caucasus.”
71 Charalambos Tsardanidis, “Turkey and the Central Asian Republics” (draft title), 1999;
P. Carley, “Turkey and Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling,” in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and
Oles M. Smolansky (eds), Regional Power Rivalries in the New Euroasia: Russia, Turkey
and Iran, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 190; Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian
States Discovering Independence, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1997, p. 147.
72 Tsardanidis, “Turkey and the Central Asian Republics,” The Economist, 4 July 1998.
73 Landau, Pan-Turkism, pp. 198, 200.
74 Ibid., pp. 209–210, 212.
75 Yoram Bronovski, Ha’aretz, 3 April 1992; Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “Turkey and the Black
Sea Initiative,” in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Thanos M. Veremis and Thanos Dokos
(eds), The Southeast European Yearbook, 1993, Athens, Greece, The Hellenic Foundation
for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 1994, pp. 38; Guardian, 23 November
1992. 
76 Birsan Iskenderoglu, “Turkey vs. the West,” TDN, 20 February 1999.
77 Bahcheli, “Turkish Foreign Policy toward Greece,” p. 147.
78 Morton Abramowitz, “This, Too, Will Pass,” Newsweek, 11 November 1996.
79 On corruption investigations against Ciller see Zeyno Baran, “Corruption: The Turkish
Challenge,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Autumn 2000, pp. 127–146,
136.
80 Alan Makovsky, “A Euro-Battered Mr. Yilmaz Comes to Washington,” Washington Insti-
tute, Policywatch, Vol. 291, 18 December 1997.
81 Hurriyet, 19 April 1999. 
82 Sibel Utku, TDN, 21 April 1999; Harun Kazaz, TDN, 22 April 1999.
The quest for identity 121
Turkey’s relations with Russia
Past history and present interests combined to transform Turkey’s relationship
with Russia at the end of the twentieth century into a complex affair fraught
with contradiction. The lengthy, intricate, conflict-ridden rivalry between the
Ottoman and Russian empires, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and between the Soviet Union and Turkey, in the twentieth, had left its mark on
the relationship between modern-day Turkey and post-communist Russia. The
two countries feared yet respected each other. Acknowledging each other’s
power and recognizing the value of working in tandem, they, at the same time,
immensely mistrusted each other, so that all their dealings were marked by
extreme caution and wariness. In the 1990s, these ambiguities surfaced as joint
Russian–Turkish commercial and military interests vied with bitter regional and
economic rivalry. As a result, the two countries’ relationship was defined by
close, if wary, cooperation, commingled with uncommonly competitive unilat-
eral steps specifically designed to undermine their rival’s interests, though again,
without ever quite pushing matters to the brink.
Turkey, Russia, and the Central Asian and Caucasus Republics
Centuries of tension and friction, interleaved with the occasional crisis, had
taught Turkey to tread very gingerly where Russia was concerned. Ankara was
well aware that the successful pursuit of its regional interests demanded, in the
present, as much discretion and circumspection vis-à-vis Russia as it had in the
past. This was particularly true in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where, as
already noted, Turkey’s desire to keep its relations with Russia on an even keel
acted as a constant constraint on its policies, and was one of the reasons it
5
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failed to become the dominant power in the region. Russia, though forced to
surrender its Asian empire, following the Soviet Union’s disintegration, did not
abandon its interest in the area. For one thing, Moscow could not afford to
ignore any strategic, economic or even religious developments, in what it
termed its “near abroad,” that might spill over and have a negative effect on
Russia. For another, Moscow still harbored hegemonic ambitions in the region.
On both counts the Russians were determined to maintain, and, if possible,
extend their influence in both Central Asia and the Caucasus.1
Though no longer legally or physically in control of Central Asia and the
Caucasus, Russia still made its presence felt throughout the region. Economi-
cally, the Republics, in the 1990s were only slightly less dependent on Moscow
then they had been in the days of the Soviet Union. The closed and highly cen-
tralized economic system, which Moscow had imposed on the Republics and,
which had been designed primarily to serve its interests, remained largely intact.
For years, the Soviet Union had treated Central Asia and the Caucasus as it’s own
private and endless source of cheap raw materials and agricultural produce. In
order to protect this economic treasure trove, the Soviet Union made sure that
other than devoting some resources to the excavation of their natural wealth, the
Republics’ economies remained almost wholly agricultural. There was very little
if any investment in manufacturing, so that the Republics possessed virtually no
industrial, and certainly no modern industrial, infrastructures. Thus, for exam-
ple, while the Republics accounted for 90 percent of the Soviet Union’s raw
cotton production, 93 percent of the cotton was processed elsewhere. Even in
such factories as existed, the technicians, engineers, administrators, and even
assembly-line workers were mostly Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, the
locals, as a rule, being barred from such highly sensitive jobs. The result of all
this was, as the Soviets indeed intended, that the Republics, industrially and
technologically backward, became totally subservient to Moscow. And, as it was
impossible to dismantle such a highly dependent economic system overnight,
they remained so well into the 1990s. It was equally unrealistic to expect the
Republics to metamorphose instantly from an undeveloped agricultural com-
munity to sophisticated industrial one. By the end of the twentith century,
the Republics, independent or not, were, much to their chagrin, still reliant
economically on Moscow.2
It was more or less the same story in the military domain. In the past,
Moscow, responsible for the region’s security, had provided the Republics with
both troops and weapons for their defense. In the 1990s, the Republics, anxious
to assert their independence, began to build their own armies. But, with few
experienced army personnel and practically no military infrastructures or
industry of their own, this proved a formidable challenge. Unable to tackle it
successfully on their own, they were forced to turn to Russia for help. They asked
for weapons and military equipment, as well as technical assistance, military
training, and tactical and strategic instruction. As a rule, officers in the
Republics’ armies were Russians, not locals. Moreover, with their armies still
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largely in the embryonic stage, the Republics had to rely on the Russian armed
forces to defend them, or to deter any significant threat to the region, such as
that posed by radical Islamic militants. Russia was quite happy to assist. By send-
ing military advisers, equipment and, when necessary, troops, to the Republics
it was able to cement its military hold on the region. In fact, it was even
suspected that Russia deliberately fomented unrest in the Caucasus in order
maintain troops in the area and guarantee its regional military predominance.3
Politically, too, Russia’s presence was still felt throughout the Republics.
Ever since the 1920s the Soviet Union had kept the Republics on a tight politi-
cal leash. It sent its own people to the area to ensure that the Republics
complied. Taking no chances, it filled the ranks of the Republics’ political, eco-
nomic, administrative, even cultural elite, with Party members. The Republics’
declaration of independence, in 1991, produced no equivalent revolution
within their ruling establishment. Central Asia’s leaders, many of whom were
ex-Politburo bosses, were all Soviet-educated, Moscow-orientated men. The
Republics’ political systems, bureaucracies and academia were still packed with
men and women imbued with the old Soviet traditions and practices. While
many of these people genuinely wanted to turn their back on the past and their
links with Moscow, old ways die hard and the Republics were, in many ways,
reminiscent of mini Soviet Unions. There is a hope that, thanks to the growing
number of Central Asian students studying abroad and absorbing Western
values and democratic practices, the Republics may one day boast a new
reformist elite. But, until then, it is the old Soviet guard that rules the roost,
often with an iron fist.4
Determined to maintain its grip on the Republics and if possible regain its
hegemonic position in the region, Russia was prepared to fight off all other con-
tenders to the title. It warned Turkey that any attempt on its part to promote
pan-Turkism in Central Asia and the Caucasus or to draw the region into its
orbit and away from Moscow’s, would be met by a Russian pan-Slavic offensive
in the Christian Orthodox areas of the Balkans and Central Asian. It was a pow-
erful threat, which Turkey could ill afford to ignore, unless, of course, it wanted
to find itself embroiled in an ethnic and religious Turkic–Slavic struggle, which
it most certainly did not. It had no desire to raise against it or against any of its
fellow ethnic communities the wrath of the entire Christian Orthodox world.
The last thing Ankara wanted was to see the Turkish and Turkic minorities in the
Balkans and Central Asia, who were often discriminated against anyway, fall
victim to even greater persecution. Aware of the ethnic powder keg these regions
constituted, it had little stomach for the resumption of the vicious racial-reli-
gious wars, which had devastated whole communities, with Serb set against
Bosnian and Albanian against Serb. If Turkey had any doubts, which it did not,
that Russia meant what it said, it only had to look to Bulgaria’s brutally dis-
criminatory policies vis-à-vis its 1.5 million strong Turkish minority and
Russia’s and Armenia’s ruthless suppression of their respective Chechen and
Azeri minorities. With both countries enjoying close links with Russia, Ankara
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was convinced that their actions were a sign of things to come if it insisted on
playing the pan-Turkic card, contrary to Moscow’s warnings.
Pursuing the Pan-Turkic theme, Moscow hinted that any bid on Turkey’s
part to encourage the Russian Federation’s Muslim Turkic minorities to secede,
would be countered by a Russian endorsement of the secessionist efforts of
Turkey’s minorities, the Kurds in particular. With Moscow’s backing, Turkey’s
minorities stood a good chance of making Ankara’s life even more difficult than
it already was, or, worse, succeeding in their endeavors.5 Clearly, Turkey could
not brush aside this barefaced threat to it territorial integrity. Add to this,
Russia’s extensive military presence along the Armenian–Turkish and Georgian–
Turkish borders and it is easy to see why Turkey was very careful not to do in
anything that might excite Russian suspicions. In 1999–2000, despite having
saluted the Chechens’ efforts to shake off the yoke of Russia’s “cruel colonial
imperialism,” which, it emphasized bore absolutely no resemblance to the
“terror motivated” Kurdish insurrection, Turkey failed to intervene in the
Chechen war of independence.6 Much to the exasperation of its own Turkic
ethnic lobbies, Ankara, insisting that the matter was an internal Russian affair,
did nothing to stop Moscow brutally reasserting its control over Chechnya.
Moreover, anxious not to provoke Moscow unduly, it pointedly ignored the dev-
astation and mass carnage Moscow spread in the course of the fighting, its sole
reference to the matter being to lament the terrible humanitarian tragedy caused
by war in general. In like manner, in fear that Russia might draw a parallel
between the Kosovar’s Muslim Albanians’ national rights and those of Turkey’s
own minorities, thus stirring up the Kurds and Armenians in Asia Minor,
Ankara did not back the Kosovar’s Albanians’ efforts to secede from Serbia,
another Russian regional protégé.
Energy resources: gas and oil
Questions of fuel and energy featured at the top of both Russia’s and Turkey’s
agenda. Their relationship in this respect, combining the Turkey’s lack of suffi-
cient oil and gas resources, Russia’s frantic need for money, as well as the desire
of both to monopolize Central Asia’s and the Caucasus’ energy market, was a
typical example of how the two countries often veered from close cooperation
to fierce competition. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey imported most of its gas
from Russia who, with 49 trillion cubic meters of gas, possessed the largest gas
reserves in the world. In 1997, having decided to reduce its dependence on oil,
Turkey signed an agreement with Russia for the purchase of 16 billion cubic
meters of gas a year. This was meant to cover 50 percent of Turkey’s estimated
gas needs, as well as help it overcome any possible future gas shortages. With
demand for gas set to rise from 12 billion cubic meters, in 1999, to 42 billion
cubic meters, in 2005, Turkey faced the prospect of severe gas shortages and
needed all the gas as it could get.
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It was no coincidence that the Russian gas agreement was signed more or
less at the same time as the EU, once again, rejected Turkey’s membership appli-
cation. Aggrieved and alienated by Europe’s decision, Ankara pointedly set
about improving its relations with Russia. But, despite its many advantages, the
Russian gas deal also possessed several significant drawbacks. First, it was
dependent on the execution of an immensely ambitious and complicated engi-
neering project. The agreement, known as “Operation Blue Stream” involved
two stages. During the first stage, the existing gas pipeline between Russia and
Turkey was to be expanded to double its current capacity. During the second
stage, a 1213 km long, 2100 meter deep pipe – the deepest in the world – was to
be laid under the Black Sea, carrying Siberian gas to Turkey’s Black Sea port of
Samson and from there to Ankara. The pipeline, to be built by an international
consortium of French, Italian, Japanese and Russian energy companies, at the
cost of 3.2 billion dollars, was to be completed by 2010.7 Small wonder its oppo-
nents ridiculed the entire scheme, labeling it derisively, “Operation Blue
Dream.” Second, while reducing Turkey reliance on oil, it increased Turkey’s
dependence on Russian gas. Turkey already imported 68 percent of its gas from
Russia. In 1999 it was importing 7 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia as
compared to only 5 billion from Algeria and Nigeria, its other two primary gas
sources. This was far too much. Not wanting to become totally dependent on
Moscow, which in light of the various areas of conflict between them, was
simply too dangerous, Turkey began looking for other gas suppliers. Hence the
1996 Iranian–Turkish gas deal, followed by the 1999 Turkameni gas agreement.
Turkey also decided to diversify its energy resources, buying more electricity
from its immediate neighbors. However, Blue Stream threatened to rival and
undercut Turkey’s other regional energy projects, such as the Turkameni gas
deal, with Turkey having to choose between financing Operation Blue Stream or
the Turkameni gas project, a hard choice given the advantages of both.8 Blue
Stream also presented a potential challenge to the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan
pipeline, about which more later.
There were few things that Turkey would have liked more than to end
Russia’s monopoly over Central Asia’s and the Caucasus’ fuel market. Once they
were able to extract and transport their gas and oil resources without Russia’s
help, the Republics would not only become more independent economically,
and therefore politically, but also better equipped to fulfill one of their primary
functions, as Turkey sees it, and form a buffer zone between it and Russia.9
Better still they would be free to draw closer to Turkey. Abolishing the Russian
fuel monopoly would also, and no less importantly, allow Turkey to exploit the
Republics’ energy resources itself. In the 1990s, Turkey, as noted, needed all the
oil and gas it could get, and, given that it was determined not to become depen-
dent on a single supplier, from as many sources as possible. The fuel-rich
Republics offered a solution to both problems. They were also a potential
money-spinner and could provide Turkey, if it played its cards right, with a
handsome source of income. Hence, Ankara encouraged the Republics to
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embark upon various energy projects independently of Russia, ideally in coop-
eration with Turkey itself. The only problem was Russia, who seeing things dif-
ferently, was determined to maintain its hold on the Republics’ fuel market, and
who, with a head start in the regional energy game, could and did spoil many a
Turkey-inspired deal.
In 2000, Russia and Turkmenistan closed a deal allowing Russia to buy 40
billion cubic meters of gas a year from Turkmenistan. The agreement, immedi-
ately set alarm bells ringing in Ankara. For one thing, it entrenched Russia’s
presence in the region. For another, it posed a threat to Turkey’s own arrange-
ments with Turkmenistan, in that there was the distinct possibility, or so Turkey
feared, that there would not be enough gas left over for Turkey to transport to
Europe, as posited in the Turkmeni–Turkish agreement. Turkey had no doubt
that this was precisely Russia’s intention. Hoping to corner the European
gas market itself, and aware that “the next stage of our Turkmeni gas project
is the sale to Europe,” Russia, Cumhur Esumer, Turkey’s Energy and Natural
Resources Minister protested, “is trying to block us.”10
But two could play at that game. In 1997, Turkey set in motion a plan to
build a pipeline to transport Azeri oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediter-
ranean port of Ceyhan and hence to Europe, by passing Russia altogether. In an
effort to promote the project, known as the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route, Turkey
boasted that the Ceyhan port’s loading facilities were vastly superior to those of
the Russian port of Novorossiysk, which until now had a virtual monopoly over
the transport of Central Asian oil to Europe. It also made public Russia’s habit
of diluting high-grade Azerbaijani light oil with inferior, sulphurous Russian
crude. Turkey, on the other hand, could guarantee to supply Europe with prime
unadulterated Azeri oil. One of the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route’s many advan-
tages was that, once operational, it would end Russia’s monopoly over the trans-
port of Central Asian oil. Another was that it would reduce maritime traffic, in
the hugely congested Straits.11
The Straits
The 28 km long Bosporus Strait (Strait of Istanbul) and 70 km long Dardanelles
Strait (Strait of Canakkale) linked by the Sea of Marmara, is one of the busiest
waterways in the world. Three times more ships pass through the Bosporus each
year than though the Suez Canal and four times more than through the Panama
Canal. Traffic in the Straits even outstrips traffic in the Straits of Hormuz, com-
monly held to be the most crowded in the world. In 1996, a total of 49,952 and
36,198 vessels sailed through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, respectively. In
1997, some 50,000 ships traversed the Straits, including sixty warships, 4,500 oil
tankers, and a large number of merchant ships and leisure cruisers. This is in
addition to the 1,500 intercity ferries and shuttles which sail back and forth
between the eastern and western sides of Istanbul each day, carrying some of the
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500,000 people who cross the city, either by bridge or boat. Then there are the
vast number of fishing boats, which ply their trade across the Sea of Marmara.
Unfortunately for Turkey, far from being static, these numbers grew by leaps
and bounds. Since 1960, the total number of foreign vessels passing through the
Straits has increased by 150 percent, their tonnage by 400 percent.12 During the
1990s, traffic in the Straits grew at an alarming rate of 15 to 20 percent per
annum, so that by the early 2000s the number of ferries crossing the Sea of 
Marmara is expected to reach an impossible 2,000 a day.13
Oil tankers account for a large percentage of the Straits’ traffic. In 1996
alone, 4,248 oil tankers passed through the Bosporus and 5,657 through the 
Dardanelles. Ten to fifteen supertankers, one or two of them exceeding 210
meters in length, cross the 700 yards wide Straits daily, carrying on board a vari-
ety of extremely hazardous substances, including crude oil, liquid gas chemicals,
pesticides and herbicides. These ships are so big and their cargo so dangerous
that Turkey is forced to close waterway to all other ships, until they complete
their two-hour long journey through the Straits. The result is a huge backlog and
even bigger bottlenecks than usual. With the number of big tankers expected to
rise, Turkish officials have warned that the Bosporus would eventually have to be
closed four times a day, creating even greater delays and worse congestion.14
The Bosporus and Dardanelles are not only the busiest straits in the world,
they are also among the most difficult to navigate. Crossing the labyrinth-like
Bosporus is a highly skilled and chancy business. Full of twists and turns, ships
are forced to change course at least twelve times, four times at an angle greater
than 45 degrees, as they wend their way though the waterway. To make matters
worse, the Bosporus possess few shallows or sandbars, upon which ships in
trouble can ground themselves before smashing into the shore. As a result, more
than one ship, having lost its bearings, found itself crashing into houses built
along the strait’s shore, leading to sardonic comments about “the limits of Turk-
ish hospitaliy.”15 The Dardanelles, which boasts six sharp turns, some requiring
ships to alter their course abruptly at an 80 degree angle, are no better. At two
points, Kandilli and Yenikoy, the ships’ navigators, unable to see either the ship’s
port or starboard side, are forced to steer by a combination of skill and blind
luck. Add to this the fact that the entire waterway suffers from bad weather, fog
and unpredictable currents, and navigational risks increase tenfold. For exam-
ple, if in normal times, the north to south current from the Black Sea to the Sea
of Marmara, is something between 3 to 4 knots, in rough weather it increases to
a frightening 6 to 7 knots. As if that was not enough, the Straits also incline at a
20 degree angle north to south, which combined with the fairly rapid currents,
transform any journey down the Straits into something reminiscent of a luge.16
The combination of heavy traffic, the difficulties of maneuvring through
the Straits, and the often dangerous cargo on board many of the ships, is an
explosive one. Between 1983 and 1993, there were 167 large-scale accidents in
the Straits, all with appalling physical and environmental consequences. During
the 1990s, over 150 accidents took place in the Straits. In 1992, a Lebanese vessel
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carrying 13,000 sheep and goats went down in the Bosporus. Old, decrepit and
uninsured, the ship was not considered worth salvaging, and was left, together
with its cargo, to rot on the bottom of the sea. Accidents involving oil tankers
have proven particularly nasty. In 1997, the oil tanker Nassia, carrying 19 mil-
lion gallons of oil went up in flames and began drifting perilously close to the
Bosporus’s European shore. It took the Turkish authorities seven days before
they managed to tow the burning wreck out into the Black Sea and so avoid
a colossal disaster. As it was, maritime traffic in the Straits was interrupted for
an entire week, causing huge delays and thus increasing the odds on further
accidents happening. In the midst of all this, the Turkish Daily News suggested,
sarcastically, that someone should “try that in the middle of New York City or
any major American or European port city.”17
Nor was that the end of it. In December 1997, a Norwegian tanker heading
towards Western Europe, with 30,000 tons of Russian crude on board, narrowly
missed one of the Bosporus’s twin bridges. In August 1998, a Greek tanker car-
rying 87,000 tons of crude oil ran aground, forcing the Turkish authorities, yet
again, to close the Straits. In October that year, a Turkish oil tanker collided with
a water tanker. Luckily, in all these cases the oil in the ships’ hold did not spill
overboard.18 Even more fortunately, no supertankers have, so far, been involved
in a fatal accident in the Straits. The devastation caused by a supertanker explo-
sion would equal that produced by an earthquake measuring 11 on the Richter
scale. It would also set off a succession of maritime accidents in the Straits,
wreaking unspeakable havoc on the densely populated shores of the Sea of
Marmara, and utterly destroying the Straits ecosystems.19 But, it did not take an
accident to ravage the Straits’ marine ecology. Heavy traffic and the increasing
amounts of human and industrial waste pouring into the Straits have terminally
damaged much of the waterway’s plant and animal life. According to environ-
mentalists, for example, out of the 160 fish species indigenous to the Straits only
twenty-six still survive.20
The discovery, in the 1990s, of oil in the Caspian basin meant, or so Turkey
feared, that the situation in the Straits would go from bad to worse. By the end
of the 1990s, oil tanker traffic from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk to the
Straits had doubled in number. Add to that the transport of another estimated
80 or 100 million tons of Caspian oil a year and, by 2010, the number of ships
passing through the Straits would triple, or more. With the odds on the Straits’
marine life suffering irreversible damage or some catastrophic accident taking
place rising daily, Turkey, insisting that the Straits have only finite shipping
capacity, took steps to monitor and reduce traffic in the waterway. To this end,
it unilaterally modified the 1936 Montreux Straits Convention, which until then
had regulated shipping through the Straits. Under the Convention, Turkey had
no right to impose restrictions on vessels using the Straits. It could not, as is the
case in the Panama Canal, require ships, regardless of whether they were small
boats or supertankers, carrying dangerous cargo or not, hire specially trained
pilots to steer them through the Straits. As a result, only 40 percent of all large
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ships navigating the Straits bothered with the expense of hiring skilled pilots.
Unfortunately, these were usually the ships in the worst condition, and, which,
if they ran aground, would cause the greatest amount of damage. Yet, despite the
fact that most of the serious accidents in the Straits involved ships without
pilots, under the Convention there was nothing Turkey could do. It could not
even reduce the risks by ordering ships to install basic safety features, such as a
double hull. Nor could it oblige them to carry insurance, which would at least
cover the cost of any damage they caused. Worse, still, given that passage
through the Straits was toll free, it fell to Turkey to pay for any damage done as
well as to pay for the upkeep of the Straits.21
It was an intolerable situation, which, in light of current maritime trends,
would only deteriorate further. Arguing that shipping conditions had changed
radically since in 1936 rendering the signing of the Montreux Convention obso-
lete – for example, whereas in 1936 approximately two ships crossed the Straits
each day, by 1990s an average of 134 ships passed through the Straits daily; sim-
ilarly, in 1936 the average oil tanker measured 40 meters, but by the late 1990s a
typical oil tanker was 350 meters long; and in 1936 Istanbul’s population was 1
million, but by the end of the twentieth century it was 12 million, all of which
meant that the odds on an accident happening were far greater and its conse-
quences far graver22 – Turkey began unilaterally to revise the rules regulating
traffic through the Straits. In June 1994, it introduced the Bosporus and
Canakkale Safety of Passage Act, which imposed various restrictions on ships
sailing through the Straits, especially those carrying oil and other flammable
materials. According to the Act and its various subsequent amendments, all ves-
sels passing through the Straits must be fully insured. Ships over 300 meters long
could enter the Straits only after they had received the Turkish maritime author-
ities’ permission. No ship above 190 feet in height was allowed to cross the
Straits as there was every chance that they would crash into one of the two sus-
pension bridges spanning the Bosporus, north of Istanbul. These new rules
restricted oil supertanker traffic in the Straits. But, even ordinary oil tankers
were affected by the new regulations. Henceforth only double-hulled tankers, of
whatever length, would be allowed across the Straits. All dangerous cargo must
be declared and Turkey reserved the right to conduct spot checks, as well as to
inspect the ships’ safety facilities. The number of tankers and quantity of oil
crossing the Straits at any one time was, henceforth, severely restricted. Oil
tankers were not allowed to queue-jump any more. All ships were limited to a
speed of 10 knots and overtaking was absolutely forbidden. Finally, Turkey had
the right to close the Straits, during fire-fighting and rescue operations, during
anti-pollution operations, when taking soundings, while carrying out scientific
research, and even during sporting events.23
Still not satisfied, Turkey periodically imposed new restrictions on shipping
passing through the Straits. It also installed several new and very expensive traf-
fic management systems in the waterway. The cost of building and running
these systems, and any other schemes Turkey might come up with in the future,
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was to be born by the ships themselves, which would, henceforth have to pay a
special levy to cross the Straits, a particularly high one in the case of oil tankers
ferrying oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to Europe. Not surprisingly,
the majority of Straits users strongly objected to the new regime. Foremost
among the protesters was Russia, who was particularly hard hit by Turkey’s uni-
lateral actions. Russian trade relied heavily on the Straits and almost a third of
the ships crossing the Straits flew the Russian flag. Tightening the rules of pas-
sage and forcing Russia to pay for the privilege of crossing the Straits as well,
meant fewer ships, less trade and a significantly smaller income. It would also
discourage foreign entrepreneurs from investing in Russia, thus reducing even
further the country’s chances of economic recovery.
Russia suspected that Turkey deliberately sought to reduce, if not com-
pletely stymie Russian shipping through the Straits in order to increase the odds
on the materialization of its Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan scheme. It claimed that
Turkey’s environmental concerns were entirely feigned, and like its constant
harping on the dangers arising from the growing number of ships navigating the
Straits – according to Russia there is no limit on the number of ships that can
safely cross the Straits at any one time – was meant simply to promote the
Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline, at Russia’s expense. Russia also, and somewhat
contradictorily, while insisting that the Straits Act was totally unnecessary,
accused Turkey of failing to improve safety standards in the Straits in the hope
that future accidents will put yet another obstacle in the way of the Novorossiysk
route. But, with the profits on the transport of 80–100 millions tons of oil at
stake, Russia, not surprisingly, felt that it had to muster every argument it could,
contradictory or not. Nor were Russia’s accusations entirely spurious. While
Turkey’s environmental and other concerns were very real, the bonus effect of
the Straits Act in terms of promoting the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route did not
escape Ankara’s eye. There is little doubt that as far as Turkey was concerned, the
new Straits regime served the dual purpose, of, on the one hand, making the
Straits a safer place, and, on the other, advancing Turkey’s fuel policies. As for
the latter it remains to be seen whether the new shipping restrictions in the
Straits will indeed advance the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan project at Russia’s cost.
Common interests: civil and military trade
In as much as Turkey would have liked to have undercut, even expropriate,
Russia’s monopoly over Central Asia’s and the Caucasus’ oil, it could not afford
– even for such high stakes – to alienate Russia completely by pushing matters
too far. Not only was Russia too big and too dangerous to provoke, and Turkey
loath to endanger its supply of Russian gas, but there were also several other
important military and economic interests at stake. Throughout the 1990s,
Turkey and Russia enjoyed an extremely profitable commercial relationship,
which, to a degree, tempered their political and strategic rivalry. Turkish trade
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with Moscow had flourished during the 1990s, and, though, by 1999, Russia was
no longer the commercial gold mine it had been, owing to the demise of the
lucrative suitcase economy, the CIS still accounted for 9 percent of Turkey’s
overall imports – well ahead of the United States and the Middle East – and 5.6
percent of its exports.24 This was not something Turkey would give up lightly.
Nor was it all a one-way street. As Russia’s principal trading partner in the
Middle East, Turkey helped shore up Russia’s faltering economy and Russia had
every reason to try and expand its commercial links with Ankara even further.
Accordingly, throughout the 1990s, Turkey and Russia signed many trade deals
and were continuously negotiating new ones. Their aim was that by 2010
bilateral trade between them should reach the sum of 10 to 12 billion dollars a
year, making Turkey one of Russia’s biggest trading partners, second only to
Germany, currently Moscow’s chief trading partner. It was an attractive prospect
and provided both countries with a strong financial incentive to keep their
relations on an even keel.25
In 1993, Russian–Turkish trade took on a new dimension, as Ankara began
to purchase weapons from Moscow. The West’s reluctance to sell Turkey arms for
fear that they might be used against the Kurds and its, to Turkey, irritating habit
of threatening to deny Turkey weapons in order to, as Ankara sees it, blackmail it
into improving its human rights performance, forced the Turks to look for other
more reliable, less fastidious arms suppliers. Russia was the obvious choice, and
Turkey in urgent need of arms, had few qualms in buying them from NATO’s
principal ex-enemy. Moscow, in turn, desperate for money, was only happy to
oblige. Thus, Turkey became the first NATO country to purchase, on a regular
basis, a wide range of Russian military equipment including helicopters, armored
personnel carriers, and air defense systems. It, naturally, did not want to do
anything to jeopardize this welcome and relatively secure source of weapons.26
While Turkey’s relationship with Russia, during the 1990s was often distin-
guished by rivalry, especially in Central Asia, open conflict with Moscow was
never an option. For one thing, Turkey’s basic westward orientation meant that
it was simply not worth its while to contest Russia’s bid for the mastery of Cen-
tral Asia and the Caucasus. Especially not in view of Russia’s determination to
retain its hold over its former Asian empire and its ability severely to bruise
Turkey, if not worse, should Ankara be foolish enough to push Moscow to the
brink.27 For another, Turkey had too many other more pressing problems and
conflicts to deal with. What with Syria, Iraq and Iran to the east and Greece to
the west, Turkey had quite enough on its hands as it was, and had no need to
make its life even more complicated by adding Russia to its list of enemies.
Admittedly, some of these conflicts were quiescent, while others were in the
process of being resolved in Turkey’s favor, still it would have been, as Ankara
well knew, foolhardy of it deliberately to go looking for trouble, especially with
Russia. The Turkish tradition of avoiding, where possible, unnecessary conflicts
also helped temper Ankara’s policies towards Russia. It was for a combination of
these reasons that Turkey refused to act as the local representative of Western
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interests in Central Asia. If the West, and especially the United States, wanted
to restrict Russia’s political or economic hegemony in the region, then, Turkey
believed, it should do something about it itself and not expect Turkey to fight
its battle for it. Again, for Turkey, who looks westwards, it seems pointless to
struggle with the Russians over mastery in Central Asia.
A new cold war: the battle for Central Asia’s energy resources
Central Asia and the Caucasus’ huge oil and natural gas reserves are an
immensely valuable economic prize, well worth fighting over. The known
Caspian Sea oil reserves, some 15 to 29 billion barrels, are equal to those of the
North Sea. Early soundings, however, indicated that the real amount was much
greater, perhaps as much as 163–200 billion barrels of oil, which was roughly a
quarter of the Middle East’s oil reserves. The region’s gas reserves stood at 10
trillion cubic meters, or 12 percent of the world’s gas reserves, and were equal to
160 billion barrels of oil.28 Small wonder that during the 1990s this gargantuan
well of fuel was the subject of intense international competition. Turkey, one of
the participants in the battle over the regions’ energy resources, became one of
the key players in the Central Asian fuel market. With its ever-growing energy
needs, Turkey required the region’s oil and gas for its own consumption. In
order to jump the queue and convince the Republics to sell their fuel to Turkey
first, Ismail Cem called their attention to the fact that not only did Turkey
require and would continue to require vast amounts of oil and gas in the future,
but that it was “the only country that can pay cash, pay it now and continue to
pay it up front.”29 By posing as a dependable, highly profitable and long-term
customer, Turkey was able to obtain a 49 percent interest in an international
consortium that had the right to explore Aktau in Kazakhstan’s gas reserves.
Turkey also hoped to make some money by transporting and distributing
Caspian oil to Europe by means of the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline. The
pipeline would also, as noted, relieve traffic congestion in the Straits, by offering
an alternative to the Novorossiysk route; congestion, which, Turkey feared
would only get worse once Russia’s mega-tankers began to transport Caspian 
oil as well. In order to promote the project Turkey capitalized on the fact 
that, situated halfway between East and West, it was, as it pointed out to all 
concerned, the ideal distribution point for Central Asian oil and gas.30
While Russia, which wanted to exploit the region’s oil and gas resources
itself, might contest Turkey’s claims and try to frustrate its plans, the United
States chose to ally itself with Turkey in the battle over the region’s energy
resources. During the 1990s, with its own oil reserves dwindling daily, the United
States became increasingly dependent on oil imports, and oil from Venezuela,
Mexico and the Persian Gulf soon accounted for 50 percent of American oil con-
sumption. By 2010, this figure is expected to rise to 60 percent.31 The United
States, having learnt the lessons of the 1970s oil crisis well, was determined that
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its “economy will never again be held hostage” to a single oil supplier. Accord-
ingly like Turkey, it sought to diversify its fuel suppliers. Likewise, and for much
the same reasons, it hoped to establish multiple routes for the transport of oil, so
that Iran, for example, could not blackmail the United States by blocking or
threatening to block American oil supplies.32 But, as a global superpower, the
United States also looked beyond its specific energy requirements. With global oil
consumption expected to grow by an average of 2 percent a year, by 2015 the
world’s energy consumption, standing at 104 million barrels a day, would be 55
percent higher than it was in 1995.33 Not wishing to deplete the world’s existing
resources, or give any current oil producer too much economic and political
power, the United States encouraged the advent of as many new alternative
energy providers as it could. The addition of “new players,” would also, the
United States believed, “make energy markets more competitive, transparent and
market sensitive, three perquisites of an efficient and smoothly functioning
world energy sector.” In other words it would keep fuel prices low. This was cer-
tainly true of Caspian crude, which cost only 5 dollars per barrel to produce,
more than Saudi Arabia’s rock bottom operating costs of 1.5 dollars per barrel,
but less than the North Seas 13 dollars.34 Inevitably perhaps, plain profit also
played its part in exciting the United States’ interest in Caspian oil, with Ameri-
can oil companies hoping to obtain a large chunk of the highly lucrative Caspian
Basin oil business.35
The Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
“Contract of the Century”
Azerbaijan was lucky enough to own a significant proportion of the Caspian
basin’s oil reserves. In 1997, Azerbaijan’s known oil reserves were 17 billion bar-
rels, or 0.7 percent of the world’s known reserves. By 1998, this rose to 27 mil-
lion barrels.36 By the end of the century, with its oil reserves thought to rival
those of Kuwait, Azerbaijan was set to become the world’s largest oil producer
and exporter. Turkey, who enjoyed a close relationship with Azerbaijan, was
quick to get in on the act, obtaining a 9 percent stake in an international con-
sortium that had secured the rights to the Shah-Deniz oil field.37 But, Turkey’s
greatest coup was to acquire a 6.75 percent share in the Azerbaijan International
Operating Company (AIOC), established in September 1994. The AIOC
brought together the Azerbaijani government, on the one hand, and an inter-
national consortium of public and private oil companies headed by the United
States, on the other.38 The AIOC agreement, “Contract of the Century,”39 led to
establishment of an operating company which owned the drilling rights to Azer-
baijan’s three major oil fields, Azeri, Shiraq and Gunsheli, from which it was
eventually hoped to extract some 3.9 million barrels of oil or 35–40 million tons
of oil, a year. More realistic estimates set production levels at 800,000 barrels a
day, which, at an outlay of a mere 5 dollars per barrel, would still be enough to
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provide AIOC members with a tidy profit. The AIOC operating company
was also to finance the construction of a pipeline to transport the Azeri oil to
outside markets. Turkey, naturally, hoped that the AIOC would select the port
of Ceyhan as the pipeline’s termination point and to its immense delight it
discovered that in this it had the full support of the United States.40
Energy routes: the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline
The United States, in line with its goal of increasing the number of global fuel
transportation routes across the globe, envisioned the creation of an East to
West Caspian energy corridor. In practise, the corridor would consist of twin oil
and gas pipelines, which, running under the Caspian Sea, would link Kaza-
khstan and Turkmenistan, on the sea’s eastern shore, with Azerbaijan, to the
west. From Baku the two pipelines would continue westwards crossing Georgia
into Turkey and finally emerging in the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
The oil pipeline – some 1728 km long – was, once operational, hopefully by
2004, to convey 25 million tons of Azeri crude plus 20 million tons of Kazakh
crude, a year. It was an immensely complicated and expensive engineering pro-
ject. The Republics had neither the technical knowhow nor the money – an ini-
tial estimate of 2.4 billion dollars soon swelled to a massive 3–4 billion dollars –
needed to build the pipelines themselves. Oil revenue money went some way
toward paying for the project, as did Turkey’s commitment to buy gas from the
Republics, which the latter used as collateral to obtain funds for the pipelines’
construction. But this provided only a drop in the ocean as far the money
needed to finance the project went. Turkey had too many economic problems of
its own to afford to go it alone, however much it would have liked to. Clearly, the
project was in urgent need of outside investors. Luckily, there was the possibil-
ity that the United States, who expressed a great deal of interest in the pipeline,
might bail out the project. For one thing, it fell in line with the United States’
global energy policies. For another, by passing Russia and Iran, hitherto the
region’s traditional fuel transport routes, the pipeline dovetailed with the
United States’ strategic interests. It would help weaken, and possibly isolate,
Iran. It would also end Russia’s monopoly over the transport of Central Asia’s
energy resources, thus significantly reducing the Republics’ dependence on
Moscow. Finally, championing the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route was also, the
Americans thought, a way of compensating Turkey for the economic hardships
it had endured in the wake of the Gulf War.41
Azerbaijan was keen to cooperate. Eager to reduce its dependence on Russia,
its arch-rival Armenia’s patron, Baku pushed hard for the southern Ceyhan route.
The Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan project would also, the Azeris hoped, as a bonus, result
in the annulment of section 907 of the United States’ 1992 Freedom Support Act
(FSA). Thanks to the FSA, which sought to help the ex-Soviet Republics find their
economic, social and political feet, the United States poured some 1.3 billion
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dollars into Central Asia and the Caucasus between 1992 and 1998. Medical care,
particularly prenatal and child healthcare was a top priority, and the United States
spent vast amounts of money modernizing the Republics’ primitive health infra-
structures. It sent them medicine and basic medical equipment, as well as doctors
and medical teams to help combat various infectious diseases such as tuberculo-
sis, which still plagued the region. The United States also became one of chief con-
tributors to the United Nation’s High Commissioner of Refugees’ program to
relieve the plight of the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the region. It even
sent, on its own initiative, 200,000 ready-made meals to help feed some of these
unfortunate people. Azerbaijan, to its intense disappointment, benefited very
little from all this. In 1993, following the Nagorno–Karabakh war and some very
heavy pressure on the part of the American Armenian lobby, the Senate passed an
amendment to the FSA, known as section 907, which severely limited the amount
of humanitarian assistance Azerbaijan could receive directly from the United
States. Other than protest, there was very little Azerbaijan could do about this,
until, that is, the discovery of Azeri oil, which together with the southern pipeline
route constituted a powerful incentive for the United States to abandon section
907, not least because Washington feared that if it did not clinch the deal, others
such as the EU, Japan, or even Iran, would. Azerbaijan, thus had every reason to
hope for the best, as did Turkey.42
Turkey had great many hopes invested in the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route
and launched a public relations campaign highlighting the project’s many
advantages. Russia, it pointed out, owing to stormy weather, was regularly
obliged to close its Black Sea ports for part of the year. The Ceyhan port, on the
other hand, which enjoyed a mild Mediterranean climate, could operate all year
round. When discussing the route’s many merits, Ankara tended to emphasize
those that just happened to mesh with the United States’ interests. It called
attention to the fact that the three current fuel routes ran though Russia, Arme-
nia and Iran, all of which were either politically unstable or hostile to Washing-
ton. This could not be said of Azerbaijan, Georgia or Turkey. The project would
also, Ankara enthused, end Russia’s monopoly over the Republics’ oil exports
and thus loosen its grip on the region.43
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan project faced several problems, most of which
involved money. The Republics’ oil industries were in their infancy and few of
them had the infrastructures necessary to carry out oil exploration operations,
to drill for oil or to transport it elsewhere. In most cases these had to be built
from scratch – a costly business, which might prove too much for investors,
especially if there were other less expensive alternatives, such as, for example, the
Middle East, available. Indeed, the landlocked Republics, with their nascent oil
industries, found it very difficult to compete with the Middle East which, thanks
to its flourishing seventy-year-old oil business and easy access to the sea, could
afford to sell its oil at rock bottom prices and keep transport costs to a mini-
mum. As for transporting Caspian oil itself, Iran, Armenia and Russia all offered
cheaper and quicker alternatives than the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan route.
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Azerbaijan’s reluctance to send its oil across Armenia, and Turkey’s and the
United States’ veto on the idea of ferrying the oil through Russian or Iranian ter-
ritory, left Georgia, as the only possible land link, and a much longer one at that,
between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Pumping oil through pipelines is an expensive
business – the longer the pipeline the higher the outlay – and, at 1728 km, the
operating costs of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan line were daunting. A highly cir-
cuitous route, it would also take much longer to transport the oil. Conversely,
Russia’s Baku–Novorossiysk and Georgia’s Baku–Suspa – Suspa being Georgia’s
Black Sea port – routes were shorter, cheaper and, no less importantly, already
being used to ship small amounts of Azeri oil across the Black Sea. Accordingly,
with their infrastructures more or less in place, they could be ready to ferry large
amounts of oil far sooner than the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and at a frac-
tion of the cost. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s pipeline (CPC) was another
more cost effective alternative to the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan route. The 1580 km
long pipeline – costing 2.5 billion dollars – was to connect the Tengiz field’s oil
in Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Boasting a capacity of
560,000 barrels per day, or 28 million tons a year, it had every chance of becom-
ing the principal transport route of Caspian crude over the next twenty-five
years. The CPC had one other huge advantage over its rival: it was run by the
powerful American Exxon and European Chevron oil companies, and was thus
likely to win Western backing In sum, given the estimated cost of the Baku–
Tiblisi–Ceyhan route which at 3–4 billion dollars, was twice, even three times,
more than that of any of the rival routes, there was every chance that the AIOC
would eventually opt for one of the already functioning, shorter or cheaper
Black Sea routes.44
Global oil prices also reduced the odds on the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan project
ever seeing the light of day. In the late 1990s, overproduction led to huge oil sur-
pluses and, as a result, a massive drop in oil prices. The Caspian states, as new-
comers to the oil business, had, at first, to make do with even lower prices. This
jeopardized the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan project on two counts: first, because the
construction of the pipeline was to be financed in part with oil revenue money;
second, because the AIOC companies may balk at the idea of building an expen-
sive pipeline, expensive to build and expensive to run, in return for a profit so
small it would hardly cover their outlay. One way around the problem was
simply to ship more oil in return for more money. Indeed, it was generally
agreed that in order to become economically viable, the pipeline had to convey
oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – potentially the Caspian Sea’s two
largest oil producers – as well from oil fields still under exploration. Yet, even
this additional oil may not be sufficient to turn the pipeline into a financially
sound venture. Though by 2008, the region will probably produce some 700,000
barrels a day, this will still not be enough to offset the pipeline’s operating costs,
not to mention a decent profit margin for investors.45
But perhaps the greatest obstacle to the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline’s
prospects was Russia’s fierce opposition to the project. Russia was convinced
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that the pipeline was part of a long-term American–Turkish plot – conspiracy
was how it put it – to undermine Moscow’s position in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, and take over the region’s oil market. While Russia was confident that
it could handle Turkey fairly easily, having already had some experience in suc-
cessfully fending off Turkish challenges in the region, Washington’s intervention
was a completely different story. Though the United States’ growing interest in
Central Asia and refusal to recognize it as a Russian sphere of influence came as
no surprise, it did, nonetheless cause concern in Moscow. The Russians inter-
preted the United States’ constant meddling in the Republics as part of an over-
all program designed to drive Russia out of the Central Asia and the Caucasus
region and replaced it as the dominant regional power. In order to verify their
theory the Russians only had to look to the part the Americans played in the
establishment of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRASBAT).
CENTRASBAT was set up in order to allow greater coordination and coopera-
tion between the armed forces of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and
held its first exercise in September 1997. So how, the Russians asked themselves,
were they to explain the fact that the United States sent a retired General, desig-
nated the Special Representative of the US Defense Secretary, to help the
member states set up the organization? CENTRASBAT was clearly a part of an
American scheme to gain control of the area, was the conclusion. Washington’s
onslaught on Central Asia’s and the Caucasus’ oil market was part of the same
plan, though in this case, the Russians thought, the aim was not simply to wrest
the region’s oil trade from Russia, but to “gain undivided control of the world’s
oil and gas market.”46
Russia had no doubt that if the United States was unable, for what ever
reason, to control all or part of the region’s oil resources itself, it would be quite
happy to see Turkey, with its strong links in the region, do so in its stead. After all,
in this new cold war, it made little difference which party to the alliance weakened
Russia. The Russians probably agreed with Paul Wihbey, who observed that in
the race for the Caspian Sea oil, the Americans had no more valuable ally than
Turkey, who thanks to its geostrategic location, history and ethnic fabric could
counteract Moscow, in ways and methods that Washington could not. Each
dollar spent on Turkish defense and on increasing Turkey’s power will, eventu-
ally, save much American blood and money, he added.47 All this explained, the
United States support for planned pipeline through Turkey, which Moscow
protested, would engender serious Russian financial losses and lead to “an esca-
lated drift of several post-Soviet republics to Ankara, away from Moscow,” which
was, the Russians suspected, the whole point of the project anyway.48 Turkey,
hoping to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Russia, fuelled the latter’s fears of
American–Turkish collaboration, Ismail Cem boasting that the United States
and Turkey, seeing eye to eye on a wide range of strategic, political as well as fuel-
related subjects, strode hand in hand in Central Asia and the Caucasus.49
Russia, therefore, had every reason, economically, politically and strategically,
to put a spoke in the wheels of the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan project. Unfortunately
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for Turkey, Russia, who still wielded considerable political, economic and military
influence in the region, had an almost infinite capacity to cause trouble. Georgia,
for example, a key member of the project would, as Ankara knew and feared, “not
be immune to Russian pressure or terrorist activity,” designed to hamper to the
pipeline’s operation. If Russia failed in Georgia, it could always stir up more trou-
ble between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and bring Azeri oil production to halt.50 Nor
did the Russians necessarily have to indulge in dirty tricks. As a Black Sea state
Russia could simply refuse to sanction the construction of a trans-Caspian under-
water pipeline. Given that without Kazakh and Turkmeni oil the project was not
economically viable, the Russian veto would probably be enough to kill off the
entire project. In its battle against the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline, Russia
found an unexpected ally in Iran. Iran, too, opposed the project, both for eco-
nomic reasons and because of fears that it would lead to growing Turkish and
American influence in the Central Asia.
Fearing Russia’s ability to block if not destroy altogether the Baku–
Tiblisi–Ceyhan project, and not really wanting to embark upon an oil war with
Moscow, Turkey and the United States decided that, rather than challenge
Russia, it would be better to work with it. They, therefore, elected to involve
Russia and, for much the same reasons, Iran in the project in a limited way. The
United States suggested to Moscow that Russian firms should also export oil
through the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan and CPC pipelines.51 Turkey backed the
American offer; first, because if accepted it would improve the chances of its
project materializing; second, and no less importantly, it would remove one of
the major sources of Russian–Turkish friction, always a Turkish priority. Indeed,
having boasted of Turkey’s close alliance with the United States, Cem was quick
to reassure the Russians that they had nothing to worry about by pointing out
that not “everything done to date [had] been a fight with Russia.”52 This was also
why Turkey was willing, with the United States’ approval – the United States
having a vested interest in defusing any potential conflict between Russia and its
ally Turkey – to give Russia a stake on the AIOC consortium.
In order to persuade Russia to accept its offer, the United States played up
the advantages, to the Russians, of doing so. Frederico Pena, the United States’
Energy Secretary, played up the merits of the East to West energy corridor,
which, he claimed, could serve and secure Russia’s energy and commercial
needs. For one thing, the AIOC and CPC could ferry oil from Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. For another, both
consortiums would offer Russia better access to more attractive markets.53
Robert Gee, the United States’ Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and Inter-
national Affairs, added that Russian participation in the AIOC would render it
a much larger share in the region’s oil business than anything it could afford
independently. The Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline specifically could benefit
Russia financially, as using it would offset any financial losses Moscow incurred
owing to lost haulage business. In sum, Gee concluded, Russia’s participation in
the AIOC, created a win-win situation from which everybody gained.54 Russia,
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though not entirely convinced, and still suspicious of the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan
project, accepted the invitation. The Russian oil company, LUKOIL joined the
AIOC, thus winning a stake in the Azeri oil market. While Russia will probably
still push hard for the Black Sea route, its membership in the AIOC and CPC
consortiums may temper its opposition to the Turkish Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan
project, enhancing the latter’s prospects of success.55
By the beginning of the twenty-first century the odds on the Baku–Tib-
lisi–Ceyhan route materializing rose significantly. A sharp increase in oil prices,
from under 10 dollars a barrel, in 1998, to 35 dollars a barrel, in September 2000,
enhanced the route’s commercial competitiveness vis-à-vis its Black Sea rival.
The new restrictions on oil tanker traffic through the Straits, also improved the
chances of the Mediterranean route, as Turkey knew they would. In addition,
Turkey, in order to augment the route’s attractiveness, considered offering the
pipeline’s users tax reductions and subsidies, instituting special tariff regimes
and giving concessions on the price of crude oil as well as granting users right-
of-way privileges. By the end of the 1990s, one of the few remaining clouds
on the horizon was the request that Turkey absorb any construction costs above
the initial 2.4 billion dollar estimate, a sum that could reach well over 1 billion
dollars, which Turkey can ill afford. But, bearing in mind the future payoff, it
would be money well invested, especially if Ankara can persuade the United
States to foot part of bill. And it might well do, as the United States knows every
cent spent on Turkey will, in the long run, serve American global, regional and
economic interests.56
Turkey and the United States
Turkey’s relationship with the United States during the 1990s was not all plain
sailing, especially compared to what it had been during the fifty or so years of
the cold war, when the United States considered Turkey, thanks to the latter’s key
geostrategic location, one of its most valuable assets in the battle against com-
munist Russia. Anxious not lose such a vital ally, the United States, did all it
could to keep Turkey sweet, by among other things selling it cut-price weapons
or awarding it special economic privileges. It was even willing to overlook
Turkey’s various offences against human rights. Not that the Turks, being as
eager to retain the United States’ friendship as Americans were to keep theirs,
needed much if any, as some would put it, bribing. The demise of the Soviet
Union, in 1991, however, led to a slight shift in the United States’ policy towards
Turkey, the Americans believing that there was no longer as great a need to
pamper Turkey. There was also the fact that after almost fifty years of coopera-
tion the United States tended to take Turkey for granted, or at least that was how
it appeared to disgruntled Turkish officials, who complained bitterly that the
American Secretary of State had visited Damascus twenty-fourtimes, between
1992 and 1996, without bothering to call upon Ankara even once.57 Things
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improved somewhat during and in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War,
when the United States needed Turkey’s help to wage its war against Saddam
Hussein. Then came 1996, which reminded, indeed impressed on, Washington
just how valuable and, possibly, irreplaceable an ally Turkey was.
This (1996) proved to be a very bad year for Washington in the Middle East.
On the diplomatic front it seemed to have very few friends left in the region. It
had no official diplomatic relations with Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and its
relationship with its few remaining allies was increasingly shaky. Saudi Arabia,
extremely nervous at having to play host to a large number of American troops,
would periodically raise the matter with Washington, in the hope of getting
them out or at least significantly reducing their numbers. More worrying still,
Americans, living or serving in Saudi Arabia, became the target of Islamic ter-
rorists, who in June 1996 bombed the American base in Daharan, killing nine-
teen soldiers and wounding hundreds of others. Egypt, one of the United States’
closest allies was not only increasingly critical of Washington’s policies on the
Arab-Israeli conflict, but also drawing closer to Libya, one of the United Sates
regional bête noirs. Even Israel, perhaps the United States’ staunchest Middle
East ally, appeared, following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and election of
the right-wing Benyamin Netanyahu to the post of Prime Minister, set on giving
Washington a hard time. Netanyahu’s entry into office did not augur well either
for the peace process or American–Israeli relations. Not surprisingly, Turkey’s
friendship suddenly appeared increasingly precious, with the United States less
and less inclined to take Ankara for granted.
In 1996, Washington was also finally forced to concede that the dual
containment of Iran and Iraq had, at best, achieved only mixed results. It was
not an entire failure as Iran and Iraq were still largely confined to their borders.
Hit hard by American-inspired economic sanctions, they were too busy trying
to survive to embark on a program of aggressive conquest. The arms and
technological embargo made it much more difficult for them to develop or pur-
chase unconventional weapons and long-range missiles; though, admittedly,
their plans in this respect were not entirely frustrated. Nor were the two able to
export their revisionist ideologies and policies. In sum, thanks to the policy of
dual containment, Iran and Iraq no longer posed an immediate and serious
threat to their neighbors.
On the other hand, both Saddam Hussein and the Iranian mullahs were still
in power and showed no sign of loosening their ferocious grip on their coun-
tries. Nor had they renounced their vow to subvert the region, if not the world,
shaping it according to their lights. Moreover, neither country, despite the
United States’ best efforts, was entirely isolated, either economically or politi-
cally. The Arab countries worried lest their own populations blame them for the
sufferings of the Iranian and, above all, Iraqi people, and, wanting to avoid
trouble at home, resumed contact with both countries. Advisable politically, it
also proved an extremely profitable step economically. Certainly, Europe and
Russia thought so as both eventually closed multibillion dollar trade deals with
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Iran. Iraq and Iran also exploited their burgeoning connections with the Arab
countries, and neighboring Turkey, to circumvent the oil embargo.58 These
trends continued well into the late 1990s. A rapprochement between Egypt and
Iran occurred in 1998. In 2000, Jordan signed a free trade agreement with Iraq.
The expulsion of the International Atomic Agency and United Nations (UN)
inspection teams, charged with investigating Iraq’s non-conventional and
nuclear potential, increased the odds on the latter acquiring a nuclear bomb
sometime in the future. The fact that the Iranian and Iraqi threat to region,
though considerably diminished, remained, served to increase Turkey’s worth.59
The rise of Islamic radicalism in the Middle East also helped remind Wash-
ington of the benefits of having secular Turkey as its ally. For years, Turkey had
been the United States’ sole reliable Muslim ally in the region. Then, in 1996,
Turkey’s Islamic Welfare Party came to power. Shocked and somewhat panic-
stricken, the United States wondered whether Turkey was not about to go the
way of Iran. But if the chances of Turkey becoming an Islamic theocratic state
were, as Washington realized once it had calmed down, extremely remote, it
dared not risk such an eventuality occurring. In any case, Erbakan in power
proved bad enough, as it seemed that the United States could no longer count
on Turkey’s friendship. Alarm bells began to ring throughout Washington once
Erbakan began drawing parallels between PKK terrorism against Turkey and the
United States’ bombing of Tripoli in 1986. Small wonder, that Washington
breathed a massive sigh of relief when Erbakan resigned and his government was
replaced by a secular coalition.
Washington well aware that anger with and alienation from the West, due
among other things to the EU’s incessant criticisms of Turkey and the American
Congress’s embargo on the sale of weapons to Ankara, had fed the same radical
religious sentiments in Turkey that had eventually brought the Welfare Party to
power. Not wanting to repeat the Erbakan experience, the United States, was
careful to avoid making the same mistakes again. The American Administration
therefore, encouraged the EU to accept Turkey into its ranks. It also tried to lift
or circumvent Congress’s arms sanctions on Turkey. In January 1998, it revoked
the suspension imposed on delivery of three frigates to Turkey, two of which
were now given to Turkey outright, the third was leased to Ankara for a mere
9 million dollars. That same year, the Turkish air force received seven American-
made KC-135R tanker aircraft.60 It could, therefore, be said that Erbakan marked
a crossroads in American–Turkish relations, though not in the way he had
hoped. His year in office, alerting the United States to the dangers of losing
Turkey, inspired it to multiply its efforts to woo and regain the latter’s confi-
dence. After all, as Jesse Helms, Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee admitted: “The United States would be paralyzed in
the Middle East without Turkey . . . one of the most credible friendly allies of
this country.”61
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Shared interests
After the nadir of 1996, Turkey and the United States became closer than ever.
“If,” the TDN boasted, “the temperature of Turkish–US relations could be mea-
sured by the number of Turkish delegations, it would register white-hot on any
scale.” With a great many interests in common, Turkey and the United States
certainly had much to talk about, and high politics, security matters, diplomatic
issues, strategic concerns, trade ventures, economic cooperation, cultural affairs
and ecological questions all featured on the American–Turkish agenda.62 That
Turkey was the United States sole reliable Muslim ally in the volatile Middle East
has already been noted. But, Turkey’s political and strategic worth to the United
States went way beyond the Middle East. Straddling the Balkans in the West and
Central Asia and the Caucasus in the East, Turkey formed an invaluable buffer
zone between the West and these extraordinarily explosive areas. Moreover,
Turkey often found itself in the very eye of the various ethnic and religious
storms that rocked the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia. Though, admit-
tedly, reluctant to become too closely involved in these regional upheavals, and
certainly unwilling to police either area for the West, Turkey, nevertheless, for
reasons of its own, helped to defuse, contain, even end a large number of these
actual and potential crises, crises which threatened both its and the West’s well-
being. Turkey also, when it served its interests, helped Washington fight several
of its battles in the area – as it did, for example, in the race to corner the Caspian
oil market – though always in tandem with the Americans. Indeed, Turkey, “able
to counter the Russians in ways America couldn’t,” proved pivotal to the success
of American policies throughout Eurasia. Turkey’s achievements, there and else-
where, underscored its continued and immense value as a partner and ally,
despite the end of the cold war. More than one member of the Administration
believed that, owing to Turkey’s key geostrategic position, each dollar spent on
Turkish defense would save double if not treble that amount in American blood
and money.63
Happily, for Ankara, the United States invested in its beliefs. Throughout
the 1990s Turkey received, on average, a generous 0.8 billion dollars of Ameri-
can aid a year.64 It also enjoyed a steady stream of American weapons. During the
Clinton years, it obtained about 800 million dollars worth of weapons per
annum, becoming one of the world’s largest recipients of American arms, sur-
passed only by such long-term and valued American clients like Saudi Arabia,
Taiwan, Israel and Egypt. Between 1990 and 1995, Turkey acquired 1.53 billion
dollars worth of surplus American military equipment; second only to Greece,
who, to Turkey’s disgust, secured 1.8 billion dollars worth of equipment, but
way ahead of Israel, who obtained only 718 million dollars worth.65 Over all,
during the eight years of Clinton’s presidency, the United States furnished
Turkey with four times as many weapons, as it did between 1950 and 1983 at the
height of the cold war. The Clinton Administration also made it much easier for
American companies to compete for Turkish tenders for the sale of advanced
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weapons systems like the 4.5 billion dollar, 145 King Cobra advanced attack
helicopters deal. The United States also became closely involved in Turkey’s mil-
itary training programs and participated in various Turkish military exercises;
to a greater extent even then it did surpass those of its two other regional front-
line allies: Egypt and Israel.66
NATO, too, provided a fruitful basis for American–Turkish cooperation.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two countries banded together
in an effort to expand NATO membership, beyond its current North American–
West European limits. During the Balkan wars, Turkey, with America’s blessing,
took part in various NATO operations to end the fighting and keep the peace in
the region. In the early stages of the war in Bosnia, Ankara helped enforce
NATO’s sanctions against Serbia. After the war, it contributed troops to the
NATO force in Bosnia, charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Accords.
During the Kosovo crisis, Turkey joined the West in its efforts to deter Serbia
and prevent it attacking Muslim Albanian refugees. In 1999, it sent 1,000 Turk-
ish troops to the KFOR units in Kosovo. The United States was more than happy
to have a predominately Muslim country involved in these and other similar
operations in the region, operations that might otherwise have appeared to be
exclusively Western, Christian enterprises. Turkey’s participation was, Washing-
ton thought, doubly useful in that it reassured the local Muslim populations –
in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo – that NATO and the other peace-keeping
forces, unbiased and impartial, had their best interests at heart. It could also, the
United States hoped, silence the Muslim countries’ criticisms of the operations,
and perhaps even persuade some of them to join the peace-keeping efforts in the
Balkans themselves. Turkey saw its participation in the Balkan peacekeeping
operations as way of helping the Balkan Muslims, descendants of the loyal sub-
jects of the former Ottoman Empire, but without becoming unilaterally or too
closely involved in the conflict. Given that very few, if any, Turks actually volun-
teered to fight alongside the Muslim Bosnians and Albanians, while the govern-
ment refused, in principle, to be drawn in to the war, the government felt it
necessary to at least be seen to be doing something for the local Muslim popu-
lation. Participation in the NATO operations was the ideal solution. It put an
end to any carping about Turkey’s apparent indifference to its Muslim brethren’s
fate while, at the same time, winning it some very valuable points with the
United State and West.67
Turkey’s and the United States’ interest in exploiting the Caspian oil
reserves has been dealt with at length. But this was not the only economic inter-
est the two had in common. The United States, having listed Turkey as one of
the world’s ten biggest emerging markets, began to encourage Americans to
invest in its ally’s market. Thanks to this and to the fact that Turkey’s workforce
has an impressive work ethic, but costs very little, American investment in the
Turkish textile industry – Turkey’s number one export business, accounting for
40 percent of all Turkish exports – and in various assembly-line manufactories
– a Turkish speciality – rose spectacularly. Trade between the two counties also
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took off. In 1989, American–Turkish trade stood at 3.5 billion dollars, nine years
later, in 1998, it approached the 6.3 billion dollars mark. Between 1995 and
1999, the volume of trade between the United States and Turkey jumped by 28
percent. By the end of the decade the American market accounted for 8.8 and
8.3 of all Turkish imports and exports respectively.68 Turkey exported to the
United States a wide range of products, including, despite heavy competition
from China’s dirt cheap products, textiles and steel, where Turkish exports
increased by 17 percent, and even pasta, with Turkish pasta competing success-
fully with traditional Italian products. Hoping to expand their profitable trade
relations even further, the United States and Turkey opened negotiations over
the establishment of a free trade zone in the Adana–Yumurtalik district. Goods
produced in the free zone would be exported to the United States, enjoying the
special benefits applicable in the US–Israeli free trade agreement.69
Areas of disagreement
Like any marriage, however happy, Turkey’s and the United States’ relationship
was not entirely quarrel free. The two allies disagreed, sometimes extraordinar-
ily fiercely, over several issues; some minor, some major. Nevertheless, conscious
of the benefits of cooperation, the two endeavored to keep, as much as possible,
all friction between them to a minimum. At times they succeeded, at others, par-
ticularly when matters of conflicting national interests were involved, less so.
But, even when deeply divided, and on the face of it pursuing widely divergent
policies, the United States and Turkey always managed to find some common
ground between them, and, if not, at least a way to rise above their differences. 
Polychlorinatedbiphenyl (PCB) pollution in the Incirlik air base district, in
northern Turkey was one of the minor, if extremely irritating, to Ankara at least,
points at issue between Turkey and the United States. Polychlorinatedbiphenyl,
a highly toxic substance found in oil used to cool down electric transformers, is
a deadly environmental hazard. In humans, it may, among other things, cause
liver dysfunction or severe damage to their reproduction systems. It is also a sus-
pected carcinogenic. In fact PCB is so dangerous that it is no longer produced in
the United States. After the closure of the joint American–Turkish military bases
in Turkey, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the oil used in the bases’ trans-
formers was sent to Incirlik where it was buried in metal containers. Unfortu-
nately, the containers sprung a leak and the oil began to seep into the soil. Owing
to the PCB’s organic properties there was every chance that it would eventually
filter into the area’s subterranean waters and reach the Seyhan River, a main
water source. Turkey had neither the technical expertise, nor the money needed
to decontaminate the area and remove the PCB containers. The United States
had both. What is more the United States, having put the PCB there in the first
place, albeit it with Turkey’s consent, was also, or so Ankara claimed, morally
responsible for this environmental disaster. But when Ankara asked United
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States to clean up the mess, the latter, to the Turks amazement, refused, point-
ing out that as there was no signed agreement between the two on the matter, it
was not legally obliged to do so. Dismayed, Ankara approached the Americans
again, several times in fact, but to similar effect. Ankara thought Washington’s
attempt to duck its obligations by relying on legal quibbles especially unsavory,
even contemptible, as in the United States, the Environmental Protection
Agency ruled that all PCB leaks had to be dealt within forty-eight hours of their
discovery. Yet, Turkey remonstrated, in Incirlik PCB has been seeping into the
soil for over ten years “and we still cannot get anything done.”70
The closure of the American–Turkish bases provoked another disagreement
between the two countries, this time over the Americans’ decision to return
various pieces of American military equipment home. The Turkish General
Staff, arguing that equipment had been used by both forces, demanded right of
approval over which items would be sent back. The Americans refused. The
United States, on its part, hoping to cut costs, and, ironically, using the same
argument as above, i.e. that both armies had used the equipment, demanded
that all items awaiting shipment should be exempt from storage fees and custom
duties. This time it was Turkey, loath to miss an opportunity to earn a consider-
able sum of money and annoyed with the Americans for not leaving behind
more weapons, who said no. In 1997 the two, stubborn as ever, were still
arguing over these issues.71
The United States’ reluctance to buy a greater number of military compo-
nents from Turkey – components used in building American weapons systems,
which were then sold to Turkey and other countries – was another bone of
contention between the two countries. Turkey would also have liked to sell more
military equipment to the United States. The effect, in both cases would have
been to give its military-industrial sector a tremendous boost. With money now
available to invest in and develop the infrastructure necessary to produce
weapons for its own use as well, Turkey would no longer have had to spend vast
sums of money buying weapons abroad. Not only that but, it would no longer be
dependent on foreign arms suppliers like the EU who often exploited this either
to punish Turkey or force it to adopt policies considered detrimental to Turkish
interests. Turkey would also have been able to develop its weapons export indus-
try. Unfortunately, none of these dreams materialized as the United States was
not inclined to offer Turkey a larger share in the American weapons market. This
was extremely disappointing, but what made it really annoying was that the
Pentagon, as Ankara discovered to its fury, was considering testing and buying
defense equipment from over a dozen countries, including, Russia, but excluding
Turkey. “Why,” the TDN asked plaintively, “wasn’t Turkey on the Pentagon’s list?”
One possible reason, according to Ankara, was the Americans’ mistaken assump-
tion that, “Turkey has no defence related material to sell and everything to buy
from the United States.” But, perhaps, Washington was also happy to keep Turkey
dependent on it for weapons, which, like extra insurance, guaranteed that in the
final count Turkey would always remain by the United States’ side.72
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Most of these areas of minor disagreement, involving as they did mostly
technical and financial issues, mixed in with a bit of petty pride and prestige,
though extremely vexing, could be, once the two countries set their mind to it,
and with a little give and take on both sides, easily resolved. Not so the various
points of dissent, between the Turkey and the United States which as a rule
embraced matters of principle, national interest and policy. The United States’
and Turkey’s policies towards Syria were a case in point. Though both agreed that
Syria was an extremely nasty, dangerous, terror-promoting country, divergent
regional interests and perspectives led to several disputes over various aspects of
the two countries’ policies towards Damascus. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey
repeatedly asked the United States to put more pressure on the Syria to stop sup-
porting the PKK. The United States, not wanting to alienate Damascus too much
and spoil any chances it may have of brokering a peace agreement between Israel
and Syria, or, worse, end up pushing Syria into Iran and Iraq’s arms, refused.
Though, it must said that the State Department promised not to condemn
Turkey, if it turned out that Ankara, as part of its campaign to persuade Syria to
expel the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, was responsible for the series of bomb-
ings in Damascus in 1998, Turkey, for its part, strongly objected to any sugges-
tion of removing Syria from the list of terror promoting countries. The United
States, however, suspected that this would probably have to be done as part of the
Israeli–Syrian peace agreement. Ankara pointed out, with justice, that while a
peace accord may stop Syria supporting anti-Israeli terrorist groups, it would
have no such effect on Syria’s efforts to promote terrorism in Turkey. There was
also some concern in Ankara lest the United States, believing that resolving the
Turkish-Syrian water dispute in the latter’s advantage would persuade Syria to
grant Israel title to the Golan Heights’ water resources, this being one of the
major obstacles to peace between the two, and in its eagerness to bring the con-
flict between Syria and Israel to end, would press Turkey to modify its position
in its quarrel with Syria over the rights to the waters of the Euphrates. Luckily for
Turkey, owing to the deadlock in the Israeli–Syrian peace process, most of these
possible sources of acute conflict remained latent, and did not seriously mar
American–Turkish relations.73 This was not so in the case of Iran and Iraq.
In principle Turkey appreciated, even approved of, the logic behind the
United States’ dual containment policy. After all, it too had a vested interest in
keeping Iran and Iraq as weak and as isolated as possible. Yet, at the same time,
whether for economic or political reasons, Turkey often opposed and, in prac-
tise, ignored the sanctions imposed on both countries. In 1997, Turkey anxious
to extend and diversify its energy sources signed a 23 billion dollar gas agree-
ment with Iran. Most of the 228 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas was destined
for Turkey’s ever-growing gas market, the remainder some 10 billion cubic
meters a year was to be sold to Europe, providing the Turks with a handsome
source of revenue (see Chapter 4 for more details). In line with the agreement,
a pipeline was built connecting the Iranian gas fields in Tabriz with the Turkish
cities of Erzeum, Sivas, and Ankara. It was a sweet deal with only one snag: it
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violated the sanctions on Iran. Ankara, anxious not aggravate Washington –
particularly in view of the 1996 American Iran–Libya Sanctions Act, which
imposed heavy penalties on companies or countries investing 20 million dollars
or more in the Iranian or Libyan fuel market – insisted that it had not breached
the embargo on Iran. Any Turkish investment in the project, it pointed out, had
been confined to Turkish territory alone.74 This was a piece of legal sophistry the
Americans found far from convincing. They disliked the gas agreement, which
not only filled Iranian coffers, but flew in the face of the United States’ declared
policy of undercutting Iranian gas with gas from Central Asia. Luckily, for
Turkey other than protesting strongly against the agreement, the United States
did nothing. Washington, itself, for reasons of profit and politics, had tacitly
approved several deals between various Central Asian countries and Iran. Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan, for example, had both concluded agreements with
Iran, according to which the latter would process Turkmeni and Kazakh crude
in its refineries in northern Iran and export the same amount of oil from its Gulf
ports. Turkmenistan also agreed to supply Iran’s northern cities with gas – a deal
explained by the fact that most of Iran’s gas fields are located in the south. As
these and other similar agreements served to break Russia’s monopoly over the
Central Asian fuel market, the United States was quite happy to turn a blind
eye to their obvious breach of the embargo on Iran. It would have been grossly
hypocritical of Washington to punish Turkey for doing the same.75
As for Iraq, prior to the Gulf War, trade between Turkey and Iraq amounted
to 2.5 billion dollars per annum, making Baghdad one of Turkey’s four biggest
trading partners. After the war and the institution of sanctions against Iraq,
trade between the two dwindled to a mere 200 million dollars a year. Turkey was
particularly hard hit by the oil embargo on Iraq. No longer allowed to transport
Iraqi oil, it lost one of its most important sources of income. Turkey claimed that
sanctions against Iraq had cost it some 35 billion dollars. Not surprisingly,
Turkey sought to revoke or at least modify some of the sanctions against Iraq. It
also, when it thought it could get away with it, circumvented them. The United
States, though questioning Turkey’s grim observation that “the first victim of
the Gulf War was Iraq the second, Turkey,” was generally sympathetic to
Turkey’s economic difficulties, some of which, it admitted, were indeed caused
by the war.76 It therefore agreed to allow Turkey to ship limited amounts of Iraqi
oil, in order to earn a little extra money as well and ease the unemployment sit-
uation in the country’s poverty-stricken south. It also overlooked Turkey’s
agreement with Iraq to import crude oil in lieu of the Iraqi debts to Turkish
businessmen. The deal stimulated the southeast’s faltering transport business, as
most of the oil was carried by Turkish trucks and created a large number of new
jobs. It also, given that most of the profits went to Iraq’s Turkish creditors in the
area, injected a great deal of much needed money into the southeast. But this
was not enough to satisfy Turkey, and soon with Ankara’s tacit consent, thou-
sands of Turkish trucks began carrying tens of thousands of barrels of smuggled
Iraqi oil across Turkey. Oil smuggling was a highly lucrative business and the
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smugglers, unlike Ankara, were quite happy to see the sanctions remain in place.
Oil smuggling also provided a neat solution to Turkey’s problem with the UN
oil embargo, which might otherwise have led to a serious rupture in relations
with the United States. It allowed Turkey to deny that it was in breach of UN
sanctions, while still doing business with Iraq and the United States to pretend
that nothing was amiss, and the sanctions were strictly enforced.
Turkey also opposed the United States’ bombing campaign against Iraq. It
had agreed reluctantly to the launching of aerial attacks against Iraq from the
Turkish base in Incirlik, and even then only after it had received a quid pro quo
in the form of the oil for food agreement, which allowed Turkey to transport a
limited amount of Iraqi oil and recoup some of its losses from the Gulf War.
Unfortunately, however, the bombing tended to interfere with the smooth ship-
ment of Iraqi oil, as well as disrupt the newly revived, if so far modest, Turk-
ish–Iraqi trade. This added to Turkey’s southeast provinces’ troubles, as their
economic regeneration was largely dependent on the oil transport business and
trade with Iraq. But that was not the only reason Turkey objected to the bomb-
ing of Iraq. It seriously questioned the political objective behind the bombings,
which was to destabilize Saddam’s regime, bringing about its eventual demise.
Blaming Saddam for the bombing, the Iraqi people would, or so the Americans
hoped, either rise up in revolt, or provide the Iraqi opposition with sufficient
grassroot support to enable it successfully to topple Saddam. Turkey thought the
whole plan delusive and dangerous. It had no faith in the Iraqi opposition,
which, it thought, was much too weak and divided to launch an effective coup.
It also disliked, in principle, the plan’s blatant interference in Iraq’s internal
affairs, which, it feared, could mark the beginning of new, unwelcome style of
interventionist American foreign policy. “It may start in Baghdad,” the TDN
remarked, but “you never know where it ends. Why not Turkey?”77
Paradoxically, perhaps, Turkey was horrified, at the possibility, however,
slim, that the American plan might succeed. Saddam’s demise would probably
result in Iraq’s disintegration – a nightmare scenario as far as Turkey was con-
cerned. Iraq’s dissolution would rock the entire region. One of the few regional
powers capable of counter-balancing Iran would disappear and, without Iraq
breathing down its neck, Iran would be free to devote itself to undermining and
subverting Turkey. It would also, in all likelihood, lead to the establishment of a
Kurdish state, which encouraging separatist sentiments among Ankara’s Kurds
would threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity. In sum, instead of welcoming the
collapse of its arch-rival, Saddam, Ankara sincerely hoped to prevent it.
The incendiary question of Kurdish nationalism was the subject of a series
of American–Turkish quarrels. Turkey consistently denied that there was such a
thing as a separate Kurdish identity. Its Kurds, Ankara insisted, were simply
Turks who happened to be Kurds. It deeply resented the United States’ unwar-
ranted pressure on it to recognize the Kurds’ ethnic, cultural and linguistic iden-
tity. Washington’s attempts to meddle in the Kurdish affair – an, it stressed,
internal Turkish matter – was, Ankara complained, completely unjustified and
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unacceptable. It could also, Ankara feared, prove to be very dangerous, as Wash-
ington was convinced that the only solution to the Kurdish problem, was a polit-
ical one, which could mean anything from giving them special rights to full
autonomy. Having no desire to undermine the monolithic Kemalist nationalism
upon which their state was based, or do anything that might threaten its terri-
torial integrity, the Turks utterly rejected the American position. They pointed
out that the Kurdish problem far from being an ethnic issue, was simply one of
PKK terrorism, which once quashed, would no longer exist. It certainly repudi-
ated any kind of a political solution to the problem, which might end up with
Turkey divided into ethnic cantons. The United States disagreed, and, not sur-
prisingly, Turkey’s old Sevres phobia soon resurfaced, with Turkey suspecting
that the United States was a party to Western Europe’s plot to weaken and divide
Turkey into small tribal units.78
The United States and Turkey were no less divided, and for much the same
reasons, over the Kurdish “Safe Haven” in northern Iraq. Admittedly, like
Turkey, the United States had no interest in creating an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq. It did, however, want to see some kind of strong, united
Kurdish entity in the region capable of putting Saddam under considerable
pressure. To this end, it welcomed the Iraqi’s Kurds’ adoption of various state-
like qualities, such as the holding of elections. It even toyed with the idea of Kur-
dish autonomy. The possibility of a future Iraqi federation, which would include
a Kurdish state, was also bandied about. This proved too much for Turkey to
stomach. At best, it thought, American policy would encourage its own Kurds
to demand similar rights for themselves, at worst, it would end in an indepen-
dent Kurdish state. A Kurdish state, even as part of an Iraqi federation, would in
all likelihood adopt a policy of Kurdish irredentism, and, like a magnet, attract
Turkey’s own Kurdish citizens. Once again Turkey’s Sevres complex raised its
paranoid head, Ankara suspecting that Washington’s advocacy of an indepen-
dent Kurdish administration was in effect part of a broader scheme to weaken
and divide Turkey. It led, as Kemal Kirisci observed, a great many Turks to
regard the United States as “an enemy state rather than an old strategic ally.”79
A Kurdish political entity, however diluted its form, might also, Turkey fret-
ted, lead to the collapse of Saddam’s regime and to the disintegration of Iraq. In
such an event, even without an official Kurdish state in place, a political vacuum
would emerge in northern Iraq, which the PKK would be quick to fill. The
United States, however, if not anxious for Iraq’s disintegration, longed, as noted,
to see the back of Saddam. Seeing the Iraqi Kurds as a means to achieve this end,
it began to forge close links with the Iraqi Kurdish opposition. Turkey, quite
apart from the fact that it had no desire to see the collapse of Saddam’s regime,
or build up a Kurdish nationalist movement, thought the whole enterprise
futile. It had no more faith in the two Kurdish leaders’ ability to topple Saddam
than it had in that of the Iraqi opposition forces. Moreover, as it pointed out to
the United States, dependent on Saddam for fuel, part of which they sold abroad
in order to earn money, Barazani or Talabani “have to be at least on speaking
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terms with him [Saddam]. So to expect Barazani and Talabani to get into an
adventure against Baghdad” with no assurance of its success “would be foolish,”
in the extreme.80 The whole project, Ankara concluded, was a pipe dream. The
United States would be far better off adopting Turkey’s sensible and practicable
policy of maintaining a weak Kurdish front, just about strong enough to worry
or irritate Saddam, but no more.
The Armenian question proved no less of a thorn in the side of Ameri-
can–Turkish relations than the Kurdish problem. The powerful American
Armenian lobby persuaded Congress to pass a bill acknowledging that the
Ottoman Empire was responsible for the Armenian genocide during the First
World War. Quick to respond, to this, to its mind, outrageous accusation which
certainly had no basis in reality, the Turkish National Assembly voted to erect,
in Ankara, a memorial commemorating the persecution of the American Red
Indians by both the United States’ white settlers and its government. It was well
within its rights to do so as some of the Red Indian tribes, the Apaches for exam-
ple, or so Turkish nationalists claimed, indulging in a little fiction-building of
their own, had Turkic roots. While Washington could afford to brush off the
threat, however embarrassing, to build a monument commemorating the suf-
ferings of the Red Indians, it could not ignore the bill’s possible political and
strategic consequences. Hypersensitive to any accusation that it was guilty of the
mass murder of well over 1 million Armenians during the war, Turkey was liable
to overreact, and tie up the United States’ policies throughout the Middle East,
the Balkans and Central Asia. It might do so even though in some cases cooper-
ating with the United States was in its best interests, so that in sense it would be
cutting off its nose to spite its face. A prime example of this was the Turkish
threat to stop working in tandem with the Americans in the Caspian oil market.
It would certainly, the Administration thought, persuade Turkey to withdraw its
support from the, in its view, more problematical aspects of American policy,
which until now it had supported only extremely reluctantly – the air strikes
against Iraq being a case in point. In 1999 alone, the United States launched,
from Turkish bases, over 150 air strike against Iraqi targets – mostly radar instal-
lations and anti-aircraft batteries, which threatened the American planes
patrolling the safe zones in northern and southern Iraq. Not only could Turkey
put a stop to this, but it could also expand its trade relations with Iraq and Iran,
further weakening the United States’ already fragile dual containment policy. In
short, the bill, the Administration realized, could imperil the United States’
efforts to fight “drugs, thugs and terror” in the Middle East.
What is more, Turkey, incensed, appeared set to embark down this highly
unnerving road. It warned that it would resume railway links between Baghdad
and Turkey. It initiated agreements for the importation of Iraqi crude, and it was
a hardly a coincidence that just as the bill was being discussed in Congress,
Turkey suddenly decided to upgrade its mission to Baghdad to that of a full-
blown embassy. Ankara denied that there was any connection between the two
issues but the Administration, aware that it would achieve nothing in Iraq or
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elsewhere “unless the Turks were on the same page,” took the hint and forced
Congress to withdraw the bill.81 But the issue did not to disappear. In January
2001 the French National Assembly accepted a bill that attributed the massacres
of the Armenians to the Turks. Accordingly, the city of Paris decided on building
a monument in memory of the Armenian victims. Ankara retaliated economi-
cally, barring French companies from participating in Turkish tenders, and can-
celled the procurement of security items from France. The Lord Mayor of Ankara
decided to retaliate by building a monument in memory of the Algerians killed
by French troops. “Similar measures would be taken against any country that
would link the Armenian plights to the Turks,” warned Turkish officials.82
Given the headache the US Congress bill had caused it, Washington was
determined, not, if it could help it, to reopen the Armenian issue ever again.
Thus, Turkey scored a double victory. It not only killed off the present bill, and
probably any other similar bill in the future, it also drove home to the Adminis-
tration the fact that not only did it need Turkey, but, no less importantly, that it
could not take Turkish cooperation for granted. In the case of the Armenian bill,
by allowing Turkey to prove, once again, that it was in nobody’s pocket, it
induced the Americans to redouble their efforts to woo Ankara, and treat it and
its interests with greater respect.
Human rights
One of the biggest issues liberal Washington had to take up with Ankara during
the 1990s was the latter’s human rights policies. In 1977, the United States’ State
Department presented Congress with the first of a series of annual reports on
the human rights situation throughout the world. Over the years, the portion of
the report devoted to Turkey grew consistently larger. Moreover, if at first, the
State Department’s criticisms of Turkey were relatively mild, by the end of the
1990s it pilloried Turkey’s human rights policies, which it fiercely and uniformly
condemned. Nor was the State Department exaggerating. In 1999, Turkey
topped the European Court of Human Rights’ list of thirty-seven countries
accused of violating human rights. Out of the 7,771 complaints registered in the
court, Turkey received a record 1,825 complaints, way ahead of Italy, who was
second in line with 1,191 complaints.83 The complaints specified, inter alia, beat-
ing, assault, and torture. The 1998 report of the Human Rights Association, the
Istanbul Branch, listed the most common methods of torture at Turkish police
and gendarmerie stations, as threatening with rape, disappearing under torture,
torturing the victim’s family, displaying a pregnant woman nude to her hus-
band, etc. There were also “common” methods such as beating, electric shocks,
and hitting the victim’s head with an iron bar.
In view of the large number of politically motivated arrests in Turkey, the
country’s detention and prison systems came under intense international
scrutiny and criticism. Turkey was accused of breaking of the rules of custody
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by, among other things, assaulting, beating, and even torturing prisoners and
detainees. Suspects could be held for up to fifteen or thirty days without arraign-
ment. They could be questioned without legal counsel present. The practise of
torturing detainees, both during police questioning and after, was fairly wide-
spread. According to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, between September 1980
and September 1995, 445 people had undergone torture and died in Turkish
detention centers. Human rights associations report that 80 percent of women
serving time in Turkish prisons were raped. There are 72,000 prisoners in
Turkey’s heavily dense prisons. As Time found, some prisoners share their beds
with others, and most prisons are dormitory-style in acute need of improve-
ment to make them suitable for the accommodation of human beings. Attempts
by the authorities and the inmates to change conditions often result in riots,
hunger strikes, death-fast, and bloodshed. The authorities reasoned they could
better maintain order and discipline by reducing numbers and the transfer of
convicts from large, dormitory-style facilities to new single or triple-bunk cells.
However, the prisoners expressed fear of being moved to smaller cells, even if in
new, more comfortable buildings. The relative isolation, they argued, would
leave them at the mercy of their jailers, who could more easily bully or torture
them. “There is safety in numbers,” the inmates said.84 In early 2002 there were
more than 100 people on hunger strike in a dozen Turkish prisons. Those on the
death-fast track took only liquid and vitamins but at a rate that permitted them
to waste away at a very slow rate.85
The State Department 1999 report on human rights, noted that though the
Turkish constitution allows for freedom of speech and the press, and though
there is no official censorship in Turkey, in practise both freedoms are severely
curtailed. Anyone deviating from the official government line, when discussing
the Kurds, the status of Islam in the country, the military’s role in politics, the
Armenian question, or Turkish–Greek-Cypriot relations, risked censure, if not
imprisonment.86 In 1996, Amnesty International and the New York based Com-
mittee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ) accused Turkey of harassing,
intimidating and imprisoning human rights activists, lawyers and journalists,
whose only crime was to voice ideas contrary to government policy. Between
1994 and 1996, Turkey had the dubious honor of being the country that had
arrested the most journalists, its rivals for the title being those well-known
paragons of liberalism: Ethiopia, communist China, Kuwait, Nigeria and
Myanamer (Burma).87 Nor have things improved much since. According to
PAN, the International Organization of Authors and Poets, after China, Turkey
boasted the largest number of imprisoned writers and journalists in the world.
It had incarcerated 132 writers for thought crimes; ordered the closer of 152
associations, newspapers and magazines all of which were guilty of criticizing
government policy, while Turkish officials had banned 331 subversive books and
newspapers.88 In July 1999, the Turkish Press Council published the names of
fifty-five journalists who, having written articles deemed harmful to the Turkish
state, were either in prison or facing criminal charges. The Voice of America
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revealed that over the past seven years twenty-five Turkish journalists had died
in highly questionable circumstances.89 To its immense credit, the Turkish press,
despite the risks involved, remained courageously defiant. Often, the Turkish
journalists sole, if meager, defense against government harassment was to report
on the government’s gross violations of the principle of free speech, usually at
the cost of their jobs if not their freedom.90 Nevertheless, giving no quarter, they
continued to criticize mercilessly both government and army policies. Nothing
and no one were exempt from the Turkish press’s ruthless scrutiny, which as
random perusal of both English and Turkish journals shows, was not inclined to
voice its disapproval delicately or be less forceful in its views.
The Kurds and the advocates of Kurdish nationalism came in for some par-
ticularly rough treatment. Until 2000, there were no legal publications in Kur-
dish in Turkey and anyone daring to voice an opinion sympathetic to Kurdish
nationalism risked being arrested automatically. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional’s 1996 report, the government consistently violated the rights of the
members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HADEP). Defiant,
Kurdish activists continued to publish material on their people’s plight and lack
of rights, distributing it through the Kurdish underground network. The gov-
ernment’s violation of Kurdish rights, particularly during its war against the
PKK, was strongly criticized abroad. Amnesty International, the New York
based CPJ, and the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki all highlighted Turkey’s
human rights offenses in the Kurdish southeast. However, to be fair, they
devoted equal space to PKK atrocities against civilians, men, women and chil-
dren, which, they admitted, were among the most viciously obscene violations
of human rights on record.91 The State Department’s 1999 report pinpointed the
Kurdish southeast as the area in most need of change in terms of Turkey’s
human rights situation. Things improved a little, after the end of the PKK war
in 1999, when the government allowed the publication of at least a few works in
Kurdish. However, sensitive as ever about the subject of Kurdish nationalism the
government periodically cracked down on individuals and publications too
openly sympathetic to the Kurdish cause.92
Islamic activists were also victimized by the state. Despite sanctioning and
even, to a degree, encouraging the growth of political Islam, the Turkish author-
ities, extremely sensitive to the threat political Islam posed to the country’s sec-
ular identity, took, when necessary, appropriate action – or as the State
Department would have it, inappropriate action – to frustrate it. The State
Department’s 1999 report noted and strongly criticized the ten-month prison
sentence imposed on Istanbul’s mayor, Recpe Tayyip Erdogan, found guilty of
calling for a religious insurrection in speech he gave in Siirt, in December 1997.
The speech included the following verse from a 1920s folk song: “the mosques
are our barracks, the believers are our soldiers, the minarets are our bayonets,
their domes are our helmets and the faithful our army,” which apparently was
enough to convict Erdogan of seditious activity.93 The report also censured the
Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision to dissolve the Welfare Party for its
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supposed infringements of the state’s secular constitution. It also condemned
the ban imposed on several of the party’s leaders, including Erbakan, barring
them from taking an active part in Turkish politics. Nor was that the end of it.
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Islamic Virtue Party for
ostensibly anti-secular activities. In January 2002, the Constitutional Court
ruled that Erdogan, already on the government’s hit list of subversive Islamic
activists, could not head any political party. The decision prevented him from
entering parliament and scotched his plans to form a new moderate Islamic
party, by the name of the Justice and Development Party. As earlier noted, the
Islamic parties were not the Constitutional Court’s only casualties. Since 1963,
the court had disbanded some twenty-two political parties for undermining the
constitution’s secular articles or violating the principles of democracy.
Turkey was severely criticized for being too lax and not disciplining way-
ward prison wardens and policemen. It failed to stop them from violating sus-
pects’ and prisoner’s rights and did not punish them appropriately when they
did. The few who were brought to trial, their crimes, such as beating a detainee
to death, being too shocking to ignore or impossible to cover up, were sen-
tenced, at the most, to seven and half years in prison. With time off for good
behavior, it meant that they would only spend two to three years in jail.94
The State Department’s 1999 report highlighted three areas that were in
urgent need of radical reform. The first focused on Turkey’s consistent failure to
observe the principle of free speech and expression, including the right of reli-
gious freedom. The second concerned the state’s odious treatment of human
rights activists, including non-governmental organizations, doctors, lawyers,
even parliamentarians who were subjected to constant censure, harassment and
imprisonment. The third related to the handling of political detainees. The
report expressly demanded that Turkey decriminalize free speech, release jour-
nalists and parliamentarians imprisoned for political reasons, put an end to the
practise of torturing suspects during interrogation and after, and indict officers
found guilty of doing so. Turkey should also allow the various non-governmen-
tal organizations, shut down for political reasons, to reopen. The report urged
the government to democratize the country’s political system even further and
permit more people holding different views to partake in the political process,
lift the state of emergency in the southeast, and resettle the refugees displaced by
its war against the PKK.95
The State Department’s censure of Turkey was nothing compared to the
American human rights lobby’s impassioned condemnation of Turkey’s human
rights policies. The latter not only condemned Turkey violations of human
rights, but demanded that Congress and the Administration take action to stop
this state of affairs. To this end, it joined forces with other anti-Turkey, non-
governmental organizations and lobbies, who had criticisms of Turkey. For
example, these bodies regularly accused Turkey of supporting the Azeri army,
obstructing Western aid to Armenia, violating the country’s Greek and Armen-
ian minorities’ religious freedoms, and supplying weapons to Chechen rebels.
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Forming a large pressure group, these organizations pressed Congress to enact
anti-Turkish legislation. The human rights lobby also pressed Congress to cut all
aid, specifically military aid, to Turkey. These requests, purposely phrased in
such a way as to show Turkey in the worst possible light (“Ankara was black-
mailing Washington, begging for more weapons by using its poor economic
records”), did not win it many friends in Congress.96 Still, in 1997 and 1998, to
the anti-Turkish lobby’s delight, Congress decided to cut subsidies on arms
exported to Turkey, on the grounds that these weapons could not be used
against non-combatants during Turkey’s war against the PKK.
By the end of 1990s, the threat to reduce military aid to Turkey in an effort
to persuade it to reform its human rights policies, or any other of its policies
for that matter, was no longer the potent weapon it had been. For one thing,
Turkish firms were producing more and more military modules themselves,
including a number used in American weapon systems. Less dependent on
American modules, Ankara was able to shrug off threats to stop sending it spare
parts if it did not improve its behavior. For another, Turkey, or so the human
rights lobby claimed, deliberately announced an amazing 150 billion dollar
arms procurement program, which, as Turkey intended, got the global and
American arms market “salivating”97 over the prospect of huge long-term
profits. Turkey, so argued the lobby, had in effect, enlisted the help of the all-
powerful world arms industry, which exerted heavy pressure on the American
Administration and Congress, as well as governments around the world, to
overlook its human rights violations. Whether or not this was Turkey’s aim in
announcing the program, the fact was that within a short time of the announce-
ment the United States lifted several bans on the sale of weapons to Turkey.
As noted by Kemal Kirisci, Ankara, convinced that Congress was endemi-
cally hostile to Turkey, expected the stronger Congressional role in foreign pol-
icymaking in recent years to work to Turkey’s disadvantage since its main
advocates were in the Defense and State Departments and National Security
Council. Congress’s actions during the 1990s certainly appeared to bear out its
forebodings, and the Secretary General of the Turkish General Staff, General
Erol Ozkasnak, expressed concern lest the “the speed of our [Turkish–Ameri-
can] relations will not be halted by some Congress members.” Turkey thought
that the Administration had failed it in this respect and had not done enough to
ensure a friendlier Congress. But, confident that the chances of its human rights
record having any practical effect on the Administration’s policy were extremely
remote, the State Department’s periodic censure did not particularly worry it
either. After all, in the State Department, as in the Defense Department and the
National Security Council, all of whom were Ankara’s “main advocates . . .
strategic interests regarding Turkey usually prevail.”98
The United States continued, throughout the 1990s, to sell arms to Turkey,
its human rights policies not withstanding. In the aftermath of the Gulf War the
Republican Bush Administration promised Turkey a vast amount of weapons.
The Democratic Clinton Administration not only made good its predecessor’s
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pledge but made a few of its own. In fact, in terms of overall value, 47 percent of
American arms shipments to Turkey, between 1984, the year the war against the
PKK began, and 2000, took place under President Clinton. Clearly, the Clinton
Administration despite its seemingly greater commitment to human rights
issues, apparently, saw no reason to change the United States’ policy on the sale
of arms to Turkey.99 This was, in part, because, like all American Administra-
tions, it was sensitive to Turkey’s singular internal and external circumstances.
Threatened from within by Islamic and separatist movements, and living in an
unstable and unpredictable region, surrounded by states who would like noth-
ing better than to weaken and destabilize it, Turkey, the Americans realized,
often felt that it had no choice but to defend itself, without necessarily paying
too much attention to liberal niceties. The United States understood and sym-
pathized with Turkey’s – as it saw it – ongoing fight for its existence, even if the
specific form it took did not always accord with Western or democratic values
or even Western policy. Hence Washington silence when Turkey’s Generals
effectively toppled Erbakan from power, contrary to the rules of Western
democracy. As for the Kurds, Washington, despite its basic endorsement of the
principle of Kurdish nationalism, branded the PKK a terrorist organization,
backed the idea of a Turkish security zone in northern Iraq, and approved, tac-
itly, of Turkey’s search-and-destroy missions against the PKK bases in the area.
It also sanctioned, and perhaps even took part in, the Turkish operation to cap-
ture Abdalluh Ocalan, an operation that skirted dangerously close to the edges
of international law.
But, perhaps, above all, it was the Administration’s appreciation of Turkey’s
value as an ally that ultimately persuaded it if not to ignore Turkey human rights
offences, then at least not to let them affect its working relationship with
Ankara. In a region riven by ethnic strife, that was politically unstable and eco-
nomically weak, as well as scarred by terrorism and generally hostile to the West,
Turkey, whatever its faults, was a virtual rock of stability. It had already demon-
strated its worth in the Gulf War, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and with new con-
flicts brewing in the Middle East, the Caspian and Caucasus, the United States
needed its Turkish ally more than ever. It certainly had no desire to antagonize
it unduly on issues relating to human rights violations. And when that proved
impossible owing to Congress’s intervention, it exploited the burgeoning
Israeli–Turkish relationship either to transfer aid to Turkey indirectly or con-
vince Congress, which was as a rule pro-Israeli, that by helping Turkey it was
also helping its ally Israel.100 In any case, as the Administration pointed out to
Turkey’s critics, compared to some of its neighbors – Iran, Iraq, Syria, and even
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among the West’s principal allies – Turkey, a constitu-
tional, secular country, which shared many of the West’s goals and values, and
whose political and social models were grounded in Western principals, was a
paragon of democratic virtue.
The Administration was also convinced that harping too much on Turkey’s
dubious human rights policies and using threats in order to blackmail Turkey
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into reforming itself was, ultimately, counterproductive. It believed that there
was a direct link between the EU decision, in 1997, to reject Turkey’s member-
ship application and the latter’s consistently poor human rights record. Turkey,
it argued, having been rebuffed by the EU, at Luxembourg, had little incentive
to improve its human rights performance. According to the United States,
instead of using the prospect of EU membership as a stick with which to beat
Turkey over the head, the Europeans should use it as a carrot in order to encour-
age Ankara to reform. It believed that the promise of admission would inspire
Turkey to overhaul its political, social, judicial systems, and bring them in line
with Western practises. After all, it had worked before with Spain, Portugal and
Greece, why not with Turkey? Yet, the Europeans, unconvinced, refused to
listen, and were resentful that Washington was trying to tell them whom they
should admit to their club. They turned a deaf ear to the American warning that
the Turkish government, Turkish liberals, intellectuals as well as the public,
believing that Turkey, the victim of European bias, was blatantly discriminated
against, would, increasingly frustrated, eventually turn their backs on the West
altogether. Still the United States did not give up and throughout the late 1990s
urged the EU to admit Turkey into its ranks, while criticizing the Europeans’
“shameless and short-sighted” policies and acknowledging that “they [the
Turks] had every right to feel betrayed.”101
Not that the Administration was blind to Turkey’s human rights transgres-
sions. It admitted that there were problems in this respect and periodically
impressed on Turkey that it expected it, as a democracy, to heed its appeals to
reform itself. By the end of the 1990s, Administration officials were happy to
announce that there was some “reason for optimism” in this respect as there had
been some definite and obvious “changes for the better” in Turkey’s human
rights performance. Amnesty International upheld the American assessment.
The 1999 Amnesty International report on Turkey noted that there had been,
since 1995, a significant drop in the number of Turkish prisoners who suffered
ill treatment or had undergone torture, as well as fewer disappearances and extra
judicial executions. This was partly due to the long overdue change in Turkey’s
habeas corpus laws. Since 1996, detainees had the right to legal counsel within
four days of their arrest, the right to have a lawyer present during interrogation,
and the right to have a lawyer accompany them throughout their detention
period. The gradual decline in the war against the PKK also had a positive impact
on Turkey’s human rights situation. In addition, the report acknowledged that
for the past few years “there has been much talk, apparently sincere,” in Turkey
of new laws, programs and regulations to improve human rights. But, at the
same time, the report warned that much more had to be done – including, and
above all, chastising and punishing officials guilty of human rights offences –
before Turkey could claim to have set right its human rights record.102
By the end of 1999 the United States, pleased with Turkey’s efforts to
reform, believed that henceforth things could only get better. Administration
officials pointed out that Ocalan’s capture bringing the war against the PKK to
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an effective end meant that “80 percent of the excuses of the Turkish govern-
ment” as regards “rights abuses disappeared.”103 The PKK’s unilateral declara-
tion of a cease-fire, in February 2000, gave hope for even further improvement,
as did the EU decision, in December 1999, at long last to accept Turkey’s mem-
bership application.104 Thus, 1999 was seen as a turning point in Turkey’s human
rights performance, which had long blighted American–Turkish relations. Yet,
in the final count, Turkey’s human rights practices never really endangered
Turkey’s close association with the United States; Washington simply had too
much at stake to risk losing Turkey’s friendship. The Administration was also
willing to allow Turkey a great deal of leeway, settling for less than absolute and
instant reform. Work in progress was quite enough to satisfy its liberal con-
scious, which was why in Ju1y 1999, the American Secretary of Defense, William
Cohen, declared at a press conference in Ankara that he saw nothing to prevent
the pending transfer of American arms to Turkey.
Close allies – common ground
The manner in which the United States dealt with Turkey’s human rights records
was, in many ways, representative of the nature of American–Turkish relations
as a whole. Despite its disapproval of Turkey’s human rights policies, Washing-
ton, for whom Turkey in the 1990s was as important an ally as it had been in the
days of the cold war, did not let its, often justified, reproofs stand in the way of
close cooperation with Ankara. In like manner, Turkey, though often exasper-
ated with United States’, to its mind, selfish and myopic policies, nevertheless
continued to collaborate closely with Washington. Situated in a dangerous
region and surrounded by potential foes, Ankara knew that it best hope for the
future lay in cleaving as closely as possible to the United States. Moreover, the
two countries had too much in common and too many joint interests at stake –
including the need to curb Russia’s overweening influence in Central Asia; to
stem Iranian fanaticism; to check Iraqi extremism; to end, or at least limit, the
possible repercussions of the many political crises and ethnic wars in Central
Asia and the Middle East; and to secure a regular energy supply – to allow petty,
and sometimes not so petty, disagreements to come between them. As a result,
both were careful not to let any differences of opinion overshadow their, hith-
erto, extremely fruitful association. They were ready, instead, to indulge in a
little give and take in order to ensure that at the beginning of the twenty-first
century their alliance remained as strong, as solid, and as effective as ever.
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It is only in a foreign Land that you can understand
that Greeks are your long lost brothers.1
There is nothing quite like a good quarrel with the United States or a crisis with
Turkey, The Economist once commented, to persuade the Greeks to support
their government;2 something the violent demonstrations during President
Clinton’s visit to Athens in November 1999 certainly confirmed. There is a
seeming unanimity in Greece over their country’s policies towards Washington
and Ankara. However, unlike their uneasy, volatile relations with the United
States, which tend to flare up at times of crisis, the Greeks are preoccupied with
Turkey to the point of obsession. Their age-old conflict with their neighbor to
the east absorbs them more than any other foreign policy issue. Considered a
priority, Greek newspapers devote more column space to Turkey and related
issues than to any of their European counterparts. Not so the Turkish press,
which ranks the Greek–Turkish conflict only sixteenth in order of importance.3
It is a telling difference, representative of other spheres where the two coun-
tries differ in terms of their perception and response to events. Take, for example,
the 1919–22 war. In Turkey, the war, which replaced the old Ottoman-Islamic
loyalties with a new national consciousness, is seen as a war of liberation and
patriotic resurgence.4 In Greece, it is regarded as the greatest tragedy of modern
times, a disaster, which wiped out 2000 years of Greek presence in Asia Minor.
Yet, it is incontestable that the war also inspired Greek unity. Previously, in the
absence of common shared experiences, such as a national effort or war, most
Greeks in Greece were not even aware that they were Greek citizens. The war and
the need to absorb the over 1 million Greek refugees, who had been forced to flee
Asia Minor, engendered a strong sense of Greek national unity and patriotism.
The 1919–22 war is only one of three traumatic events, which underlie and
feed Greece’s negative, often violent, feelings towards Turkey. The other two 
are the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, and the partition of Cyprus in 1974.
6
What the neighbor to the west says
Greek–Turkish relations
Together, these three calamities delivered a severe and apparently final blow to
the Megali Idea – the dream of a greater Greece embracing the “unredeemed”
Greek and Hellenic lands in the Balkans, Asia Minor, the Aegean and Mediter-
ranean seas – which had, over the years, provoked, an endless, often bloody
irredentist conflict. It also accounts for Greece’s tendency to challenge Turkey’s
integrity, embodied in the claim that as “As long as Constantinople is Istanbul,
you don’t belong to our kind.” Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine
Empire, has a special, symbolic place in Greek consciousness. Controversy over
the city can even bring a basketball game to an abrupt conclusion, as happened
in December 1996 when the match between Aris Thessaliniki and Besiktas
ended when the Turkish team spotted Aris supporters brandishing a sign
stating “Constantinople is the capital of Greece” and refused to return to court
after the first half.5
Not that Turkey, at least according to Greece, lacks regional ambition.
Greece is convinced that Turkey’s conquest of northern Cyprus is merely the
first stage of a Turkish plan to impose a Pax Turkana in the Aegean and revive
the Ottoman Empire.6 Greece worries that, unless Turkey is stopped in its tracks,
a process of regional Finlandization will soon take place with Greece’s defense
and foreign policies, as well as its freedom of movement in the Aegean, Mediter-
ranean and Ionian all being subject to Turkish consent and approval. Worse,
Greece suspects that Turkish dreams go way beyond that of becoming a regional
power and that Ankara seeks to wield power from the Adriatic to the China seas.
Turkey’s global ambitions apart, Greece has long quailed at the thought that
Turkey might seek to deflect its internal troubles by provoking a quarrel with
Greece.7 The Greek horror of a communist onslaught faded in the 1960s, only to
be replaced by growing fears of a potential Turkish threat, fed in part by Greece’s
acute consciousness of its relative military weakness. The 1974 defeat in Cyprus,
Athanassios Platias confessed, laid bare the fact that Greece had no deterrent or
offensive capabilities, other than those provided by the United States and NATO.
And, he pointed out, in Cyprus the latter conspicuously failed to come to
Greece’s assistance.8
Matters did not improve with the end of the cold war. Turkey, or so Greece
enviously believes, found its place in the new postwar system. The Soviet
Union’s disintegration and the Persian Gulf ’s inherent instability inflated its
regional importance. Worse, Turkey’s goals and self-imposed roles in these and
other areas, like the Balkans and Central Asia, have won the West’s approval. By
contrast, Athens bemoans, Greece, despite being a rock in a sea of Balkan insta-
bility, conspicuously failed to elicit Western support. President George Bush
senior certainly thought Greece of negligible worth. Not so Turkey, whom he
prized greatly, which was probably why on 20 July 1991, the seventeenth
anniversary of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus – defined as “intervention” by
Ankara – a sensitive date by all accounts, he tactlessly promised Turkey another
F-16 assembly line.9 Small wonder that Greece, forlorn and forsaken, has been
forced, or so it feels, to become “a lone wolf.”
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The end of the cold war, Athens felt, only magnified the Turkish threat. Pre-
viously, in order not to shift attention and resources away from its battle with
the Soviet Union, the West took great pains to prevent Turkey from attacking
Greece. This was no longer the case, and Greece could not depend on the West
to protect it against Turkish aggression. Furthermore, the vacuum in the
Balkans, following the collapse of communism, whetted Turkey’s appetite and
encouraged it to try and regain its former position in the region. Remember,
thundered George Papandreou, Greece’s Foreign Minister, that
Turkey has always justified its occupation of Cyprus by claiming that it was
protecting the island’s Muslim-Turkish population, and who is to say that this will
not serve as a precedent for future escapades in the Balkans? Undoubtedly, Turgut
Ozal’s talk of a new rising Ottoman Empire offer little comfort to Greek ears.
Neither, it is worth adding, does Ankara’s tendency to refer to the Albanian and
Bosnian Muslims as “brothers” and “sisters.”10 Greece often complains that it is
the only NATO country whose territorial integrity is threatened by a fellow
NATO member, with Turkey, or so Greece alleges, seeking to encircle it east and
west. Not content with having a huge state, which already dwarfs Greece in the
east, Turkey, Greece accuses, with Muslim connivance, schemes to do the same
in the west. A host of issues divide Greece and Turkey, many of which center on
questions of territorial and maritime sovereignty. Turkey, for example, has
threatened to go to war if Greece dare to expand its Aegean islands’ territorial
waters from 6 to 12 miles. In 1996, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller,
pronounced 3,000 islands and islets in the Aegean, Turkish territory, warning
that Ankara would consider any attempt by Athens to take these islands by force
a casus belli. In late January 1996, the two countries nearly came to blows over
the Imia/Kardak islets, a few miles off the Anatolian shore alongside the Dode-
canese islands. As this the first time Turkey had called into question Greek sov-
ereignty in Greek territory, it is hardly surprising that the incident rang alarm
bells in Athens.11 Equally worrying for Greece, is the fact that at an 80–100 per-
cent degree of readiness, the Turkish forces stationed opposite the Greek Aegean
islands are on higher alert than Turkey’s other forces, which maintain only a 50
percent state of military readiness. Other points of Greek–Turkish contention
include the fate of the Muslim Turkish minority in Greek Western Thrace, the
rights to mine the minerals of the Aegean continental shelf, and control of the
Aegean’s air space.
But the biggest single Greek–Turkish dispute is Cyprus. As far as Greece is
concerned the problem goes way beyond Turkey’s occupation of the island’s
northern sector. Turkeys’ greater military power means that it can dictate
Cyprus’s future. Neither is this Turkey’s only strategic advantage. Unlike Greece,
which lies at a distance of 600 miles from Cyprus, Turkey is a mere 60 miles away.
Turkey is also blessed with a much larger population than Greece – 65 million
compared with 10 million – and so has virtually unlimited human resources at
it disposal. Finally, Greece has to cope with the fact that its GNP is almost half
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that of Turkey’s, and, as Athanassios Platias rightly pointed out, “the smaller the
GNP, the fewer the resources devoted to the output of military goods, even if
the proportion of productive capacity so allocated is very high.”12
The roll call of Greece’s military disadvantages vis-à-vis Turkey is a long
one. They include, other than those already mentioned, lack of strategic depth,
lengthy and difficult to defend borders, the need to safeguard thousands of
islands and islets scattered throughout Aegean, and population centers well
within the range of Turkish artillery, all of which serves to tie up Greece
defenses. Also Greece has inadequate road and rail networks, has only a short
time to respond to a Turkish attack, especially in respect of the islands off the
Turkish mainland, and there are no early warning systems registering Turkish
incursions into Greek air space.13
The 1974 war in Cyprus encouraged Greece to rectify at least some of its
military shortcomings. It established offensive units independent of NATO and
expanded its navy and airforce, thus improving its ability to respond to Turkish
threats and incursions. But, with 7 per cent of the national budget now devoted
to defense needs, the burden on the Greek economy is heavy one. Indeed, with
4.8 percent of its GDP going to the army, Greece spends more on defense than
any other NATO member. Turkey by comparison allots 4.4 percent of its GDP
to defense. Five percent of Greece’s labour force is employed in the military
industry, again the highest percentage in NATO. And, Greece clearly means
business, declaring that it will go to war should Turkey attempt to mine the
Aegean’s continental shelf ’s minerals to a depth of 200 meters or attack the
Republic of Cyprus. Having stationing troops on the island which, acting as a
tripwire, will ensure that a Turkish assault triggers an immediate and legitimate
Greek response, demonstrates that Greece is all set to defend its rights.14
A war of words
The Greek–Turkish conflict has unleashed a flood of extraordinarily emotive
rhetoric on both sides of the Aegean. Greece has a tendency to describe the lands
it lost to Turkey in erotic terms, talking of the rape of Greece and the defilement
of virgin Greek territory. Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz have noted that
the Greeks, who see the Turks as a lust-filled nation, often liken the fall of Con-
stantinople to rape. They speak of the youthful and virile sultan, who tore a hole
in the city’s walls and seized the Byzantine capital. Over the centuries, the figure
of a fallen woman or grieving widow, often venerated in folk songs and poems,
came to symbolize the city, now known as Istanbul.
Emotions run high on either side of the Greek–Turkish divide. The irasci-
ble Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, had been heard to say that “we
will have nothing to do with Turkey. A man cannot discuss things with murder-
ers, rapists and thieves.”15 The celebrated Greek author, Nikos Kazantzakis,
swore that for the Greeks freedom means purging themselves of the corrupt
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Turkish traits acquired under Ottoman rule.16 The Greek Consul in Montreal
took umbrage at a series of lectures held in a local university entitled: “Turkey:
Two Millenniums of Art and History,” protesting that the Turkish nation “had
settled in the region much later” and that most of the discoveries cited were a
part of the Greek cultural heritage.17
Pangalos’s sacking in February 1999, following his part in the Ocalan fiasco –
more of which later – prompted the Turkish Daily News to reprint the minister’s
scurrilous remarks about Turkey, asserting that these
have ensured him a place in the history books. He has called the Turks “thieves, cut
throats and sexual deviates”. He has claimed that the fact that “every Turkish woman
wishing to enter the civil service must undergo a virginity test”, is proof that cultur-
ally Turkey is not European. Jacques Chirac’s championship of Turkey’s application
to EU membership, led to him being compared to “the star of a beauty contest seek-
ing to seduce the Turkish government”. Finally, accusing Washington of dragging its
feet over Cyprus, Pangalos, branded Bill Clinton “a gross liar” and called upon
Greek Americans to stop donating money to the presidential election campaign.
It is high time, the paper observed “that Pangalos pay the price of his choleric
behaviour and that the Greek government rid itself of a Foreign Minister
incapable of acting like a diplomat.” Diplomacy the Daily News, summed up
“even when dealing with an arch rival cannot embrace those who refuse to
accept its rules and, disseminating hatred, exhibit all the primitive emotions of
a bankrupt statesman.”18
Clearly, Turkey, no shrinking violet, could prove equally vicious when it
came to criticizing Greece. In May 1996, the Turkish Defense Minister, Oltan
Sougourlou, while insisting that “nobody in Turkey harbors any hatred or
animosity towards Greece,” let drop somewhat disingenuously that,
if anyone in Greece even dared to try to normalise relations with Turkey, he would
be immediately accused of betraying his nation. What can one do with this kind of
mentality. If we were to give them the whole of Turkey they would demand Central
Asia. In World War II we rendered them every possible assistance, yet once the war
was over, they exploited our naivete to secure various advantages in the Aegean.19
In December 1996, Tancu Ciller, Turkey’s Foreign Minister at the time, boasted
that Greece’s fear of “our military might . . . is a well justified!” During a visit to
Malaysia in August 1996, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan bemoaned
Turkey’s misfortune in “having Greece for a neighbor.” As for Pangalos’ insults,
the Turkish Foreign Ministry, dismissed them as “impertinent . . . expressive of
a psychopathological state of mind.”20
In such a loaded cultural and political atmosphere, awash with negative,
even abusive images, the chances that the two countries’ relationship would
improve appeared, at best, remote, at worst non-existent. Interviews with Greek
and Turkish politicians, journalists, diplomats and soldiers confirmed this, ren-
dering the prospect of a positive gesture, let alone compromise or concession,
on the part of either, unlikely. Greek officials harped on the fact that Turkey
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possesses the largest army in Europe and that Istanbul alone has more citizens
than Greece. Their Turkish counterparts pointed out that these were the very
two reasons why Europe and Greece did not attack and lop off Western Turkey.
“Turkey,” the Greek ambassador to Turkey, Dimitirs Nezeretis, observed, upon
leaving Ankara in February 1999, “is a big and tough country” and, he added,
“I see no prospect of an improvement in Turco-Greek relations in the near
future.”21 It would take something dramatic, even cataclysmic to provoke a
conspicuous change in Greek–Turkish relations.
As chance would have it, something sensational did happen and only hours
after the Nezeritis interview. Unfortunately, its immediate effect was to exacer-
bate Greek–Turkish relations even further. On 16 February 1999, Ankara
announced the capture of Abdullah Ocalan. It also made public Greece’s part in
the affair, the Greek embassy in Nairobi having given shelter to the PKK leader.
Nor was this all, as Ocalan’s arrest revealed the scale of the political military and
logistic help Athens extended the PKK. As a result, Greek–Turkish relations hit
an all time low. Some compared the Ocalan affair and its reverberations to those
of the 1919–22 Turkish–Greek war and the 1974 crisis in Cyprus. The Turkish
press called upon the government to react as vigorously as it had in the past to
this new instance of Greek aggression and provocation. It compared Greece’s
cooperation with the PKK to Syria’s overt collaboration with the Kurdish under-
ground organization. And, it urged the government to warn Athens that unless
it stopped supporting the PKK, it would become the target of a Turkish military
operation, an ultimatum that had already proved itself in Syria’s case.
In order to strengthen its suit, the Turkish media published a plethora of
material proving Greece’s close association with the PKK. It revealed that police
in Edrine, having interrogated Kurdish detainees, identified Lavrion, in the
southeast of Athens and an unnamed camp 45 miles north of Athens as PKK
indoctrination and recruitment centers. In 1993, the Greek government gave the
PKK permission to establish a branch of the Kurdish Red Crescent Society in
Athens, to provide medical help to Kurds wounded in the war with the Turkish
army. Greece also allowed the PKK to set up an office in Athens under the name
“The PKK Representation in Athens.” In 1994, the PKK’s political wing, the
National Liberation Front of Kurdishtan (ERNK), opened an office in Athens,
which was in effect a PKK financial as well as recruitment and training center.
The office also printed and distributed the Foni Tou Kurdistan – The Voice of
Kurdishtan – and other subversive PKK publications. (In March 1997, the Kur-
dish publishing house, KOMAL, which was declared illegal in Turkey, resumed
its activity in Athens). Finally, the PKK were able to collect a “revolutionary tax”
from Kurdish asylum seekers in Greece, as in, for example, a camp at Patras.22
Not that the Turkish government needed any encouragement. Furious,
Ankara demanded, no less, Pangalos’s extradition for his part in the Nairobi
affair. President Demirel, denouncing Greece as country that supports terror-
ism, and warned that Turkey may well launch a military strike against the PKK
bases in Greece. Visa exemptions for Greek tourists were abolished and NATO
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meetings between Turkish and Greek officers were held at junior levels only.
Even Turkish businessmen refused to do business with Greece, and cancelled
ongoing deals. Then, suddenly, within a few months everything changed. This
time literally thanks to a cataclysmic event.
In August and September 1999 massive earthquakes hit both western
Turkey and Athens. Greek and Turkish rescue missions instinctively rushed to
each other’s aid. People collected goods and donated money to help victims of
the quake in both countries. Turkish and Greek newspapers paraded headlines
such as “Brothers You Are Not Alone” and “Thank You Neighbor,” and, what is
more, in each other’s language.23 The changed atmosphere was as dramatic as it
was remarkable, indicative of the marked difference between the governments’
and the people’s attitude. While the former traditionally, almost automatically,
tended to adopt a tough and uncompromising stand, the latter proved, at least
in times of crisis, sympathetic and compassionate. But, the earthquakes also, as
will be seen, had an effect on the politicians, encouraging them to reconsider
other less dramatic developments and put them in perspective, to the benefit of
the two countries’ relationship. There is little doubt that the earthquakes and
their aftermath have engendered a positive climate in both Greece and Turkey,
which augurs well for the future.
The Aegean and continental shelf
In June 1995, Greece announced that, in accordance with the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, it intended to expand the territorial waters around the
Greek Aegean islands from 6 to 12 miles. Turkey, which observes the 12 mile
limit in the Mediterranean and Black seas, but maintains a 6 mile limit around
its Aegean islands, warned Greece against doing any such thing. If, Turkey
explained, all Greece’s more than 2,000 islands acquired a 12 mile limit the
Aegean would become a Greek lake. With 64 percent of the Aegean Greek and
only 24 percents left to the high seas, Turkish ships on their way to the Mediter-
ranean would be forced to sail through Greek waters.24 Consequently, Turkey
declared, if Greece went ahead with its plan, it would have no choice but to
declare war.
According to Athens this particular quarrel goes back to the 1970s and
Turkey’s unflagging efforts to gain control of the Aegean. It points to Turkey’s
refusal, since 1974, to respect the Greek Aegean islands’ air space and the Athen-
ian Flight Information Region (FIR). Turkey counters this by pointing out that
Greece has failed abysmally to fulfil its FIR responsibilities, noting sarcastically
that “though it manages 7 percent of all air traffic in Europe, Greece is respon-
sible for 30 per cent of all delays.”25 In August 1974, Ankara issued a Notice to
Airman (NOTAM), number 714, which moved the information line for aircraft
approaching Turkey several miles west of the previous Turkish Aegean FIR. As a
result, most of Greece’s Aegean islands suddenly found themselves east of the
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new FIR line and under Turkish jurisdiction. Athens reacted strongly, exclaim-
ing that the Aegean FIR was fixed by the International Civilian Aviation
Organization in 1952 and that Turkey had no right to shift it. Athens also com-
plained that Turkey had failed to observe the Greek islands’ air space set at 10
miles. Recognizing only a 6 mile limit, the Turkish air force regularly violated
the islands’ air space. Unfortunately, interception attempts by the Greek air
force have multiplied the danger of dogfights.
Turkish demands for a share in the Aegean continental shelf ’s mineral and oil
reserves also exasperated Greece. The Turkish claim, Athens argued, contravened
the Lausanne agreement of 1923, which awarded Greece the entire Aegean, other
than the Turkish coast. Moreover, Greece is in desperate need of the shelf ’s
mineral wealth, which contains its only oil field – in Prinos, southwest of the
island of Thassos – though it, too, is running dry. In the 1980s Greece produced 1
million tons of oil a year, but by the 1990s this dropped to a paltry 600,000 tons.
In order to prove its charges of Turkish territorial and financial cupidity,
Greece brandished an official Turkish textbook, published in 1997, which
declares that the Aegean islands are an extension of the Anatolian continental
shelf, thus insinuating that the islands have no continental shelf. Athens is
equally sensitive to Turkey’s insistence that the Aegean and its islands have
always belonged to Anatolia, implying that Greek control of the islands is, at
best, temporary. Then there is Tansu Ciller’s claim to 3,000 islets and rocks,
some of which are hundreds of miles from the Turkish coast, and most of which
have been under Greek sovereignty since 1913. Quoting Turkey’s own descrip-
tions of itself as a regional power with interests throughout the Ionian Sea,
Athens protested that it is subject to “Turkish territorial claims . . . ranging from
the Evros river in northern Greece to the Aegean islands as far as Crete.” More-
over, it accused, ever since 1995 Turkey has deliberately provoked crises in the
Aegean in order to challenge Greece and impose its will on the area. Greece wor-
ries that it will find soon itself, in a regional version of Finlandization, “having
to co-ordinate our defence and foreign policies with Ankara in an area ranging
from the Aegean to the Ionian.”26
Worse, Greece fears that Turkey will one day try to seize the islands by force.
The fact that Turkey’s Fourth Army – the Aegean Army – is stationed along
Greece’s borders serves only to augment Greek anxieties. Numbering 35,000
troops and equipped with landing craft, the Fourth Army is the second largest
force in NATO, though independent of NATO. No less alarming is the deploy-
ment of Turkey’s three other 650,000-strong armies. Turkey’s First Army, sta-
tioned in Thrace, is a formidable military force, which lies only a stone’s throw
away from potential Greek targets. Turkey’s Second Army, deployed in southeast
Anatolia opposite Syria, Iraq and Iran, spends most of its time fighting the PKK
and quelling insurgencies in the southeast. The Third Army is in charge of
Turkey’s eastern and Georgian frontiers.27
Greece, has to face this powerful military force with an army of less than
115,000 men. Its elite force – the Fourth Army Corps – is charged with defending
172 Turkey: facing a new millennium
the Greek–Turkish borders in Thrace and the Aegean. The First and Second Army
Corps – by far weaker – defend Greece’s northern frontier. The Second
Army Corps is, however, in the process of becoming a rapid deployment force.
The air force and navy maintain Greek air superiority and control of the Aegean.28
The arms race
While most countries are intent on slashing their military budgets, Greece and
Turkey are spending more money on arms than ever. Greece, currently imports
95 per cent of its military equipment, with only 5 per cent produced domesti-
cally, a dramatic fall from the 20 per cent figure of 1990. According to the Greek
newsletter COSMOS, Greece has a long way to go before it achieves the target of
a 50:50 imports and domestic production ratio set in the early 1990s.29 The
reason is simple, small countries like Greece find it extremely difficult to create
a modern, efficient arms industry. Their diminutive domestic market renders
the costs of production extraordinarily high. Nor is it, as Greece has discovered,
always easy to cut expenditure by importing technology or using substitutes. As
a result, in the few cases where Greek components were used, their added value
was frequently well below the 40 per cent mark.30
Between the end of the 1990s and 2007, Athens means to spend some 16
billion dollars on arms. It will acquire 35 percent of these weapons from the
United States, much less than the 80 percent it purchased in 1974. Greece’s
extensive shopping list includes, AWACS, early warning aircraft, fighter jets,
helicopters, transport planes, pilot training systems, upgraded F-4 phantoms
and tanks, anti-aircraft systems, submarines, capital warships, torpedoes,
corvettes, and missile boats. Greece also plans to improve its military capabili-
ties in such critical areas as command control, communications, computing,
intelligence and information warfare, the conduct of extended military opera-
tions, air and sea control, armour-based fire-power support, air defenses, and
troop endurance and survival ability, all of which cost money too. Finally,
according to Andre Gerolymatos, Greece is in the process of replacing the divi-
sion, as the organizational unit of command, with brigades and battalions,
which will enhance the army, navy and air force’s ability to function as a single
integrated force. It will also improve mobility, essential if Greece is to cope with
the multiple Turkish threat.31
Turkey military spending program calls for 150 billion dollars to be expended
in the first quarter of the twenty-first century alone. Ankara justifies this mind-
boggling sum by pointing to, among other things, Greece’s huge defense bill,
noting that proportionally it is the highest in NATO. Turkey’s land forces will
receive 60 billion dollars, with which they will buy 48,564 wheeled vehicles, 750
helicopters, 3,627 main battle tanks, 1,951 guns and howitzers, 180 rocket and
missile systems, 150 anti-tank rockets, and 12 remote control air vehicles. The
navy will get 25 billion with which to purchase 38 helicopters, 35 landing vehicles,
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25 auxiliary class ships and vehicles, 16 patrol ships, 15 guided assault boats,
14 frigates, 12 corvettes, 9 submarines, 4 anti-mine ships, 4 mine sweepers, and
1 communications ship. The air force, allotted the sum of 65 billion dollars,
will acquire 640 fighter jets, 442 air defense weapons systems, 160 training aircraft,
79 operations planes, 68 transportation planes, and 25 helicopters.32
The vast amounts Greece and Turkey plan to spend on arms mean that they
are in effect mortgaging their future. There is little doubt that the citizens of
both countries would much prefer it if these gargantuan sums were used to
finance various essential civilian projects. Certainly in Turkey there have been
calls – which have grown louder since Ocalan’s capture and the effective end of
the war against the PKK – to devote more money to the country’s twenty-six
eastern and southeastern war-torn provinces. Local businessmen have already
taken steps to relieve the region’s economic plight. Firms, owed money by Iraq,
money they have little chance of seeing, banded together to set up a company
that will import oil – to the tune of 7 million tons – from Iraq in lieu of the Iraqi
debt. This, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, waxed enthusiastically, will help kick
start the local economy because on average, as he calculated, over the next two
and half years, 500 fuel tankers will arrive daily in Turkey and 15,000 vehicles
will be put to work. “Given that each vehicle employs 20 people this means
300,000 jobs,” he declared. Moreover, Ecevit hoped that Turkey would gain
transportation revenues, companies would increase their profits and the state’s
tax revenue would grow. Iraq would also benefit and would purchase with its oil
revenues local merchandise, thus stimulating business in Turkey’s southeast.33
The government in Ankara, sensitive to public opinion, also did its bit to help.
Ecevit promised 100 million dollars in aid. Factories in the region were offered
long-term low-interest loans, tax exemptions, and generous reductions in the
price of electricity. The government announced that it would award displaced
Kurdish villagers grants to encourage them to return home, and, Ecevit proudly
proclaimed, 1,000 families had already taken advantage of this offer. Finally, the
government promised to triple its investment in the east and southeast.
Yet, impressive as this is, it is far from enough. The number of displaced
persons in the region is thought to be 4 million. Unemployment has reached the
3 million mark. Farmers, whose numbers have been reduced by 75 percent,
have been particularly hard hit. Fifty-three schools, accommodating 20,000
children, were planned for 1999, with another 72,000 children to be provided
for the following year. On the industrial front, there are plans for eleven official
industrial zones expected to create 32,000 new jobs. Also in the pipeline are
eleven power-producing and transmission facilities plus four portable power
plants, each capable of generating 75 megawatts of electricity. The sums needed
for these and other similar projects are estimated at 1.8 billion dollars per
annum.34 It must be said that this massive figure is dwarfed by the vast amount,
80 billion dollars according to official Turkish sources, Turkey has spent battling
with the PKK. Some, however, claim this to be a laughably conservative
estimate and that the real outlay was 7–15 billion dollars a year, which over the
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fifteen years of the PKK insurrection (1984–99), adds up to the incredible sum
of 225 billion dollars.35
Offsetting these urgent domestic needs is the reluctance of various inter-
ested parties in Turkey, particularly within the military industrial field, to cut
their budgets and surrender the rich pickings afforded by continued military
spending. Money is also needed to pay for the damage wrought by the 1999
earthquake. The earthquake had a disastrous effect on Turkey’s economy, 35
percent of the country incurring some form of damage. Turkey’s industrial and
commercial sectors were particularly hard hit, suffering losses of 42.5 percent
and 34.6 percent, respectively. Given the urgent need to revive Turkey’s econ-
omy, it is unlikely that the southeast will receive the money it needs. Yet, even
the desperate need to allocate money to reconstruct Turkey’s quake-stricken
areas has failed to persuade the military to reduce its budget: most of the weapon
procurement plans have survived the earthquake largely intact. The 2000 mili-
tary budget was set 7.6 billion dollars or 8.8 percent of the annual budget, a
negligible change from 1999. Aware that since the winter of 2001 Turkey has
been facing a severe economic crisis, the military has agreed to postpone, at least
temporarily, its 19.5 billion dollar modernization program. It is worth noting
that the army believes that the 150 billion dollars earmarked for buying
weapons, falls far short of Turkey’s real needs. Surely, this figure will, despite
promises to spread the arms purchases over several years, hamper efforts to curb
Turkish inflation. And, this, together with all the other urgent economic exi-
gencies it faces, should give the government pause for thought; it might be that
the Turkish–Greek thaw might after all result in the transfer of monies from
military to civil needs.36
In Greece, too, the government has, following the thaw in Greek–Turkish
relations, faced pressure to cut military expenditure and divert the money thus
saved into vital domestic programs. At the time, the Greek government was well
aware that Greece was the only EU country that had failed, owing to its poor
economic performance, to join the European Monetary Union (EMU), and was
anxious to improve its economic management and meet EMU standards.
Greece was to become an associated member of the EMU in March 2000; full
membership was to follow in 2001. Eventually, Athens did join the EMU. But
before accession, few conditions had first to be fulfilled, among them that the
drachma’s exchange rate was to remain stable for at least two years. Indeed,
Greece did achieve an impressive number of fiscal and economic achievements
– inflation has fallen from 15 percent in 1993 to under 4 percent in 1999; the
country’s fiscal deficit in the late 1990s, was slightly above 8.8 percent, a marked
improvement on 1993’s 13.7 percent (but still far from the EU 3.7 percent); the
1996 growth rate showed a 2.6 percent upward trend, well above that of the EU;
in 1998, there was a 10 percent increase in public and private investment as
opposed to 4.5 percent for the EU. Still, Greece had some way to go before it
conformed to EMU norms. It had to reduce inflation to around 2.5 percent;
improve its debt:GNP ratio, which though it had fallen from 105.5 percent in
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1996 to 100.7 percent at the end of 1998, was still among the highest in the EU;
reduce the textile and agriculture sectors’ share in the country’s GNP, which at
21 percent was much larger than that of other EMU members (agriculture
accounts for 2.4 per cent of the EU’s entire GNP); and curtail cotton production
in line with EU policy (fast replacing other crops, cotton has become a growth
industry of vital importance to the Greek economy). Greece had also to cut the
prime interest rate from 10.75 per cent to 3 per cent as in other EMU countries.37
As noted, in 2001 the country did become a party to the EMU, and complied
with its standards; presumably, the Greek–Turkish thaw enabled the transfer of
monies from military to civil ends.
In view of the above it is tempting to think that these urgent economic
demands may ultimately persuade Greece and Turkey to divert money from the
military to much needed domestic projects. This, in turn, may help alleviate
Greek–Turkish tensions. In any case, awareness of the need to cut their military
budgets may well have prompted both sides to start negotiating with one another.
The United States
Athens’ criticisms of the United States boil down to two closely related com-
plaints: the Americans’ total disregard of the historic basis of many of Athens’
claims and their unwavering pro-Turkish stance. Athens is convinced that
the Republican Party traditionally and instinctively favors Turkey over Greece.
Certainly the Bush senior administration has proved itself a particular Greek
bugbear, while Greece has no doubt that Bush junior will follow in the footsteps
of his father.
Greece claims that as a young nation, the United States has absolutely no
sense of history. As far as the Americans are concerned the past began in 1945,
which is one reason, why they find it so difficult to understand Greece’s quarrel
with FYROM over the right to the name Macedonia – Greece insists upon call-
ing the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), underlining its sole
historic claim to the name Macedonia.38 Moreover, having burst onto the inter-
national stage in 1945 and at the outset of the cold war, the United States found
Turkey to be a much more valuable ally than Greece, particularly in its battle
against the Soviet Union and communism. This bias continued well into the late
1980s and 1990s. In order to secure Turkish cooperation during the Gulf war,
Washington put the Cyprus dispute on hold. Ignoring Greece’s insistence on the
strong parallels between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Turkey’s acting likewise
in Cyprus, President Bush announced that Cyprus would not be included in the
American search for peace in the Middle East. The dispute in Cyprus would be
turned over to the UN instead, which effectively meant deferring the solution to
the crisis perhaps indefinitely. The United States justified its decision to aban-
don Cyprus, which was particularly jarring in light of its relentless efforts to
resolve the Arab–Israel and Balkan conflicts, by pointing out that while the
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Arabs and Israelis had exhibited a willingness to negotiate, such was not the case
with Greece and Turkey.
The question of American military aid to Greece and Turkey has also led to
Greek protests of unequal treatment and pro-Turk bias. In 1980, Greece finally
persuaded Congress to pass a series of laws, guaranteeing Greece 7 dollars worth
of military equipment for every 10 dollars of equipment Turkey obtained. But,
Athens suspected that the White House, unhappy with this development, was
simply waiting for the opportunity to revoke this ratio. In 1991 its forebodings
were realized when, following the Gulf War, Washington effectively quashed the
7:10 ratio. It awarded Turkey a sizeable grant, while Greece had to be satisfied
with a considerably smaller loan. It also sold Turkey far more sophisticated
weapons than anything Greece possessed. True, the 7:10 ratio was reinstated
in July 1991, but it has since, owing to Greece’s and Turkey’s massive arms
procurement programs, largely fallen by the wayside.39
To Greece’s dismay the Democratic Clinton Administration proved no
better than its Republican predecessor, keeping up a steady flow of arms to
Turkey to the tune of 800 million dollars per year, or 4.6 billion dollars in its first
six years in office. In 1997, the path was cleared for Boeing and Bell Textron to
bid for a 4 billion dollar contract to sell Ankara 145 advanced attack heli-
copters.40 By the end of the 1990s, Turkey had become one of the United States’
major arms buyers, second only to such favored clients as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan,
Israel and Egypt.
Given the above, Athens concluded that the United States has always, and
possibly will always, side with Turkey against Greece. Ocalan’s capture clinched
matters. “Nobody,” railed Pangalos, Athens’ soon to be dismissed Foreign
Minister, “Believes that the Kenyans handed Ocalan over to the Turks. There
were” he said, hinting that the United States had taken an active part in Ocalan’s
capture, “some very big, blond men involved in the affair.” Other less vicious
minds agree that the United States, which had long regarded Greece as a trial
and a nuisance, sent agents to help Turkey seize Ocalan, but only because it
wanted to prevent Turkish retaliatory action against Greece. This made little dif-
ference to Pangalos who, unrepentant, continued to upbraid the United States:
“some people in the United States want its friends to constantly say ‘yes’. Well
though a friend of the American people, I refuse to be anyone’s slave.”41
The assistance rendered Turkey by the Jewish and Israeli lobbies in the
United States has also made life hard for Greece, which in any case finds it diffi-
cult to promote its cause in Washington. Not that life in Washington is easy for
Turkey either. Ironically, Nuzret Kandemir, Turkey’s Ambassador to the United
States, has claimed that the toughest part of his nine-year stint in Washington
was his battle against the Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Kurdish and Armenian lobbies.
Working in Washington, Kandemir sighed, “is like taking an exam.”42
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Cyprus
Cyprus is the principal source of Greek–Turkish enmity. The two countries’
hold utterly conflicting views of the island’s past, present and future, and
particularly of the 1974 crisis. Greece believes that Turkish nationalism – a rel-
atively new phenomenon dating from 1923 – feeds upon expansionist
démarches, like that of Cyprus in 1974. It is convinced that Turkey regards
Cyprus as a bridgehead for further territorial expansion. Consequently, Greece
reasons, it has no choice but to fortify Cyprus’s remaining Greek portions.
Turkey, for its part, insists that its intervention in 1974 was a rescue mission,
born of its commitment to the welfare of fellow Muslims and nationals, whom
the Orthodox world seeks to eradicate.
Greece dismisses Turkey’s account of its actions, pointing out that, having
conquered the island’s northern portion, it then set about altering its demo-
graphic make-up by settling Anatolian Turks in the area under its control, and,
Greece protests, on land belonging to the some 250,000 Cypriot Greeks, who
had been forced to abandon their homes in 1974. (There are currently less than
500 Greek Cypriots left in Turkish Cyprus.) This settlement policy, Greece
claims, is particularly insidious, as the Cypriot Turks have long maintained a
separate identity and culture from their mainland cousins. They may share a
language and religion, but, even here, there are subtle differences between the
two. According to Greek sources at 114,000 the mainland settlers greatly out-
number the Cypriot Turks, who total a mere 88,000.43 This glaring imbalance
owes much to the fact that since 1974 a large number of the island’s Turkish
inhabitants have left for Britain and Malta, while over 80,000 mainland Turks
have immigrated to northern Cyprus. It is a case, Greece complains, of “a Turk
leaves and a Turk comes.” The result is that while in 1960, Cyprus’s Turkish pop-
ulation numbered 160,000, by 1998, that number rose, according to the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), to 198,000. The Turkish Cypriot daily
newspaper, Avrupa, further disclosed that 70 percent of the TRNC’s bank
employees, 75 percent of its restaurant owners and 90 percent of its jewelry-
shop owners are Turkish settlers.44 These figures, Athens remarks snidely, entitle
the TRNC “to inclusion in the Guinness Book of Records,” as despite the whole-
sale emigration of the Cypriot Turks the island’s Turkish population just keeps
on growing and growing.45
Greece also accuses Turkey – an accusation Turkey vehemently denies – of
sending the “Grey Wolf,” a hard-line nationalist paramilitary youth organiza-
tion (Bozkurt) to Cyprus. These thugs, Greece charges, took part in the summer
of 1996 in a number of violent incidents along the border separating Greek from
Turkish Cyprus. According to George Papandreou, the Grey Wolves were also
implicated in the forest fires that raged throughout December 1996 on several
Greek islands including Cyprus.46
Turkey has a 35,000-strong expeditionary force on Cyprus. The Eleventh
Army Corps, part of Turkey’s Second Army based in Malatya, Turkey, is a
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formidable military force. Commanded by a Lieutenant General, it consists of
two infantry divisions, the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-ninth, plus an indepen-
dent armored brigade, the Fourteenth, which has at its disposal over 100 first-
class tanks, approximately 100 personnel carriers cum fighting vehicles, and
self-propelled artillery. Then there is the indigenous Turkish Cypriot force num-
bering some 5,000 men, who serve as light infantry.47 According to Greece, the
Turkish expeditionary force has its own agenda, often quite different and as a
rule more hard line than Ankara’s. Enjoying a great deal of leeway, the Eleventh
Army Corps, Greece inveighs, behave in much the same way as the Japanese did
in Manchuko during the 1930s.48
The island’s Greek sector is also awash with soldiers – the Republic of
Cyprus vies with Israel and Lebanon for the title of the world’s most heavily
armed region – charged with defending it against further Turkish incursions.
However, given that the Greek portion of Cyprus is only a few minutes’ flight
away from Turkey, but 600 miles away from Greece, this is no simple task. The
logistical problems are immense and in an attempt to overcome them, Greece
decided, among other things, to station Soviet-made anti-aircraft missiles –
worth some 500 million dollars – on the island and thus safeguard the aerial cor-
ridor between Greece and Cyprus. But, Ankara, drawing attention to the fact
that with a range of 150 miles these missiles could easily penetrate Turkish air
space, insisted that the missiles were offensive rather than defensive weapons
and threatened to go to war should Greece proceed as planned. To prove their
point, Turkish sources quoted Theodore Pangalos’s boast that “the Greek
Cypriots ordered only 38 missiles, which, if used, will eventually destroy only
38 Turkish aircraft.”49
Turkey’s fierce reaction, and the prospect of a new Greek–Turkish
imbroglio, persuaded Athens and the Republic of Cyprus to reconsider the
matter. Eventually, after much acrimonious discussion, they decided to station
the missiles in Crete, 500 kilometers from the TRNC – which is thus well within
the missiles’ radar range – but 150 kilometers from the Turkish nearest coast.
The missiles, owned by the Republic and manned by Greek Cypriots trained in
Russia, would be under mainland Greek command. Turkey, however, was far
from satisfied. Condemning the decision as “inadmissible,” it warned Greece
that it was making “a huge mistake.”
According to Athens, it decided to redeploy the missiles, mainly because the
“conflict in Cyprus and particularly its militarization, consistent with Ankara’s
thinking, works to Turkey’s advantage.” Hence, Greece must focus upon politi-
cizing the problem. It is why, for example, the government explained, the
Republic’s accession to the EU is a priority. Unfortunately, this meant, the gov-
ernment then pointed out, that it had to abandon the plan to station the S-300
missiles on Cyprus. Neither the EU not NATO would welcome into their ranks
a country embroiled in military conflict, that has weapons systems which may
provoke a Turkish attack, and that employs Russian technicians to maintain
them. One need only listen to NATO’s – whose code name for the missiles is
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Grumble – mutterings that had the missiles been stationed in Cyprus their radar
systems, manned by Russians, would have been able to monitor NATO aircraft
flying over the Balkans.
These explanations failed to convince, let alone appease the Greek govern-
ment’s right-wing and opposition critics. Branding it as “the greatest humiliation
Hellenism has suffered,” they saw the decision to redeploy the missiles as proof of
Greece’s military weakness – some said helplessness – vis-à-vis Turkey. Greek
right-wingers were similarly vociferous when Turkey grabbed Ocalan outside the
Greek embassy in Nairobi, denouncing the government as “a government
of Quislings” and hinting at high-level collaboration. The whole point of the
missiles, opposition circles exclaimed, was to convince Turkey of the effectiveness
of the Greek-Cypriot Unified Defence Doctrines (UDD). By removing them, and
surrendering Greece’s long-range capability, the government had achieved
precisely the opposite, proving to the Turks that the UDD is utterly worthless.
Moreover, the S-300 deployment, intended to add “a sharp edge to the UDD’s
strategic bargaining power, backfired badly,” because, yet again, “Athens and
Nicosia were oblivious to Turkey’s well known and violent objection to any
form of military bluffing.”50 Yet, whatever the government’s critics might think,
it is clear that the S-300 scheme failed to deter Turkey, who went ahead anyway
and threatened Cyprus. Neither was Ankara highly impressed by the growing
military ties between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. But these very contacts,
like Athens’s growing military investments in the island, specifically sought
to deter Turkey.51
Paradoxically, the S-300 affair signalled the onset of a more positive era in
Greek–Turkish relations. It drove home to Greece the fact of Turkey’s superior
military strength. At the same time, the Greek decision to redeploy the missiles,
thus rendering the UDD less of a threat, removed one of the many barriers to a
rapprochement between the two countries. Furthermore, by forcing the two
countries to talk rather than confront each other, it helped ease Greek–Turkish
tensions in general. Finally, in Ankara, officials, well aware that Athens had
yielded to Turkish might, felt sufficiently confident to consider the possibilities
of a détente. When within a few months Greece once again bent to Turkish
pressure, this time over Ocalan, both sides were ready to embark upon the
earthquake-inspired diplomacy of August–September 1999.
Cyprus and the European Union
Highlighting Ankara’s threats to annex the TRNC if the Republic of Cyprus is
admitted to the EU, Greece accuses Turkey of blackmail. Greece claims that
Turkey will consider letting the Republic enter the EU only if it is allowed to join
the organization first. Turkey vehemently denies this and insists that its opposi-
tion is based purely upon the 1960 Cypriot constitution, which states clearly that
Cyprus cannot subscribe to any organization, including the EU, that does not
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include Greece and Turkey; an argument that raises the suspicion that Greece
is right and Turkey is angling for EU membership. Greece, which ardently sup-
ports the Republic’s application for EU membership, retorts that the current
state of affairs in the island has rendered at least this part of the constitution
irrelevant. The constitution, it explains was designed to prevent Enosis – the
unification of Greece and Cyprus – not block the island’s membership of inter-
national bodies. Besides, asks Greece, how come a state, that is to say Turkey,
“that has broken a treaty can invoke that treaty for the purposes that suit her.
Partition [of Cyprus since 1974] . . . is one breach. Recognition of the state that
is consequent of partition [the TRNC] is a second breach.”52 As if blackmail were
not enough, Greece also credits Turkey with deliberately and artificially exacer-
bating the situation in Cyprus in the hope that the EU will balk at admitting to
its ranks a country engaged in an fierce ethnic dispute.
The Austrian precedent is not a more convincing case as far as Ankara is
concerned. The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 prohibited union between Austria
and Germany, in the same way as the 1960 treaties in regards to Cyprus specifi-
cally negated Enosis between Greece and Cyprus. Yet, in 1995 Austria was allowed
entry into the EU, thus establishing an indirect union between Vienna and Berlin.
Why should not Cyprus be allowed to do the same, asks the Hellenic world? The
Turkish reply is clear: in the 1960 Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee, each community
has a veto over membership of international organizations unless Greece and
Turkey are parties to it, which is not the case with the EU where only Greece is a
member. In the Austrian case all the parties to the Austrian State Treaty agreed to
Austria joining the EU, even Russia, which in 1955 insisted on avoiding repetition
of the Anschluss. “If states all agree to interpret their treaty in a particular way, or
to waive a breach of the treaty that is fine. But this is not the case here because one
of the parties to the [Cypriot] treaty, Turkey, does not agree.”53
Whatever the truth behind the Greek accusations, it is worth noting that
one of the reasons Turkey objects to “Greek Cyprus” admission – the Turkish
riposte to Athens and Nicosia’s “the so-called TRNC” or, more generally, “the
pseudo state;” Greece also tends to girdle its references to TRNC officials with
inverted commas, for example, “the Prime Minister of the pseudo state” – is that
the EU would then have two anti-Turkish Greek states. Worse, the Republic’s
admission but not the TRNC’s will, Turkey fears, fix once and for all, at least in
Europe’s eyes, the border between the Hellenic and Turkic worlds. Warning that
the accession of a divided Cyprus will cause an irreparable breach between
Turkey and Europe, Ankara insists that the EU will not discuss Cyprus’s admis-
sion until certain conditions are met. It further demands that the EU treat the
Republic and TRNC equally, as two independent states.54
Not that Ankara is overjoyed at the prospect of the TRNC joining the EU.
Indeed, the possibility that the TRNC will become a member of the EU as part
of a process at the end of which the entire island will join the EU, has provoked
a great deal of acrimony, this time between Turkey and the TRNC. Ankara
insists that the Cypriot Turks join the EU only after Turkey, to which the TRNC
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has retorted that Ankara cannot keep on treating it like a baby, that the two
countries are equals, and that it should be treated as such. This truculent
response is somewhat surprising, given that, except for Turkey, the TRNC is
boycotted by the rest of the world, and its economy is totally dependent on
Turkey’s. The TRNC’s annual inflation is 58 percent and it has 4,000 dollars
GDP per person; the Greek Cypriot Republic boasts a 4.8 percent inflation and
14,000 dollars GDP per person.55 In any case the prospect of the TRNC joining
the EU as part of a package deal is at present non-existent, which makes the 
passions the issue arouses all the more extraordinary.
Cyprus’s future
Greece’s solution to the Cyprus imbroglio – a bizonal, bicommunal state with
both the Greek majority and Turkish minority enjoying equal political rights –
is far removed from Turkey’s vision of the island’s future. Greece, for one, is con-
vinced that Turkey, seeking to consolidate it control over the TRNC, has
absolutely no interest in reuniting Cyprus. Nor is it in any hurry to resolve the
conflict, given that with every passing day its links with the TRNC grow stronger
and more extensive, while the prospect of unification retreats into the distance.
Certainly, Ankara, despite some 1,000 ethnically based incidents per year, hails
Cyprus as a shining example of a conflict in which partition produced stability,
though not admittedly tranquillity. But, counters Greece, it is a false stability,
totally dependent on the UN troops’ success in separating the two communities.
Turkey’s policy on Cyprus hinges, Greece believes, on two external, extra-
neous considerations. The first, pan-Turkism, predisposes Ankara to shun any
compromise for fear of prejudicing its ties with Muslim or ethnic Turk elements
in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. The second, and more important
issue, already mentioned, is the EU, and Turkey’s insistence on holding the
island hostage to its ambition to join the EU. Turkey will only, Greece contends,
abandon its uncompromising stand on the dispute if admitted to the EU.
Just as Greece accuses Turkey of neo-Ottomanism and dreams of a new
Ottoman Empire, Ankara reproaches Greece with wanting to revive the Byzan-
tine Empire. Athens’s prospective empire, Turkey avers, will embrace the entire
Aegean, and its capital will be Istanbul – the much coveted and sorely missed
Constantinople. In line with its ambitions Greece, or so Turkey claims, is intent
upon dispossessing the Cypriot (and Thracian) Turks. As evidence, it points to
Greece’s tendency to refer to the island’s Turks as “Muslimized Greeks,” which
certainly smacks of colonial inclinations.56 Turkey and the TRNC fear that once
Cyprus is unified the island’s Greek majority, adopting the policies of their main-
land compatriots, will seek to suppress the identity of the Cypriot Turk minority.
Turkey finds the Greek goal of Enosis equally unacceptable, and sees no
reason to assume that Greece has abandoned that, to its mind, iniquitous idea,
which has led to the mass murder of hundreds of Cypriot Turks. In fact, Ankara
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claims, once Cyprus is unified and the proponents of Enosis prevail, there is
every chance of history repeating itself. Nor has Turkey much faith in EU
ability to safeguard the island’s Turks, given its poor record in preventing
the slaughter of Muslims. Who is to say, Ankara contends, that what happened
in Bosnia, where Orthodox Serbs massacred innocent Muslims under the
impassive eyes of EU troops, will not take place in a unified Cyprus, whether
it joins the EU or not. Only this time it will be a case of Orthodox Greeks
killing Muslim Turks.
The Cypriot Turks insist that in 1974, they, with Turkey’s assistance, acted
wholly in self-defense. They point out that there is not a single Turkish family
on the island who has not lost at least one of its members to Greek violence. But,
declared Rauf Denktas, the TRNC’s president, when interviewed by an Israeli
journalist, “we will survive just as you survived the Holocaust,” leaving the jour-
nalist with the distinct impression “that Hitler and Greece retain an over-
whelming presence in the TRNC.”57 Not that the Cypriot Turks are the only ones
to have suffered. The Republic of Cyprus’s museums are full of horrifying pic-
tures of savagely beheaded Greek-Cypriot children. It would thus appear that
the principal barriers to a settlement in Cyprus are fear and mistrust. At present,
the Cypriot Turks swear that only mainland Turkey can guarantee their safety.
The Greek Cypriots deny this, and demand the withdrawal of the 35,000-strong
Turkish force as well as the return of some territory currently in the hands of the
TRNC.58 The Cypriot Turks reject this demand, emphasizing that unlike Turkey,
Greece has no legitimate claim to Cyprus. After all, they observe, the island was
under Ottoman not Greek sovereignty for 300 years, adding that Turkey would
find it insupportable to lose a second territory in the island, in addition to the
southern part already lost to the Greeks.59
Cyprus is a typical post-cold war conflict, a mixture of ethnic and religious
questions which, together with historical undercurrents and external interven-
tion, combine to create a complex and unwieldy problem. The fact that
partition apparently works, and calm prevails, renders a satisfactory solution to
the affair all the more difficult. However, if Turkey does eventually soften and
agree to a compromise settlement, it will probably come in the form of a con-
federal Cyprus, perhaps a loose federation whose Turkish part will receive max-
imum autonomy, practically verging on sovereignty, and whose security will be
guaranteed by the physical presence of Turkish troops. Not a minority, not a
community while the other side enjoys the status of a state, not a weakened
party to a federation, but a separate, equal and legitimate entity within a con-
federation – this is the mantra of the Turkish side to the conflict.60 As Ismail
Cem, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, explained: “We want Cyprus to continue as a
political entity, even if it is called the Confederation of the United States of
Cyprus. But, the Turks must never be deprived of their right to govern them-
selves.”61 In return Turkey will expect to be admitted to the EU. The Cypriot
Turks recent admission that they are willing to drop their demand to be recog-
nized as an independent entity, if, in return, the international community
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acknowledges that the Republic neither speaks for nor represents them, did not
signal a deviation from this basic Turkish stance.
According to Ersin Kalaycioglu, any settlement in Cyprus must meet several
basic conditions. First, Greece and Turkey must abandon their claims to Enosis
and Taksim (partition) respectively. Second, the Turkish minority must be
granted equal political and sovereign rights. Third, there must be some kind of
mechanism, which guarantees the Turkish minority’s safety. Fourth, the
TRNC’s share of the island must shrink from the current 37 per cent to a size
commensurate with its population. Fifth, several areas must be reserved for the
re-settlement of refugees, while bearing in mind the situation in Cyprus since
1974. Sixth, all foreign troops must withdraw from Cyprus. Seventh, the island
must be demilitarized, with only a police force left to keep order. Once these
provisions are satisfied, negotiations for a final settlement can begin. In the
course of the negotiations for, preferably, a united, federal republic, Turkey,
Kalaycioglu argues, should – in light of the Greek Orthodox Church’s past
history and in order to curtail any Enosis-inspired zeal – insist upon a secular
constitution. Only then may the newly established Federal Cypriot Republic
start to negotiate its accession to the EU.62
The European Union
Athens has managed, despite Turkey’s custom union with the EU, to block the
passage of EU aid money to Ankara. Only in 1999, in the wake of the talks
between the two countries – more of which later – and Turkey’s devastating
earthquakes, did Athens deign to release the funds, which by then had reached
the not inconsiderable sum of 500 million dollars. But, this was as far as coop-
eration between the two the sides went. Ankara, though grateful, still threatened
to veto the admission of new NATO members should the Republic of Cyprus
join the EU, while Athens warned that in the event of talks between the EU and
TRNC it would blackball any future EU members. Athens justified its recalci-
trant stance but arguing that it was acting for the benefit of its fellow EU states.
After all, it explained, “we are simply telling the Turks, what you feel about
them.”63 Whatever the truth of the matter, Athens regarded its ability to block
Turkey’s accession to the EU as a major strategic asset.
While some European states perhaps secretly welcomed Greece obduracy,
others deplored it. Greece insistence upon blocking Turkish membership, they
remonstrated, dangerously polarized attitudes in Turkey. In January 1997, Klaus
Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister publicly blamed Greece – its refusal to
transfer EU money to Turkey – “for Turkey’s Islamisation” which, he claimed,
“largely due to Turkey’s estrangement . . . is the fault of the Greek element in the
EU.”64 The point behind Kinkel’s and other similar strictures was that Turkish
radicalism will be cut short the moment Europe – for which read Greece – stops
alienating Turkey. These criticisms were hardly music to Greece’s ear, and served
to increase its own sense of alienation.
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The events in the Balkan did not help. There, for reasons of Orthodox soli-
darity, Greece, in stark opposition to the rest of NATO, declined to take action
against the Serbs and side with the Bosnian Muslims. It justified its refusal to
“act like civilised Scandinavians in the Balkans,” by pointing out that it knows
better than any one else the “pleasure” of living next to Muslims. Nevertheless
the whole episode left it feeling isolated, its self-image “a lone wolf ” more deeply
entrenched than ever.65
Then at the end of 1990s, for reasons soon to be discussed, Greece reached
the conclusion that if it wanted to modify Turkish policies it should start speak-
ing with Ankara and that, therefore, a few concessions were in order. Its decision
to sanction the Helsinki resolution, and allow Turkey to become a candidate for
EU membership, marked a revolution in Greek policies. Greece’s agreement to
Turkey’s candidature was not, however, condition free. Athens insisted that a
solution to the Cyprus problem should no longer be considered a prerequisite to
the Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU. It was adamant that, henceforth,
all Greek–Turkish territorial disputes be referred to the International Court of
Justice at The Hague. Finally, it demanded that Turkey meet the same accession
conditions as the other eleven EU candidates. In this context, Greece pointed to
the need for a serious discussion of the human rights situation in Turkey, noting
that, in order to qualify for EU membership, it, Turkey, will have to modify over
20,000 Turkish laws and regulations in line with the EU’s human rights statutes.66
Minorities and ethnic problems
The minorities in the Greek provinces of Xanthi and Rodopi and in Western
Thrace are another source of friction. Athens, i.e. the official Greek publication
The Muslim Minority of Thrace: Minority Rights in a European State, considers
them Muslim.67 Ankara insists that they are Turks and claims that they are sub-
ject to unfair restrictions, even persecution by the Greek authorities. A pam-
phlet published in 1998 by the Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe
entitled: The Turkish Minority of Western Thrace accuses Greece of cultural and
ethnic cleansing, just short of genocide. The pamphlet has both infuriated and
alarmed Greece, which, seeing that the Federation’s sole point of contact is a
telephone number in Ankara and that it was distributed by the Turkish Foreign
Ministry and various Turkish embassies, suspects that it is Turkey’s handiwork.
A second publication, The Macedonian Minority in Greece: A Human Tragedy
within the Boundaries of the European Union, proved even more worrying. This
pamphlet, issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry not only accused Greece of
atrocities against Greek Macedonians, but included maps identifying several
regions within Greece as Macedonian.68 Greece is nervous that, as in Cyprus,
these allegations of ill treatment will be followed by active Turkish intervention
on behalf of the Muslim minority and the creation of a new northern Cyprus
in Greece itself.
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In like manner, Athens also links Turkey’s close ties with the Muslim
minorities along the Greek borders in FRYOM, Albania and Bulgaria, with
events in Cyprus, pointing out that in all these cases Turkey insists that it is
simply protecting the region’s Turkish Muslim minority. With the Cypriot
precedent constantly looming in the background, Athens frets that Turkey is not
only bent upon helping the Muslim minorities challenge Greece’s territorial
integrity but might even intervene on their behalf. It is one reason why Athens
views the Turkish land and naval units stationed permanently in Tirana and
Albanian ports with suspicion and concern.
Greece has tried to meet the ethnic challenge with, among other things,
demographic weapons. The Greece Orthodox Church announced “A Greek
Plan to Spur Births”, designed to increase the birth rate among Greek Orthodox
families along the Turkish border. According to the plan, applied initially in
northwestern Thrace, each Greek Orthodox family will receive a substantial
subsidy for every third child born.69 At the same time, Greece has its own ethnic-
based complaints against Turkey. The Greeks of Turkey: Under Threat of Elimi-
nation shrieks the title of one Greek publication. Athens also accuses Turkey of
deliberately repressing Istanbul’s Greek Orthodox community, a community, it
notes, which in 1923 numbered 100,000 and in 1988 a mere 5,000. Athens has
likewise made much of Turkey’s now defunct Refah Partisi’s – the Muslim Wel-
fare Party – call to convert the Aghia Sophia into a mosque. And, while delighted
with the US Congress’s decision to appoint a commission of inquiry to examine
the human rights situation in Turkey, Athens was outraged that the same com-
mission was also charged with investigating the status of Thrace’s minorities.70
Several other ethnic battles have infringed upon and played a part in the
Greek–Turkish conflict. Greece, for instance, declared 24 April a Memorial Day,
marking the deaths of the Armenians massacred, or so Greece claims, by the
Turks during the First World War. Turkey’s war with the PKK is another, more
serious, example. Indeed, Athens viewed its links with the PKK as one of its few
effective weapons against Turkey, assuming that the more resources Ankara
wasted on the PKK, the less it could afford to open a second front against Greece.
The last thing Athens wanted was a PKK-free Turkey at liberty to turn its atten-
tion to Greece. Similarly a Turkey flanked by a strong Iraq, Iran and Syria meant
a harassed Turkey, which poses less of a threat to Greece. Hence Athens’s strong
protests to Israel following the Israeli–Turkish rapprochement. Greece accepted
the Israeli argument that Turkey could have easily found an alternative to the
supply of Israeli weapons. But Israel’s cooperation with Turkey, Athens com-
plained, by effectively neutralizing Syria, meant that Ankara was free to take
action against Greece.
In view of all this, it is hardly surprising that when on 20 October 1998 Syria
and Turkey signed an anti-terror agreement, alarm bells reverberated through-
out Athens. The Adana Memorandum was preceded by a series of tough Turk-
ish demands, accompanied by ominous declarations, such as Ismet Sezgin’s,
Turkey’s Defence Minister, murmurings that “Turkey’s patience is running out.”
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There were also implicit threats of intervention, as when Turkey deployed hun-
dreds of armored vehicles and several thousand troops along its 375 mile long
border with Syria. In addition, the head of Turkish Intelligence was rumored to
have warned his Syrian counterpart that “Turkey’s military would enter Syria
from one side, leave it from the other” – another version spoke of Turkish tanks
rolling into Damascus within ten hours of crossing the border – unless the latter
expelled Ocalan. All in all it proved a pretty successful mode of negotiation.
Syria, for example, agreed to end its anti-Turkish campaign sparked off by
Ankara’s close contacts with Jerusalem, thus underlining the potency of the
Turkish military threats. The Syrian–Turkish accord itself – partially brokered
by Iran and Egypt – banned all PKK activity, including trade and commerce, in
Syria.71 Syria further agreed to stop supporting the PKK and expel Ocalan.
Finally, it undertook to persuade Lebanon to do the same.72 Thrown out of Syria,
Ocalan was soon caught in Nairobi.
Proof of Turkey’s military power and its ability to impose its will, without
having to fire a single shot, the Syrian–Turkish accord reawoke all Athens’s old
fears of its neighbor to the east, plus some new ones. Turkey was clearly on a roll.
It began with its humiliating indifference to the Greek deterrence, followed by
its threat to bomb the S-300, which, in turn, forced Cyprus and Greece to back
down and station the missiles in Crete. Now came Turkey’s diktat to Syria to end
its association with the PKK. The Adana Memorandum not only demonstrated,
conclusively, Turkey’s regional military dominance, but it gave it a decisive edge
in its battle against the PKK at home and in northern Iraq. Moreover Turkey was
now sufficiently confident to tackle the PKK’s other patrons. Having pushed
Ocalan out of Syria, it made sure that none of the European countries would
grant him asylum. Turkey eventually caught up with Ocalan in Kenya, where he
found refuge in the Greece embassy. His capture, again without Turkey firing a
single shot, marked the beginning of the end of the war against the PKK.
Thus, two key players – Syria and the PKK – who had enjoyed intermittent
Greek support and who by consuming a considerable portion of Turkey’s time
and resources, had diverting its attention away from Greece, had practically dis-
appeared. Was it, Greece wondered, now its turn? Would it too be subjected to
a Turkish diktat similar to the one addressed to Syria? The climate in Ankara did
not appear promising. Ocalan’s arrest, the Turkish media predicted menacingly,
“is only the beginning . . . Turkey has proved itself a feared enemy . . . its adver-
saries have learned the hard way that no one can undermine the vital interests
of our country.”73 The fact that Turkey’s Prime Minister at the time was Bulent
Ecevit, the man not only responsible for Turkey’s successes against the PKK, but
who ordered Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and certainly appeared in
no mood for compromise, did not calm Greek nerves.
These developments, plus the assessment of Greece’s and Turkey’s relative
military strengths, fuelled Athens’ fears for the future, making the possibility
of talks with Turkey suddenly an extremely attractive proposition. It was
certainly, Athens thought, preferable to an armed conflict with a powerful
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and overconfident Turkey. Interestingly enough, Turkey too, for all its belliger-
ent posturing, had no interest in an open military conflict with Greece, which
would have a devastating effect on its relations with Europe. Moreover, Turkey
was well aware that it would be negotiating from a position of strength. All
this goes a long way toward explaining the current rapprochement between
Greece and Turkey
A breakthrough?
In July 1999, after almost ten years of virtually no direct contact, Greece and
Turkey embarked on a new round of talks. Given that the 1988 Davos accord
resulted in nothing but disputes over interpretation, allegations of cheating, and
shattered hopes, neither side was overly confident about the outcome of the
current discussions.74 Indeed, seeking to lower expectations, they admitted they
would be extremely surprised if the talks produced any substantive or dramatic
results. “We are not,” George Papandreou, Greece’s new Foreign Minister
explained modestly, “aiming very high, merely to the point where we think we
might achieve some results.” His Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem agreed,
speaking of the effort to draw closer, “without raising expectations or being too
assertive.”75 Both believed that small steps forward in non-contentious areas
such as environmental and cultural affairs, crime fighting, economic coopera-
tion, even the removal of Greece’s ban on EU aid payments to Turkey, were all
that was possible at the time. However, once achieved, these will act as a spring-
board for further more complex negotiations over such intractable problems
as Cyprus, the Aegean border, and Turkey’s EU membership, which clearly
demand a more favorable climate.76
Previous attempts at a Greek–Turkish rapprochement have proceeded at
particularly leisurely pace. It took Greece and Turkey ten years to finally agree to
implement the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) – including a commit-
ment to respect each others’ sovereignty – drawn up in May and September
1989, following Andreas Papandreou and Ozal’s meeting in Davos. The CBMs
established guidelines reducing to a minimum the interruptions to civilian ship-
ping and air traffic caused by military exercises on the high seas and in interna-
tional air space. They also specified a code designed to prevent incidents and
accidents on the high seas and in international air space, involving the two
countries’ air and naval forces. The Greek periodical COSMOS, for one, did not
think that the ten-year time lapse between Davos and the CBMs’ implementa-
tion augured well for the future.77
Yet these caveats, doubts, and reservations apart, the remarkable chemistry
between Papandreou and Cem, who regularly refer to each other as “Dear
George” and “Dear Ismail” did raise expectations similar to those evoked by the
Davos accords.78 Some even harked back to the 1930s and the surprising friend-
ship that sprung up between those two seemingly die hard enemies Eleftherois
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Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal, which led to the conclusion of several extremely
satisfactory agreements between Greece and Turkey.79
The reasons behind the thaw
Several factors combine to explain the, on the face of it, surprising turn for the
better in Greek–Turkish relations. The two violent earthquakes, which hit Turkey
and Greece in August and September of 1999, resulted in a fierce outpouring of
shared grief and sympathy.80 The mutual devastation and empathy were such that
both, almost reflexively, sent humanitarian aid to help ease their neighbor’s
plight. The Ocalan affair, which could have led to an alarming deterioration in
Greek–Turkish relations, was another factor serving as springboard for a
renewed dialogue instead. It is worth mentioning in this context the Kurdish
anti-Greek demonstrations throughout Europe, the seizure by Kurds of Greek
legations in Europe and Kurdish accusations of Greek connivance in Ocalan’s
capture – despite the fact that it was Greece who gave him refuge in the first place
– which led to bitter Greek recriminations concerning Kurdish perfidy and
ingratitude. This made it easier for Greece to disassociate itself from the Kurdish
cause, thus removing another source of conflict with Turkey. Events in the neigh-
boring Balkans and above all the Kosovo crisis, provided a salutary shock to both
countries as they found themselves not only on either side of the Balkan divide
ethnically, religiously, politically, and even military, but also in danger of being
sucked into the conflict. Not wishing to follow in the destructive path of the feud-
ing Balkans states, Greece and Turkey decided that dialogue, even cooperation, is
infinitely preferable to inflammatory unilateral steps or just plain estrangement.
Non-governmental groups and societies have also played their part in pro-
moting Greek–Turkish relations, as has tourism, though not to begin with. In
1984, following the record number of Greeks who visited Turkey– several hun-
dred thousand in 1982–83 – Ankara decided to exempt Greek tourists of the
need to acquire visas. Unfortunately, as the most popular tourist sites proved to
be the areas from which the Greeks were expelled during the 1920s, Greek
tourism, at this point, did nothing but fan the flames of ethnic hatred. The
number of tourists from both countries dropped dramatically, so that by 1985
only 130,000 Greeks visited Turkey and 200,000 Turks visited Greece. Things
have improved since the thaw in Greek–Turkish relations, and especially since
the 1999 earthquakes, with Turkey welcoming over 170,000 Greek tourists and
500,000 Turks spending their holidays in Greece.81
But, as John Sitilides correctly observed, much of the credit for the new pos-
itive climate should go to the private business sector. Early 2000 saw an unprece-
dented number of private initiatives in a number of diverse economic fields.
These initiatives, engineered by entrepreneurs of various nations, range over a
several countries and continents. Thus, Italian, Greek, and Turkish companies
joined forces to build, within three years, a half-billion dollar energy plant
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which, using gas from Russia and run by the Exxon-Mobile Corporation, will
provide Turkey with much needed power. Other examples include a Greek firm
who purchased a Turkish mine, in order to export its raw materials to Europe
and Africa for industrial, agricultural, and construction purposes. A natural gas
network system is also planned, which, linking Greece to Turkey, and allowing
the latter to purchase surplus Greek gas, will meet Turkey’s huge energy
demands. There is also a joint Greek–Turkish venture, funded by the EU, to con-
struct high-voltage transmission lines which will deliver electricity to the
Balkans. A Greek plant, which uses Turkish technology to manufacture plastic
irrigation pipes for the Balkan market, is another joint Greek–Turkish initiative.
Finally, there are plans to install environmentally sensitive wind-power produc-
tion systems in Greece and Turkey, thus relieving, to a degree, their grave urban
pollution problems.82
That same year, Turkey held an exhibition in Athens promoting Turkish
exports, including textiles, chemical products, medical instruments, and con-
sumer goods. It proved a huge success as dozens of Greek companies rushed to
buy Turkish goods, especially textiles and ready-made clothes. Not surprisingly
there are now plans for an Athens-based Greek–Turkish Chamber of Commerce.
At the end of February 2000, 140 Greek businesspeople met in Istanbul with
their Turkish counterparts to discuss ways of overcoming obstacles to trade such
as tariffs and dual taxation, and of boosting export subsidies. They also explored
the possibilities of new joint business ventures mostly in the Black Sea region.83
Trade clearly played an important part in promoting the Greek–Turkish
rapprochement. In 1995, trade between the two countries – with a combined
population of over 75 million people – was a mere 411 million dollars. By 1998,
it was 690 million.84 Then came 2000 a year with a profusion of private economic
initiatives. It is evident that as trade and economic cooperation increase, as
more people, companies and countries are involved in joint ventures, and as the
profits from these initiatives mount and, with them, the reluctance to lose all
that has been invested and gained, so will the number of parties who have a
vested interest in good relations grow. As a result, politicians and soldiers will
find it increasingly difficult to check, let alone reverse, the current thaw in
Greek–Turkish relations. Indeed, as far back as 1996 a meeting of Greek and
Turkish business entrepreneurs concluded that once the annual trade between
the two countries reached the 2 billion dollar mark, soldiers and politicians
would be much less eager to orchestrate crises.85
As for the politicians, in Greece, Pangalos’s dismissal and replacement by
more a moderate politician clearly helped the cause of reconciliation. So did the
obvious chemistry between George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, Greece and
Turkey’s current Foreign Ministers, who, incidentally, are both trained sociolo-
gists. At the same time, and paradoxically, the fact that Turkey’s Prime Minister
is Bulent Ecevit, the man who ordered Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and orches-
trated Ocalan’s capture, augurs well for any future negotiations. Given his past
history, Ecevit can afford to make concessions without fear of being accused of
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being weak or unpatriotic. His image as a strong man will certainly come in
useful in dealing with Turkey’s nationalists and the TRNC’s inevitable com-
plaints once a painful compromise over Cyprus is hammered out. The Greek
Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, has already had to overcome charges of lack of
patriotism, when he rejected the “so called super patriots” demand to “Kurdify
Greek foreign policy.”86 The chances of Ecevit being subjected to a similar brow-
beating are very small indeed.
First steps
The path ahead of Greece and Turkey is both long and thorny. There is little
hope, for example, of a compromise over the Aegean. Athens insists that its ter-
ritorial rights in the Aegean are not open to negotiation and that any dispute
should be turned over to the International Court of Justice. Turkey, however,
does not recognize the court’s jurisdiction and is adamant that the two resolve
their Aegean disagreements between them. The prospects for a meeting of
minds over Cyprus are not much better. This despite Ankara’s acute sensitivity
to the fact if it fails to meet mounting international expectations it will be the
one branded bull-headed and intractable.87
Nevertheless these knotty issues apart, between 1999 and 2000, Greek–
Turkish relations underwent a radical transformation. September 1999 saw talks
between Greece and Turkey on a whole range of issues, including cultural and
economic affairs, energy production, anti-seismic safety measures, and security
matters. The mayors of Athens and Istanbul visited each other and signed a pro-
tocol on cultural, trade, tourism, and technical cooperation. In addition, both
sides announced measures that augured well for the future. Sabahattin Cak-
makoglou, the Turkish Defence Minister, promised, in light of the recent
improvement in Greek–Turkish relations, to reduce the number of Turkish mil-
itary exercises in the Aegean, while admitting that some of them may have been
“carried out for political reasons connected to our neighbours.” He added that,
“Repeated exercises constitute an additional cost for the economy.”88 The Turk-
ish air force agreed not only to accept the Athenian FIR, but to remove all
ammunition from planes flying over the Aegean. Meanwhile, in Greece, Dimir-
tis Apostolakis, Greece’s Deputy National Defense Minister’s conceded that
Athens did not consider Israeli–Turkish military cooperation a threat, an admis-
sion as surprising as it was refreshing. His hope that no one in Greece will even
think of the two countries’ association as an anti-Greek axis is far removed from
Pangalos’s offensive depiction of Israel and Turkey as “evil states.”89
That same month a Turkish football team, the Marmara Sports Club, played
a charity match in Rhodes, to raise money for the Turkish and Greek earthquake
victims. Among the fans accompanying the club was the former Turkish Presi-
dent, General Kenan Evren. The Greek press, harking back to previous Greek–
Turkish sporting events, which resembled battlefields rather than sports
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meetings, noted how “not too long ago the arrival on a Greek island of a senior
Turkish General, retired or not, dozens of Turkish reporters and a group of
young Turks would have inflamed many sections of [Greek] society.” This was
clearly no longer the case. The Turkish journalist, Yorgo Kirbaki, was also struck
by the changed atmosphere. In the past, he wrote, matches between Greece and
Turkey in the PAOK Thessaloniki stadium were “hell on earth, it being almost
impossible to leave the stadium in one piece.” But, he enthused, the September
1999 match between PAOK and Galatasaray, “was heaven . . . I remember
neither the match nor the goals. But who cares? Turks and Greeks under the
same sky hugged one another and prayed for a peaceful tomorrow, filled with
friendship and love!”90
In November 1999, there began a new round of UN-brokered proximity
talks over Cyprus, while President Clinton visited both Greece and Turkey.
December saw a major breakthrough in the countries’ relations, with Greece
finally lifting its veto on Turkey’s candidacy for the EU. Meanwhile, Turkey,
having first removed the Heybeliada Clerical School in Istanbul, closed since
1971, from the control of the Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and placed it
under the its own authority, and then setting up a body – The High Religious
Council Administration, part of Istanbul’s University’s School of Theology – to
monitor the Orthodox education provided by the school, promised to reopen
the school, thus removing one more bone of Greek–Turkish contention.91
Finally, the Greek football federation decided, in December 1999, to put in,
together with its Turkish counterpart, a bid to host Euro 2008.
Throughout these months a record number of Greek companies have
contacted the Turkish embassy in Athens in search of Turkish partners with
which to do business in Turkey. Athens hinted that it might recognize the exis-
tence of a Turkish minority in Western Thrace, going so far as to admit that they
are not “Muslimized Greeks” and that “there is no need to repeat the sins of
past.” In return, Greece expected comparable improvements in the position of
Istanbul’s Greek citizens.92 Representatives of Greek and Turkish municipalities
in the Aegean met to discuss common problems. A modern Turkish history
exhibition was sent to Thessaloniki and Athens aboard Mustapha Kemal’s per-
sonal railway car. A Turkish Friendship Train carrying rail workers, journalists
and emergency personnel, and whose purpose was to bolster the new and posi-
tive discourse between the two countries’ media, arrived in Thessaloniki just as
the Turkish Consulate there was marking the sixty-first anniversary of Kemal
Atta Turk’s death.93
In January 2000, the Greek Foreign Secretary paid an official visit, the first
since 1962, to Ankara. Greece and Turkey also concluded a series of bilateral
agreements on illegal immigration, combating terrorism, cross-border crime,
fraud and organized crime, money laundering, duplicate taxation, shipping, sci-
ence and technological co-operation, and environmental protection. Not surpris-
ingly, John Sitilides thought this to be “the most intense period of diplomatic
engagement between Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the United States, in years.”94
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There has also been remarkable progress on the military front. In the early
summer of 1999, Turkish military planes carrying humanitarian aid to Kosovo
were allowed to fly over Greece. A short time later, a 1,400-strong Greek force
took part in peacemaking operations in Kosovo alongside Turkish troops. Over-
all, since 1994 about 2,020 Greek and 2,360 Turkish troops have served together
in UN and NATO missions, first in Bosnia and then in 1999 in Kosovo.95 Octo-
ber 1999 saw the official opening of NATO’s Joint Southern Command Center,
in Larissa, Greece, born of the Alliance’s recent reorganization. It is one of four
subregional NATO headquarters, the remaining three are situated in Izmir in
Turkey, Verona in Italy, and Madrid in Spain. Greeks and Turks work closely
together in both Larissa and Izmir. A Turkish Major General is the Larissa’s
Center’s Chief of Staff, while a Greek Major General holds the same position in
Izmir. The newly formed South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) is a joint
Greek, Italian, and Turkish venture. This seven-nation regional task force is cur-
rently commanded by a Turkish Brigadier General, while a top Greek Defense
Ministry official oversees its policies. The brigade’s headquarters, at present in
Bulgaria, will move to each of its member states in turn.96
In early June 2000, 150 Turkish marines, provided with air cover by ten
Turkish jet fighters, landed on Greek shores as part of a NATO training exercise.
Athens also agreed to let Turkish warplanes to fly over Greece while en route
elsewhere. And, it announced its intention to vacate the Andros and Psathoura
shooting ranges located in the middle of Aegean’s international air space. In the
meantime, back in Turkey, a bold plan was drawn up for the dissolution of the
100,000-strong Turkish Aegean Army, established in 1975 in response to the
rising tension with Greece and stationed only a stone’s throw away from the
Greek forces in the Greek Aegean islands. In return, Turkey expected Greece to
make several concessions over the Aegean. The plan, which many in Turkey
thought premature, was eventually shelved. Nevertheless, the mere fact that
senior Turkish officials, such as Admiral Guven Erkaya, Prime Minister Ecevit’s
personal advisor, cast doubt on the future of the hitherto sacrosanct Aegean
Army is clear evidence of the fresh winds blowing in Turkey.97
The future
It remains to be seen whether the thaw in Greek–Turkish relations will have long-
term and lasting results. There remain, despite the friendly even accommodating
atmosphere, several serious differences between the two countries, particularly
over questions of sovereignty and flying rights in the Aegean. There Greece and
Turkey still intercept each other’s aircraft, on the dubious grounds that they have
violated the Turkish or Greek Aegean islands’ air space, as happened during a
NATO exercise in October 2000 over the islands of Lemnos and Ikariya.
On the whole, however, Greece and Turkey seem anxious to confine their
disputes to the rhetorical level, though when compared to the aggressive and
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nasty war of words which had hitherto characterized the two countries’ rela-
tions, their recent declarations have been remarkably temperate, even tame.
Even more striking are the pacific and conciliatory statements issuing from both
sides of the Aegean. Bulent Ecevit has admitted that Turkey has no territorial
designs on Greece, adding that there are no real conflicts of interest between
Ankara and Athens. This sentiment was echoed by the Greek Prime Minister,
Simitis, who claimed that the delineation of the Aegean continental shelf is
Athens’s sole remaining dispute with Turkey, the implication being that all the
other stumbling blocks to better relations, including apparently Cyprus, have
been removed. These seem to be slightly extravagant claims, and the Greek gov-
ernment’s spokesman was probably closer to the mark when he described the
current state of relations between Greece and Turkey as one of “non tension.”98
The fate of Turkey’s bid for EU membership, will have a decisive effect on
future Greek–Turkish relations. George Papandreou, underlined this point
when he urged not to let “the momentum that has developed [following
Turkey’s candidacy] go to waste.” It was, he emphasized, “of vital importance . . .
that Turkey’s candidacy did not remain on paper . . . Greece had endorsed an
authentic candidacy, which anticipated the actual rather than sham prospect of
Turkey joining the EU.” Once Turkey realizes that its accession to the EU is
assured, it might well become more flexible as regards other outstanding
Greek–Turkish quarrels. Better still, welcomed by Europe, Turkey’s acute sense
of isolation, alienation, even siege will wither away, and this, in turn, may help
resolve the questions, such as the Kurdish issue, dividing Turkey and the EU.99
Conversely, once Turkey joins the EU Athens will begin to regard its neigh-
bor to the east as a European rather than exclusively Greek problem. Inciden-
tally, the Kurdish demonstrations throughout Europe, following Ocalan’s arrest,
made it clear that Turkey is indeed a European issue. As a result, Greece will
expect various European bodies to deal with Turkey. No longer compelled to act
as Europe’s anti-Turkish spokesman or spearhead the EU’s anti-Turkish poli-
cies, Greece will be relieved of its self-imposed burden of confronting Turkey for
Europe’s sake. This, in turn, will lead to marked improvement in Greece’s rela-
tions with Turkey and, no less importantly, Europe. No longer in Europe’s “bad
book,” Greece’s conviction that it is “a lone wolf,” might disappear to be replaced
by the gratifying sense it is looked upon kindly by its fellow EU members.
How else will a lasting thaw or, better still, a future settlement benefit
Turkey and Greece? For one thing, it will mark the end of 500 years of Hellenic–
Turkish enmity, at least on paper. It will allow Greece to settle its territorial
disputes with Turkey. A prospective territorial settlement will, in all likelihood,
designate those areas that may be reasonably considered Hellenic sovereign
Greek territory. In return, however, Greece will have to give up its Megali Idea
ambitions and Greek irredentism will come to an end. It will be worth it as, for
the first time in history, instead of being threatened by Turkey, Greece’s borders
will enjoy Turkey’s blessing. Moreover, no longer the sole member of the EU
embroiled in an international ethnic, political, and military conflict, Greece’s
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process of integration into Europe will move swiftly ahead. It would, for
example, be given the aid it needs to meet EMU economic and financial stan-
dards. As a result instead of being, as it currently is, the least economically
inspiring member of the EU, Greece’s financial and economic situation may take
a turn for the better.
Turkey will benefit equally. The sweeping Greek–Turkish ethnic and inter-
national conflict will no longer bar – at least on paper – Turkey’s way westwards
toward acceptance as a European country. Greece may even be willing to give
Turkey a hand in attaining this far from easy goal. Thus, at long last, the century-
long Kemalist quest to became a part of Europe will be attained, with all the
credit going to the Turkish Kemalist government. This will no doubt strengthen
the government’s hand, as will the fact that internally Islamic and radical
nationalism, which fed on Greek and European animosity, will fade away. A
friendly Greece may also help clear the way towards an improvement in Turkey’s
relations with the Orthodox world, including, and above all, Russia. The two
might even cooperate to stabilize the ever turbulent Balkans. Above all, once its
conflict with Greece is over, Turkey will be able to celebrate the truly remarkable
achievement of not having been directly involved in a major war for almost a
century. It is a record not many countries, especially in the Middle East and east
Mediterranean, can match. True there was Korea and Cyprus. But the former
was Turkey’s meal ticket into NATO and took place thousands of miles from
home, while the latter was a military picnic. In sum, never will Ataturk’s promise
of “peace at home and peace abroad,” be closer to fulfillment.
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Two characteristics formerly featuring prominently in Israeli–Turkish relations
have vanished from the scene of late. There is now no trace of the “mistress
syndrome,” the low profile, to revert to the terms of the complaint voiced by
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion.1 Dr Uri Gordon, the first Israeli
Ambassador to Turkey – representation at ambassadorial level, not legation,
began in late 1991 – who had started on August 1990 as Chargé d’Affaires in the
Israeli Legation in Ankara, and became the first Ambassador on 31 December
1991 wrote:
[I received] a letter from General Halis Burhan, Commander of the Turkish Air-
force, inviting the commander of the Israeli Airforce Herzel Bodinger, for an official
visit. When the Israeli guest came to pay a call in Ankara on a high member of the
Turkish cabinet, he was met there by over twenty representatives of the Turkish
press and electronic media. This was no longer “Low Profile.” Other similar visits
followed.2
Neither was there the zero-sum game policy that obliged Turkey to refrain from
fostering relations with Israel, for fear of harming its ties with the Arab and
communist worlds. The communist bloc is a thing of the past, as is the power of
the Arab world to mobilize its resources for the purpose of dictating policy.
Turkey may perhaps suffer over its relations with Israel, but in contrast with the
past, this no longer inhibits Ankara in developing its contacts with Jerusalem.
Israeli–Turkish relations are out in the open now, Ankara flaunts significant
portions of this to the public, undeterred by loud criticism or the counter-
measures adopted by the Arab and Islamic worlds.
What are the components of these relationships, widely regarded as one
of the main crossroads in the Middle East, often said to include the United
States, sometimes Jordan, and described in superlatives kept for rare occasions?
(For example: “Israel’s relations with its second friend [with Turkey; the first is
7
A bridge across the Middle East
The Turkish–Israeli rapprochement
Washington] overshadow even its relations with the United States!”) The
Turkish–Israeli system is called the “Baghdad Pact No. Two,” the remarkable tie,
the “Phantom Pact,” “The Three Musketeers,” brilliant move, rapprochement,
alliance, alignment, axis, entente, cooperation, partnership, unique develop-
ment, shock, betrayal, the contemptuous machination of Turkey’s rich Jews (the
donme), “the odd couple,” etc. According to one count, by January 2002 sixty-
six authors and research institutions had produced more than 100 academic and
journalistic publications that attempted to analyze it. Furthermore, as Anat
Lewin noticed, the Turkish press adopted the laudatory tone for Israel – its
defense technology is the best in the field, the “Mossad” is the most dreaded
counter-terrorism intelligence service, Jewish lobbies on the Capitol Hill are the
most effective, etc. – meaning that Turkey has much to gain from befriending
such a state.3 Conversely, it is worth noting the comment of Ismail Cem,
Turkey’s Foreign Minister, who complained that deliberate exaggeration is used
when his country’s relations with Israel are described. Middle Eastern extremist
Arabs use excessive terminology, hoping to damage Turkey’s influence in the
region; Israelis, who fear an improvement in Turkish–Arab relations, do the
same, hoping to spoil Turkey’s status among the Arabs. “Both our Arab and
Israeli counterparts have been warned about the matter,” added Cem.4
Still, some in Turkey characterize the relations with Israel as the most
significant change in their country’s foreign policy in the past fifty years. Israeli
parallels are the special relationships Israel pursued with France in the 1950s,
Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Shimon
Peres took a particular pride in the two countries’ rapprochement, defining
Turkey as the “locomotive force” of the Muslim world and as “the regional
super-power.” Alternatively, Syria deplores the present collaboration between
Turkey and Israel that practically “sandwiched” it, and views it as the greatest
mishap the Arab world has endured since 1948 (the loss of Palestine). Al’Quds,
a Palestinian newspaper, showed its readers a cartoon of Mesut Yilmaz, Turkey’s
Prime Minister, dressed with the Israeli flag, and, continued the newspaper,
when answering the question what kind of songs he loves, Yilmaz replied: the
Israeli anthem!5
Israeli–Turkish relations can be divided into two periods. The first
comprised some forty years of generally covert links, fluctuating in volume,
military and intelligence-orientated in nature; during this period, the overt ele-
ment featured low-level diplomatic representation, with the civilian dimension
as minuscule as mutual commerce. By contrast, we can now point to over a
decade of ramified connections –military, economic and civilian – whose rapid
expansion, since the early 1990s particularly, never fails to astound. On the
Israeli side at least, there exists a great eagerness to foster this relationship to the
utmost, along with jitters lest anything beyond Israel’s control should bring
about its collapse. That is also the undertone behind the words of Alon Liel, an
Israeli diplomat who, having served in Turkey during the 1980s, recently called
for greater prudence in the special relationship with Turkey, which could be
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destroyed by a rash move on Israel’s part.6 Looking for an example, Dr Liel
could have easily pointed to the unfortunate words of an Israeli official who had
specified what Turkey and Israel have in common: “I don’t know if you know,
but the Turks really hate Arabs very much.”7 Not much longevity awaits the rela-
tionship that is founded on hatred. The words of an earlier Israeli emissary to
Turkey, who served there in the 1950s, may therefore be equally applicable to the
present period:
[T]he only thing that disturbs me is the optimistic tone . . . The splendid state of
Turkish-Israeli relations is liable to deteriorate for a variety of reasons [of which]
the principal one, in my opinion, is not the danger of expanded Arab influence. I
shall list the dangers in their order of importance, as follows: (1) The danger of an
unsuccessful outcome of Solel-Boneh’s projects in Turkey, should such a thing
happen, Heaven forbid. (2) Continuation of three-way deals in which Israel makes
too great a profit, including the continued re-exportation from Israel of Turkish
commodities without Turkish authorisation.8
While there is a consensus in Israel as to the value of the special relationship with
Turkey – to the degree that Israel’s desire for rapprochement with Ankara is
taken for granted, hence few analyses are published regarding the necessity of
cooperation – in Turkey, by contrast, the issue is controversial, prompting
extensive debate. The result is that the Turkish press is quite open and differing
as to various aspects of the bilateral cooperation. Certain findings published
there never appeared in Israeli sources. For example, Turkey’s Aksiyon Magazine
is the only organ to publish what is claimed to be the text of the February 1996
Turkish–Israeli agreement on military cooperation.9
Israel: cherishing the Turkish connection
Important changes clearly mark Israeli policies towards Turkey and a clear
thread of “Turcification” is discernible in them. For instance, the country appar-
ently departed (May 1997) from the policy prevailing till then in relation to
Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took
up position unequivocally on Turkey’s side, sharply condemning Kurdish ter-
rorism and ruling out the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.
Netanyahu went further, claiming there would be no peace between Israel and
Syria unless that country called off its support of terrorism, including that of the
PKK.10 These words far transcended Israel’s actions in relation to the Kurdish
issue. Despite Turkish pleas, Israel had declined to take sides against Kurdish ter-
rorism, even while demanding – and eliciting – firm measures by Turkey against
Palestinian, Islamic and Hizbullah terrorism. Furthermore, to avoid deviating
from the Israeli low-profile line as regards the Kurds, the accords concluded
during the November 1994 visit to Israel by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Tansu
Ciller, relegated mutual anti-terror efforts to the bilateral police agreement,
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alongside the drive against drugs and organized crime. Israel found the Turkish
definition of “terrorism” in conjunction with “Kurdish” hard to accept, hence
Turkish–Israeli cooperation in this domain was excluded from the agreement
on strategic cooperation, relegated instead to the policing dominion.11 Israeli
apprehensions hinged principally upon fears of vulnerability to a further
terrorist front vis-à-vis the PKK. Indeed, the day following Netanyahu’s decla-
ration, the PKK announced in Beirut that henceforth Israel – like the United
States – would constitute legitimate targets for Kurdish counter-attacks.
But there exists also in Israel a persistent pro-Kurdish sentiment lingering
from the country’s extensive support for the Kurdish struggle for independence
in northern Iraq. (Ariel Sharon, Israeli Foreign Secretary in 1999, said: “It is a
known fact that we have good relations with the Kurds in Northern Iraq and
especially with Barazani, but we do not have relations with the PKK.”)12 How-
ever, Israel, it seems, did finally acknowledge the Turkish contention that there
can be no halfway war against terrorism; Turkey, which acts firmly against anti-
Israeli terrorism on its soil, is entitled to Israeli support against the PKK.
Prime Minister Netanyahu, ruling out Israeli–Syrian peace that did not
include a Syrian undertaking to halt support for the PKK, likewise conformed
with Ankara’s views. Turkey displayed growing unease as it observed Israeli–
Syrian peace negotiations, including the possibility of Israel lobbying in the
United States for Syria’s removal from the lists of states that support terrorism
or trade in drugs, without Syria relinquishing first its support for the PKK.
Turkey was equally perturbed at the prospect that, should a peace treaty be
concluded, Israel’s demand for redeployment of Syria’s army would have it
stationing its forces along the Turkish border. Hence, a scaling down of “Israel’s
Ostpolitik” vis-à-vis the Arab world, Syria in particular, was no cause for regret
in Turkey.
It seems also that the Israeli stand in the October 1998 Turkish–Syrian crisis
which resulted in the expulsion of Abdullah Ocalan from Damascus and his
eventual arrest later on in Nairobi, generally conformed with that of Turkey.
When Turkish troops amassed along the border with Syria, Israel announced it
would withdraw some of its units from its Syrian front, practically declaring
neutrality in the crisis and nullifying the Turkish–Israeli “sandwich” strategy
that Syria dreaded. Some in Turkey expressed frustration. (“We weren’t sur-
prised: Israel is known as an ungrateful and unreliable entity, always disap-
pointing you when you need them most.” Or “Apparently, the Turkey–Israel
military rapprochement is important as long as it serves Israeli interests.” Or
“Israel does not think of anything else but her own interest.”) Other sources
viewed differently these Israeli moves and regarded them as complementing the
Turkish interest, going so far as to confirm that they came as a result of a specific
request from Ankara. The Israeli–Turkish “pincer-like strategy,” used when an
ultimatum was posed to the Syrians, was too alienating and could further exac-
erbate Turkish–Arab relations. The mood in Ankara was that “while believing
that no good will come form the Arabs, we still have to accept that we have to
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live among 100 million of them.” For those who looked for a proper occasion,
the above crisis furnished an opportunity to demonstrate that a third party – be
it the Hellenic world or an Arab state – was never the aim of the Turkish–Israeli
rapprochement.13
Another event apparently reflecting Israel’s growing acceptance of the
Turkish view was the decision by the Tel Aviv municipality to bestow honorary
citizenship upon Bernard Lewis, a world authority in Islamic and Middle East-
ern studies. The literary supplement of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz hosted a wide-
ranging debate among Israeli historians and orientalists as to whether Professor
Lewis deserved the honour, and whether or not he had denied that the Armeni-
ans suffered genocide during the First World War. A brief survey of Israel’s aca-
demic community would find that it is still “in” to argue that the Armenian
massacre fits the genocide definition. The views of the Israeli orientalist,
Yehoshua Porat, are thus exceptional: there is no recall of any equally authorita-
tive pronouncement in Turkey’s defense. After categorically rejecting charges of
genocide against the Armenians, on the grounds that there is no factual evi-
dence of a high-level Ottoman master plan for their annihilation, Porat adds:
I cannot but express my suspicion – of course unsupported – that there are circles
in Israel who find the thrust of Turkish policy hard to swallow. After all, this is a state
whose citizens are almost all Muslim, but nevertheless maintains friendly relations
with Israel, inclines towards the West, is a member of NATO, and does not share in
vilifying the United States as the source of all the afflictions from which the Third
World suffers sporadically. I get the impression that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and
Hafez al-Assad’s Syria get a warmer welcome in those circles, whose criticism of
Turkey is highly over-done.14
A third conclusion – as yet more of an assessment awaiting confirmation and
corroboration – relates to the Israeli–Syrian peace contacts, apparently sus-
pended by Israel for the sake of Ankara. Participants in the occasionally strate-
gic talks held between Israel and Turkey maintain the idea that Israel adopted
Turkey’s view that Ankara would be harmed by an Israeli–Syrian peace agree-
ment. Such an accord could be expected to enhance Syrian, hence also Kurdish,
perhaps even Greek freedom of maneuver for anti-Turkish démarches. It is
noteworthy that Turkey made public its agreements with Israel in April 1996,
after publication of the existence of a Syrian–Greek military agreement. The
Athens–Damascus accords permit Greek airforce planes to undertake training
flights over Syrian air space and receive ground services at Syrian airfields, while
likewise granting the Greek navy docking and anchorage facilities in Syrian
ports. Despite denials by Greece and Syria regarding the very existence of such
an agreement, Turkey repeatedly warned Greece against using Syrian air space:
in view of Greece’s access to practically unlimited air space over the Mediter-
ranean, it has no grounds for training its pilots in Syria and paying dearly for
ground services. Such a step would be a provocation, insisted Ankara. At first,
Israeli officers and officials maintained that Turkey could take on both Greece
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and Syria “with one hand tied behind its back.” Israel Defense Forces Comman-
der in Chief, Lieutenant General Lipkin-Shahak, no doubt not a diplomat,
dismissed the dread that Ankara affected concerning Cypriot plans to station
Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles on the island, by remarking that
“Turkey could annihilate Cyprus with its fishing fleet.”15 Yet, following their
meetings with their Turkish counterparts, Israeli negotiators apparently grasped
the depth of the Turkish feeling on the Greco–Syrian issue. This might support
the view that suspension of Israeli–Syrian contacts was designed inter alia to
placate Ankara. As already noted, the topic deserves further consideration; if
established, it would reflect the degree of “Turkification” Israel is experiencing.
The most vivid illustration may be offered by Israel’s self-control and
restraint in the following instance. As a rule, any challenge to the Second World
War Jewish Holocaust and its virtually sacrosanct status comes in for unequivo-
cal Israeli condemnation, going as far as total rejection and censure. But in this
case, Israel showed self-restraint. In January 1997, members of the Turkish par-
liament, headed by their speaker, Mustaffa Kalemli, visited Yad Vashem in
Jerusalem, the national shrine commemorating the Jews massacred in the Second
World War. Two of the group were members of the Rafah Partisi (Welfare Party);
one of the two, Ahmed Derin, concluded his visit to the shrine with the hope that
no institution like Yad Vashem would ever have to be erected again in commem-
oration of anyone, the Palestinian people included.16 The restraint that Israel dis-
played can of course be ascribed to self-interest and profit-and-loss calculations.
But it can also be attributed to the growing Israeli awareness that Turkey’s frame
of reference, which also embraces the Arab and Islamic dimension, does not
always correspond with that of Israel, and Israel therefore cannot expect exclu-
sivity in its relationship with Turkey. Turkey has close ties – in commerce and
energy – with Iran. Should Iraq be freed of current sanctions, Turkey will become
its main supplier. Syrian–Turkish relations have greatly improved recently, and
after a lengthy period without an accredited Turkish ambassador, Damascus has
consented to the nomination of a new ambassador.17 The Israel–Turkey
rapprochement is thus just one thread in a thick web of Turkish interests. Fur-
thermore, while Israel endeavors to play down Turkish sensitivities over Greco-
Israeli relations (and Ankara’s effective veto of elements thereof – see later), Israel
must come to terms with Turkey’s other spheres of interest.
Turkey has its own shock-absorbers in relation to Israel: when the Refah
Partisi was declared illegal in January 1998, the Speaker of the Knesset, the
Israeli parliament, told a group of foreign military attachés – including the
Turkish representative – that “Till yesterday, I thought there are two democra-
cies in the Middle East. Since yesterday, I’m not so sure, after what happened in
Turkey.” The Speaker subsequently withdrew his remarks, praising the robust
nature of Turkish democracy, whereupon the incident was written off.18
A significant change – and for the first time ever in the three-way relation-
ship between Israel, Greece and Turkey, an overt one – came with Israel’s refusal
to expand its military cooperation with Greece. For readily comprehensible
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reasons, Greece exhibits great interest in the burgeoning military contacts
between Israel and Turkey. Three Greek military attachés are stationed in Tel
Aviv; the Israeli military attaché in Rome is also accredited to Athens. In view of
Greece’s intention of spending 16 billion dollars in the decade to come on pro-
curement of equipment and weaponry and modernization of its army, Israeli
arms manufacturers might have been expected to display an interest.19 However,
regardless of Greek requests, Israel’s aircraft industry has not taken up the
tender for upgrading and modernizing forty Greek airforce F-4 (Phantoms).
Likewise, Israel has restricted military exports to Greece to harmless items
like bullet-proof jackets, patrol boats without armament, detachable fuel tanks
for aircrafts, etc.
Arms sales to Cyprus are exhibited as an illustration of the policy of SIBAT,
the body responsible for Israel’s military exports. As Israeli arms exports to the
conflict-ridden island are liable to be harmful to a country friendly to Israel,
SIBAT limits the quality and extent of Israeli arms sales to Cyprus to “non-lethal
weaponry.” We should recall that an Israeli–Greek military cooperation agree-
ment (similar to the one signed later between Ankara and Israel) was concluded
as far back as December 1994. Israel, however, avoided imbuing the agreement
with any real substance. Greece, too, recently called off joint naval exercises, on
the grounds – or more plausibly, the pretext – that its navy was too busy inter-
cepting infiltration from Albania and could not spare a single frigate for joint
exercises with the Israeli navy.20 The change in Israeli policy towards Greece is
expressed less in the refusal to sell that country this or that item of military hard-
ware, than in public abandonment of the forty-five year old policy of (ostensi-
ble) neutrality in Greco–Turkish relations. During the years 1950–90, Israel
went so far as to claim that the doleful state of its relations with Greece was due
to that country’s capitulation to Arab pressure. The 1990s, however, exposed
relations between Jerusalem and Athens in a further respect, when Israeli com-
panies declined to take up tenders in Greece lest it be interpreted as detrimental
to Turkish interests. Disagreements were reported between the Israeli defense
establishment, anxious to avoid fostering relations with Greece for fear of
endangering links with Turkey, and the foreign ministry that sought to preserve
a balance within the Greco–Turkish-Israeli triangle. Interestingly, the division is
different in Greece, where the military establishment is keen for links with Israel,
while the foreign ministry is traditionally hostile.
Israel has recently been exposed to two symptoms of Turkish sensitivity. The
Israeli–Palestinian conflict threatened to push the Turkish–Israeli relations back-
wards, in particular when Ankara hopes to lessen the Arab world’s animosity per-
taining to her relations with Israel, by openly supporting the Palestinians. Often
Ankara differentiates between Israel and Zionism, and openly declares that.21
Apparently, Turkey feels a responsibility for the plight that befell the Palestinians:
the Ottomans were the first to permit, during the nineteenth century, the immi-
gration of Zionism-inspired Jewish colonists to Palestine thus starting the
conflict there. “We share something in common with the Palestinians,” say
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Turkish officials, “We were both duped by the Arabs, who stabbed us both in the
back, causing us to lose the Empire, and left the Palestinians alone to their fate.”
All through the 1990s the Turkish media clearly sided with the Palestinian
version of the peace negotiations with Israel, having only minor reservations per-
taining to the integrity and talents of the Palestinian leadership. Intermittently,
Turkish reporters gave deeper analyses, in addition to almost daily reporting, of
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The general picture – who is to be blamed and for
what – has not altered:
The Children of Israel have given the first monotheistic religion to humanity but in
the meantime committed their first sin. Yehuda has spread the seeds of racism onto
the world. He has said, “You Children of Israel are different from all other tribes.”
This is how the Jews have committed their first sin. Then they got the blood of Jesus
on their hands. And they slowly paid for these sins for 2000 years. Russians have
slaughtered tens of thousands of them in every pogrom, the Spaniards were unable
to extinguish [all] the Sepharadim [Jews of Oriental origin] by killing them. The
remaining [Jews who were spared the killing were expelled from Spain in 1492]
sought refuge in the arms of the Ottomans. What happened to the Ashkenazim
[Jews of European origin] was not very different. The grandchildren of the Children
of Israel, alias the chosen people of Yehuda, paid for being chosen by inhaling Zyklon
B gas during World War II . . . The Jews who have paid for their sins for thousands
of years are making their relatives pay for it in the 20th century. The West gave them
Palestine, the land of their Semite relatives, as a present [with the result that] there
has been much bloodshed in the Holy Land since the proclamation of the State
of Israel.22
According to the Turkish media the Palestinians paid a dear price because the
powers – the same Christian West that had plotted against Turkey – conspired
against them. The Arab side who almost took control over Palestine during the
war of 1948, was forced to give in to American and Soviet pressure. As from July
1948, American and Soviet troops were deployed on Israeli soil, thus putting
into effect the plan of giving the Jews a state. At the entrance of the Knesset, there
is a slogan, “Israel’s borders are from the Nile to the Euphrates.” The reporter
told his readers that a map of this kind is in Israeli school books, “planting impe-
rialist ideas in the minds of children.” The Middle East, Iran, Pakistan, the Gulf,
Africa and, of course, Turkey, are on Israel’s expansionist list.23
Jewish settlements – according to Radikal “a knife in the chest of the Pales-
tinians” – is the strategy used by Israel to apply this expansion and establish
legitimacy in the land: “Seasonal families stay at one settlement for three
months and then move to another one. This is how the policy of creating legit-
imacy on land works.”24 Radikal knew to say that in accordance with their rabbis’
orders, the settlers kill Palestinians. In case you are wounded or in need of help,
a settler will not come to your assistance if you are not Jewish. In fact he will find
a way to kill you.25 What is left for the Palestinians is to defend themselves by
acquiring martial arts, karate for instance. However, this enables them to con-
front the Israelis solely by using their bodies. Had “Bibi” (Benjamin Netanyahu)
208 Turkey: facing a new millennium
been a Palestinian, his right of residence in Jerusalem would be abrogated: a
Palestinian, native of Jerusalem, who leaves the city for more than seven years is
not entitled anymore to an Israeli identity card (“Blue Card”). Had Netanyahu,
who lived and worked in the United States for twelve years, been a Palestinian,
he would have been banned from returning to the city.26
The words of Zvi Elpeleg, Israel’s ambassador to Ankara (1995–97), are
worthy of attention. Elpeleg stressed Turkish sensitivity to the Palestinian issue. In
his view, a crisis in Israeli–Arab relations would not entail deterioration in
Israeli–Turkish ties, but a downturn in relation to the Palestinians would. “Their
sensitivity on that point is almost as great as on the Armenian issue,” Elpeleg
warned. “Many millions in Turkey are interested in nothing outside their own
borders more than the Palestinian issue; no government in Turkey can withstand
the pressure of those millions.”27 By way of illustration: Turkish journalists smug-
gled used gas grenades, cartridges and bullets into the chamber of the Israeli Prime
Minister to protest against their use by Israeli troops while confronting Palestini-
ans. (“Try to do this in Cankaya Palace in Ankara,” said a Turkish officer).28 Simi-
larly, it is to be doubted whether Israelis have ever heard the foreign minister of a
friendly country says anything to match the following dialogue. In response to a
question from the Cumhuriyet, the Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, Mumtaz
Soysal, explained what he meant by “activities defined as terror by Israel.” It
should be recalled that he was speaking in the year following the Oslo accords, and
despite of the spate of terrorist suicide bombings then sweeping Israel:
Question: With the phrase “defined as terrorist”: do you mean to say that they
actually are not so?
Answer: Yes. Because not everything is “terrorism.” The struggle of Palestine
still continues. Palestine has not achieved its wishes completely. Neither have the
Palestinians . . . Among them are those who want to continue struggle by defending
their rights, they are trying to defend their rights. But a part of the Israeli people is
insistent on stamping these efforts as “terrorism.”29
Ankara insists that there is no resemblance between the Kurdish struggle for
self-determination and the Palestinian one, nor any similarity between the two
leaders, Ocalan and Arafat. Turks resent any comparisons (“ridiculous analogy,”
“funny semblance”) between the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and
the Israeli one in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They see, however, the
attraction, particularly in Europe, in portraying the Palestinians and the Kurds
as parallel cases. Warnings, comparisons and lessons, therefore, were quick to be
voiced. When Ocalan (“Apo,” i.e. uncle), was facing expulsion from Damascus,
as Ankara had insisted, the risks for Turkey were predicted, in particular when
the Arafat precedent was quoted:
Unfit for Arafatization (Arafat Lastiramamak)
Realistic evaluation of the efforts for the Arafatization of Abdullah Ocalan:
Efforts to try and build a parallel between the lives of Apo and Arafat are in vain.
Apo was born within the borders of the Turkish Republic, he is from Urfa. Arafat
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was born in Cairo, not in Palestine. His father was of Palestinian origin but lived in
the rich quarter of Heliopolis in Cairo. He had sold all his land in Palestine to
achieve his ambitions in Egypt. Yassir Arafat has always blamed his father for not
leaving him a piece of land in Palestine, but to the outside world he acts as if his
father’s land has been occupied by Israel. Abdullah Ocalan never had a problem
such as not having land, occupation and exile.
Arafat speaks Arabic with Egyptian accent, not Palestinian one. Apo, on the other
hand, did not know Kurdish when I met him in 1991. In our interview at the Beka’a
he told me that he speaks Turkish, gives orders in Turkish, and thinks in Turkish.
Arafat went to univeristy in Cairo, Ocalan attended the Faculty of Political Science
in Ankara.
Arafat had behind him the oil sheikhs, kings and dictators . . . This was the force
from which Arafat got his strength. He was accepted to the U.N. General Assembly
with the votes of the Muslim and Arab nations. Terror was still new and it could
be accepted as a struggle of the Palestinians [who were] trying to get back [their]
occupied land.
Ocalan does not have all that money and power behind him and terror is now
considered a global threat. Still, Turkey should be very careful and should not forget
that Arafat started gaining his real power after he was out of Syrian control, and he
managed to harm relations between Israel and her neighbours, especially Egypt, by
opening representative offices in those countries.30
Another comparison was made between the Jewish Holocaust and the Armen-
ian claim to have suffered genocide during the First World War. The nine-month
prison sentence given to the French Roje Garaudy for questioning the number of
Jews killed during the war (according to Garaudy 1.5 million instead of 6 million
Jews), raised doubts as to the “intolerance about figures” that a country like
France suffers from. Garaudy, according to Zaman, “only claims that the figures
have been intentionally exaggerated, and unacceptable policies have been built
upon these figures.” Is this claim not worth investigating, asks Zaman? It con-
cludes that “even in Europe academicians are not allowed to investigate and
make declarations outside the official view.” The comparison with “the incidents
of 1915” is clear: “There is a big imbalance between the number of Armenians
claimed to have been killed and their actual population. This shows that those
who have exaggerated the figures had some other intentions.”31
The nomination of Ehud Toledano as the Israeli ambassador to Ankara, and
the furious response it evoked in Turkey – he was ultimately turned down by
Turkey – confronted Israel with the second Turkish sensitivity, this time over
accusations of genocide of the Armenians during the First World War. It was –
falsely – reported that in a radio program in 1981 Professor Toledano had
allegedly accused Turkey of massacring the Armenian people. The terms and
expressions the Turkish press employed in relation to Toledano were inflamma-
tory in the extreme – “Toledano [is] an extreme pro-Jewish Sharia” – in contrast
with the outgoing ambassador, Zvi Elpeleg, known to be a secular Israeli.
“Toledano is an admirer of the Armenians and even quarrelled with [his Profes-
sor] Bernard Lewis for this reason.” And so on.32 It appears to have been beyond
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Toledano’s power to overcome the rejection of his appointment to ambassador
in Ankara, in view of the multitude of interests that stood to lose thereby. Ali
Birnad was right on target with his article in Sabah, attributing the scuttling of
the Toledano nomination inter alia to the “jealousy of his [university] col-
leagues.”33 Israel and the Israelis are probably far more attentive now to Turkish
sensitivities on the Armenian issue. With that, the following quotation is worthy
of attention – despite its length and the excessive fantasy to which Toledano was
linked. It ties together Turkey’s greatness, Armenia, Russia, the Armenian lobby
in the United States, Azerbaijan, Israel, Bernard Lewis, Professor Toledano’s col-
leagues at Tel Aviv University, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s falling-out with his
Foreign Minister David Levy:
Ambassador Toledano is said to be the student of Prof. Bernard Lewis, a well known
American historian of Jewish origin, known for his pro-Turkish stand. Toledano,
whose pro-Armenian stand and articles on Armenian genocide claims against
Turkey have come to light, went so far as to quarrel with Lewis on this issue, and
other scholars at Tel Aviv University report that the two professors are not on speak-
ing terms for this reason.
In [a] magazine published in Israel, it was stated that Turkish–Israeli relations
might be endangered due to this position of Toledano.
That’s not all. It’s also stated that Toledano distorted the facts, adopting a posi-
tion more pro-Armenian than an Armenian, with articles claiming that the Turks
conducted a genocide against the Armenians.
It was learned that the appointment of a man known for his clearcut identity in
Israel and known to be supported by the Armenian lobby in the USA, is causing
concern in the Netanyahu wing of the Israeli government; but [David] Levy, being
a member of a coalition party, objected to the bid to withdraw his nomination. It is
also claimed that Toledano, not being a professional diplomat, will harm the rela-
tions unfolding between Israel and Azerbaijan after Netanyahu’s visit to Baku. The
Armenian lobby and Armenian-Russian alliance will thus have an important
opportunity to torpedo Turkish–Azerbaijani–Israeli relations.
In view of all these developments, we can only say that, hopefully, the ambas-
sador’s biased approaches and view have been changed. We hope he has come to
grasp the greatness of the Turkish nation and its fairness, and the unfair treatment
it has endured. We hope he has achieved a perception of historical facts and recon-
sidered the position of his own country.
It’s not easy to perform duties in Ankara which will be one of the most conspic-
uous centres of the 21st century. For this reason the eyes of the Turkish nation will
be fixed on Toledano.34
It should be noted that Israel was aiding Azerbaijan to set aside US Congres-
sional Amendment 907, adopted during the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict
over Nagorno–Karabakh. Passed under pressure from the Armenian lobby in
the United States, the amendment precluded US aid to Azerbaijan. Unlike reser-
vations in Congress, the Administration in Washington has been eager to aid
Azerbaijan, which borders on Iran and grants American companies oil and gas
prospecting concessions.35
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The Armenian issue did damage the bilateral relations; concurrently, the
same Armenian issue proved how solid the relations are. In April 2000 the Israeli
Minister for Education, Yossi Sarid, participated in the commemoration gath-
ering held in Jerusalem, in memory of the Armenian victims of the First World
War. Sarid announced that from now on Israeli high-school syllabi will include
the 1915 plight of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey reacted by
officially boycotting the Israeli Independence Day reception held in Ankara a
fortnight later. It also raised the possibility – of course, reassured his audience
the Turkish Ambassador to Israel, nothing practical, only a theoretical possibil-
ity – that Turkey’s Secretary for Education would include the issue of the Jewish
Holocaust denial in Turkish schools’ syllabi.36 Both sides attempted to confine
the event to verbal or ceremonial reactions. The Foreign Office in Jerusalem
announced the Israeli official stand on the issue: “We accept that many Armeni-
ans perished in the wars that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. We sym-
pathise with the victims of these events. These events that brought so much
suffering to the Armenian people should not be forgotten.” The Israeli daily
Ha’aretz commented that with minor alterations this same official stand could
be used to express condolences on the death of Americans in the recent
influenza epidemic.37 An Israeli official in Jerusalem explained:
We are in a deep problem. Like others who enjoy good relations with Turkey, we
find ourselves between the hammer and the anvil. One small slip of a tongue and
immediately you face a federal case . . . It is extremely painful for us because our
Holocaust is recognised by the world. Each time when you talk about the Armen-
ian issue you have to think twice how on earth you should call “this thing.” Turkey
takes issue with whoever talks about the “Armenian genocide.” So our position
is that we recognise the plight of the Armenians, but we do our utmost to evade
historical circumstances and the question of who is to be blamed.38
Bitter conflicting views did come to light in Israel following the above. We have
already quoted Yehoshua Porat. Shimon Peres referred to the Armenian plight
as “tragedy, not genocide.” Tom Segev, a well-known publicist in Ha’aretz, men-
tioned another aspect: the Armenian case was not included in the curriculum of
Israeli schools because granting it a recognition, “might pose a competition
before the Jewish genocide. The Israeli culture of commemoration does not
accept that genocide could be a universal phenomenon. It presents the Jewish
extermination as a unique phenomenon.”39 Ha’aretz’s editorial was even
harsher: it blamed Israeli diplomacy for deliberately acting to forget the past of
another people. This is a problematic stand, warns the newspaper, in particular
in light of the Jewish struggle against Holocaust denial. It weakens the moral
stand of this fight, said Ha’aretz:
The Jewish people, a victim of the Holocaust, must remember the genocide of
another people. No diplomacy should stand in the way of it. It is wrong to assume
that there is an insoluble contradiction between political interests and a moral
stand. The problem is not Turkish pressures. The problem is to give up to them.40
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Palestinians and Armenians aside, and one easily discerns that the Israeli society
highly interests the Turks, in fact on certain occasions attracts and fascinates
them. “When you are in Israel, all your problems are solved the moment you
show a Turkish passport!” is but one of the enthusiastic descriptions.41 Many
aspects prevailing among the Israelis have become the subjects of inspection by
Turkish newspapers. Indeed, few of them have appointed permanent corre-
spondents who report from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.42 For instance, about the
conflict between orthodox and secular Jews: secular shop-owners in Jerusalem
found a way to bypass the Jewish orthodox ban to work on the Sabbath by sell-
ing their shops to Muslims for one Israeli shekel on Friday and buying them
back on Sunday morning. There are similar stories about the Batsheva Ballet
Dance Group that was forced to wear modest attire in accordance with religious
regulations; the division between men and women in Jewish Hassidic dancing;
the difficulties and homesickness of the newcomers to Israel; the Viagra sales
boom in Israel; the ban on playing music of the much loved by the Nazis com-
poser Richard Wagner; the fashion show of Israeli bathing suits that carried
Egyptian designs (“[Israeli–Arab] Peace on the Podium”); the television com-
mercial about a detergent that could clean even Monica Lewinski’s dress; the
high-quality politicians [sic] that the Israeli coalition government system
attracts; and so on.43 Israel is described as “Little America;” in certain areas it
surpasses America. True, you won’t find car industry in Israel but you do have
the IAI, Israel Aircraft Industry that produces sophisticated technologies and
aircraft. And also: “I took a bus from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv . . . Where are we? If
this is still the same desert we have been travelling on since Baghdad, then what
is this pasture all around me? This is a heaven created on the desert. The jour-
nalist in me wants to send out praises to those who have fought the desert with
determination and who have won.”44
The Turkish media attributed one simple reason to all these successes: it is
not foreign money that makes the miracle but the high priority and financial
assistance given to education, research and development, and industrializa-
tion.45 Israeli freedom of expression fascinates the Turkish correspondents: the
television often criticizes the government and could say anything about
Netanyahu, could call him a liar, crook, etc., and you will not be prosecuted. Try
– if you are brave enough – to do the same to Arafat, Mubarak, King Hussein,
Assad: you will immediately be jailed, in fact your life will then be in peril. And
the lesson as the Milliyet sees it: when the Arabs cherish freedom of speech, they
will be able to regain their rights.46
Occasionally, however, the above superlatives and their like are balanced by
calls for more realistic interpretations for the “Little America” phenomenon.
The country is described as the product of the money of rich American Jews,
which means that at its fiftieth anniversary (1998) Israel is still an artificial state,
heavily dependent on external support. Also, “What a pity” it was to establish
the state of Israel: it resulted from the guilt-conscience of the Europeans who
had committed the Holocaust plus the hypocrisy of British colonialism, US
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interests ,and the strong Jewish lobby therein. All made the country built upon
a lie, namely: the portrayal of Palestine as an empty place where you could “Give
the land without people to the people without a land.”47 Zaman’s Taha Kivanc
recorded the following in his “Notes from Jerusalem”:
Our businessmen who found many things to criticize in Amman in relation to the
city and the people, were a bit hasty in admiring everything they saw in Israel. Their
eye caught the richness and high technology used everywhere in Israel. This is
always very effective in impressing people. However, the businessmen did not even
care to listen to words such as, “These people have immigrated to Israel already
mastering knowledge and know-how. Half of Israel’s national income is US finan-
cial aid.” I think, however, that there are two important achievements in Israel: one
is that they have turned the desert green, and the other is that they have revived a
dead language and are using it as an everyday language. Everything besides these
two things can be bought by money or achieved by well-educated people.48
Admiration for the other is, many a time, not restricted to one side. Not surpris-
ing, therefore, that Israelis often envy the way things are determined and done in
Turkey, economy exclusive. “We should talk Turkish to the Palestinians/
Hizbullah/Syria/Iraq/Iran,” is the prevalent advice offered in Israeli media, in par-
ticular following the Syrian yielding as regards the presence of Abdullah Ocalan
in Damascus and the victory of the Turks over the PKK. Turkey’s credit among
the Israelis jumped sky-high when its F-15s forced an Iranian aircraft on its way
to Damascus to land in Dyarbakir. There its cargo was searched for weapons that
Tehran might have shipped to the Lebanese Hizbullah. Israel has also to learn
from Turkey how to impose secularism or how to give the coup de grace to the
old theocratic order, the same as Mustafa Kemal did, by abolishing the wearing of
the fez in 1925. (Israel needs an authoritative, secularly courageous leader like
Ataturk, insisted the writer). And, unlike the Israeli political system, the writer
called to learn from Turkey how to eliminate the influence of army Generals by
not appointing them to political posts. (“Aren’t there anymore civilians in Israel
that we choose our leaders from among the Generals?” asked an admirer of the
Turkish system). And so on. A selection of the titles of the articles that praise
Turkey read: “Talk to Him in Turkish,” “Take Turkey, For Example,” etc.49
Turkish authoritative assertiveness does attract the Israelis. Still, the follow-
ing quotation shows another kind of appreciation for the Turkish way. Note, for
instance, the plans to change massively the Yitzhak Rabin Suqare in Tel Aviv, the
place where the Israeli Prime Minister was murdered, and to turn parts of it into
a huge parking lot. “The largest public square in Tel-Aviv is being sacrificed . . .
but without a public square we are not a public,” declared the writer. However,
there exists a remedy, and not so far from Tel Aviv:
Recently I returned from Turkey our neighbour. There, they were wondering how
to commemorate one of the most unnecessary battles in human history: the battle
of Galipoli . . . After 85 years all the parties to the battle looked for a proper way to
remember it, and decided on an international competition on how to re-plan the
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place. The great surprise was that the plan that won the contest was the one which
strongly recommended neither to change nor to touch the site. His Excellency
the City Engineer of Tel-Aviv: you should not go so far, to Paris for instance, to learn
about squares, or to learn about the culture of designing public places, or how
to deal with a national/international commemoration of a site which is a fixed part
in the collective memory of the nation and of the world. Suffice it to stop at the
neighboring country. You will then be enlightened.50
Turkey: policies and attitudes towards Israel
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and termination of the cold war have
inspired changes in the roles of Israel and Turkey. Both prominent cold war
players since the late 1940s, the two countries have been cast into a fixed role
with the West, a state of affairs apparently immutable. The collapse of commu-
nism put this role in question (more evident in Turkey than in Israel) in both
countries, neither being located geographically in the West or Europe, even if
their leaders would have wished it otherwise. Likewise, the Ostpolitik pursued by
each of the two governments – that of Necmettin Erbakan, whose Muslim
visions rendered him less than eager for an extended honeymoon with Israel,
and Israel’s pursuit of a “New Middle East” (overwhelmingly identified with
Israel’s Labour Party Nobel Prize Laureate Shimon Peres) – served as catalysts in
the Israeli–Turkish rapprochement. When Turkey’s pro-Western secular mili-
tary establishment felt threatened by Erbakan’s Islamic policies, it stepped up
the pressure in the opposing direction, generating a steadily expanding interac-
tion with Israel. Similarly, when the May 1996 newly installed right-wing
Netanyahu government in Israel suspended contacts with Syria – thereby meet-
ing Turkish expectations – it was precisely at this point in the premierships of
Erbakan and Netanyahu that relations between their two countries scaled to
heights previously unknown. Bowing to military demands, Erbakan and the
seventeen Refah Partisi ministers of his cabinet endorsed the contract for the
upgrading in Israel of Turkish F-4 aircraft. The quid pro quo: consent of the
Turkish military to a limited reduction in the size and activity of the multilateral
force – actually Anglo-American units (known as Operation Provide Comfort
or as Operation Northern Watch), that monitor from Turkey the northern
regions of Iraq, north of the thirty-sixth parallel.
The sentiments portrayed here were best depicted by Ilhan Selcuk, a left-wing
Turkish intellectual not renowned for his pro-Israel sympathies. A summary of
his words in Cumhuriyet interprets the Israeli–Turkish rapprochement. Accord-
ing to Selcuk, Saudi Arabia and Iran, their mutual rivalry notwithstanding, share
the view of secular Kemalist Turkey as a threat. Even if they detest one another, all
the “pro-shari’a” groups, are the enemies of Turkey. All the Muslim states would
sense triumph should secular-Kemalist Turkey collapsed. Moreover, the Refah
Partisi is a Trojan horse playing along with these forces hostile to Turkey. Selcuk
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goes on to list Turkey’s enemies who supported the PKK: Armenia; Greece;
Syria; the Cypriot Greeks; Iran; and the Greek and Armenian lobbies in the
United States. According to Selcuk, that leaves Turkey with nobody but the Jewish
lobby and Israel, and all that is asked of Israel is to discharge its obligations to
the Palestinians. Selcuk concludes accordingly that, with Turkey encircled by the
hostility generated by cooperation between shari’a and Orthodoxy, “it is a vital
Turkish national interest to cooperate with Israel.” Israel relieves Turkey’s isolation
imposed by this wall of hostility, simultaneously fielding a Jewish American lobby
to counter-balance the Greek and Armenian lobbies.51
Ambassador Zvi Elpeleg explained Turkey’s interest in Israel: it is helpful
that the Turks believe in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and deduce there-
from that Israel is capable of swaying the whole world.52 The Turkish press often
describes Israel, in particular the James Bond like operations of the Mossad, as
capable of furnishing Turkey with intelligence and services beyond any imagi-
nation.53 Turkey notes the different standards applied towards Israel. For exam-
ple, German police treated leniently the shooting by Israeli security at Kurds
who stormed (February 1999) the Israeli consulate in Berlin in the aftermath of
the kidnapping of Abdullah Ocalan: notwithstanding Israel’s vehement denials,
its was widely assumed that the Mossad assisted Turkey in locating the PKK
leader. If it was Turkish security, Germany’s reaction would have been totally
different, complained the Turkish the press. In a similar event in Berne some
years ago, the Turkish ambassador to Switzerland had been declared persona non
grata.54 The conclusion: let us befriend the Israelis.
In fact, Israel and its subsidiaries do undertake ramified lobbying efforts on
Turkey’s behalf. Shimon Peres’s intervention with his colleagues in the Council
of Europe, the European Parliament and the Socialist International, convinced
many of them to shelve their objections to the customs union that the EU con-
cluded with Turkey early in 1996. Israel has acted similarly on Turkey’s behalf in
the United States, particularly in toning down congressional criticism of Turkey
over its treatment of the Kurds, human rights, rights of political association and
freedom of speech, imprisonment of journalists, restrictions on free press, etc.
The American Jewish Committee (AJC) and B’nai B’rith are the forefront of
acting on behalf of Turkey in the United States however, often at a cost – the
anger and distaste of other ethnic groups, especially the Armenian and Greek
Americans, and criticism in the American public opinion. “I can not stress
enough that for Americans, a free press – that is the freedom to express contrary
views in print – is absolutely fundamental to our definition of a functioning
democracy,” stated the representative of the AJC to his Turkish audience in
Istanbul. “I am selfish,” he added: improvements in the above fields would
deprive hostile lobbies of ammunition and help winning the battles on the Capi-
tol Hill on Turkey’s favour.55 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has
also protested over Israel supporting the Turkish campaign against the station-
ing of S-300 missiles on Cyprus.56 In all, Israeli efforts have achieved a mixed
success: the US Administration is interested in closer ties with Turkey, but
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Congress remains critical. The alternative seemed obvious as the Radikal ana-
lyzed it: “Turkey is in search of a country to buy arms without being confronted
with the human-rights, Kurdish and Cyprus issues, and Israel needs a country
to sell its arms to.”57
Similarly disappointing was the flat rejection the EU handed out to Turkey
in Luxembourg, in December 1997, and the ensuing fallout in the EU–Ankara
relations. Turkish Airlines’ renewal of its fleet of a 2.5 billion dollar budget went
for forty-nine Boeing 737–800 airliners, granting the US manufacturer prefer-
ence over its European Airbus competitors. While Prime Minister Rabin and
Secretary Peres found it relatively easy to promote the Turkey of President Ozal
and of Prime Minister Ciller, the succeeding Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin
Netanyahu – himself not exactly persona grata in the West (he complained that
the American press portrayed him as “A Western Saddam Hussein”) – certainly
had it much harder to intervene on behalf of Turkey’s Muslim Prime Minister,
Necmettin Erbakan.58
The Israeli–Turkish rapprochement was a further episode in the domestic
stand-off, setting Turkey’s Western, secular, military establishment at logger-
heads with the religious parties and organizations. It looks as if Turkey’s secular
military establishment dictated a public policy of rapprochement with Israel, in
spite of domestic Muslim opposition, sometimes disregarding complaints over
the flouting of proper democratic procedures in implementing ties with Israel,
and regardless of Refah’s traditional anti-Israel and anti-Semitic positions
(more of which later).59 Turkey’s Islamic press linked efforts to close down the
Imam schools (Imam Hatip Lycee) to the collaboration between Turkish Gener-
als and Israel.60 Particular indignation was directed against General Cevik Bir,
Turkey’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief, who was portrayed as tough and
extremely anti-religious. It should be recalled that Bir is the Turkish signatory
on the military cooperation accords with Israel.
Domestic Turkish differences may also be linked to the events that erupted
early in February 1997 in the Ankara suburb of Sincan, a working-class town, 25
miles from Ankara. “Jerusalem Day” was marked there by anti-Israel protests,
with stone-throwing at actors depicting Israeli soldiers, the burning of the
Israeli flag, and a vigorously anti-Israel speech – also calling for adoption of the
Muslim shari’a as Turkey’s future law – from the Iranian ambassador Raza
Bageri. The latter cursed and reviled the United States, and promised Sadat’s fate
would befall anyone signing agreements with Israel. The reaction of the Turkish
army was exceptionally forceful. The following day, tanks, personnel carriers
and other military vehicles churned up the streets of Sincan. A military
spokesman denied any connection between the military movements and the
Muslim rally. (“We held routine maneuvres. That is the normal route the tanks
take. Are they supposed to hover over the neighborhood?”). Sincan mayor, Bekir
Yildiz, of the Refah Partisi, was dismissed from his post on the orders of the Inte-
rior Minister. Indicted with others on charges of disrupting public order, aiding
an armed gang, and disseminating religious hatred, he was sentenced to four
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years and seven months’ imprisonment. The Iranian ambassador was declared
persona non grata, whereupon Iran expelled the Turkish ambassador and
another diplomat. (In September 1997 the two ambassadors returned to their
respective posts).61
A further expression of Islamic protest was the attempt on 19 May 1996 to
assassinate President Demirel in the west Turkish city of Izmit. The would-be
assassin justified his act as a response to the conclusion of the military agree-
ment with Israel. In addition, the Muslim press knew to tell about the Israeli
ambassador’s excessive involvement in Turkey’s domestic affairs, serving as the
“confidant” of the Generals in plotting the toppling of Erbakan’s government.62
Refah and Israel
Of special interest is the domestic Turkish response – by the Refah party primar-
ily – to relations with Israel. We have already noted that bilateral relations flour-
ished – contrary to Refah’s declared wishes – particularly during Necmettin
Erbakan’s term as Prime Minister. This calls for a more detailed explanation.
The Refah and its leaders adopted intransigent positions vis-à-vis Israel,
notably so prior to Erbakan’s elevation to Prime Minister, but it was also evident
during his incumbency. Islamic organs depicted Israel as “abnormal” by com-
parison with existing states. Not merely the state of its inhabitants, Israel is also
the state of all Jews, every Jew in the world has the right to settle there, yet it pos-
sesses neither constitution nor recognized boundaries.63 Israel’s creed, Judaism,
was described as a fundamentally political religion, actually the most political of
all faiths. Its aim is to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates, actually to Nevse-
hir in Kapadokia and to Sanliurfa in the southeast of Turkey: the two blue stripes
in the Israeli flag symbolize the Tigris and the Euphrates. Israel, thus, is a double
enemy of Turkey: she harbours expansionist dreams pertaining to her territory,
and supports the establishment of a Kurdish state, clearly contrary to Turkey’s
interests. The leadership of the Fazilet party – successor to the Refah – termed
Israel as a “questionable country of three million,” which means that for a huge
country like Turkey to look to Israel for guidance in its foreign policy, “is not
only a historical mistake but an international scandal.” Furthermore, a Turkish
newspaper explained that the Refah had to close down, eventually to be suc-
ceeded by the Fazilet, to get rid of the “Zionist and Jewish domination” among
its high echelons, in particular to purify itself of the corrupting influence of the
powerful Turkish Jewish community.64
Anyone concluding an agreement with Israel must be on constant alert, said
the Refah, for Jews love no one but themselves. Anyone in close contact with
Jews is never content, as experience has shown over the generations.65 Israel also
foments dissension between Turkey and its neighbours: even though Turkey and
Iran have had no border conflict for centuries, Israel was inciting Turkey against
Iran, or revealing the close military secrets of Turkey’s neighbours (for example:
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Turkey was provided with the secrets of the Syrian MIG-29).66 Furthermore, at
cocktail parties the Israeli embassy holds, alcohol is consumed like water and
toasts are drunk “to honour the massacre of Muslims. Every imaginable evil
occurred at these Independence Day parties.”67 But Turkey is not alone: Israel
had become the problem of the entire Muslim world, for its establishment had
shunted the Jewish problem from Europe to Asia, from the Christian world to
the Muslim sphere. As far as Muslim Turkey is concerned the danger is double:
the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul pursues the same plans as the Jews
have in the past. The latter waited for 2000 years to establish a state, finally real-
ized it by buying land during the time of the British Mandate over Palestine.
Alas, this is the same tactic used by the Greeks in Turkey today.68
The conclusions as to the policy Turkey should adopt towards Israel are self-
evident: the close bilateral relationship with Israel would transform Turkey into
a Middle Eastern country detached from Europe or into a confrontation state in
conflict with Iraq, Syria and Iran – effectively with the entire Arab world. More-
over, the rapprochement with Israel is at the expense of potential Turkish links
with the Balkan states, Greece, and the Turkic republics of Central Asia. All this
would be a boon to Israel, but a burden on Turkey: the latter had paved the road
but Israel would reap the fruits. The conclusion: “Let us not make Israel our
enemy but let us not get too close.”69 Defining the Israeli–Turkish rapproche-
ment as the most significant development in Turkey’s foreign policy in the past
fifty years, the writer, Aydin Menderes of the Refah, drew the disconcerting
conclusion that Turkey has no proper assessment of the drastic consequences
and damage arising from this change. “Unrestricted Turko–Israeli friendship
is unrealistic,” he affirmed.70
Many in Turkey found these anti-Israeli, even anti-Semitic tones disturb-
ing. Several months ahead of the formation of the Erbakan government, Presi-
dent Demirel offered the following comments in an address to Turkey’s National
Security Council:
Are the Turks, who did not engage in anti-Semitism 500 years ago, now to become
anti-Semites? . . . Was the Islam of 500 years ago more progressive than the Islam of
our time? Is that which was not done then [i.e. anti-Semitism, persecution] to be
done now? If Refah achieves office, it will have to display tolerance and equality,
which were granted to Jews, Armenians and Greeks by the Sultan 500 years ago.71
Indeed, when the Refah took office, a change did become evident. Amazingly,
when Erbakan’s term of office came to an end, his government found itself
praised for its activist policy towards Israel! Refah representatives did not boy-
cott Israel. On the contrary, at the governmental, parliamentary and municipal
levels, Refah ministers, members of parliament, and mayors acted to reassure
the Jewish community, as well as holding overt contacts with diplomats from
the Israeli embassy. It seemed that above all the benefit of Turkey’s interests
called for businesslike relations with Israel, devoid of the ugly rhetoric men-
tioned above.72 The Islamic press even underwent a process of “soul-searching.”
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Its conclusion held the Refah Partisi (RP) to blame for the situation wherein
Israel was Turkey’s sole friend. Were it not for Refah’s enmity towards the West,
Europe, and the EU, Turkey would not have been left with no ally but Israel.73
On leaving office in mid-1997, the Erbakan government (including, it will
be recalled, the Refah along with Tansu Ciller’s “True Path Party,” better known
as the Refah-Yol coalition), gained startling praise for the policy of rapproche-
ment with Israel adopted during its term in power. Ambassador Elpeleg likewise
offered his praises. In response to the question: “What is preferable: a meek
Erbakan within the government, or an Islamic movement – unbridled, anti-
Israeli and anti-Western – excluded from power?” he replied:
Things look different when seen from the Turkish end. There are numerous advan-
tages to Erbakan being in power – first and foremost from the viewpoint of the
grave socio-economic difficulties afflicting Turkey. Erbakan’s party is presently the
only party to take heed of the tribulations of the millions deserting the villages in
the East and streaming into the large cities, the only party attempting to combat
retardation.74
We shall conclude this section of the chapter by quoting the words of Nazif
Akumus in Yeni Gunaydin, where he summed up the Refah–YOL coalition and
its Israeli policy, suggesting, in “a mixture of humour and reality,” that Israel
would miss Erbakan:
During the Refah–Yol government, it was assumed that relations with Israel would
be impaired (albeit not suspended) and that the warm atmosphere would cool down
and that there would be a reversal to the previous climate. However, Necmettin
Erbakan surprised everybody in this matter, as in others. He contributed to fostering
the relations with Israel, whom he had been accusing for years of being the architect
of “Zionism.” So much so that the news arriving from Israel last month, following
the demise of the Refah–Yol government . . . was accompanied by remarks such as,
“we were more comfortable, and our relations were more mature, during the
Refah–Yol government.” What’s more, the headlines of an Israeli paper – “we miss
the RP government” – reflected a mixture of humour and reality.
Although the agreements with Israel evoked reactions in the Arab world and
angered some radical groups in Turkey, we consider it the most appropriate policy
of recent years in Turkish foreign policy. Particularly on the terrorist issue, we
believe that both countries, marching hand in hand, will take the Middle East a
long way forward. We have observed some of the results and we have more hopes
for the future.75
Turkey–Israel: the military aspect
Israeli–Turkish military cooperation touches upon a number of principal
domains: air, sea, land (infantry, armour), aircraft industries, armament indus-
tries, missile manufacture, intelligence, and so on. The financial aspect of this
interaction is unknown – modernization of Turkish military planes and armour
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in Israel is among the few items whose cost has been made public – but is easily
assessed as running into hundreds of millions of dollars if not more. The flow is
not exclusively one way – that is to say, Israeli military sales to Turkey. On the
contrary, Israel pays for use of sophisticated Turkish military installations and
installs Turkish-made components in its weaponry. Cooperation is close, insti-
tutionalized and structured: steering committees, regular meetings, strategic
dialogues at fixed intervals, with the hierarchy of deliberations reaching the
most senior echelons, i.e., defense secretaries or even higher. Sales of Israeli
weapon systems to Turkey frequently include cooperation with local manufac-
turers who produce some of the components, or share in assembling the
final product. Thus, systems for locating and rescuing pilots are manufactured
in Israel (by the Tadiran corporation), but assembled in Turkey by the local
munitions concern, Aselsan.76
The Reliant Mermaid, the annual American–Turkish–Israeli tripartite naval
rescue exercise held in the Eastern Mediterranean since early 1998, hinged upon
the purely humanitarian effort of maritime rescues. The parties thereto were
revealed to the public, leaving room for conjecture that Israeli–Turkish interac-
tion, the surprising Jordanian attendance (composing together “The region’s
three sane countries”),77 and the American backing it receives, are now suffi-
ciently robust and profound to permit the parties to exhibit their shared non-
military endeavors. Indeed, the navies of Turkey and Israel hold maritime
exercises, and operation Reliant Mermaid was preceded by naval maneuvres in
the summer of 1996. In addition, the Israeli navy trains at Turkish diving facili-
ties, where it benefits from lower prices than the equivalent cost of such special
training in Germany or Britain.78
Intermittently – arousing by this the concern and wrath of its Arab sisters –
Jordan deviates from the Middle Eastern Arab vehement objection to the
Israeli–Turkish cooperation. Accordingly, Jordanian officials and navy officers
attended the Reliant Mermaid and other Turkish–Israeli military forums. This is
an understandable, prudent move, by an inherently weak country – more than 3
percent annual population growth, 30 percent unemployment, 30 percent living
below the poverty line, 3,500 dollar GNP per capita, a 7 billion dollar foreign
debt – which is periodically threatened by its mightier Arab neighbours, as well
as by Muslim and Palestinian radicalism. Started in 1996, secret Turkish–
Jordanian military cooperation – secret for fearing other Arab countries’ vocif-
erous condemnation – was extended to the above mentioned trilateral contacts.
Interestingly, it was Jordan’s King Hussein who initiated this extension. In April
2000 a Turkish jet fighter crashed, its pilot killed while training in Jordan, thus
revealing the extent of Turkish–Jordanian cooperation. More intriguing is the
Jordanian airforce becoming the third “leg” to the aerial interaction between
Turkey and Israel. A low-profile 1984 Turkish–Jordanian military cooperation
agreement, turned in the late 1990s into intensive interaction, “the most signif-
icant cooperation [that Turkey has] other than NATO.” It included regularly
conducted reciprocal high-level military visits, a telephone hotline service
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between military commanders, exchanges of troops for training purposes, and
aircraft use of one another’s air space for training runs. The Turkish airforce
provided training programs to Jordanian pilots and ground personnel: Jordan-
ian F-16 pilots underwent flight simulation training in Turkey, and Turkish-built
CN-235 light transport aircraft were leased to Jordan. Exchanging infantry
troops increased steadily since 1997: from infantry squads, to fully equipped bat-
talions, to entire divisions in 1999. Land forces from both countries are trying to
familiarize themselves with the different topographic conditions of Turkey and
Jordan, and the troops from both countries were transported with Turkish C-
130 (Hercules) cargo aircraft. Most interestingly, both armies have been training
each other in cartography and in language. Military teachers from both coun-
tries are assigned to one another’s military academics, where Jordanians teach
Arabic to Turkish cadets and Turks teach Turkish to Jordanians.79
Israeli–Turkish military cooperation is reported in detail in world media,
and we shall list here only its principal elements. Most of the bilateral military
exercises are kept under heavy secrecy. Computerized battlefield simulations for
the land forces are conducted regularly in Turkey and Israel. In one of the war
games both countries troops – up to the battalion level – served as peacekeepers
in a virtual country examining, inter alia, their ability to act in harmony. Israeli
officers found these simulations to be of particular value because of the experi-
ence the Turkish side has gained in similar NATO exercises.80
The modernization in the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) of Turkish planes –
fifty-four F-4s (Phantoms) and forty-eight F-5s – at a cost, including interest, of
900 million dollars, is probably the most publicized military deal done between
the two countries.81 Under the December 1996 agreement, upgrading of the F-
4s is to be completed by 2006–8; the first plane will be dispatched back to Turkey
thirty-three months after its arrival in Israel. (Turkish critics claimed that the F-
4s would end their metal life in 2010 and shortly afterwards the planes would
have to be grounded, hence the entire package lacks any military or economic
rationale.) The Turkish planes are to undergo structural improvements, and be
fitted with radar systems, computerized aeronautical systems, navigation sys-
tems, electronic warfare systems and armament to improve the planes’ perfor-
mance in bombing missions. The IAI also will do the upgrading of the Turkish
airforce C-130 cargo aircraft. The Israeli C-130 modernization package solves
the financial problem of airforces that have hundreds of C-130 but are finding it
difficult to replace them with the modern version (C-130J). Among other ben-
efits, these upgrading projects are of importance to Israel in creating thousands
of jobs in its aircraft industry.82
The contract for modernization of the F-4s was prefaced by a February 1996
agreement for mutual military visits, training and exercises, dispatch of
observers to oversee military exercises, staff exchanges, and acquisition of mili-
tary know-how. By virtue of this agreement – concluded for a five-year term and
subsequently to be extended annually – the two airforces and navies are to hold
mutual visits and joint exercises. Concomitantly, the agreement stresses that
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when the soldiers of either signatory are on the territory of the other, they shall
not be involved in conflicts between the host state and any third party.83
The training exercises of the two airforces are held eight times annually, a
week each time, four deployments in each country. The joint exercises in Turkey
(at first joint exercises were excluded, hence the Israelis trained without the
participation of Turkish planes, without armament, and without electronic sur-
veillance equipment), are held at the Konya firing range. Overland exercises are
a novelty for the Israeli pilots, improving their skills in dealing with land targets;
due to Israel’s diminutive size, the Israeli airforce generally trains over the
Mediterranean. Turkish pilots train at Israel’s computerized firing range, and
at the Nevatim airfield. In June 2001 a triple cooperation took place when
American Air Force F-16s deployed in Germany joined the training over Konya.
(The Anatolian Eagle, the tri-party aerial cooperation for 2002, was supposed to
include thirty warplanes from each of the three participants).84
There were also non-combat features in the two airforces’ activity; their
interaction is so intensive that they could also afford the ceremonial side. For
instance, Israeli F-15s took part in an aerial display in Turkey (June 2001), to
celebrate the ninetieth anniversary of the Turkish airforce. Likewise, Turkish
airforce senior officers and combat pilots came to Israel and participated in a
highly televised event to commemorate the flight of two Ottoman pilots (“the
Neil Armstrong and Charles Lindberg of Turkey”). The two crashed (1913) with
their small French-made aircraft near the Sea of Galilee, on their way from
Istanbul to Alexandria.85
Another domain wherein Israel and Turkey – and since 1999 the Royal
Jordanian airforce – collaborate is their airforces’ intentions to establish a radar
network to pinpoint and identify migration routes of predatory birds in the
autumn and spring, to minimize the chances of aircraft–birds collision. Alto-
gether, some ninety Turkish F-16 pilots have already received training in rela-
tion to bird–plane collisions and related Israeli safety regulations. (In 1995 an
Israeli F-15 crashed, its two pilots killed, following a collision with a bird.
During the last twenty-five years 170 European and Israeli military aircraft were
badly damaged, and more than thirty pilots killed, in aircraft–bird collisions.)
Seven radar stations are to cover Turkish and Israeli airspace, providing
updated information on bird migration along the Europe–Africa route. Turkey
will be able to give Israel and Jordan a two-day warning of the autumn migra-
tion, while Israel and Jordan will provide Turkey with a similar alert in advance
of the spring migration.86 It seems that the same thinking that the Reliant Mer-
maid disseminated, is applicable here as well: the real interaction between the
air forces is sufficiently robust which enables them to exhibit their shared non-
military endeavors
When the airforces’ training proved successful, other areas were included.
Sales were reported of the Israeli Python 4 air-to-air missiles to Turkey and of the
Israeli made Ehud reconstruction system for the Turkish airforce dog-fight train-
ing. (Ehud enables the reconstruction of all flight stages, plus a warning system
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against mid-air collisions between aircraft.) Refuelling tankers were also supplied
to the Turkish airforce; the cost would be covered by credit given by Israeli banks
to the Turkish airforce. In August 1996, an agreement was concluded between the
two countries’ arms industries. Various publications point to Israeli–Turkish
collaboration in manufacture and sale of the Popeye surface-to-air missiles;
Turkish manufacture of the Israeli infantry rifle, Galil; formulation of defensive
doctrines against ballistic missiles; eventual Turkish participation in production
of Israel’s Hetz (Arrow) anti-missile-missile; and joint manufacture of the
jet-propelled, 400 km. range Delilaha cruise missile. It was also reported that the
Turks voiced great interest in intelligence and other data transmitted by
the OFEK satellite that Israel has recently launched into space.87
The offer of the Israeli Merkava (Chariot) Mark 3 tank for sale to Turkey, and
modernization of Turkey’s M60A3 (Patton) tanks, mark growing interaction
between the two countries in relation to their ground forces. Turkey’s armoured
units comprise 3,000 Patton tanks, 900 of which are suitable for upgrading.
Israeli tank-promotion proposals include fitting the Patton with a 120 mm
Merkava gun, endowing the aging tank with new artillery capabilities in range
and the penetrative power of its shells. The Patton’s American engine will be
replaced by the 1,000 hp German MTU one. In all, the upgrading project will
include improvement in the tank’s artillery capability; an improved capacity for
survival by more effective armouring; improvement in the precision of the
“tankionics” by installation of an advanced fire-control system and command
systems; day and night vision systems for the tank commander and gunner; and
improving the tank’s performance by installation of a stronger engine, etc.
The saving in time and money makes it probable that the Turkish army
will adopt the Israeli offer: modernization of a Patton takes two months, at a cost
ranging between 1 million and 2.25 million dollars; a new tank, it should be
recalled, costs 5–6 million dollars. (Indeed, the Turkish army has examined the
procurement of new tanks – the Abrahams, the LeKlerk, the Challenger, the Leop-
ard, and the T-90 Main Battle Tank, offered to it by the United States, France, the
UK, Germany and Russia, respectively.) Within a short while major parts of the
work could be done in Turkey in a production line for upgraded Pattons, offered
by TA’AS, the Israeli military industry, to MKEK, its Turkish parallel.
But the tank deal is of wider importance: closer bilateral relations require
Israel to discard the veil of secrecy surrounding its weapons development pro-
grammes. With growing collaboration between the two defense establishments,
Israel increasingly shares its arms production secrets with Turkey. This becomes
obvious with the offer to sell Turkey the Merkava tank: as part of the agreement
on cooperation in military technology, Israel is willing to set up production lines
for the Merkava in Turkey. Israel’s arms supply has thus been attractive to
Turkey because it is followed by the transfer of military technology and know-
how. (There is one exception: the transfer of Israeli technology or weapon sys-
tems that were developed with American participation is subject to US approval,
which is not always granted.)
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This clearly coincides with Ankara’s declared policy of becoming more self-
sufficient in meeting its own military requirements. Mutual trust thus brings
about mutual interests that produce mutual dependency, and all combine to
create collaboration in the most sensitive and secretive domains. Next to the
close cooperation that the IDF, IAI and TA’AS have with the US armed forces
and military establishment, the level of intimacy with the Turkish military is of
the highest degree.88
A number of elements here come together: Israel’s position as fifth in rank
among the world’s arms producers; Turkish plans for arms procurement, mod-
ernization and refitting for its army which is the largest in Europe and second
only to the US army in NATO. Approximately one-third of Turkey’s annual mil-
itary budget is devoted to modernization and weapons upgrading. These plans
run in the stunning range of 150 billion dollar over the next twenty-five years
(60 billion dollars for the ground forces, 25 billion for the navy and 65 billion
for the airforce). And, as noted, the fact that local production of weapon systems
covers a mere 21 percent of Turkey’s needs produce calls for more self-suffi-
ciency. In addition, Israel is ready – in particular its Foreign and Defense min-
istries – to increase its imports from Turkey and to lower tariffs and customs on
imported Turkish goods (cement, cast iron, textiles, food, agriculture products,
etc.), even at the expense and protest of local producers who face bankruptcy.
The story was apparently a simple one: the economic crisis in the Far East
strongly hit Turkish steel exports to that region. The next step was the damping
of the Israeli market with cheap Turkish steel. Turkish iron, offered in Israel for
230 dollar a ton, is cheaper by 40 dollars in comparison to locally produced cast
iron. NESHER, the Israeli cement industry, was more successful: it managed to
keep its monopoly by enforcing a high tax over the import of Turkish cement,
thus infuriating Turkish cement exporters and Israeli customers, who look for
cheaper cement. The need to buttress the strategic cooperation justifies Israeli
deficits in its civil trade with Turkey.89
Turkey is also considering the manufacture of a helicopter suited to its
needs, and is looking for a partner; it intends to produce in Turkey some 95 per-
cent of the aircraft’s components. Thus, Turkey’s defense needs, the Israeli arms
industry, and Israel’s willingness to share with Turkey its manufacturing tech-
niques, and its readiness for joint production of weapons, thereby stepping up
Turkey’s local output, all combine to generate the expansive and qualitative mil-
itary cooperation portrayed here.90
Intelligence cooperation constitutes a principal span in Israeli–Turkish
rapprochement. This is a domain in which speculation is rife, but Turkey’s loca-
tion between the three states of special interest to Israel (Syria, Iraq, Iran), and
Israel’s joint border with Syria (a matter of interest to Turkey), leave little scope
for assuming anything but the existence of close Israeli–Turkish intelligence ties.
The two countries act extensively in scrutinizing initiatives for the development
of non-conventional weaponry in the Middle East, keeping watch on occur-
rences of radicalism, and ideological or religious terrorism, threats to energy
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sources in the Middle East and Central Asia, developments in the Muslim
republics of Central Asia and Iranian influence in that region, etc. Intelligence
cooperation between Israel and Turkey comprises exchanges of information,
routine intelligence briefings, analyses of data, including that collected by Israeli
satellites, and tripartite deliberations involving agencies from the United States,
Israel and Turkey.
Civil cooperation
With the purpose of tempering criticism, domestic and external, over its military
collaboration with Israel, Turkey stresses that the military element is no more
than one portion of the interaction between the two countries. The contract for
modernizing the Phantoms is nothing extraordinary, claimed the Turkish paper
Zaman, citing the then Foreign Minister, Tansu Ciller, to specify details of exist-
ing agreements between the two countries. Israeli–Turkish annual trade already
reaches a volume of one billion dollars – weapons and tourism excluded – the
largest volume of bilateral trade between any two countries in the Middle East.
Fifteen percent of Turkey’s Middle Eastern trade – oil-producing countries
inclusive – is with Israel. The Israeli–Turkish Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed
in 1996 and ratified in April 1997, and the custom-free arrangements and agree-
ments for the avoidance of double taxation that each country has or plans to
conclude (for instance, Israel with the Unites States, Turkey with the EU, etc.),
opened new venues. Current trade already enjoys these agreements: Turkey sells
duty-free products to Israel; Israel adds its own finishing and sells them free of
duty to the United States. Indeed, since the ratification of the FTA and the inclu-
sion of textile and agricultural products in the agreement, the bilateral trade
volume increased by 100 percent. All project 2 billion dollars or more in mutual
trade from the early years of the twenty-first century. Optimists claim that multi-
billion figure to be on top of military trade and the movement of tourists
between the two countries. Alongside close military ties – roughly one-third of
bilateral relations – there is extensive and much larger civil interaction between
Turkey and Israel, with great potential for further expansion and longevity.
The bodies that plan the future relations stressed they were aiming at a realistic
4 billion dollar annual bilateral cooperation.91
Zaman specified thirteen spheres of Israeli–Turkish agreement and cooper-
ation, correct for October 1996, eleven of them of non-military in nature.92 This
interaction is to be found in the fields of culture, education and science; cooper-
ation relating to environment and nature protection; mail and telecommunica-
tions; the campaign against smuggling of drugs and narcotic substances; health
and agriculture; regulation of trade free of customs and duties; encouragement
and protection of financial investments; prevention of dual taxation; agreements
on technical and economic cooperation, etc. For comparison with Israeli–
Turkish trade links, it is worth studying Turkey’s commercial ties with Greece.
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Overshadowed by the dispute between the two countries, mutual Turkish–Greek
trade attained a volume of a mere 430 million dollars (year 1995) for a joint pop-
ulation that comprises 75 million. Businessmen from the two countries agreed
that, were mutual trade to reach 2 billion dollars, politicos in Ankara and Athens
would be more circumspect about disrupting bilateral relations.93 In view of the
data relating to current trade, and the outlook for the years to come, Israel and
Turkey seem unlikely to allow the disruption of relations between them.
Israeli–Turkish trade has taken a significant quantum leap. In 1991, mutual
trade totaled 100 million dollars; by 1995, it had passed the 440 million dollar
mark; and by 2000 it approached the 1 billion dollar target. As a further illus-
tration, in 1987, Turkish exports to Israel totaled 19.8 million dollars, while
Israeli exports to Turkey came to 34.3 million dollars. In other words, mutual
trade totaling 54.1 million dollars is less than 5.5 percent of the current figures.
Up to 1993, Israel held the upper hand – its exports to Turkey exceeded Turk-
ish exports to Israel. As of 1994, Turkey has steadily pulled ahead, with an annual
surplus of 50 million dollars in its favour. Turkish exports to Israel include,
among other things, textiles, industrial products, food products, cement, cast
iron, building material, electronics, glass, stone items, car tyres, raw materials,
grains, cement, and major construction projects like the NATBAG 2000, the
extension of the Ben-Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. The main constituents of Israel’s
exports to Turkey are chemicals, plastics, computers, air conditioners, medical
equipment, telecommunications, drilling and seismic mapping, medical insur-
ance policies for the use by Turkish citizens in Israeli hospitals, irrigation equip-
ment, etc. In February 2000, six agriculture irrigation projects totaling 600
million dollar, part of Turkey’s GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project), were allo-
cated to Israeli companies. By virtue of its geographical proximity, Turkey’s high-
tech exports to Israel, including products of assembly electronics, compete
successfully with electronic firms from the Far East, as well as with their Israeli
counterparts. The average monthly wage of a Turkish production worker is
300–400 dollars; an engineer makes 1,000 dollars. Parallel Israeli figures are 300
percent higher. In 1992, for instance, monthly minimum wage in Turkey was
210.80 dollars, the equivalent figure in Israel was 507 dollars. Since the late 1990s
the gap has widened because of the economic crisis that Turkey suffers from.
However, one of the results of the crisis has been that more Israeli companies
have moved their factories to Turkey; on average their spending on labour wages
has reduced by 58 percent.94
Israeli–Turkish commerce is also affected by Turkey’s trade links with the
EU. Under the customs union agreed in January 1996, duties on goods traded
between Turkey and the EU are being phased out progressively – 70 percent of
the reductions had been completed by August 1993, the remainder are in the
process of accelerated elimination. However, elimination of Turkish duties on
imports from the EU had a detrimental effect upon Israeli exports to Turkey and
their competitiveness with the European products. This was partly rectified
when the Turkish–Israeli free trade zone came into effect.95
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Israeli tourism to Turkey is likewise a flourishing Turkish export sector, so is
the joint venture of marketing Turkey and Israel together to tourists from Japan
and the United States. Some 350,000 Israelis have visited Turkey annually since
1994 – altogether, 15 percent of the Israelis who took trips abroad chose Turkey
– spending an average of 1,000 dollars per head, while their casino wagers (i.e.
losses) come to 1.5 billion dollars annually. For comparison, the annual sum total
of all betting in Israel is 1.5 billion dollars.96 With an annual turnover of 1.85 bil-
lion dollars, the tourist industry further tilts the bilateral trade balance in
Turkey’s favor. The number of Israelis visiting Turkey has recently dropped: in
1997 it was down to 300,000 as it also was in 2001. The reduction in numbers of
casinos is one reason, but the Turkish ambassador to Israel explained that “Israeli
tourists want to travel overseas.” In other words, Turkey has become “too Israeli”
for their taste, and they see no obvious difference between a vacation there or at
home. Still, by the year 2002, the number had not declined any further.
Israeli tourism in Turkey, and Israeli-Turkish commerce, reflect the robust
character of bilateral relations. Nothing can compare with civilian trade as an
illustration of the extent of interstate relations. Only a calm climate of confidence
in long-term relations could facilitate trade on the scale specified. Tourists and
investment in tourism – possibly the element most indicative of a friendly,
relaxed atmosphere, and confidence in its preservation – are the most prominent
characteristics of extensive non-military relations between Israel and Turkey. In
1986, 7,000 Israelis visited Turkey; in 1992 160,000; and, as already noted, from
1994 onwards some 300,000–350,000 annually, out of some 2 million Israelis
touring the world each year.
Cultural Turkish–Israeli exchanges thrive. People to People projects and
more than thirty agreements enable contacts between Turkish universities,
research institutes, and medical schools. The University of Ankara, the Middle
East Technical University, Bilkent, Bogazici, Galatasaray, Bilge, Konya, Antalya,
and Kirikkale have been visited by scientists and faculty from all seven Israeli
universities and scientific research centres. Hundreds of trainees from both
countries have participated in scientific seminars and instruction courses. Vio-
linists, pianists, and other musicians, opera singers, orchestras, ballet and dance
groups, perform at each other’s festivals. (“Cafe Istanbul” was the name given to
the performance of Turkish musicians in Israel in winter 2002.) Turkish and
Israeli film weeks, architecture, painting, carpet and photograph exhibitions
won much success and acclaim. The Ottoman carpets exhibition in Jerusalem,
and the Israeli “Bread” photograph exhibition, drew large crowds. The latter,
shown in Istanbul in June 1998, centred on the many symbolic meanings of
bread in different cultures. The Turkish Cancer Association displayed pho-
tographs of the Israeli model, Ariella Shavid, who had her breasts removed
owing to cancer. Shavid went on with her life, without altering her post-surgery
appearance, sending a message of courage and pride to other breast cancer
patients. Turkish university students who spent their summer in Israeli kibbutz;
high-school students from Israel who visit schools in Turkey, lecture and show
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videos, and are hosted by Turkish families with children of similar age, have
added a great deal to the People to People projects.97 The result of all this is that
broad circles of Israelis and Turks have a direct interest in continued contacts, in
enhancing their business, and preventing or minimizing any upheavals between
Ankara and Jerusalem. Recalling the aforementioned example from
Turkish–Greek relations, politicians and soldiers in both places may be expected
to do their utmost to prevent the collapse of the bilateral relationship.
However, problems do arise. Political and religious objections, as well
as economic and commercial complaints, intermittently threaten to mar the
above described rapprochement. Turkish employees in Israel experience poor
working conditions, their passports are kept by their employers, and companies
usually do not pay their full wages to discourage them from leaving for better
jobs. Those who nevertheless prefer not to stay on, do not see their passports
again: the companies, so the rumour says, sell the passports in Istanbul, now
stamped with the highly sought-after Israeli work permit visa, to new job seek-
ers. Alternatively, the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv demands 700 dollars for a new
passport.98 On the other hand, complained the Turkish daily, Radikal, “Our
workers get into trouble for harassing women.” And when the Israeli police
imprison foreign workers and detain them (in “concentration camps”) till their
deportation procedures are finalized, the real reason is revealed: “It is the U.S.
who is enforcing this. The U.S. wants Israel to employ Arabs and get on with the
peace process so they have asked Israel to send back all foreign workers.”99
Neither was military cooperation devoid of any friction. The Turkish media
differed as to the value of intelligence Turkey gets from Israel. Sabah praised the
satellite pictures of Syria, which were full of top-secret military information,
including indications as to the inferior weapons that country deployed along its
border with Turkey. The Milliyet, however, complained that contrary to the two
countries’ intelligence-exchange agreement, Israel avoided supplying Turkey
with updated intelligence on Syria. What it did eventually supply Turkey with,
was information available to the public, not secret photographs of Syrian troops
taken by the Israeli satellite, OFEK-4.100 Similar complaints were raised in rela-
tion to the upgrading of the Turkish F-5 aircraft, which the IAI won the tender
for through a proposal “based on shrewdness.” The consortium that won the bid
appeared to be from Singapore; it turned out at the last moment that the bidder
is actually the IAI. Moreover, after the aircraft-modernization agreement was
signed, Turkey insisted that the multifunction display that would be fitted in the
F-5, would be of the Israeli-made Elbit type, and identical to the avionics that
exists in the Israeli F-16 jet fighters. This was to cut down the duration of train-
ing because Turkish pilots, before moving to the advanced F-16, had first to
prove themselves on the F-5. The IAI refused and insisted on inferior systems
being installed in the F-5, demanding instead higher payment for the Elbit prod-
uct. In the same bid the Turkish aircraft industry had increased the number of
locally made systems, for instance the VHF/UHF radio systems fitted in the F-5.
Still, complained the Cumhuriyet, although the IAI was asked not to calculate
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these radio appliances, the final fee to be paid to the Israelis included payment
for such systems. On the other hand, Israel complained about the quality of
Turkish military export to Israel: a tender won by an Israeli producer for the
supply of 5,000 special commando uniforms with bullet-proof vests was passed
on to a Turkish company. Alas, it was found to be below the standard – the vests
were not resistant to bullet and shrapnel – and the tender was cancelled.101
During a visit to Israel of Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz (September 1998),
Benjamin Netanyahu greeted his Turkish guest. The following quotation from
Zaman might be a good example of the various aspects that are interwoven in
the bilateral relations. It binds together Turkey’s sensitivity in relation to its
Ottoman pride with its hectic secular-religious present; the uncertainties, terror
and violence that the city of Jerusalem is coping with; and Israeli sensitivity to
the Holocaust:
Netanyahu must have advisors who know Turkey very well, [so] he spared his best
words for Ataturk. Among all the niceties about Ataturk, his words, which should
have offended us, went unnoticed. These words were about the situation in
Jerusalem at the beginning of the century: “Apart from the wall built by Suleiman
the Magnificant, Jerusalem was in a pitiful state, with arid land,” said Netanyahu.
Maybe that was the case but in those days Jerusalem was in the hands of the Turks
and it had not become the scene of terror yet. At least its status was not under dis-
cussion. Everyone who visits Israel is taken to Yad Vashem. I had different feelings
while going around in the museum this time. I spent a long time in front of one pic-
ture. The picture was of a group of judges and underneath it said, “This is the photo
of judges supporting the Nazi regime.” I felt like crying while reading this. We must
start collecting material for a future museum to commemorate the oppressed
people of 28 February. [On 28 February 1997 the Turkish military presented Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan with a list of demands. This ultimatum eventually
brought Erbakan’s resignation. See Chapter 4].102
If still needed, this quotation is yet further evidence of the close contact between
internal and external affairs that the bilateral Turkish–Israeli rapprochement
raises.
Opposing forces: Arab and Muslim reactions
It would be an understatement to argue that Israeli–Turkish relationship is not
popular in the Arab world. Apparently, the parallels are obvious: the Arabs have
lost Palestine and Alexandretta, and blame for those setbacks falls upon Israel
and Turkey, respectively. The Arab world and Iran pursue continuous cam-
paigns against both countries, albeit “on the back burner” and by means of sur-
rogates: Syria assails Turkey by means of the PKK underground, and Israel by
means of the Lebanese Hizbullah. Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon
(evacuated in May 2000) and its Turkish parallel in northern Iraq, are – in the
Arab view – outright additional conquests. (Privately, Turkish officials disliked
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the Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanon: it undermines our presence in north-
ern Iraq, they said.) A harshly violent historical legacy – also colonial in Turkey’s
case – leaves its mark on the Arab world’s relations with Turkey and Israel. Most
Arabs regard both countries as an affliction, a Middle Eastern subsidiary of the
ugly and secular sides of Western civilization. The two together form a Western
thrust – also of military features because of Turkey’s membership in NATO –
into the core of the Muslim and Arab world. The Turkish case also poses a cul-
tural threat: Ankara could be presented as a model of a democratic and secular
state for Arab and Muslim countries to emulate, and to serve as a bridge between
East and West.103 The Arab response, therefore, reflects bitterness, emotions,
phobia, anxiety, etc. See, for instance, Arab accusations, repeated in Turkish
newspapers, that when crossing Turkish territory, Israeli agents placed crocodile
eggs in Iraqi lakes.
The Arab reaction included, inter alia, displays of alienation toward, and
denial of legitimacy of, the Turkish–Israeli cooperation, and calls for the estab-
lishment of counter-steps and coalitions. However, verbal reactions were the
most the Arab world afforded vis-à-vis this bilateral cooperation. (Interestingly,
the Hellenic world or the Kurds acted in a similar way: there was only one single
violent Kurdish reaction – the raid in February 1999 on the Israeli consulate in
Berlin following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan.) Syria and Iraq, supposedly
the countries most negatively affected – Syria by the pincer-like grip and Iraq by
the Turkish security zone in its territory – took care not to antagonize mighty
Turkey. Baghdad was doubly cautious because Turkey and Jordan (another
party, albeit a junior one, to the Turkish–Israeli cooperation), are Iraq’s only
export exits. However, Turkey was excluded from the role of hosting or facilitat-
ing in any way the 1990s peace talks between the Arabs and Israelis. The Arab
partners concerned were totally opposed to granting Turkey such a role because
they did not want to strengthen its standing in the region, especially because of
Ankara’s links to Jerusalem.104
The term “perfidy” is commonly bandied about between Turkey and the
Arab world. Such was Arab aid to Britain in its war against the Ottoman Empire;
Egypt’s assistance to the Greek Cypriots in their war against the Turkish Cypri-
ots; Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel; and Turkey’s steady, principled
support for the continued presence of the Western powers in the Middle East
and North Africa, in direct opposition to Arab nationalism. The following
figures illustrate the “chill” between Ankara and its mid-eastern neighbours:
1982 marked a zenith in trade relations between Turkey and the Arab world; 44
percent of Turkey’s exports, and 29 percent of its imports, were with trading
partners from the Arab Middle East. A steady decline has reduced these figures
to a low: by 1996, they had fallen to 11 and 8 percent, respectively.105
Matters were not always in such a wretched state. The Muslim common
denominator was brought to the fore, in particular during the prime ministership
of Necmettin Erbakan, as a means to strengthen the Arab–Turkish bond at the
of expense the Turkish–Israeli one. As mentioned previously, no deterioration
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was recorded in the bilateral relations during the short-term government of
Erbakan. Also, raising the Muslim common nexus was greeted with little enthusi-
asm by the secular and military elite of Turkey.
It is interesting to note the remedy proposed by Khaled bin Sutlan bin Abed
al-Aziz, a scion of the Saudi royal family, son of the Saudi Defense Minister, and
proprietor and publisher of the Al-Hiyat newspaper. Thriving economic inter-
actions – the basis for the intensive Turkish–Israeli cooperation – is also the
recipe for bettering Arab–Turkish relations. After a doleful description of the
grave consequences of the Israeli–Turkish alliance, the writer poses the follow-
ing question and answer: “How then can we prevent Turkey’s dissociation from
its links of friendship and support with the Arabs? Solely by granting supreme
importance to mutual economic interests. It is vital to find a form of economic
integration between the Arabs and Turks, even if it is a gradual process.”106
Before their very eyes, the Arabs witnessed the emergence – free of the inhi-
bitions and constraints of the cold war – of a renewed “Baghdad Pact” which,
since the 1950s, bears the infamous connotation of an anti-Arab means, with
Turkey acting in contrast to Arab national aspirations. The unleashed regional
powers, be they Turkey or Israel, are much more dangerous because this time
they are not curbed by the Soviet Union. The two were portrayed as a living
proof of the Arab collective weakness, if not as an existential nightmare. The
1990s version of the new Baghdad Pact is composed of Turkey and Israel, but
as in the past is serving Western colonial aspirations and is viewed as offering
threats. It brandishes the water weapon, very clearly spelled out by Ofra Bengio
and Gencer Ozcan: “Put bluntly, the fear was that the Arab ‘oil weapon’ would
be ‘overwhelmed’ by the Turkish ‘water weapon’.”107 It possesses military tech-
nology, Israeli nuclear monopoly, industry, territory, a large population, and
controls regions and areas thick with crossroads of unrivalled importance.
Revival of Ottoman hegemonic dreams and renewed subjugation of the Arab
peoples were not excluded. Reactions and proclamations were swift: “The
Turko–Israeli treaty – the most perilous milestone in the Middle East since the
First World War . . . comprises the ambition to draw a political and economic
map based on water, by means of the Israeli-Turkish gun and with United
States backing.”108
An Egyptian newspaper contrived to list the detrimental effects an
Israeli–Arab peace would exert upon Turkey – suggesting that Turkey favoured
continuation of the Middle East conflict. The Kurds, said the newspaper, would
envy and copy the Palestinians. Syria, relieved of its front with Israel, would con-
centrate on its dispute with Turkey. Opposition by Iran and various Muslim
movements to the peace process would sharpen differences and provoke clashes
and conflicts within Turkey, already wrought with religious–secular standoffs.
Turkey would come under growing pressure over Cyprus. The revival of Beirut
and Haifa as business centres of considerable weight in the regional economy
will enable those cities to replace Istanbul, the principal beneficiary from the
devastation of Beirut. And so on.109
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In addition to these , Arab sources watch, some would say with horror, how
Turkey focuses again on the Middle East. They list Turkish reluctance to get
entangled in the ethnic complexities of Central Asia, or confront the traditional
influence of Russia, successor of the Soviet Union, as the power with a decisive
say in that region. Here one can repeat Moscow’s warning to Turkey against
being carried away by Pan-Turkish fantasies, lest Russia would respond with
Pan-Slavism, targeting Turkish and Turkic ethnic elements and Muslim concen-
trations.110 The Arabs are aware that Turkey’s alienation from Europe causes it
to divert its attention also to the Middle East, and accordingly to collaboration
with Israel. “Turkey realised that while becoming westernised she has to
establish relations in the Middle East as well. She thought Israel was the most
suitable country to develop relations with.”111 Yet, there was another factor that
brought about the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Here is another
disenchanted country as far as enjoying European sympathies:
The hatred against Jews is based upon religion, and against Turks on the many years
of fear. While they [the Europeans] always remember when they cross themselves
that the Jew crucified Jesus, most have made it a habit to scare their children with
the threat: ‘Be good, or else I will give you to the Turks’. Hatred has become second
nature to the Europeans.112
That is to say, the need to balance European and Russian reservation, as well as
hostile Greek and Armenian lobbies, even a critical American Congress, direct
Turkey toward Israel, and back into the Middle East.
Turkey’s prime objective seemed to be Syria and Iraq, not Tehran. An
assault on the first, as part of the conflict between the two, would be less costly
than an attack on Iran. (The same thinking is applied as regards Turkey’s Jews.
Arab sources preferred to blame the Jewish community there for forging the
Israeli–Turkish alliance; it is evidently easier to accuse the Jewish community
than the Turkish government.)113 Hence, if Ankara is not restrained, additional
Arab territory – such as Mosul in northern Iraq – could fall into Turkish hands,
in addition to the plights that have already befallen Syrian Alexandretta and
the Golan Heights.114 Thus, Arab fears of Turkey predated the Turkish–
Israeli rapprochement. The latter, however, has added further fuel to the flames.
It is an open account, warn Arab sources, still to be settled, not necessarily
in Arab favour.
In view of the above, we should note the diagnosis – and remedy – proposed
by the aforementioned scion of the Saudi royalty. Arabs have every right to be
concerned, but they should ask themselves what brought about their break with
Ankara, and how they should respond?
On the whole, Arab politics are wanting in the capacity for coping with rapid
changes on the ground. Arab politicians wake up to discover that the situation has
changed. The Arabs assumed that Eritrea would remain a loyal friend even after
gaining its independence; they also assumed that Turkey would be on their side
forever, even if it gained no benefit thereby.
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The Arab side did not comprehend the complexities of the internal situation in
Turkey, or that country’s regional and international considerations. This created a
climate that could push Turkey even further into the camp of unfriendly countries.115
We have already specified the economic remedy proposed for healing Turkish–
Arab relations. Interestingly, this remedy coincides with the thrust of this chap-
ter, namely that flourishing economic ties are the nearest to a guarantee of good
relations – as illustrated by Israeli–Turkish relations and, conversely, in their
absence – in Turkish–Greek and Turkish–Arab relations. Second in rank are
proposals for Turkish–Arab cultural collaboration: according to al-Aziz it is vital
that Arabs and Turks start purging history books and textbooks of mutual
insults.116 A good omen is Syria’s readiness to alter the curriculum of Syrian
schools so that the 500 years of Ottoman rule should not be regarded anymore
as imperialism responsible for the Arabs’ “worst tragedy,” backwardness, and
weakness. Conversely, Turkish texts still carry the negative image of the Arab
as a bedouin, traitor, womanizer, uneducated and submissive.117 Al-Aziz also
advocates military cooperation between Turkey, Pakistan and the Gulf states:
I do not propose that we in the Gulf purchase military services from other coun-
tries. On the contrary, it is a matter of recognition and consolidation of shared
interests. As those countries could serve to defend us, we too, in the Arabian Penin-
sula, can enhance their strategic depth. We are important to them no less than they
are important to us.118
Ostensibly, the Israeli–Turkish rapprochement has generated new alliances in
the Arab world. It is still premature to assess their vitality, value or capacity for
survival, and we will thus restrict the discussion to a mention of developments.
One matter currently under discussion is an Egyptian–Iranian rapprochement.
Meetings at senior levels – the first for decades – were held in Tehran and Cairo.
The December 1997 Islamic Conference convened in Tehran offered a conve-
nient forum for these discussions. However, further improvement of bilateral
relations seems to be impeded by Cairo’s apprehensions regarding Iran’s role in
Muslim terrorism in Egypt and North Africa.
Syria and Iran recently signed a series of agreements on boosting bilateral
trade. At their conclusion, the sides voiced concern over Turkey’s links with
Israel, and discussed further expansion of their own relations in view of those
links. Syrian–Iraqi relations have displayed an unexpected spurt recently, like-
wise explained by fear of the Israeli–Turkish alliance. Thousands of Syrian mer-
chants were granted Iraqi entry visas to sell goods sanctioned for sale under the
UN embargo on Iraq. Baghdad has also called off its anti-Syrian propaganda
broadcasts from the “Voice of Arab Syria” (the station launched its broadcasts
in the 1970s; Damascus is persisting in its counter-propaganda broadcast from
the “Voice of Iraq,” though the tone is now less hostile). Telephone links between
Syria and Iraq have been renewed. Here, too, the ties are nascent, or, to be pre-
cise, the first after a two-decade rift; they are not marked by concrete political
expressions but with Syrian concern lest it be tarnished by association with a
“leper state” like Iraq.119
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Joint exercises by anti-aircraft defense units from Russia and Syria were held
at a Russian site in late September 1997. The units drilled with Russian S-200
surface-to-air missiles, designed for use against high-altitude planes. The exer-
cises were defended as a response to the joint maritime exercises held by Turkey,
Israel and the United States (“Reliant Mermaid”).120 Iran likewise explains the
expansion of its army with the necessity of defending itself against what it terms
“the Israeli–Turkish conspiracy.”
In spite of the above, the harsh terms did not impede renewed normaliza-
tion of relations between Ankara and Tehran. In November 1997, each of the
two countries restored its ambassador to the other’s capital, and renewed bilat-
eral military consultations, as well as deliberations on subjects like terrorism,
energy and trade. The contention put forward by Philip Robins, concerning
Ankara’s considerations in its policy vis-à-vis Iran, probably holds equally for
Tehran’s position towards Turkey. Robins suggests that Turkey does not have the
luxury of geographical distance from Iran, and it therefore seeks ways of reach-
ing an understanding with Tehran, albeit maintaining a critical approach
towards Iran. The same could be argued in the reverse direction.121
Hitherto, the Arab and Islamic response to Israeli–Turkish relations features
much talk but very little action. Counter-alliances have yet to emerge, and it is
doubtful whether they will; the causes of the existing rifts within the Islamic and
Arab Middle East still await removal, leaving opponents of the Israeli–Turkish rap-
prochement very frustrated and with few opportunities for action. Moreover,
following the initial waves of wrath and anger, Turkish–Arab contacts seem to
experience an upsurge. We have already mentioned the growing volume of
Syrian–Turkish relations (see Chapter 4). Egypt, which in 1997 toyed with the idea
of a Greek–Egyptian accord to counter-balance the Turkish–Israeli one has con-
cluded (June 2001) a multibillion cubic meter gas deal with Turkey, a multibillion
dollar buyer of Egyptian energy. The pipeline will run from the Egyptian town of
Al-Arish to Ceyhan. Surprisingly, following Turkish insistence, a branch will
connect it to the Israeli town of Ashkelon. Conversely, Ankara turned down the
Egyptian plan to include Syria and Lebanon in the deal. Iran, a major gas supplier
to Turkey did not like the Egyptian concurrence, but eventually blamed Turkey and
Egypt for sacrificing their interests in favour of the Zionist and American ones.122
It seems that Iraqi dependency on water from Turkish sources leaves little
scope for anti-Turkish démarches, and epitomizes the general Arab reaction
depicted above. When the other side fires off remarks like “They have oil, we
have water – let them drink their oil”, anti-Turkish initiatives have to be cautious,
and in fact are hollow.
Epilogue
The end of the decade was marked by a tragic event in Turkey – the earthquake
of August 1999. A huge Israeli machine of help was set in motion and started yet
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another stage in Turkish–Israeli relations. The epitome of this diplomacy is the
“Israel–Turkey Village” (called “Israil Koy” by its inhabitants) in Adapazari,
which stood in the epicentre of the quake. It consists of 320 houses plus com-
munity buildings (shops, school, police station, playground, and clinic). The
village serves as a model for the restoration of the town and other earthquake-
stricken people. A “We Won’t Forget You” sign, plus the Turkish and the Israeli
flags, welcome those arriving in the village. Turkish public opinion – surpris-
ingly, Muslim press included – went out of its way to acclaim the Israeli support,
rescue teams, humanitarian help, etc. Inevitably, a comparison was made
between the Israeli rally to support Turkey and the help provided by Ankara’s
Arab neighbours; the end result was greatly in Israel’s favour. It could be a mere
coincidence but the “earthquake diplomacy” of Jerusalem and Athens symbol-
ized a clear improvement in the bilateral relations of Greece and Israel with
Turkey. The Turkish–Israeli volume of trade for the year 2000 – civil items only,
tourism excluded – has reached, for the first time, the 1 billion dollars, a jump
of more than 22 percent; joint military cooperation rocketed by 40 percent in
comparison with 1999.
A second issue that is still pending is the possible exportation of Turkish
water to Israel, to the volume of 50 million cubic meters annually – 10 percent of
Israel’s water shortage and about 2.5 percent of the country’s annual consump-
tion. Ankara insists that water from the Euphrates river will not serve a future
peace agreement between Syria and Israel. That is to say, Syrian yielding to Israel
water from the Jordan river and the Sea of Galilee could not be met by a Turkish
allocation of more water from the Euphrates river to Damascus. The develop-
ment of the Euphrates basin – the river’s water in particular – is at the center of
Turkey’s GAP project. However, Turkey could become the central component in
the region if it would irrigate the drought-stricken Middle East. This it could do
by selling the water from its rivers that currently empty into the Mediterranean.
Various issues are involved in this: Israeli hesitation to be dependent on a foreign
supplier as regards an existential commodity like water; Turkey’s eagerness to
balance its arms trade with Israel by exporting water to the latter (“water for tank
upgrading”); the 150 million dollar specially built terminal at the Manavgat river
mouth, 60 km east of the city of Antalya, which empties into the Mediterranean
(the terminal that was to serve the tankers that would load the river’s water stands
idle, waiting for its Middle Eastern buyers); the competition with the plunging
prices of water desalination (50 cents per cubic meter, less than half the price of
imported Turkish water); the pressures emanating from the Israeli military,
Israel’s arms industry, the IAI and the Foreign Office, who strongly support a
water deal with Turkey, even if it is economically more expensive than other
water production options; and so on. In July 2002 the water deal was not yet been
finalized, a fact that threatened to mar the bilateral relations. The low cost of
desalinated seawater from the projects that Israel has initiated in 2001 (due to be
operational by 2004), and the controversy over the transportation of the water –
50 cent for a cubic meter – brought the negotiations to a standstill. Ankara wants
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the buyer to pay for the transportation – transportation thus becoming another
Turkish export item to Israel – in addition to water. Israel wants the supplier to
cover transportation and to halve the cost of the water at the Manavgat terminal,
currently standing at 12–18 cents a cubic meter. A surprising Israeli offer – to
pay Turkey a one-off compensation of 150 million dollars, equal to the cost of
the Manavgat terminal, and to buy itself out from the whole deal, raised
angry reactions in Turkey. “We are not in favor of ‘baksheesh’” commented the
Turkish negotiators.123
The third event, this time with more detrimental effects – though it seems
that both sides do their utmost to limit the damage – are the repercussions of the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the above described relations. Presumably it is not
very comfortable to be defined as a friend of Israel when so much criticism is
directed against it. Indeed, in the Arab world Turkey was labelled as a party to the
axis of evil, together with the United States and Israel. Implications were not slow
in coming: no less a person than Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister,
defined Israel as committing genocide against the Palestinians, and the newspa-
per Safak talked of “Adolf Sharon.” Demonstrations were held against the Israeli
football star, Haim Revivo, of Fenerbahce, with banners saying (in English),
“Revivo Go Home.” Public opinion polls taken at the height of the Palestinian
uprising in the summer of 2001 showed that 81 percent of the Turks see Israel as
their fourth biggest enemy after Armenia, the Republic of Cyprus, and Greece.
Alternatively, others differentiated between “Sharon and his government” and the
Israeli people: “governments come and go, but the real friendship of the people
stays.” And in the Hurriyet more positive voices talked about the help Israel
handed to Turkey following the earthquake of 1999 and in capturing Abdullah
Ocalan, the PKK leader. “Have ever the Palestinians handed us such help?” asked
the newspaper. Scheduled visits and joint military exercises were initially post-
poned but later held as planned, and Ariel Sharon paid a visit to Ecevit in August
2001. No contract was cancelled. On the contrary, a 668 million dollar tender was
given in March 2002 to the Israeli military industries to upgrade 170 US- made
M-60 A-1 Turkish tanks. Neither did the remark of Ecevit go unnoticed, surpris-
ingly in Turkey itself: “people who live in glass houses should not throw stones,”
was the reaction of Mehmet Ali Birand, a well-known publicist.124
Summary: “a drama over a drama”
Motivated by Kemalist eagerness to overcome – perhaps even to disregard – the
geopolitics of the Middle East in which it is located, Turkey spent many years
knocking on Western doors, while simultaneously persisting in the refusal to
take sides in regional conflicts, whether between Israelis and Arabs, or any other
standoff. That is, seemingly, a thing of the past: the 1991 Gulf War was a water-
shed, marking the renewal of Turkey’s involvement – a very cautious one, but
very circumspect – henceforth in the Middle East. Turkey’s relations with Israel,
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and the inevitably pro-Israel position that that relationship projects – whether it
is so in fact, or merely interpreted as such by the various players – offer a further
expression of Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East. This renewed
interest in the Middle East, and Turkey’s repeated rejection and attraction by the
West and Europe (culminating in the 1997 and 1999 Luxembourg and Helsinki
contradictory decisions), provide the context wherein Turkey’s interaction with
Israel has been molded in recent years. If membership of the Baghdad Pact in the
1950s was a fleeting episode which Ankara swiftly abandoned, the Gulf War and
the relationship with Israel indicate that Turkey’s involvement with the Middle
East has now taken on facets of greater permanence.
Israel and Turkey have been motivated to weave their close ties by mutual
interests, some of them existential. The region’s two most pro-Western states –
whose democratic, and pro-American character and, equally, their usefulness to
Western ends, have been placed in doubt since the termination of the cold war
– collaborate with each other so as to survive as free societies. With US encour-
agement, Israel aids Turkey with arms and equipment denied by an indifferent
Europe and hostile American public opinion. Turkey’s air space, its ports, and
other installations are made available to Israel. Israeli training facilities are avail-
able to Turkey. Neither Turkey nor Israel expects the other country to fight its
wars. It may be just as well: in spite of Turkey’s membership of NATO, Ankara
has often wondered whether other members of the alliance would hasten to its
defence if called upon to do so. The vigour radiated by the links between the two
states, and the American support they enjoy – Ankara and Israel welcome even
a greater American role in the region – apparently exude a tone of status quo
over the region. Revisionist players who plan to upset that status quo might be
reluctant to put the alliance to the test.
The economic and civil contacts element underlies the military ties between
Turkey and Israel. It renders their interaction more permanent, as a structure
whose components have an interest in its survival over time. The middle class
and elite in both countries have mutual trade contacts. Many, as a result, have
vested interests in their survival and development. Incidentally, while the elite in
the Arab world boycott Israel, the Turkish elite is at the forefront of contacts
with it. One could therefore safely say that the rapprochement clearly consists of
both peoples, not only their governments. If this collaboration possesses strate-
gic dimensions, it is precisely the non-military links between Ankara and
Jerusalem that support them. To sustain this, one should bear in mind that,
more than between any two Middle Eastern countries, bilateral Turkish–Israeli
trade (military and tourism excluded) is the highest in the region. Joint ventures
the two countries have initiated in Central Asia, in commercial fields as in pro-
duction and delivery of energy, development of water sources, development of
all kinds of terra incognita, etc., all feature a strategic dimension, not necessarily
of guns and tanks. On the contrary, the non-military aspects give a wide basis to
the relationship, probably projecting longevity. By way of comparison, all other
bilateral special relations of Israel (with France, Iran and South Africa) that
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failed were principally of one dimension – the military or governmental one –
and lacked a wide basis.
The culmination of any political relationship is a mutual exposure to the
culture and society of the people behind it. One can safely conclude that Turks
and Israelis are on the right path toward this kind of exposure. “A drama over a
drama,” is the definition given by Alon Liel, the Israeli Chargé d’Affairs in Ankara
in the early 1980s, to the current Turkish–Israeli economic, political, military, cul-
tural and social rapprochement. Dr Liel’s impressions should be taken seriously:
in the early 1980s, when Turkey downgraded its relations with Israel, it enabled
merely a representation of junior diplomats. Liel was then the junior Israeli rep-
resentative in Ankara. When it comes to evaluating the current rapprochement,
“a drama over a drama” is the right definition for the comparison between the
1980s and the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century.
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When we come to evaluate Turkey’s record in the 1990s and the country’s
prospects for the 2000s there are several “No”s and “If”s that we will mention and
elaborate on. In addition, the trend by which Turkey is described in numerous
publications during the 1990s necessitates clarification. Since the end of the
1980s new opportunities have indeed been opened for Turkey, new crossroads
have emerged, new encounters and contacts created. Seemingly, they project
a Turkey that is an emerging multiregional power for the foreseeable future.
Definitions of Turkey as the rising “Middle Eastern power,” “the Central Asian
pivot,” the “multi-regional power,” or even as the emerging “regional super-
power” as Time magazine had used (see the Help Wanted “Ad,” at the beginning
of Chapter 1), are to be found in many publications.1 We, too, we have used this
terminology when we came to describe the country’s status, performances and
prospects. However, a clear warning should be attached to these definitions.
Turkey will not be the said power if it means clashes and confrontations and wars,
be it with Russia, Iran, Muslim radicalism, excessive Arab nationalism, ethnic
forces, etc. It is hard to recall a power that occasionally does not need to resort to
forceful means and weapons.
Notwithstanding territorial disputes, water conflicts, ideological strife, and
other disagreements, Turkey enjoys a unique and enviable situation in which no
one dares to antagonize it. This is not something to depreciate, bearing in mind
neighbors like Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Turkey has used the waning of the cold war
and the opportunities opened to it thereafter to weaken its internal and external
adversaries and to secure its military and economic capabilities. The country
should be readier now to cope with its internal problems, described so cruelly
and in an unpitying way by President Demirel (see the quotation in the Intro-
duction to this book.) Furthermore, Turkey’s leadership, so much yearning for
and thinking of the future that awaits the country in Western Europe – in spite
of waves of setbacks, rejections, alienation and ambivalence – has done its
utmost not to get embroiled in Asian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, or Mediterranean
complexities. There is hardly a chance that Turkey would become an active or a
warring party in these crises. The country has not fought a war on its territory
since the 1920s – a status on a par with only a handful of states. It would be pure
imprudence to deviate from this record and to find itself mired in the eastern or
Balkan squabbles when its declared visions are far away in the West.
The Turkish encounter with the Caucasus and Central Asian Turkic peoples
has aroused emotions, hopes and plans for a different future in which Turkey
Conclusion
is at the center of a revived Pan-Turkism world. Certainly, emotions and hopes
exist, perhaps even thrive but, again, one should expect very cautious Turkish
behavior. The Turkic world is wrought with ethnic conflicts, other actors are
meddling in its affairs, wishing to reap political hegemony, cultural benefits and
economic and energy gains. And Turkish nationalism – which was extricated,
molded and refined from the ethnic hodgepodge that characterized the
Ottoman Empire and which intermittently still needs to prove its prevailing
character among Turkey’s own fifty or more ethnic groups – might face grave
risks. Turkish nationalism that politically, culturally, and socially faces chal-
lenges but nevertheless aspires westwards, will be reluctant to be the Turkic
ethnic and cultural pivot, let alone its police force. “We are not going to build an
Eastern alternative” declared President Demirel, emphasizing the direction that
Turkey had no intention of taking (see Chapter 4, p. 114).
Internally, too, there are “not”s and “if”s. Turkey’s Islam is more Turkish
than Pan-Islamic. A declared Muslim politician led the country – appointed,
ruled, and ended his tenure through democratic and parliamentary procedures.
True, Necmettin Erbakan stayed in office for less than a year, and the democra-
tic procedures were of the Turkish democratic kind in which the military is the
shield defending democracy. Still, neither the country’s politics nor its ambience
were Islamically altered when Turkey chose a Muslim politician for Prime Min-
ister. Predictions are a precarious business; still, Turkey is not going to be
Islamized à la Iran, Algeria or Afghanistan. Neither does the Turkish military
consider itself permanently superior to the civil echelons. On the contrary, when
during the Gulf crisis there were deep conflicting views between the Turkish
executive and the Turkish Chief of Staff, it was the latter who handed in his res-
ignation, not the other way round. Similarly, open involvement of the military
in governmental decision-making procedures à la September 1980 coup is a
precedent that would not recur. In 1997, when the military intervened in what
eventually brought about the resignation of the Prime Minister, it was through
a covert procedure, actually a minor move if compared with the coup of 1980.
When the watchful eyes of the EU look for excessive influence by the military in
Turkish politics, one could predict that the Turkish democracy is practically safe
from overt military interventions.
The early years of the twenty-first century saw two crises and one ray of
hope. The economic crisis that erupted in 2001 spoiled many efforts to buttress
the Turkish economy and the country’s currency. In its turn the economic and
fiscal depression led, in 2002, to the collapse of the coalition government that
had ruled Turkey since April 1999 – a relatively long period for a Turkish exec-
utive – and to a new round of general elections, held in early November 2002.
The reforms that the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted in August 2002
are a great leap forward. The death penalty was abolished, Kurdish education,
television, and language courses were made legal. Among the adopted fourteen
principles of the reform package, the Turkish parliament left the death penalty
for times of war only. (No executions have been carried out in Turkey since
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1984, though the death penalty was still legal.) Television broadcasting in lan-
guages other than Turkish were made legal. Private schools will be able to use
languages other than Turkish. Freedom of expression will prevail with no pun-
ishments for criticism against the military, the state, the parliamentary system,
the government, the legal system, or Turkish identity. Laws and rules related to
freedom of gathering, assembly, and demonstration, will become more lenient.
The reforms are indeed wide: right-wingers and nationalists termed them as
pure betrayal, a reward to terrorism. Still, it has been a huge leap forward, made
with an eye to the EU: the reforms were practically the EU stipulation to start
accession negotiations with Turkey.
Future developments will tell whether these Turkish moves will be recipro-
cated by Europe and the West. If positive, Turkish society will become more
pluralistic, open, and liberal minded. If negative, radicalism, introversion, reli-
gionism, and excessive nationalism will rule the day in Turkey. Time will tell.
Note
1 See for instance Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerg-
ing Multiregional Power, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
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